Supreme Court of the United States

On March 23, 2020, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Allen v. Cooper, concluding that Congress lacked the authority to enact the Copyright Remedy Clarification Act of 1990 (CRCA), which purported to abrogate state sovereign immunity in copyright infringement actions. The CRCA, which sought to remedy alleged state copyright infringement, provides that any “State, and any [State] instrumentality, officer, or employee” shall be liable for copyright infringement “in the same manner and to the same

extent as any nongovernmental entity.” In Allen, the Supreme Court held that the CRCA was not a valid exercise of Congress’s constitutional powers under Article I or Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, although the opinion leaves open the possibility that a narrower congressional abrogation of state sovereign immunity for copyright suits might be constitutional.

The immediate practical effect of the decision is that copyright holders cannot sue state governments for copyright infringement without their consent. The decision’s broader significance lies in clarifying the

limitations on Congress’s power to provide remedies for state constitutional violations. This Sidebar will review the law of state sovereign immunity, the dispute in Allen v. Cooper, the Court’s opinion, and the implications for Congress.

QUESTION PRESENTED:

Like most States, Colorado requires its presidential electors to follow the will of its voters when casting their Electoral College ballots for President. In the 2016 Electoral College, one of Colorado's electors violated Colorado law by attempting to cast his presidential ballot for a candidate other than the one he pledged to vote for. Colorado removed him as an elector, declined to accept his ballot, and replaced him with an alternate elector who properly cast her ballot for the winner of the State's popular vote, consistent with Colorado law. The removed elector later sued Colorado for nominal damages.

The questions presented are:

QUESTION PRESENTED:

A Washington State law threatens a fine for presidential electors who vote contrary to how the law directs. RCW 29A.56.340 (2016). Petitioners are three 2016 presidential electors who were fined under this provision solely because they failed to vote as the law directs, namely for the presidential and vice presidential candidates who won a majority of the popular vote in the State.

The question presented is whether enforcement of this law is unconstitutional because:

QUESTION PRESENTED:

The District Attorney for the County of New York is conducting a criminal investigation that, by his own admission, targets the President of the United States for possible indictment and prosecution during his term in office. As part of that investigation, he served a grand-jury subpoena on a custodian of the President's personal records, demanding production of nearly ten years' worth of the President's financial papers and his tax returns. That subpoena is the combination-almost a wordfor-word copy-of two subpoenas issued by committees of Congress for these same papers. The Second Circuit rejected the President's claim of immunity and ordered compliance with the subpoena.

The question presented is: 

19-715 TRUMP V. MAZARS USA, LLP

The Committee on Oversight and Reform of the U.S. House of Representatives has issued a subpoena to the accountant for President Trump and several of his business entities. The subpoena demands private financial records belonging to the President. The D.C. Circuit upheld the subpoena as having a legitimate legislative purpose and being within the statutory authority of the Committee.

The question presented is:

19-760 TRUMP V. DEUTSCHE BANK AG

The Question Presented is:

19-267 OUR LADY OF GUADALUPE SCHOOL V. MORRISSEY-BERRU

The First Amendment's Religion Clauses forbid government interference in a religious group's selection of its ministerial employees. The federal courts of appeals and state courts of last resort have long agreed that the key to determining ministerial status is whether an employee performed important religious functions. This Court's unanimous 2012 ruling in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. EEOC was consistent with that existing analytical consensus, and other circuits and states since 2012 have continued to rely on it. Yet the Ninth Circuit has now twice ruled that, under Hosanna-Tabor, important religious functions alone can never suffice-those functions must always be accompanied by considerations such as a religious title or religious training in order to demonstrate ministerial status.

The question presented is:

19-348 ST. JAMES SCHOOL V. BIEL

The First Amendment's Religion Clauses forbid government interference in a religious group's selection of its ministerial employees. The federal courts of appeals and state courts of last resort have long agreed that the key to determining ministerial status is whether an employee performed important religious functions. This Court's unanimous 2012 ruling in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. EEOC was consistent with that existing analytical consensus, and other circuits and states since 2012 have continued to rely on it. Yet the Ninth Circuit has now twice ruled that, under Hosanna-Tabor, important religious functions alone can never suffice-those functions must always be accompanied by considerations such as a religious title or religious training in order to demonstrate ministerial status.

The question presented is:

QUESTION PRESENTED:

WHETHER OKLAHOMA COURTS CAN CONTINUE TO UNLAWFULLY EXERCISE, UNDER STATE LAW, CRIMINAL JURISDICTION AS"JUSTICIABLE MATTER" IN INDIAN COUNTRY OVER INDIANS ACCUSED OF MAJOR CRIMES ENUMERATED UNDER THE INDIAN MAJOR CRIMES ACT-WHICH ARE UNDER EXCLUSIVE FEDERAL JURISDICTION.

THE MOTION OF PETITIONER FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL IS GRANTED, AND IAN GERSHENGORN, ESQ. OF WASHINGTON, D.C., IS APPOINTED TO SERVE AS COUNSEL FOR PETITIONER IN THIS CASE

QUESTION PRESENTED:

The Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 (TCPA), Pub. L. No. 102-243, 105 Stat. 2394, generally prohibits the use of any "automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice" to "make any call" to "any telephone number assigned to a * * * cellular telephone service." 47 U.S.C. 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) (Supp. V 2017). The TCPA excepts from that automated-call restriction any "call made for emergency purposes or made with the prior express consent of the called party." Ibid. In 2015, Congress amended the TCPA to create an additional exception for calls "made solely to collect a debt owed to or guaranteed by the United States." Ibid.

Respondents wish to use an automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice to make calls to the cell phones of potential or registered voters to solicit political donations and to advise on political and governmental issues. First Am. Compl. ¶¶ 8-10, 12. The court of appeals held that the government-debt exception to the TCPA’s automated-call restriction violates the First Amendment. The court further held that the proper remedy was to sever the government-debt exception, leaving the basic automated-call restriction in place. The question presented is as follows:

Whether the government-debt exception to the TCPA's automated-call restriction violates the First Amendment, and whether the proper remedy for any constitutional violation is to sever the exception from the remainder of the statute.

19-431 LITTLE SISTERS OF THE POOR V. PENNSYLVANIA

Since 2011, federal courts have repeatedly considered whether forcing religious objectors to provide health plans that include contraceptive coverage violates the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA). Over and over again, this Court has reviewed these cases on an emergency basis or on the merits. Yet it has never definitively resolved the RFRA dispute. In 2016, an eight-Justice Court in Zubik v. Burwell did not reach the RFRA question and instead remanded for the parties to try to reach a resolution, on the evident assumption that the executive branch possessed the power to provide broader accommodations and/or exemptions. After months of negotiations (and an intervening election), the agencies finally agreed to promulgate new rules providing a broader exemption, seemingly bringing an end to this long-running dispute.

Those new rules were challenged, however, by several states, resulting in a nationwide injunction on the theory that RFRA and the Affordable Care Act not only do not require, but do not even allow, the religious exemption rules. That nationwide injunction has stagnated other cases, and it conflicts with the judgments of many courts that have issued final orders affirmatively requiring comparable exemptions under RFRA. The rights of religious objectorsincluding the Little Sisters' right to defend an exemption-remain very much at issue.

The questions presented are:

19-454 TRUMP V. PENNSYLVANIA

The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA), 42 U.S.C. 18001 et seq., requires many group health plans and health-insurance issuers that offer group or individual health coverage to provide coverage for preventive services, including women's preventive care, without cost-sharing. See 42 U.S.C. 300gg-13(a). Guidelines and regulations implementing that requirement promulgated in 2011 by the Departments of Health and Human Services, Labor, and the Treasury mandated that such entities cover contraceptives approved by the Food and Drug Administration. The mandate exempted churches, and subsequent rulemaking established an accommodation for certain other entities with religious objections to providing contraceptive coverage. In October 2017, the agencies promulgated interim final rules expanding the exemption to a broad range of entities with sincere religious or moral objections to providing contraceptive coverage. In November 2018, after considering comments solicited on the interim rules, the agencies promulgated final rules expanding the exemption.

The questions presented are as follows:

QUESTION PRESENTED:

Respondents are United States-based organizations that receive federal funds to fight HIV/AIDS abroad. In Agency for International Development v. Alliance for Open Society International, Inc., 570 U.S. 205 (2013), this Court held that the First Amendment bars enforcement of Congress's directive that respondents "have a policy explicitly opposing prostitution and sex trafficking" as a condition of accepting those funds. 22 U.S.C. 7631(f).