Supreme Court of the United States

Facts of the case

Gonzalo Holguin was convicted for possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, in violation of federal law, and sentenced to 24 months in prison, followed by two years of supervised release. Holguin was again arrested for possession and intent to distribute, and after that arrest the government filed a petition to revoke the supervised release term. Before the revocation hearing occurred, Holguin pleaded guilty to the second set of charges.

At the revocation hearing, the district court explained the allegations of the revocation petition to Holguin and asked how he pleaded. Holguin answered “True.” Holguin’s attorney argued for a concurrent sentence on the revocation, but the court a 12-month consecutive sentence instead. Holguin appealed the reasonableness of his sentence, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed, finding Holguin had failed to make a formal objection after the announcement of his sentence.

QUESTION PRESENTED:

Whether a formal objection after pronouncement of sentence is necessary to invoke appellate reasonableness review of the length of a defendant's sentence.

QUESTION PRESENTED:

CONSOLIDATED WITH 18-1028 AND 18-1038, AND A TOTAL OF ONE HOUR IS ALLOTTED FOR ORAL ARGUMENT.

QUESTION PRESENTED:

The America Invents Act created "inter partes review" ("IPR"), an agency procedure for challenging a patent before the Patent Trial and Appeal Board ("PTAB"). The statute has two provisions relevant here, each of which was interpreted by a divided Federal Circuit sitting en banc. First, 35 U.8.C. § 315(b) provides that "[a]n inter partes review may not be instituted if the petition requesting the proceeding is filed more than 1 year after the date on which the petitioner ... is served with a complaint alleging infringement of the patent." Second, § 314(d) provides that "[t]he determination by the Director whether to institute an inter partes review under this section shall be final and nonappealable."

In a recent case, the en banc Federal Circuit held (with four dissenters) that, notwithstanding§ 314(d), a PTAB decision to institute an IPR after finding that the § 315(b) time bar did not apply was appealable. The panel applied that ruling in this case. Then, the en banc Federal Circuit, again divided (with two dissenters), held in this case that service of a patent infringement complaint that is later dismissed without prejudice triggers the§ 315(b) time bar.

The questions presented are:

QUESTION PRESENTED:

18-776

The deadline to file a statutory motion to reopen under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7) is subject to equitable tolling; all the courts of appeals are in agreement. But they are in conflict as to whether they have jurisdiction to review an agency's denial of a request for equitable tolling made by someone subject to the "criminal alien bar" pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C). 

The Fifth and Fourth circuit say review of equitable tolling is a "question of fact" precluded from review under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C). In contrast, the Ninth circuit says equitable tolling is a "mixed question," i.e., "a question of law," which falls under the jurisdictional savings clause under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D ). 

Therefore, the question presented is: 

Is a request for equitable tolling, as it applies to statutory motions to reopen, judicially reviewable as a "question of law?"

18-1015

Following this Court's judgment in Mata v. Lynch, 135 S. Ct. 2150 (2015), the Fifth Circuit joined all of its sister circuits in holding that the statutory deadline for filing a motion to reopen a removal order is subject to equitable tolling. Lugo-Resendez v. Lynch, 831 F 3d 337 (CA5 2016). In so doing, the Fifth Circuit adopted this Courts standard for equitable tolling from Menominee Indian Tribe of Wis. v. United States, 136 S. Ct 750 (2016). 

Thereafter, the Fifth Circuit held that it lacked jurisdiction to review the merits of whether a movant (with criminal removability) pursued their rights diligently, thus further dividing a split between the courts of appeals. Penalva v. Sessions, 884 F 3d 521 (CA5 2018). The question presented here is:

QUESTION PRESENTED:

Question One: In Gonzalez V. Crosby this Court held that a Rule 60(b) motion that either adds new habeas claim or attacks the court's previous resolution of the habeas claims, should be treated as a successive habeas petition under AEDPA's §2244. Does Gonzalez extend to post-judgment motions filed under Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure?

a. If so, should a timely filed Rule 59(e) motion toll the the time to file a notice of appeal under Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 4(a)(4)(A)(iv)?

Question Two: Whether a pro se petitioner must be warned and given an opportunity to withdraw a post-judgment motion which has been recharacterized as a successive habeas petition if that recharacterization will effect his ability to file a timely notice of appeal?

Argument Transcript: https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2019/18-6943_bq7c.pdf

QUESTION PRESENTED:

Whether the three-year limitations period in Section 413(2) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. 1113(2), which runs from "the earliest date on which the plaintiff had actual knowledge of the breach or violation," bars suit where all of the relevant information was disclosed to the plaintiff by the defendants more than three years before the plaintiff filed the complaint, but the plaintiff chose not to read or could not recall having read the information.

QUESTION PRESENTED:

In a divided decision that conflicts with decisions of federal courts of appeals nationwide, the Supreme Court of Montana held that landowners can pursue common-law claims for "restoration" requiring environmental cleanups at Superfund sites that directly conflict with EPA-ordered cleanups at these sites. The Montana court reached that result for one of the largest, oldest, and most expensive Superfund sites in the country, the Anaconda Smelter site. The court ignored EPA's views that the Superfund statute-the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA)-barred the restoration claims and that plaintiffs' preferred remedies would hurt the environment. The state court's holding throws remediation efforts at Anaconda and other massive sites into chaos and opens the door for thousands of private individuals to select and impose their own remedies at CERCLA sites at a potential cost of many millions of dollars per site.

The questions presented are:

QUESTION PRESENTED:

The Internal Revenue Code permits affiliated corporate groups-consisting of a parent corporation and its subsidiaries-to file a consolidated income tax return. 26 U.S.C. §§ 1501, 1504(a). When the Internal Revenue Service issues a tax refund to an affiliated group, that refund is made "directly to and in the name of” the parent corporation, even if the refund arises in whole or in part from the losses of a corporate subsidiary. 26 C.F.R. § 1.1502-77(c), (d)(5).

Three Circuits, including the court below, have adopted a federal common law rule known as the "Bob Richards rule," under which a tax refund paid to an affiliated group is presumed to belong to the corporate subsidiary whose losses gave rise to the refund unless the parties clearly agree otherwise. Four Circuits reject that rule, and instead determine ownership of a tax refund based on applicable state law.

The question presented is: 

QUESTION PRESENTED:

This Court has held, as a matter of "public policy," that judicial opinions are not copyrightable. Banks v. Manchester, 128 U.S. 244, 253-254 (1888). Lower courts have extended that holding to state statutes. See, e.g., John G. Danielson, Inc. v. Winchester-Conant Props., Inc., 322 F.3d 26, 38 (1st Cir. 2003). But the rule that "government edicts” cannot be copyrighted has "proven difficult to apply when the material in question does not fall neatly into the categories of statutes or judicial opinions." Ibid.

The question presented is:

PRESENTED QUESTION:

New York City prohibits its residents from possessing a handgun without a license, and the only license the City makes available to most residents allows its holder to possess her handgun only in her home or en route to one of seven shooting ranges within the city. The City thus bans its residents from transporting a handgun to any place outside city limits-even if the handgun is unloaded and locked in a container separate from its ammunition, and even if the owner seeks to transport it only to a second home for the core constitutionally protected purpose of self-defense, or to a more convenient out-of-city shooting range to hone its safe and effective use.

The City asserts that its transport ban promotes public safety by limiting the presence of handguns on city streets. But the City put forth no empirical evidence that transporting an unloaded handgun, locked in a container separate from its ammunition, poses a meaningful risk to public safety. Moreover, even if there were such a risk, the City's restriction poses greater safety risks by encouraging residents who are leaving town to leave their handguns behind in vacant homes, and it serves only to increase the frequency of handgun transport within city limits by forcing many residents to use an incity range rather than more convenient ranges elsewhere.

The question presented is: