Supreme Court of the United States

QUESTION PRESENTED: 

Under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 1051 et seq., generic terms may not be registered as trademarks. 

The question presented is as follows: 

CONSOLIDATED WITH 18-1460 AND A TOTAL OF ONE HOUR IS ALLOTTED FOR ORAL ARGUMENT

Case: 18-1323

QUESTION PRESENTED:

In Whole Woman's Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016), this Court held that a state law requiring physicians who perform abortions to have admitting privileges at a local hospital was unconstitutional because it imposed an undue burden on women seeking abortions. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit upheld an admitting privileges law in Louisiana that is identical to the one this Court struck down.

This presents the following issue:

Case: 18-1460

QUESTION PRESENTED:

QUESTION PRESENTED: 

Whether the Securities and Exchange Commission may seek and obtain disgorgement from a court as "equitable relief" for a securities law violation even though this Court has determined that such disgorgement is a penalty.

QUESTION PRESENTED: 

Whether the vesting of substantial executive authority in the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, an independent agency led by a single director, violates the separation of powers.

IN ADDITION TO THE QUESTION PRESENTED BY THE PETITION, THE PARTIES ARE DIRECTED TO BRIEF AND ARGUE THE FOLLOWING QUESTION: IF THE CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU IS FOUND UNCONSTITUTIONAL ON THE BASIS OF THE SEPARATION OF POWERS, CAN 12 U.S.C. §5491(c)(3) BE SEVERED FROM THE DODD-FRANK ACT?

PAUL D. CLEMENT, ESQUIRE, OF WASHINGTON, D. C., IS INVITED TO BRIEF AND ARGUE THIS CASE, AS AMICUS CURIAE, IN SUPPORT OF THE JUDGMENT BELOW ON THE QUESTION PRESENTED BY THE PETITION.

QUESTION PRESENTED:

Respondent is an inadmissible alien who was apprehended almost immediately after illegally crossing the U.S. border and was placed into expedited removal proceedings. See 8 U.S.C. 1225(b)(l). An asylum officer conducted a credible-fear interview and found that respondent lacked a credible fear of persecution on a protected ground or a credible fear of torture. Upon de novo review, an immigration judge reached the same conclusions and respondent's expedited-removal order became final. Respondent then filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, which the district court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because it did not raise the kinds of habeas challenges to expedited-removal orders that are permitted under 8 U.S.C. 1252(e)(2). The court of appeals reversed, concluding that Section 1252(e)(2) violated the Suspension Clause, U.S. Const. Art. I, § 9, Cl. 2, as applied to respondent.

The question presented is 

QUESTION PRESENTED:

Because of the United States' inviolable obligation not to deport individuals to countries in which they are likely to be subject to torture, individuals who are statutorily ineligible for asylum may request withholding (or deferral) of removal. Such relief is, as courts repeatedly note, a fundamental bulwark to ensure that the government's decision to deport an individual does not result in torture or death.

The courts of appeals have deeply and intractably divided as to whether 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C) divests them of jurisdiction to review factual findings underlying the administrative agency's decision to deny a request for withholding (or deferral) of removal relief. The United States has expressly acknowledged the conflict among the circuits, and it has previously acquiesced to certiorari on this question. This case, unlike those before it, cleanly presents the question for review.

The question presented is: 

QUESTION PRESENTED: 

A dismissal of a civil action without prejudice for failure to state a claim, is it or is it not a strike under 28 U.S.C. 1915(g)?

Courts have held that, unless otherwise specified, a dismissal for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) is presumed to be both a judgment on the merits and to be rendered with prejudice, is this true or false?

“A district court's dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is, of course, with prejudice unless it specifically orders dismissal without prejudice, is this true or false? " [l]n the absence of a clear statement to the contrary, a dismissal pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) is presumed to be with prejudice."

The Fourth Circuit Court decided a dismissal without prejudice for failure to state a claim did not count as a strike under 28 U.S.C.S. 1915(g), but the Tenth Circuit Court decided that a dismissal without prejudice do count as a strike under the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995( PLRA)and/or 28 U.S.C.S. 1915(g), which court is right and, is this a legal conflict between these two courts?

Would this statement of the Tenth Circuit be legally right or wrong, A dismissal for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) satisfy the plain text of 1915(g) and therefore will count as a strike, without making an y legal interpretation of this provision, inquiry, or analysis thereof in regard to congress intent or purpose? When Congress directly incorporates language with an established legal meaning into a statute, we may infer that Congress intended the language to take on its established meaning. United States v. Langley, 62 F. 3d 602, 605 (4th Cir. 1995) ("It is firmly entrenched that Congress is presumed to enact legislation with knowledge of the law; that is with the knowledge of the interpretation that courts have given to an existing statute."); see also Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U. S. 19, 32, 111 S. Ct. 317, 112 L. Ed. 2d 275 (1990) (" We assume that Congress is aware of existing law when it passes legislation.").

Is it the Court task here to determine whether Congress intended an action or appeal "that was dismissed on the grounds that it…fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted" to count as a strike under 28 U.S. C. 1915(g) if that dismissal was specifically designated to be "without prejudice?"

The dismissal for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b) (6) is a "judgment on the merits and, the type of prior dismissal for failure to state a claim contemplated by subsection 1915(g) is one that constituted an adjudication on the merits and prejudiced the filing of a subsequent complaint with the same allegations, is this true or false?

Is it true, a dismissal without prejudice for failure to state a claim "does not" fall within the plain and unambiguous meaning of 191S(g)'s·unqualified phrase "dismissed ... [for] fail[ure] to state a claim"? If true, As a result, a dismissal without prejudice for failure to state a claim does not count as a strike, is this true or false?

In any Circuit Court, will it be immaterial to the strikes analysis [whether] the dismissal was without prejudice, as opposed to with prejudice? The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit stated, " [i}n this circuit, it is immaterial ( Not material; not pertinent; of no consequence) to the strikes analysis [whether] the dismissal was without prejudice," as opposed to with prejudice.

Immaterial issue. An issue which occurs where a material allegation in the pleadings is not answered, but an issue is taken on some point which will not determine the merits of the case, so that the court must be at a loss to determine for which of the parties to give judgment. Garland v. Davis (US) 4 How 131, 146, 11 L Ed 907, 914.

QUESTION PRESENTED: 

Whether the federal criminal prohibition against encouraging or inducing illegal immigration for commercial advantage or private financial gain, in violation of 8 U.S.C. 1324(a)(l)(A)(iv) and (B)(i), is facially unconstitutional.

QUESTION PRESENTED: 

The questions presented are:

Case: 18-1584 U.S. FOREST SERVICE V. COWPASTURE RIVER ASSN

QUESTION PRESENTED:

The Appalachian National Scenic Trail (Appalachian Trail) is more than 2000 miles long, extending from Maine to Georgia, with approximately 1000 miles of the Trail crossing through lands within national forests. The National Trails System Act provides that the Appalachian Trail "shall be administered primarily as a footpath by the Secretary of the Interior," 16 U.S.C. 1244(a)(l), and clarifies that "[n]othing contained in [the Act] shall be deemed to transfer among Federal agencies any management responsibilities established under any other law for federally administered lands," 16 U.S.C. 1246(a)(l)(A). Under the Mineral Leasing Act, 30 U.S.C. 181 et seq., the United States Forest Service (Forest Service) has authority to grant certain rights-of-way through lands in the National Forest System, but no federal agency has authority under that statute to grant equivalent rights-of-way through lands in the National Park System. See 30 U.S.C. 185. The question presented is:

Whether the Forest Service has authority to grant rights-of-way under the Mineral Leasing Act through lands traversed by the Appalachian Trail within national forests.

Case: 18-1587   ATLANTIC COAST PIPELINE,  LLC V. COWPASTURE RIVER ASSN.

QUESTION PRESENTED:

The Mineral Leasing Act ("MLA'') authorizes federal agencies to grant pipeline rights-of-way over federal lands within their jurisdiction. Exercising that authority, the U.S. Forest Service granted Atlantic Coast Pipeline a right-of-way to cross small portions of the George Washington National Forest, including a 0.1-mile stretch that is approximately 700 feet beneath, and without surface impacts to, the Appalachian National Scenic Trail. While more than 50 pipelines presently cross under that footpath pursuant to similar rights-of-way, the Fourth Circuit concluded in the decision below that the Forest Service-indeed, every federal agency-lacks the power to grant rights-of-way to cross beneath the Trail pursuant to the MLA, rendering the footpath a 2,200-mile barrier separating resource-rich areas to its west from consumers to its east. The court reached that result by deeming more than 1,000 miles of land traversed by the Trail under the control of various federal, state and private entities instead to be considered lands in the National Park System, which, unlike other federal lands, are not subject to rights-of-way under the MLA. In doing so, the court not only rejected the federal government's long- settled views, but has called into question dozens of existing rightsof-way under the Trail and upset petitioner's massive investments in a pipeline designed to get natural gas to Virginia and North Carolina for the benefit of millions of people.

The question presented is: 

Whether the Forest Service has the authority under the MLA and National Trails System Act to grant rights-of-way through national forest lands that the Appalachian Trail traverses.