Technopolitik

A happy new year to all our readers! To kickstart this year’s edition of Technopolitik, we have assembled a list of predictions for 2023 across tech sectors, ranging from online regulation, biotech and outer space. Maybe we can take stock of these predictions and see how much of it we got wrong (or right) at the end of this year!

Beginning from this edition, we also introduce a new section to our newsletter called Biopolitik, while will cover all the fascinating tidbits about the biotechnology industry and its intersection with policy and politics.

Be sure to check out our Reading Menu. This edition lists some of the best books that the authors have read from last year. With that, we wish you a great year ahead!

Cyberpolitik #1: Regulatory tech battles in India

— Shailesh Chitnis

Big tech is vulnerable. For the first time in big-tech history, technology platforms are confronting slowing growth and bottom-line pressures. Aggressive expansion during the pandemic years has given way to cost-cutting during a cooling economy.

Amazon recently announced plans to cut 18,000 workers, mostly in the retail, recruiting and devices businesses. Meta, the parent of Facebook and Instagram, has cut more than 11,000 workers, or about 13% of its staff. It's a similar story across other platforms — Salesforce, Snap, Twitter — no one seems immune.

Against this backdrop, regulators are getting more active in reigning in what they see as an overreach by these platforms. In the past, Indian regulators had given technology platforms a free hand. But increasingly, the Indian government has signalled its intention to shape the country's technology landscape.

In a series of rulings in October, the Competition Commission of India (CCI) fined Google almost Rs. 2,300 crores for abusing dominance with its Android operating system and the Play Store. The government is also getting into specifics of technology implementation with new rules around standardising chargers (USB-C) and upholding consumers' right-to-repair for devices.

In 2023, expect more activity. The gatekeeping role of Apple and Google, which they exercise through their app stores, will be challenged. But since commissions from these stores are a significant revenue source for both these companies, any moves to change this structure will be a long legal battle. With the government's active role in market design, expect more public battles between incumbent tech and the government. Adding to the tech vs regulators battle, India will also be gearing up for general elections in 2024. As the elections draw closer, we can expect the conversations and controversies on the role of social media platforms in disseminating information to be pitched even further.

Indeed, 2022 was a busy year for technology policy-making with the semiconductor manufacturing policy and a revised draft of the much-awaited digital data protection bill. But this year, the government has promised to introduce a complete overhaul of the IT Act, which governs much of the digital ecosystem. The IT Act was passed in 2000 and needs to be set up for all the complexity of the internet today - from intermediaries and platforms to AI and data privacy. We also expect the bill's first draft to cover a wide range of online platforms, including social media sites, e-commerce entities and ad-tech platforms.

This act can have far-reaching consequences for businesses and civil society since all problems are now technology problems in some form.

Biopolitik: Pandemics and regulatory politics

— Saurabh Todi

The World Health Organisation (WHO) in 2023 is expected to accelerate negotiations on a draft international pandemic treaty governing prevention, preparedness, and response to future pandemics. The World Health Assembly (WHA) in December 2021 launched the process of negotiating a historical global accord. It established an International Negotiating Body (INB) to formulate a 'WHO convention, agreement or another international instrument' to aid a united global response to any infectious disease crises in the future. 

Countries felt the need for a new treaty due to various challenges made conspicuous by the experience of the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. These include equitable distribution of vaccines and health services among and within countries, knowledge and data sharing, and strengthening countries' capabilities to respond to health emergencies. Although there has been a broad consensus on the ways of working and broad policies that will guide this process, there are also significant disagreements between member states.

A central sticking point is the legal nature of this treaty. While the majority of the WHO member states favour a legally-binding instrument, there are differences in how to approach this issue. For example, the WHA has agreed to adopt the global instrument under Article 19 of the WHO constitution, which enables the assembly to draw up binding agreements on a wide range of issues under its mandate. But some countries want the treaty to fall under Article 21, which limits the number of topics that can have binding agreements. Furthermore, some prefer "non-legally binding recommendations" in the draft.

In December 2022, at the third meeting of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Body (INB), a Conceptual Zero Draft (CZD) of the instrument was released, which has been developed by the Bureau of the INB following widespread consultation. During the meeting, the task fell on INB to develop a "zero draft" in order to start negotiations at the fourth INB meeting scheduled for February 2023. The WHO has committed itself to a timeline where INB will deliver a progress report to the 76th World Health Assembly in 2023 and; submit an outcome document for consideration by the 77th World Health Assembly in 2024.

Interestingly, India has maintained a studied silence over its position on this proposed treaty. As an advocate of the interests of the global south, it must ensure the security of the interests of the developing countries during these negotiations. Given the difference of opinion among countries on these issues, it would be interesting to see how the global community reaches a consensus on this crucial initiative.

Antariksh Matters: A Space Policy at Last?

— Aditya Ramanathan

Against my better judgement, I am going to make predictions that may be largely wrong. First, the easy part: sometime in 2023, the Indian government will release a Space Policy. While the release of this policy has been long-promised, it is more likely than not to be finally made public this year. 

Now, the more difficult part: predicting some of the broad contours of the policy. I’ll start with some brief background. In 2017, the government released a draft Space Activities Bill for comments. The bill was an important step in laying down a legal framework under which space companies can operate. However, the feedback wasn’t good. The bill had vague definitions and granted excessive discretionary authority to government officials. As an example of vagueness, the bill only covered Indians or private entities registered in India, leaving foreign collaborators in a regulatory dead zone.

Similarly, it defined ‘space activity’ so broadly that even a start-up doing preliminary research and development might find itself coping with a barrage of licensing requirements. The draft bill also offers little clarity on liability. India is a signatory to the 1972 Liability Convention, which makes states liable for damage caused by space activities. The bill simply states that the government will decide the amount of money for which a private entity is liable - the sort of provision that is virtually guaranteed to scare off investors. 

A lot has changed since 2017. The government has pledged to revise the 2017 draft bill based on comments received. It has also created the Indian National Space Promotion and Authorisation Centre (IN-SPACe) to act as a nodal agency for private space companies. The next steps are to release a Space Policy followed by the heavily modified Space Activities Bill. So here are my three predictions for the Space Policy:

One, the policy will be genuinely oriented towards encouraging private sector space activity and will identify it as a key priority for India. There’s enough evidence that the government takes this seriously. The private space economy is (rightly or wrongly) seen as an important component of the “Atmanirbhar Bharat” vision of a self-reliant India. The space economy is also seen as a key catalyst for high-technology industries. The Indian Prime Minister’s push for the creation of the industry body Indian Space Association (ISpA) is indication enough that this support extends to the apex of the political leadership. 

Two, despite this commitment to private industry, the verbiage of the space policy will still place the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) at the centre of India’s space aspirations. Indeed, it is quite likely that the policy will consider the primary role of India’s private sector to be a supporting ecosystem for ISRO rather than a dynamic entity in its own right. This is a somewhat shakier prediction to make, and it is, more than anything else, a hunch based on statements made by ISRO officials and an awareness of the influence ISRO and the Department of Space wield. 

Three, the policy will likely offer a potential solution to the issue of liability. I suspect the proposal it will come up with is the creation of a space liability fund that can act as a sort of insurance pool. Typically, such funds will be built by space companies pledging a portion of their profits, but the details would probably only become clear in the Space Activities Bill. 

So that’s my largely optimistic prediction for 2023. Whatever the actual outcomes, we’ll dissect them in detail for you in this newsletter.

Cyberpolitik #2: In Service of the Digital Public Infrastructure

— Bharath Reddy

As we enter 2023, we will see increased deployment of different facets of digital public infrastructure (DPI). As we have seen with UPI, this can lead to financial inclusion and empowerment of citizens, but it comes at the cost of centralising platforms in the hands of the government.

Different facets of DPI, such as the Account Aggregator framework, Open Credit Enablement Network, UHI for health, and enhancements to Aadhaar and Digilocker, are expected to be deployed and adopted widely. These improvements will likely lead to the seamless delivery of services and unlock easy access to citizens' data across different silos. 

In addition to this, as Rahul Matthan writes, DPI will also serve as a techno-legal framework for data governance. Across the world, governing how data is collected and used has proved to be a challenge. Regulations have yet to be successful. Companies have been able to circumvent the law, and the capacity required for enforcement is also relatively high. Moreover, since DPI can be encoded into the public infrastructure, they might offer a better solution for compliance. Requests for data, consent and provision of minimal purpose-specific data can be built into the infrastructure, making compliance easier to enforce.

However, these advantages come at the cost of concentrating power over the platforms in the hands of the state. The state has access to large amounts of citizens' personal data and is responsible for safeguarding it. It also has regulatory control and gatekeeping privileges for these critical platforms. 

Concerns over regulatory access are critical given that we expect the Digital Personal Data Protection Bill (DPDPB) and Telecom Bill to be tabled in Parliament this year. The broad exemptions granted to government entities and the lack of independence of the proposed Data Protection Board in the draft DPDPB, 2022, are a cause for concern. The draft Telecom Bill 2022 has expansive definitions and allows for greater state surveillance. 

Since both bills have received comments already, we can expect them to be passed this year. The checks and balances they will enforce will play a crucial role.

Our Reading Menu

[Book] Chip War: The Fight for the World's Most Critical Technology by Chris Miller.

[Book] 10% Human: How Your Body’s Microbes Hold the Key to Health and Happiness by Allana Collen.

[Book] Human-Build World: How to Think about Technology and Culture by Thomas P. Hughes.

[Book] The End of Ownership: Personal Property in the Digital Economy by Aaron Perzanowski and Jason Schultz.

This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit hightechir.substack.com

Matsyanyaaya #1: Opening up to open-tech

— Bharath Reddy

"Open Tech" refers to transparent, inclusive technology and embodies the freedom to use, study, modify and redistribute to the maximum extent possible. The definitions of open-source software, open standards, and open-source hardware are well understood. "Open Tech" is an umbrella term that includes all of these technology areas.

The usual arguments promoting open source technologies highlight reducing costs, avoiding vendor and technology lock-in, and the ability to customise. But, given the current geopolitical climate, access to state-of-the-art technology cannot be taken for granted. Supply chain resilience and tech sanctions are a cause for serious concern. 

The acquisition of advanced technologies is not an end in itself, but a means to bring peace and prosperity to all Indian citizens. Unhindered access to state-of-the-art technology and foundational knowledge is, therefore, in India's national interest. External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar echoed this sentiment when he said India "cannot be agnostic about technology" as there is "a strong political connotation in-built into technology".

Open tech can help India achieve techno-strategic autonomy, economic growth, technology leadership, and skill development. The "openness" also helps foster trust, broaden access to technology and further democratic values.

Open tech, by its nature, is both non-rival (its use by someone does not diminish the utility to others) and non-excludable (its access cannot be denied to anyone). In economic terms, this qualifies it as a public good. As we see with other public goods, such as clean air or street lights, the incentives are weak for markets or individuals to tend to the maintenance and upkeep of public goods. This is visible in one of the main problems facing open-source software today. 

A recent study shows that almost 97% of all commercial software uses open-source code. A large number of open-source projects are maintained by individuals or small communities of developers without adequate funding. This growing reliance on open-source software increases the burden on maintainers of this code to keep the software secure, bug-free and up-to-date. 

Other areas, such as the open-source hardware, are in a nascent stage, and India could gain a valuable head-start given a favourable policy environment. This is especially important given the silicon geopolitics playing out between the US and China. 

Open standards have a range of benefits, such as removing entry barriers, promoting interoperability, and lowering costs. The government needs to encourage the promotion of open standards and also represent India-specific requirements at various international Standard Development Organisations.

The existing policy landscape includes a preference for open-source software in procurement and a policy on standards for e-governance at the Union and State governments. However, given the growing importance of open tech, a comprehensive open tech strategy is indispensable. 

This short essay is a preview of an upcoming Takshashila Report on an open tech strategy for India.

Apply here: https://bit.ly/pgp-jan23-nl

Antariksh Matters: Buying space power?

— Pranav R Satyanath

Earlier this week, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) launched its first rover, Rashid, towards the Moon’s surface. The rover was carried on a Falcon-9 rocket along with a miniature rover from the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA). But there’s a catch. The UAE did not build the Rashid rover, but it was built under contract by a Japanese private space venture called ispace. When we think of space-faring nations of the world, the UAE does not immediately strike a chord. 

However, the desert country has big space ambitions for the next decade. It has signed the US-led Artemis Accords. It has also signed an agreement with China to collaborate on future Moon missions. This is a surprising move since China has opposed the Artemis Accords and challenged its legality in the broader context of international space law. The country also boasts a full-fledged Mars programme. In March 2021, UAE became the first Arab country to place a probe in Mars orbit as part of the Emirates Mars Mission. The probe, named Hope or Al Amal in Arabic, was built by the Mohammed Bin Rashid Space Centre in collaboration with the University of Colorado, Boulder. Furthermore, the UAE also boasts an astronaut programme in partnership with NASA’s Johnson Space Center. 

But UAE is not the only Arab country to veer into the lucrative and prestigious space sector. Saudi Arabia plans to invest $2.1 billion into its space programme as part of its larger Vision 2030 mission. The country set up the Saudi Space Commission in 2018 and placed the SGS-1, a communications satellite built by Lockheed Martin, in February 2019. Earlier this year, the Saudi Space Commission and Axiom Space, a US-based private space company, also signed a deal to send the Kingdom’s astronauts into space.

Petro-states by the likes of UAE and Saudi Arabia are the newest entries into the small and often restrictive space club. Their rise is only possible due to the large-scale commercialisation of space activities. Using their large reserves of income, petro-states can buy commercial services with relative ease and break into the space club rather than spend years building a domestic space industry from scratch. 

This phenomenon raises the question: what makes a country a space power? More often than not, those counties can launch rockets (or missiles), and perhaps, the ones that can build satellites are deemed as space powers. For much of the Cold War, orbital rocketry (and missile technology) captured the imagination of a space-faring nation, one that could build bigger and more powerful rockets to send payloads to the Moon and beyond. Although some of these rockets and satellites were built by private entities, their operations, for the most part, were controlled by national space agencies. 

Of course, not all space powers are born equal. Space powers can be ranked based on the range of activities they carry out across their civilian and military space programmes. The United States and Russia by far carry out the most space activities, with China slowly playing catch-up. France, India and Japan could fall in the category of middle space powers due to similarities in their space capabilities. 

Countries like Saudi Arabia, UAE and Turkey could be categorised under an entirely new category of space powers. Their power is drawn from their ability to redirect financial resources to attract commercial collaborators. As I point out in my discussion document on the future of India’s space station programme, commercial collaboration is a new mechanism through which countries with limited capabilities can partner with private entities to augment their overall capabilities without the need for large-scale investment. 

As more private entities enter the space sector, we will likely witness more commercial collaborations in the future. Thus, making space easily accessible to many more countries.

Matsyanyaaya #2: Vibing with nuclear fusion

— Saurabh Todi

The Financial Times reported that the scientists at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) in California had achieved a net energy gain in a nuclear fusion reaction for the first time, which promises to become a cheap and carbon-neutral source of energy. The US Department of Energy (DOE) is expected to officially announce the breakthrough on Tuesday. This significant feat was achieved by LLNL’s National Ignition Facility (NIF), which is the size of three football fields. According to the website of NIF, 

“NIF is the world’s most precise and reproducible laser system. It precisely guides, amplifies, reflects, and focuses 192 powerful laser beams into a target about the size of a pencil eraser in a few billionths of a second, delivering more than 2 million joules of ultraviolet energy and 500 trillion watts of peak power, [generating] temperatures in the target of more than 180 million degrees Fahrenheit and pressures of more than 100 billion Earth atmospheres. Those extreme conditions cause hydrogen atoms in the target to fuse and release energy in a controlled thermonuclear reaction.”

Although an extraordinary milestone, the commercialisation of nuclear fusion technology will face several resources and technological constraints that are worth considering, a popular YouTube channel Real Engineering, explained these constraints in their latest video:

* Current fusion reactors combine two isotopes of Hydrogen: Deuterium (2H) and Tritium (3H), to produce Helium (4He). Although the supply of Deuterium (also called heavy water) is abundant as it is found in seawater, Tritium is a relatively rare isotope sourced primarily from nuclear reactor moderator pools where heavy water gets radiated to produce Tritium. This is a major constraint as the current supply of Tritium would significantly outstrip the demand from commercial fusion reactors, with the limited scope of increasing production.

* Lithium can be used as an alternative source of Tritium as it undergoes fission to produce Tritium and Helium. However, this process requires materials made of Beryllium which is a rare and extremely expensive element. There are also safety concerns due to the presence of trace amounts of Uranium in this material.

The video explains these and a few other challenges that the commercialisation of nuclear fusion would face. The path from technological breakthrough to commercialisation is a tough one, but the video ends on a hopeful note. This piece by Charles Seife in The Atlantic is also cautiously optimistic about the breakthrough while detailing the history of NIF and its several fusion experiments.

This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit hightechir.substack.com

Antariksh Matters: Shattering Space Record Myths

— Pranav R Satyanath

Earlier this week, a record was broken in the shadowy world of military space tech. At least, that’s what some of the headlines make you believe. The secretive X-37B Orbital Test Vehicle (OTV) uncrewed spaceplane, operated by the US Space Force, landed at the NASA Kennedy Space Center on November 12th after spending 908 days in orbit. It broke the previous orbital record (780 days) by a large margin. The spaceplane, which is built by Boeing, has been in operation since 2010. Its mission and purpose are largely unknown, building some sort of a myth around this mini-Space Shuttle-looking vehicle.

Let’s take a step back. From all the open-source images available, we know that the X-37B has a single liquid-fuelled engine built by Aerojet and powered by storable propellants. This means it can stay in orbit by increasing its altitude. So, one can say that spaceplanes are not very different from regular satellites, which operate for years and decades in orbit. Now compare those years and decades to 908 days. Not much, right? Well, yes. So long as the spaceplane can maintain orbital speed, it can stay in orbit as long as its operators wish. 

Although we don’t know much about the X-37B’s true purpose, we know some meta details that give clues as to what the purpose might be. The programme that gave birth to the X-37B isn’t a secret. Back in the early 1990s, people in the US government got pretty worried about the costs of operating the Space Shuttle. It was reusable for sure, but it was a slow and painstaking process to get the vehicle back to space. So, the US Congress told NASA to go and look at other alternatives. The result was the Access to Space study, which outlined faster, better, cheaper and smaller alternatives to the Suttle. After pondering their heads over what to test, NASA began to fund a handful of companies to research and develop reusable spaceplanes, including Single-Stage To Orbit (SSTO) tech, which is considered the pinnacle of rocketry.

Chief among these experimental spaceplanes included Lockheed Martin’s X-33 and Orbital Science’s X-34 reusable launch vehicles, along with Boeing’s X-37 experimental space manoeuvring vehicle. By 1999, NASA saw the funds dry up and no progress to show. The US Air Force (USAF) was ready to take up the X-34 and the X-37 programmes. The X-34 programme got cancelled, and the X-37 was transferred to the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA). Two years later, the X-37B was in the hands of the USAF.

From what we know, we can draw out two hypotheses:

* The X-37B is a highly manoeuvrable vehicle used to inspect suspicious activities and objects in space. 

* The X-37B is a test vehicle for the US Space Force (and Air Force) which allows them to test hypersonic re-entry, autonomous capabilities and perhaps, deployment of small payloads.

A part of the second hypothesis is already confirmed. Astronomer and space watcher Jonathan McDowell reported that the X-37B launched a subsatellite named the FalconSAT-t8, an experimental payload developed by the Air Force Academy. The second hypothesis is less likely to be true, as small satellites can perform a far better (and less suspicious) job of inspecting suspicious activities and objects.

Like the US, the Chinese also have a handful of spaceplane projects. It will not be surprising that these vehicles will have both civilian and military uses. India is also testing a version of its spaceplane called the Reusable Launch Vehicle-Technology Demonstrator (RLV-TD). 

Spaceplanes are interesting. But we must not get carried away by spooky headlines.

Comments on the Draft Telecommunications Bill, 2022

— Satya Sahu and Gayathri Poti

The draft Telecommunications Bill, 2022 will do more to prohibit Digital India's growth story rather than facilitate it. We outline some of its most glaring issues:

Definitional Over-breadth, Legislative Conflict and Procedural Lacunae

* Explanatory Note to the Bill in para.51 reassures that provisions concerning internet shutdowns recognize citizens' rights; there is no enumeration of this safeguard in the concerned clause nor mechanisms for judicial oversight or review panels to record the legality of suspension orders à la the Telecom Suspension Rules, 2017.

* The Union Government recently withdrew the Personal Data Protection Bill, 2021. In the absence of a data protection regime and an independent Data Protection Authority vested with powers to implement safeguards on the access and use of personal data by public authorities in line with the principles laid out in Puttaswamy and Shreya Singhal. , Clause 24(2)(b) contributes to the increasingly fragmented data protection framework in India, alongside the IT Act, 2000, SEBI Data Sharing Policy, 2019, Payments and Settlements Act, 2008 etc. Regulatory uncertainty and compliance costs within this framework become increasingly difficult due to the wide gamut of entities subject to the definition of "Telecommunication services" under Clause 2(2). The increased cost of compliance with implementing KYC norms and mandatory licensing regimes will result in extremely high barriers to entry for players in the OTT market. It will ensure that only market players with significant resources to meet these obligations can afford to remain in it, amplifying concerns about stifled innovation and competition in this oligopolistic sector.

* Subjecting OTT platforms to DoT jurisdiction creates regulatory overlap with MeitY's powers, creating potentially conflicting laws, duplication of efforts by regulators and market players alike, ownership of implementation measures, and increasing costs of conducting business.

* OTT platforms like real-time messaging services deploy E2E encryption. Currently, access to encrypted communication is governed by the 2021 Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code released by MeitY. Under this, significant social media intermediaries are only expected to enable the identification of the first originator of the information. The rules deliberately refrain from mandating access to the contents of the communication (especially since the 2015 draft rules that insisted on making available the plaintext of communications was met with heavy criticism), but Clause 24 empowers the Government to gain access to the contents of the communication as well. This conflicts with the 2021 Code and further aggravates the issue of regulatory overlap. The provision implicitly requires OTT platforms to create encryption backdoors and inevitably undermines Constitutional protection for free speech afforded by encryption.

* The territorial applicability of the provisions of the Bill has not been described unlike in the Telegraph Act, 1885, and the IT Act, 2000, which circumscribe their application in terms of geography and cyber attribution. The telecom and OTT sectors depend on cross-border interconnectivity and rely on internationally administered infrastructure like satellites, marine fibre-optic cable networks, etc. It is necessary to foresee and describe the territorial limits of domestic law to avoid international conflict of laws to maintain market confidence and decrease legal costs and instances of interruption in critical services.

* Clause 46 (k) of the Bill dilutes TRAI's standing to requisition information from the Government and provide recommendations before awarding licenses. Deleting the non-obstante clause and provisos to S.11 (1) of the TRAI Act eliminates TRAI's role in ensuring a level playing field for TSPs and fair and non-discriminatory treatment by the Government. Vesting TRAI with the power to investigate predatory pricing exacerbates existing overlap between the mandates of TRAI and CCI, increasing possibility of regulatory arbitrage. 

* Clause 24(1) vests the Central Government with the power to take temporary possession of telecommunication services, networks, and infrastructure, in the occurrence of any public emergency or in the interest of public safety. Clause 24(4) makes the exercise of this power concomitant with the duration of a public emergency or occasion. The Bill, however, does not provide any procedure for Government action nor define the terms' public safety' and 'public emergency', undermining the temporary nature of this power, inviting constitutional scrutiny and low investor confidence.

Insufficient Justifications for Overarching Policy 

* OTT platforms should be permitted to continue operating under the existing framework without any regulatory intervention until the ITU and similar foreign jurisdictions conclusively determine the regulation of such platforms. TRAI's 2020 recommendations propose no deviation from this approach, especially since there has been limited global progress concerning OTT regulation.

* Compliance with KYC norms is mandated for the issuance of SIM Cards and broadband connections; extending this requirement for accessing OTT communication services is unwarranted. The rigours associated with KYC rules are reserved for tightly regulated sectors like banking, where identity verification systems combat the incidence of high-risk pernicious activities. Mandating adherence to the KYC process for creating an account on an IM/e-mail/video telephony platform is not only disproportionate but is likely to dissuade users from accessing critical services. In particular, KYC formalities will deter consumers from testing newer platforms which could result in market stagnation.

* Clause 32 envisages framing regulatory sandboxes to enable innovation and technological development in the sector. However, it allows access to regulatory sandboxes only as part of the terms and conditions under its new licensing regime defeating the intent of a regulatory sandbox. Providing access to this environment only upon the award of a license raises the costs of introducing new technology in a fixed-capital-intensive sector like telecom and entrenches the market power of already dominant entities who can bear this cost. The extent and nature of the usage of new technology cannot always be preempted in the terms of a license at the time of licensing. This creates the future burden of bearing opportunity costs of not being able to leverage its own technology in new ways on the licensee, leading to avoidable legal costs and ad hoc renegotiation.

The authors are students of Takshashila’s GCPP (Technology & Policy) Programme.

Matsyanyaaya: Splinternet Conviction?

— Bharath Reddy

We often hear predictions about a splinter-net or a bifurcated Internet. What does this mean? And what are the incentives at play other than the obvious state control and censorship?

To get an idea of how the Internet could split and what it means, a good example would be Runet - the Russian national segment of the Internet. Russian interventions to create an independent national Internet range from state censorship to mandating ISPs to use national Domain Name System (DNS) servers (where website names are translated to addresses). 

There are also forces from outside Russia incentivising the split as well. During the initial phase of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, there were appeals by Ukraine to remove Russian domains from DNS servers which would cut them off from the rest of the Internet. This request was rejected as it could destroy trust in a global internet if the DNS does not remain neutral. However, requests by Ukraine to certificate authorities that issue SSL and TLS certificates for websites have been more successful, creating barriers in the process. Lastly, the hardware sanctions and market exits following the conflict could potentially lead to a split in internet standards.

As you might know, the Internet is based on communication protocols which enable different devices to speak a common language and communicate with each other. Broadly, these protocols can be classified under - content, logic and infrastructure layers. While censorship at the content layer is quite common, a fork in the lower logic and infrastructure layers could have serious ramifications. 

Network effects, protocol politics and geopolitics, come together here. The largest networks have incentives to refuse to be interoperable with competitors. In the current nature of the Internet, the US and its allies wield power to cut off competitors from critical chokepoints. This power has been exercised to an extent during the recent sanctions against China and Russia. 

The threat of such actions creates incentives for bifurcated supply chains and in this world of bifurcated supply chains there would be takers for China’s vision of national internet sovereignty. In such a scenario, future network protocols such as New IP being developed by Huawei could become more widespread. The intelligence built into the protocols at the logic and infrastructure layers could enable more surveillance and control by the ISPs and the State.

The concerns around the splitting of the Internet is thus a complex interplay between technology, geopolitics, and the relation between the State and the individual.

The report titled “One, Two, or Two Hundred Internets” by the Center for Security Studies (CSS), ETH Zürich is an exciting read that covers this subject in detail. As the author hopes, it helps enable informed discussion and decision-making on splitting the Internet.

Our Reading Menu

[Opinion] Road Ahead for UPI: Free Public Infrastructure or Yet Another Payment Mechanism? by Rohan Pai and Mihir Mahajan.

[Chapter] Gene Editing and the Need to Reevaluate Bioweapons by Shambhavi Naik.

[Book] Cellular: An Economic and Business History of the International Mobile-Phone Industry by Daniel D. Garcia-Swartz and Martin Campbell-Kelly.

This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit hightechir.substack.com

Antariksh Matters: Tying commercial and military ends

— Pranav R Satyanath

Eight months after Russia's invasion of Ukraine, it is an established fact that commercial entities in space provide a vital service for enhancing military capabilities. The Ukrainian military purchased hundreds of images from companies like Maxar and Planet to monitor Russian formations. More famously, internet services provided by SpaceX’s Starlink constellations proved vital for soldiers on the battlefield. Other companies, like HawkEye 360, offer services that warn the Ukrainian military of potential GPS interference. 

My colleague Aditya Ramanathan and I have extensively covered the issues of using commercial satellites for military purposes. After all, we covered Starlink and Russian attacks in the previous edition. The problem of commercial-military satellite entanglement, however, is indispensable. On Thursday (October 27), Russian officials warned that Western commercial satellites could be legally targeted if the United States and its allies continue their involvement in the war in Ukraine.

As mentioned in previous Technopolitik editions, Professor Davi Koplow has made a robust case for legally targeting space assets. He argues that any space asset that assists a country’s military operations could be legally targeted under the Law of Armed Conflict. Others have highlighted the importance of proportionality of attack under International Humanitarian Law and the need to take into consideration the possibility of indirect harm towards civilians during armed conflict.

The issue that I raise here is more novel. I ponder the connection between the US-Russia bilateral noninterference agreement with National Technical Means (intelligence-gathering assets, including spy satellites) and the Law of Armed Conflict. Let’s begin with National Technical Means (NTM)). During the Cold War, the US and the Soviet Union wished to limit the number of nuclear weapons deployed on either side. While both countries were willing to agree on some limits (starting with the 1972 Interim Agreement and the ABM Treaty under SALT I), neither side showed interest in on-site inspections for verification (this changed much later). Hence, the two sides agreed to verify the treaty using “national technical means of verification”. NTMs not only include satellites but also consist of ground-based radars and telemetry gathering devices. The definition of NTMs is ambiguous on purpose, as they help countries maintain technical secrecy while acknowledging spying tools as legitimate tools of verification.

Early arms control agreements between the US and the Soviet Union also led to the first steps towards space arms control. Article XII (2) of the ABM treaty stated the following:

“Each Party undertakes not to interfere with the national technical means of verification of the other Party operating in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article.”

Noninterference was codified in the bilateral agreement, which continues to be a norm in the US-Russia New START agreement. 

During the Cold War, commercial entities did exist to provide satellite imagery. Even when they did, governments did not use commercial images to verify arms control agreements. Things are, however, a little different today. The National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), which launches and operates US spy satellites, began purchasing images from commercial vendors, signing billions of dollars in contracts. The end-use of these images is unknown. Since one can not conclusively determine whether commercial images are being used for arms control verification, commercial satellites can be considered to be part of NTMs.

So, if companies like Maxar and Planet, which sell images to the NRO, also sell images to the Ukrainian armed forces, does the rule of noninterference apply, or does the Law of Armed Conflict take precedence? The answer, unfortunately, is that we do not know. The phenomenon of commercial-military entanglement is still unfolding. But pondering these questions is essential to keep outer space safe and secure.

Matsyanyaaya #1: What did CCI just do?

— Bharath Reddy

Over the past few weeks, the Competition Commission of India imposed penalties of ₹1,337 crores and ₹936 crores in two antitrust cases against Google. 

The first was related to Google abusing its market dominance in the mobile operating system and Android app store markets to gain a significant advantage over competitors in other markets. The CCI observed that Google entered into multiple agreements with OEMs that govern their rights and obligations. One such agreement assures that Google's apps, such as search, Chrome and YouTube, come pre-installed on Android devices without an option for users to uninstall them. Other agreements ensure exclusivity of its search services and even prohibit OEMs from offering devices with alternative versions of Android (forks of the open-source code), which are not approved by Google. Access to Google’s Play Store, which is essential to a smartphone, was conditional on complying with these agreements. 

The second was related to  Google’s Play Store policies requiring developers to mandatorily and exclusively use Google Play’s Billing System for app payments and in-app purchases. This increases costs for users due to the hefty service fees - Apple and Google take a 15 to 30 per cent cut from app developers and also stifles choice and innovation in the payments ecosystem.

These verdicts come close on the heels of Google’s failed attempt to overturn the €4.34 billion antitrust fine handed down by the European Union four years ago. The fines are a little more than rounding errors for a corporation that reported revenue of $69 billion last quarter, but the increasing antitrust cases globally might force them to reconsider their policies. 

There are some ostensibly valid reasons for the restrictions imposed in the agreements with OEMs. Having multiple forks of the Android operating system could lead to fragmentation, which could delay security and feature updates. Having a single app store with a gatekeeper could keep unreliable and malicious apps out. OEMs could bundle adware and malware into essential apps such as browsers. While there is a lot of attention and scrutiny about the privacy and anticompetitive practices of big tech companies, there exists a long tail of mid and small-size tech companies which have little to no oversight. Centralisation and control help avoid these risks; however, it hands over control of the entire ecosystem to Google. 

Google can leverage the network effects of the Android operating system to gain an unsurpassable advantage in other markets. This is achieved not only through the prominent placement of its apps on Android phones but also through the vast amounts of data about user preferences and behaviour which can be used to improve their offerings. Such self-preferencing and vertical integration are detrimental to competition and limit choice to the end user.

A lot of the issues discussed above are also present in Apple’s iOS and other platforms as well. Big tech companies such as Google, Apple, Meta, Microsoft and Amazon wield enormous power as gatekeepers of their platforms. The EU’s Digital Markets Act which comes into force in May next year, is expected to bring about reforms which will impose obligations on gatekeepers to ensure a level playing field.

Third-party app stores might become a reality ending Apple and Google’s monopoly in app stores, which is also one of the demands made by the CCI. There might be some trade-offs in user freedom and security when this becomes a reality. It is also quite likely that app stores will compete to find a way to balance both of these while also avoiding the exorbitant service fees currently being charged to app developers.

Matsyanyaaya #2: The CCI verdict: All bark and no bite?

— Shailesh Chitnis

It was a busy October for the Competition Commission of India (CCI), India’s antitrust regulator. In a one-two punch against Google, the CCI first fined it $161.9 million for forcing device makers to pre-install Google’s suite of apps and penalising alternate versions of Android, its “open source” operating system. Next, the CCI hit Google with a $113 million penalty for preventing app developers from using third-party payment apps.

The same week, it fined MakeMyTrip, India’s largest travel portal and OYO, a hotel aggregator, a combined $47 million for restricting market access to OYO’s competitors on MakeMyTrip’s platform. Taking all factors together, the decision represents a clear message that the CCI is looking at digital markets and platforms a lot more closely.

But do these actions have wider implications? A hot-take is to compare the penalties to the revenues of the companies and predict that it would hardly have an impact. Most companies appeal the rulings in court, and in the years that it takes for the cases to be resolved, the fines are whittled down. The CCI has also been notoriously ineffective when it comes to collections. Data shows that from 2011-2018, the CCI imposed a cumulative penalty of more than $1.3B but recovered less than 1%.

But that misses the point. The CCI rulings are important because they signal that the regulator is taking a measured approach to competition in the digital ecosystem. Until this point, India had been fair “hands off” with its approach to digital platforms. Part of the reason may have been the size of online markets when compared with offline markets. But the nature of digital markets, especially the network effects, which create outsized winners, makes an intervention in this domain timely.

Second, the CCI also recognizes the limits of its power. In the absence of supporting legislation and the fast-changing nature of this industry, the agency is nudging participants towards corrective action rather than enforcement. Even as Google will likely challenge these rulings in court, it has paused the requirement for developers to use Google Play’s billing system. Treebo and FabHotels, Oyo’s competitors, are back on MakeMyTrip. Market correction, not enforcement.

Finally, the cohort of Google, Meta and others have been used to dealing with regulators around the world. India would be no different. But, for probably the first time in their existence, big tech is vulnerable. The continued slowdown in the ad-tech supported business, coupled with fears of a recession, has created uncertainty over their growth.

Against this backdrop, the CCI’s actions couldn't have come at a worse time.

Our Reading Menu

[Opinion] The US and China are battling for semiconductor supremacy by Pranay Kotasthane and Abhiram Manchi.

[Article] Paradoxes of Intermediation in Aadhaar: Human Making of a Digital Infrastructure by Bidisha Chaudhuri.

[Book] From Mainframes to Smartphones: A History of the International Computer Industry by Martin Campbell-Kelly and Daniel D. Garcia-Swartz.

This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit hightechir.substack.com

Antariksh Matters: Starlink & the Dismal Attractions of Space Warfare

— Aditya Ramanathan

The contributors to this newsletter are not an unduly pessimistic lot. They nevertheless retained little doubt that geopolitical adversaries would seek to contest each others’ ability to use space-based assets. What was harder to predict was that we would see its first instances as early as 2022. It was also harder to imagine that some of these dangers would draw public attention because of a sordid spat over money. 

Over the last few weeks, Elon Musk, the founder of SpaceX, which runs the Starlink constellation, has been engaged in a public argument with diplomats, reporters, and assorted opinion-makers. He’s been pilloried both for his unsolicited comments on the Russia-Ukraine war, and over reports that his company sought compensation from the US government for providing the Ukrainians with Starlink services. 

Starlink’s satellite Internet services have proved crucial to Ukrainian military operations against Russia. But the story of how it became crucial to the war effort is an unusual one that involves many of the preoccupations of this newsletter: social media, private space companies, cyber attacks, remotely piloted platforms, and space warfare.

Musk began despatching Starlink systems to the war zone following a tweet from a Ukrainian politician. Starlink systems directly enabled lethal strikes on Russian forces, many of which involved the use of drones. With no formal agreement in place for the use of Starlink in combat, Musk’s company apparently sought substantial US Department of Defense financial support, with some accusing him of price gouging. Through all this, Russian forces attempted to disrupt Starlink services through electronic warfare. It is this last phenomenon that the remainder of this Technopolitik entry will focus on. 

Space Warfare is Difficult

The Russians were always keenly aware of the value of satellite communications. According to US officials, they mounted a successful cyber attack on the operations of Viasat at the outset of the war. The attack targeted Ukrainian military communications and disrupted Internet services for many civilians. It also had collateral effects beyond Ukraine’s borders, most notably, disrupting the functioning of 5,800 wind turbines in Germany (see the entry from my colleague Pranav for more on this).

Once the Ukrainians began making extensive use of Sarlink services, the Russians reportedly mounted an electronic warfare (EW) attack that SpaceX quickly repelled. Musk acknowledged this on Twitter by saying SpaceX had temporarily “reprioritized to cyber defense & overcoming signal jamming”

The exact nature of these Russian attacks are not clear. Musk’s own tweets only add to the confusion. Were they simply electronic jamming attacks? Or did they include a cyber component? It is also unclear if Russia has limited itself to electronic jamming near the Earth’s surface or if it also attempted to jam the satellites themselves. After all, Russia has a mobile ground-based platform called the Tirada-2 for precisely this purpose. What is significant is that despite reports of outages, Starlink is not known to have suffered a setback similar to that of Viasat. 

Russia’s Dilemmas and Incentive to Use Space for Military Purposes

For Russia, Starlink is a problem from hell. Legally, Starlink is probably fair game for Russian forces, since the satellite constellation is providing direct combat support to the Ukrainian military. However, the fact that it is owned by a third-party, and the fact that the third party happens to be American effectively limit Russian options. 

Also limiting Russia’s options are the sheer number of Starlink satellites. There are more than 3,000 of these tiny satellites presently in orbit. About 400 provide service to Ukrainian forces. While Russian direct-ascent antisatellite (DA-ASAT) missile would short work of a single Starlink satellite in low earth orbit (LEO), Moscow would run out of missiles if it tried to attack the whole constellation and would likely make no serious dent on Starlink operations. 

In the years to come, SpaceX plans to have up to 42,000 Starlink satellites in orbit. Even if it achieves only a quarter of this number, SpaceX would have dramatically increased the number of satellites in LEO. With rivals such as OneWeb also developing their own LEO constellations, the orbits are not only likely to get crowded but also become valuable real estate for strategic purposes, providing a sanctuary for military support systems. 

Indeed, if space were to remain a sanctuary, as some hope it does, it would only further incentivise states to use space for military purposes. This, in turn, is likely to increase competitive pressures back on Earth to find novel ways of contesting an adversary’s use of space. Starlink has given us an unexpected glimpse of the dilemmas that lie ahead.  

Matsyanyaaya: What’s Technological Sovereignty Anyway?

— Pranay Kotasthane

In recent years, technological or digital sovereignty has been all the rage. Not only is it a term meant for government strategy documents, but an empirical reality and public policy, as witnessed most recently in the US export controls on China’s semiconductor industry.

And yet, we know little about what the term means. Poor-quality arguments mistake autarky for technological sovereignty or, worse, as a mission that should be achieved by a particular date rather than as a continuing process.

And how do you even square technological self-sufficiency with the reality that the technology ecosystem is a multinational effort and not merely about creating national champions, as in the past? As I wrote in the third edition of this newsletter:

There are significant problems with the goal of high-tech self-sufficiency and the instrument of industrial subsidies, both. That's because high-tech industries today rely on extensive cross-border movements of intermediate products, talent, and intellectual property. As R&D costs required to produce technological improvements have risen across sectors, erstwhile 'national' industries have been transformed into global supply chains. Instead of national champions making complete products independently, companies only specialise in specific parts of global supply chains. 

And so, while searching for a better definition of technological sovereignty, I landed on a crisp CESifo paper titled Technological Sovereignty as Ability, Not Autarky by Christoph March and Ina Schieferdecker.

This paper uses our understanding of what it means to be politically and economically sovereign, to construct a definition of technological sovereignty. Their framework assessing the impact of General Purpose Technologies on political, economic, and individual sovereignty, is a foundational contribution.

Then, they go on to define technological sovereignty as follows:

In a narrow sense, technological sovereignty is the ability to make self-determined decisions about the development and use of technologies and technology-based innovations, especially regarding their properties (e.g. energy consumption, data usage, security, or safety) and their terms of use (e.g. restriction to certain domains, or transparency). In a broader sense, a polity is technologically sovereign, if it possesses the technological abilities necessary to maintain political and economic sovereignty.

Describing technological sovereignty as an ability opens a new window for understanding the concept. This approach places innovation policy, technology transfer, and education at the front and centre.

Crucially, this definition recognises the global superstructure of innovation and distances itself from self-sufficiency:

The ability to understand, advance, or produce new technologies must not be confused with the attempt to actually do so in all key enabling technologies and/or components. Instead, we understand it as a widening of choice opportunities, and as a prerequisite for international trade “on eye level”. Moreover, we see capacities to innovate as a key to achieving technological sovereignty.

In another section, the authors go one step further and identify the interdependence between international trade and technological sovereignty. While the simplistic arguments position these two concepts as opposites, the authors argue that the two reinforce each other.

I encourage readers to read the entire paper. Papers such as these are critical for building the epistemological foundations of technology geopolitics.

Cyberpolitik: Browser Wars, again?

— Bharath Reddy

Firefox maker Mozilla’s recent report highlights how manufacturers of operating systems use market power and choice architecture to favour affiliated browsers leading to outcomes which are not in the best interest of users. 

Mozilla’s research finds that “software can be designed to influence or even manipulate consumer outcomes. And operating systems are designed to maximise usage of their affiliated browsers.” Of the 4.2 billion mobile internet subscribers globally, roughly 72% run on Android and 27% run on iOS. The browser usage on these devices shows a strong preference for the default browser, with 65% of users on Chrome and 24% on Safari.

Having a competitive playing field for browsers is in the best interest of users. The competition fosters innovation leading to better quality, security and privacy for users. When Internet Explorer was the dominant browser after crushing Netscape, innovation had taken a backseat with no significant upgrades for five years. Firefox entered the scene with better speed, security and new features such as tabbed browsing. This created more competition in the browser market with more frequent updates.

Browser engines are another major area of concern. Currently, only Apple, Google and Mozilla develop and maintain browser engines. Since Apple’s Webkit engine is limited to apple devices, it leaves only Google’s Blink engine and Mozilla’s Gecko engine as the only cross-platform options. Having such a critical access point for the web in the hands of a single company not only leads to a lack of innovation but could be a major privacy and security risk for users. 

The current situation has come about largely due to operating systems providers using elaborate choice architecture to encourage desired outcomes. The choice of architecture includes:  

- having pre-installed browsers bundled with the OS

- prohibiting or overriding changing to the defaults 

- using dark patterns to nudge users against changing the defaults.

Other measures include having contracts that mandate OEMs to have only affiliated browsers pre-installed on the devices. App store restrictions, such as Apple’s current ban on alternative browser engines, also play a big role. Similarly, features such as in-app browsing are only possible on Android using the Blink engine.

As we move towards wider adoption of smart devices, virtual reality, and autonomous vehicles, browsers might be tightly bundled with all of these applications. Mozilla’s report highlights how competition in the browser market is necessary to advance innovation, performance, speed, privacy and security and calls upon regulators, policymakers, and lawmakers to create a new era. 

Our Reading Menu

[Podcast] Escalation in the US-China Tech War by Pranay Kotasthane and Pranav Satyanath.

[Book] Great Power Politics in the Fourth Industrial Revolution: The Geoeconomics of Technological Sovereignty by Glenn Diesen.

[Report] The War in Ukraine from a Space Cybersecurity Perspective

This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit hightechir.substack.com

Antariksh Matters #1: Small Launchers and Small Windows of Opportunity

— Pranav R Satyanath

The small satellite launch vehicle market has a new player - Firefly Aerospace. The US-based private company on Saturday (October 1st 2022) conducted the first successful launch of its rocket Firefly Alpha. The company attempted a launch in September 2021, which failed to get to orbit. Today, Firefly is one of only four private NewSpace companies in the world which provide dedicated small-satellite launch service. The other three being Rocket Lab, Virgin Orbit and Astra (the last of the three companies is an interesting case).

Firefly’s Alpha launch vehicle can carry a payload of just over 1 ton to low-Earth orbit (LEO) and 750 kilograms to Sun Synchronous Orbit (SSO). This puts Alpha  in the same category as the Polar  Satellite Launch Vehicle (PSLV), which is the workhorse of the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO).  The Alpha launch vehicle is powered by four liquid-fuelled turbopump engines that use RP-1 (highly refined kerosene) and liquid oxygen (LOx). The second stage is powered by a single liquid-fuelled RP-1/LOx engine optimised for vacuum.

The company is one of the few success stories in the highly competitive launch market, and success did not come easy. Firefly was founded as Firefly Space Systems in 2014,but the company went bankrupt and liquidated in 2017 and its assets were purchased by Ukrainian venture capitalist (also a tech entrepreneur) Max Polyakov and his company, Noosphere Ventures. Unfortunately, Polykov could only stand at a distance and watch Firefly’s success as he was forced to sell his shares after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. 

A tough time for small launch companies

Not all companies witness success by the likes of Firefly. In December 2019, Vector Launch filed for bankruptcy before it could attempt a full orbital launch of its Vector-R rocket. The company has undergone restructuring and is preparing to begin suborbital flight tests. Another US-based company, Astra, has been attempting to launch its rocket into orbit since 2020, with very little success, leaving the company to abandon its Rocket 3.3 and move to a new design called Rocket 4 instead. Oher companies in the US

India’s own attempt to launch the Small Satellite Launch Vehicle (SSLV) failed to place its payloads in orbit after a malfunction in its sensors. The SSLV is operated by ISRO’s newly- established commercial arm called NewSpace India Limited (NSIL). SSLV, unlike other launch vehicles, uses solid fuel in the first three stages. The final stage is a liquid-fuelled velocity trimming module. SSLV is India’s attempt to enter the small satellite launch market, offering a launch-on-demand service to carry upto 500 kg to LEO or 300 kg to sun synchronous orbit.

Several other launch companies around the world are preparing to tap into the growing small satellite market. Yet, it is unclear how many of these companies will survive in the coming years. More importantly, it is unclear whether these private entities have overestimated the market for small satellites, as a drop in demand puts at risk the sustainability of these companies.

Small launch vehicles for India

Indian private launch companies are not far behind the world competitors. Two companies in particular, Agnikul and Skyroot, have risen to the occasion in their attempt to fulfil India’s satellite launch demands. As an aspiring space power, India can not compete in the global space market by making an average of five launches a year. It requires dozens of launches (along with many many more satellites) to stay competitive on both commercial and national security grounds. India’s forthcoming new space policy (long overdue and still nowhere in sight) must make it conducive for private launch providers to operate and thrive. ISRO, meanwhile, must focus its efforts on improving the reliability of its GSLV series of heavy-lift rockets and allow privateers to cater to the small satellite market needs.

Siliconpolitik: India’s Semiconductor Policies v2.0

— Pranay Kotasthane

Earlier this week, the Union Cabinet approved modifications to three of the four schemes introduced in December 2021 for developing a domestic semiconductor ecosystem. Several news websites have claimed that with the government “sweetening the deal”, investments in this sector will be more forthcoming. I agree, but not without some fundamental reservations. Here’s why.

Semiconductor Fabs

To attract chip manufacturing companies, the original programme promised up to 50% upfront financial support for leading-edge nodes (28 nanometres and below). The promised fiscal support for trailing-edge nodes employing older technologies dropped commensurately, going down to 30% for a fab that produces chips at the 45-65 nanometre nodes. (The node size is a rough measure for the size of a building block in a chip. The smaller that number, the more building blocks that can be packed in the same area resulting in higher performance).

Under the new scheme, the government promises upfront fiscal support of 50% for all node sizes. The change reflects two realities. First, trailing-edge fabs are crucial for India. The demand for older node sizes will not disappear anytime soon. Future applications such as 5G radios and electric vehicles will continue to require manufacturing at these nodes. Most current defence applications also require trailing-edge chips.

Second, many countries are wooing the leading-edge node foundries with much larger incentive packages. Companies such as TSMC are being courted by all major powers, and it’s unlikely they will pick India for the most-advanced nodes. India’s chances are better for securing older technologies.

Display Fabs

Most display panel manufacturers are located in East Asia — companies from China, Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan dominate this industry. The scheme was designed with the explicit aim of import substitution. The original scheme promised up to 50% upfront financial support subject to a cap of ₹12,000 crores. As part of the changes, this upper cap has been struck off.

To me, this scheme didn’t make sense even when it was announced. I have four reasons for the scepticism.

* Even during the high peak of supply chain disruptions during COVID-19, there was no shortage of display panels, indicating that there are no constraints to increasing production, as is the case for chips. (The only shortage related to displays was for the driver chip, not the panels by themselves).

* Apart from China and Taiwan, South Korea and Japan have leadership in specific segments of displays. So we aren’t dependent on one vulnerable source, as in the case of chips.

* Import dependence on China won’t go away. Even if these fabs manufacture displays in India, the input materials will have to be imported from elsewhere. So the bottlenecks will shift but don’t disappear.

* The industry is moving to newer technologies apart from LCDs and AMOLEDs. Samsung is focusing on Quantum-dot displays instead of LCDs. The scheme might be able to get old-tech here, but for newer technologies, imports might continue.

Thus, to spend ₹12000 crores for a product in the pursuit of a failed notion of import substitution doesn't justify the opportunity costs. Moreover, removing the upper cap after Vedanta-Foxconn got into this game raises concerns about rent-seeking — the tendency of businesses to distort policies to serve their own interests.

Assembly, Test, Packaging Units, and Specialised Low-volume Fabs

For assembly, test and packaging firms, & compound fabs, the promised financial support has increased substantially, from 30% to 50%. More importantly, the original scheme allowed disbursal once a facility had begun production. Under the modified scheme, the financial support will be upfront. Prepaid, not postpaid.

These changes again warrant scrutiny. Is it another case of rent-seeking?

At the margin, I am okay with the changes in this segment. India has a potential advantage because of the need for a large, mid-level trained workforce for this segment of the supply chain, in comparison to conventional semiconductor fabs.

Semiconductor Design

Surprisingly, there were no modifications in the one area where India does have a comparative advantage - semiconductor design and design services. The capital requirement for this segment is at least two orders of magnitude lower than the first three segments. And yet, the response to the scheme for encouraging design firms seems less than lukewarm. We propose two changes in the policy for that segment in an article for Hindustan Times earlier this month:

* To receive deployment-linked incentives under the current scheme, a design firm has to be registered in India with a 50% local stake. That clause could be watered down. Companies should qualify as long as the workforce is majorly Indian and the development happens here.

* Reducing tariff and non-tariff barriers are also crucial for India’s semiconductor design companies to increase operations in India.

On both these counts, the status quo prevails.

To summarise, the modifications reflect the government’s seriousness in attracting investment in this sector. Through these changes, the government is acknowledging that India must start its chip manufacturing journey at the lower end and climb its way up. Getting good at this game takes a couple of decades. At the same time, a thin line separates responsive government policies from regulatory capture by businesses. All industrial policies run this risk, and we need to be vigilant.

Antariksh Matters #2: Planetary Defence and National Defence

— Aditya Ramanathan

On September 26, NASA concluded what it called “the world’s first planetary defense technology demonstration” in a spectacular collision. Ten months after it was first launched, NASA’s 570 kilogram Double Asteroid Redirection Test (DART) spacecraft smashed into the asteroid Dimorphos. The collision occurred 11 million kilometres from Earth. 

Dimporphos is technically a 160 metre-long ‘asteroid moonlet’ - called so because it orbits a larger asteroid named Didymos. While neither rock is headed towards Earth, the DART mission sought to establish the ability to deflect an asteroid from its trajectory.   

The DART spacecraft was launched in November 2021 from a SpaceX Falcon 9 rocket and Johns Hopkins Advanced Propulsion Laboratory (JHUAPL) managed the mission. The apparent success of DART is likely to prompt more ‘planetary defence’ missions. According to the latest decadal survey published by the US-based National Academies, NASA’s annual budget for planetary defence is more than $160 million. NASA has tracked about 27,000 near Earth objects (NEOs) using this funding. Yet this is barely enough to track naturally occurring threats from space. In particular, NEOs that are between 30-140 metres in size and typically collide with the Earth once every century, can be hard to detect. One such celestial body was responsible for the 1908 Tunguska event. 

Ambitious Proposals, Enduring Suspicions

While the DART mission was a kinetic collision, such interventions may not suffice for every contingency. While no civilisation-killing NEOs are likely to be headed Earth’s way anytime soon, smaller NEOs that can still result in catastrophes may be detected too late for deflection. Also, kinetic collisions may risk creating fragments large enough to survive reentry and cause damage on Earth. The most common proposal for dealing with such contingencies is using explosive nuclear devices. One scientific study from 2021 concluded that such devices were likely to be useful in destroying major NEOs headed towards Earth. 

While it may be prudent to seriously examine the options available, NASA’s planetary defence project is not without political implications. Any spacefaring capability that can destroy through kinetic collision, or worse yet, nuclear explosives, has obvious military implications. This is especially so because, as we have argued, space warfare is still primitive in character, depending on dual-use capabilities rather than specialised weapons or platforms. 

While the military applications of DART-like missions are unclear and fantastical at the moment, states are not known to take chances on such matters. For reasons of both survival and prestige, America’s rivals may initiate their own planetary defence programmes in the near future. 

Our Reading Menu

[Book] A History of Near-Earth Objects Research by Erik M. Conway, Donald K. Yeomans, and Meg Rosenburg

[Report] Forecasting th A History of Near-Earth Objects Researche future impact of emerging technologies on international stability and human security by Marina Favaro, Neil Renic and Ulrich Kühn

[Research Article] One if by Land, and Two if by Sea: Cross-Domain Contests and the Escalation of International Crises by J Andrés Gannon

This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit hightechir.substack.com

India Needs a Holistic and Effective Techplomacy Strategy

— Arjun Gargeyas

Earlier this year, the Takshashila Institution published the Techno-strategic Doctrine for India. The doctrine outlined the fundamental principles India must follow to springboard as a technology superpower. As the doctrine mentions, one of the critical approaches for India to reach the status of a technology superpower is by becoming a vital node in the global technology ecosystem and building strong links with states that share its interests and values and with which it enjoys economic complementarities.

Takshashila’s newly released discussion document titled India’s Approach to Technology Diplomacy by Arjun Gargeyas provides a clear and well-defined pathway for India to become a global technology player. A summary of the arguments is the highlight of this edition ofTechnopolitik.

India Needs a Holistic and Effective ‘Techplomacy’ Strategy 

Technological advancements in the 21st Century have heightened the role of technology in the diplomacy arena. Technically adept nation-states are developing their own strategies to integrate technology with their foreign policy and diplomatic initiatives. But how can technology be used as a credible diplomatic plank by the Indian State to further its national and geopolitical interests? 

The government of India, driven by the nation’s technological growth, has gradually embraced the concept of integrating technology into achieving national and geopolitical goals. Official government documents, departmental strategies and policy changes have increasingly focused on how science and technology can shape diplomatic efforts in the near future. 

The Science, Technology and Innovation Policy (STIP) 2013 was one of the instances that an intersection of technology and diplomacy found a mention in an official government document. The document states that the 'policy framework will enable strategic partnerships and alliances with other nations through both bilateral and multilateral cooperation in science, technology and innovation. Science diplomacy, technology synergy and technology acquisition models will be judiciously deployed based on strategic relationships.

This was further cemented in the most recently released draft STIP-2020 document. It discusses the role of science and technology (S&T) in reorganising India’s foreign policy priorities and shaping the global technology ecosystem.

There has also been considerable movement on the political front regarding the role of technology in diplomacy itself. In 2015, Prime Minister Narendra Modi asserted that science and technology would be put at the forefront of India’s diplomatic engagement in the future. In 2020, the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) created technically specialised divisions, such as the Cyber Diplomacy Division, E-Governance and Information Technology Division, and the New Emerging and Strategic Technologies Division. 

Apart from India’s policy directives, the government has ensured that technology has been incorporated into different diplomatic agreements, especially with established technological powers. These agreements are in the interest of utilising outside support to build India’s technical competency and technology-based alliances. 

While these decisions have showcased movement on the techplomacy front, the Indian state needs a more comprehensive and well-rounded approach to using technology in the diplomatic space. This can be achieved through a three-fold strategy focusing on the pathway for any current and future administration to employ technology as a strategic diplomatic tool. The three principles are explained below.

Principle 1: Focus on Areas of Strengths in India’s Technology Stack 

The Indian state should focus on critical areas of strength in its technology ecosystem, which can serve as potential tools of diplomatic leverage. The primary task of employing technology as a soft power tool is to pinpoint certain tech-driven areas in which the country has built expertise. Once identified, these areas can be concentrated and developed further. Investment by the state (both financial and human resources) in these critical areas that India has developed a comparative advantage in can cement the country’s leadership credentials in that particular domain. These areas of strength, when identified and developed, can translate into Indian influence in the global tech landscape. 

A framework India can use for this is to analyse the export capabilities and domestic IP innovation levels in certain areas of technologies. If India can export specific technology products on a large scale, it can positively impact the diplomatic aspect of the country as well. The biotech space, including vaccines and drugs, is an area that India can focus on. The other criterion is the ability of the Indian domestic tech industry to own IP and have a high level of innovation in a specific area of technology. The fintech ecosystem, including the digital payments arena, is where India has created a name for itself and has managed to penetrate external markets with international acceptance (UPI and RuPay are now accepted in over five different countries).

A framework for assessing India’s technological strengths

Principle 2: Foster Multilateralism as a Necessity for Tech Development 

The concept of self-sufficiency in emerging technologies must be re-examined with the Indian state championing and fostering multilateral efforts in its tech diplomacy outreach. It should be noted that there are no national industries but the existence of global supply chains. So the role of diplomacy will be central, not secondary.

In the technology sphere, diplomacy is not about seeking entry into an exclusive alliance or club but about maximising a state’s integration with the existing global value chains. Multilateralism in different critical and emerging technology fields should be more of an entrepreneurial decision to improve access and combine scientific or technical knowledge. In that regard, promoting the growth of open source technologies (and built on open standards) with very little or no entry barriers in the form of licences and royalty fees must be prioritised on the multilateral front. This can engage more stakeholders, improve accessibility, and increase multilateral efforts toward technology dissemination. 

But even with the case of open technologies, India must walk the talk. During the development of Covid-19 vaccines, there was a call by the developing countries to remove the intellectual property and licensing restrictions on Covid-19 vaccine research for public health reasons. However, even after the conversation on open vaccines at the World Trade Organisation (WTO), the Indian government did not open up the tech behind India’s indigenous vaccine, Covaxin. Hence, if India wants to lead and engage in multilateral efforts, opening up its domestic technology IP to the world should be a priority. 

Principle 2: Foster Multilateralism as a Necessity for Tech Development

This expansion of the technology-oriented Sinosphere has made other states take cognisance and increase diplomatic outreach to counter China’s ever-increasing growth. However, India, as a responsible technological power, can learn from China’s tech-driven influence in two ways.

Export Tech Infrastructure through Foreign Policy Projects: The Chinese government has exported digital infrastructure (hardware, software, networks and systems) with the help of their domestic private sector giants to many BRI partner countries. India can rely on its own foreign policy projects and initiatives to build digital infrastructure beyond its borders. This will ensure two things: One, it will build and support a robust domestic technology industry capable of competing on a global scale. Two, these digital infrastructure projects using Indian technologies (equipment, software etc.) will serve as strategic assets for the state and help increase the footprint of the Indian technological ecosystem. 

Focus on Key Battlegrounds of Digital Competition: The Chinese state actively pushes for their consumer tech to be adopted in regions such as Africa, Central Asia and South East Asia. The state has actively used its foreign policy projects, such as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), to get more partners on board and convince them to use technologies developed by China and its technology companies. The Indian state’s main focus should be diplomatic outreach through its domestic private sector firms to help set up infrastructure in regions still developing technologically. For example, Indian telecommunication firms such as Airtel and Jio can be used to set up 5G networks in regions like Africa and Latin America, which rely on foreign import of technology.

Taking Tech-Diplomacy Forward

Tech-diplomacy can only succeed when there is a push within the government, specifically the Ministry of External Affairs. A primary objective would be a foreign service officer within the government who can serve as the state’s official ‘tech diplomat’. The position of Tech Ambassador within Denmark’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the UK Consul General who serves as a Technology Envoy are specifically given the responsibilities of technology outreach. France's position of Digital Ambassador handles all international technology cooperation and diplomatic engagements as a state representative. The government of Australia appointed its first-ever Ambassador for Cyber Affairs and Critical Technology in 2021. 

These are some templates the Indian state can follow and curate a position specifically within the Indian Foreign Service (IFS) to handle technology negotiations for advancing India's national goals and interests. The role of existing Science and Tech (S&T) Counsellors under the Science Wings programme at embassies in Berlin, Tokyo, Moscow and Washington DC can be expanded to include technology outreach focusing on strategic cooperation, military applications and governance frameworks related to emerging and strategic technologies. The number of these counsellors should be increased and provided adequate technical knowledge or expertise to understand certain technologies’ geopolitical and geoeconomic aspects. This can help increase engagement and ensure India drives forward conversations on technology-related foreign policies.  

Finally, now that the MEA has specific divisions that have been created (such as NEST and the Cyber Diplomacy Division) under the ministry, a nodal agency can be established by the Indian state which can coordinate between the different MEA divisions, S&T counsellors and other foreign service officers specifically handling technology outreach at the multilateral level. The nodal agency can also rope in the help of the private sector’s international footprint to put forth the country’s case at global technology forums. The agency can eventually take on the role of coordinating India’s tech diplomacy initiatives.

India, in the long run, will benefit from being integrated into the global technology ecosystem and engaging with other like-minded nation-states through diplomacy. This would achieve its key objectives of economic integration and governance participation in the technology realm. 

This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit hightechir.substack.com

Antariksh Matters: Putting space ambitions in context

— Pranav R Satyanath

The Artemis 1 mission rocket stays grounded, ready to launch on another day. The North American Space Administration (NASA) made two unsuccessful attempts to get the massive Space Launch System (SLS) rocket off the ground. The first attempt to launch the Artemis 1 mission, the rocket's Engine-3 (SLS has four engines) faced a cooling issue. During the second attempt on September 3rd, NASA aborted the launch due to a fuel leak issue.. But the SLS stands tall to be launched another day.

The Artemis mission has raised the prospect of a new space race in popular media, with some even proclaiming that space is getting excited once again.

But the narrative around the space race is flawed, both in the context of the Cold War and the present day.

True, the United States and China plan to send humans back to the Moon by 2026. By pitting two countries’ space programmes, however, we often forget the domestic politics and organisational drivers of national space programmes. The refusal to open the ‘black box’ of domestic politics often skews our perception as to what really motivates countries to undertake certain actions, whether it is in the realm of national security or civilian space programmes.

During the Cold War, the US and the Soviet Union had set up their respective space programmes to achieve completely separate goals. In the US, successive Presidential administrations kept the civilian and military space programmes strictly separate, with NASA placed as the heart of all civilian space ambitions. The Department of Defense (and individual branches of the US military) took it upon themselves to drive the direction of the ballistic missile and missile defence programmes. Approval of budgets and high-level decision-making fell on the hands of the President, with each new Presidentsetting the course of the space program and fighting for NASA’s budgets in Congress.

In stark contrast, decision-making in the Soviet Union was decentralised. The Soviet military, in particular, prioritised the missile programme in order to match the numerical and technological prowess of the US. The technology derived from the ballistic missile programme often drove the space programme. In parallel, influential heads of design bureaus, namely Sergei Korolev (design bureau OKB-1), Vladimir Chelomey (design bureau OKB-52) and Valentin Glushko (OKB-546), led the way to propose space missions and rocket payloads to the higher Soviet leadership. The outcome of interpersonal rivalries between these men (and their design bureaus) often led to a disorganised space programme within the USSR.

While the Soviets achieved great success with the launch of the world's first satellite, dog, man and woman in space, the Moon did not capture the interest of the Soviet leadership, led by Nikita Khrushchev until August 1964 — three months after the first launch of the Saturn-1 rocket that carried Apollo astronauts to the Moon. The Soviet Union ultimately lost the “race” to the Moon as the motives and commitment to a Moon race was very different from what the Americans perceived Soviet ambitions to be.

Today, the new race to the Moon is also driven by domestic politics and marketed by domestic politics and asymmetric goals. The US aims to make its Moon landing sustainable with a long-term presence alongside its partners. On the other hand, China's goals are much more modest as it seeks to land humans on the Moon’s surface by 2026. To claim the existence of a space race often takes away the nuances of national ambitions and achievable goals. As policy wonks, therefore, we must be wary of catchy yet flawed narratives,

Matsyanyaaya #1: ​​Where Knowledge is Free and Accessible to All

— Bharath Reddy

A White House directive on 25th August requires agencies to update their public access policies as soon as possible to provide open access to taxpayer-funded publications and research. The move is expected to broaden access to research and yield significant benefits to the public on issues ranging from climate change to cancer research to protecting civil liberties in an automated world. This directive not only makes scientific research more accessible to the broader research community, it could also have implications for research funded by Indian taxpayers. 

This White House directive overrides a 2013 directive which required federal agencies with an annual grant greater than $100 million to make their research publicly available. The 2013 directive also allowed for a year-long embargo on the research and accompanying data. As expected, scientific journals use embargos to create exclusive access to research and gain subscriptions. Academics would also prefer to publish their research in journals with a better impact factor, which is a measure of the number of times an average article in the journal has been cited. The new directive expands the scope to all agencies receiving federal funding and ends the optional embargo.

This move is expected to radically transform access to research and has been praised by open research advocates and the research community. The New York Times quotes Mr Tanenbaum of the Open Research Funders Group as saying the policy “broadens the circle of science. It broadens the conversation”. This move could, however, have a significant impact on the current revenue models of journals. It would force them to look at alternative sources of revenue, which might significantly increase article processing costs. 

Publishing research in journals has been the conventional approach of communicating research. Journals operate on a subscription-based model. They charge hefty amounts from authors for publication and are only accessible by those who pay the significant subscription charges. These paywalled articles pose a significant cost barrier, and the costs can add up when referencing dozens of articles for a paper. Many people will end up not having access to such research unless they are part of a large institution that pays for a subscription to most of the journals. Studies have shown that across disciplines, freely available articles have a greater research impact. In addition, it is unethical that the fruits of the research funded by taxpayer money should not be accessible to the public. 

The trend has been changing, with more research being published in online open-access journals. Open access requires granting all users an unrestricted, irrevocable, worldwide, perpetual right of access with a licence to copy, distribute, transmit and display the work publicly and digital publication in at least one open access repository. Awareness and momentum around open access to research has been growing globally with many institutions across USA and Europe adopting open access policies.

India has had a policy on open access to the Department of Biotechnology (DBT) and Department of Science and Technology(DST) funded research since late 2014. Per this policy, any research partially or fully funded by DBT or DST or performed on infrastructure built with the support of these organisations should be made available in open access repositories maintained by their institutions or those maintained by DBT and DST. If the research is published prior in a journal that insists on an embargo, the policy recommends that the period of the embargo should not exceed one year. 

While this policy is laudable in terms of its intent, the implementation and impact have been poor. This can be attributed to poor state capacity and non-alignment of the journal and academic incentives. With the reforms imposed by the White House directive, the incentives and revenue models of the journals are expected to change significantly. This precedent could have a positive impact on Indian taxpayer-funded research as well. 

The MHRD must take the initiative to expand the open access policy to all government-funded research. In addition to setting up national open access repositories, high-quality open journals should also be set up in multiple disciplines to provide a credible platform for academics to publish their research. The journal editorial board should include renowned academics from around the world and be granted operational independence to ensure the quality of the research being published. The platform should not be restricted only to Indian research but must welcome excellent research from across the world. Over time the costs incurred will yield returns by providing broad access to research but also in nurturing and growing the research community.

These timeless lines by Tagore can guide us, “Where the mind is without fear and the head is held high, where knowledge is free”, “Into that heaven of freedom, my father, let my country awake”.

Matsyanyaaya #2: How can India use Technology as a Strategic Tool to Advance its Interests?

— Arjun Gargeyas

In the current Information Age, technology has become a ubiquitous part of every country’s society. Citizens are empowered in a wide range of ways with improved access to technology, states’ economic sectors are transitioning into the digital space, and tech development has been outpacing regulations and governance regularly. This is the era where technology is becoming a strategic tool for the state to drive growth and protect its interests. 

India, as a fledgling and rising technological power has the ability to leverage technology for the greater good. As seen from the past two decades, tech has simplified policy decisions and has improved the quality of governance in the country. The questions on accessibility, inclusion and levelling the playing field have been bridged by the use of technology to a certain extent. The Indian state should now start viewing technology and its adoption from a more strategic lens. But how can India use ‘technology’ to tackle existing problems as well as try to deploy it as a prospective solution in key areas of governance?

India’s Technology Assets 

Frontier Areas of Expertise and Scale - India must focus on identifying and building on certain technology areas where it has made and can make a significant global impact. This can aid its technology exports and help expand its international digital and technological footprint. Low-cost telecommunication operations, renewable energy systems, and digital payment frameworks can serve as model areas that India can use as soft power tools in the technology sphere.

Skilled Labour Workforce in Multiple Domains - India should look to leverage the presence of the abundant domestic human capital in the country to create a strong workforce in specific technology areas that might prove to be critically important in the near future. The availability of low-cost labour must be used to persuade technologically advanced states to look at the Indian workforce as a contributing partner to some labour-intensive supply chains. Semiconductor design and IT services are areas that continue to require large pools of human resources, and India’s workforce has proven to be competent in these fields.

A Notable Presence in International Technology Supply Chains - Though a rising technological power, India has become essential in key areas of the high-technology realm. Other states depend considerably on India for certain technology supply chains because of its comparative advantages and expertise in specific processes. This must be used to India’s strategic advantage and to ensure it remains a factor in the international technology trade ecosystem.

Research and Development 

The identification of critical technologies or key areas in technology supply chains to invest scientific and financial resources remains critical. The Indian state must consider extensive collaboration with the domestic private sector to enhance research and match global developments in specific strategic science and technology areas. This can eventually result in increased influence through a dominant domestic technology sector.

The focus on promoting research in technology areas where India-specific solutions are needed and are unlikely to be addressed by the developed world can be prioritised. Encouraging the use of open-source technologies to promote innovation free from state intervention, technology oligopolies, and international politics can help in India’s tech growth trajectory. This would make technology more accessible and more relevant to developmental challenges. Open-source technologies also serve as a counterweight to the dominance of Big Tech and aid technology sovereignty in an uncertain geopolitical climate. It can also bridge the trust deficit between the state and the citizens by addressing privacy and surveillance concerns.

While gaining a foothold in technology product development can create a zero-sum game between two or more parties, the scientific knowledge in the field itself is a non-zero-sum game. The Indian state should prioritise improving the dissemination of technical expertise as part of its technology strategy.

International Cooperation

The Indian state should not favour isolationism especially in the field of technology development. The process of collaborating in high-technology areas to tackle the existing bottlenecks in several supply chains must be one of the sector’s priorities. The principle of ‘plurilateralism being a necessity and not a choice’ while dealing with critical and emerging technologies must be championed if India aims to become a leading tech power.

Leading talks with fraternal multilateral groupings to build technological partnerships can be done. The Indian state should also engage in responsibilities such as improving technology-related trade, facilitating technology transfer agreements between participating states, and setting credible technology standards in critical and emerging technologies.

A good example would be to move forward on the recently signed India-Europe Trade and Technology Council to build a robust technology trade infrastructure. The focus should be removing export controls on components related to critical technologies and reducing import tariffs for high-tech products.

The Ministry of External Affairs must also take up a technology diplomacy approach to include science and technology as a source of outreach through appointed officials leading diplomatic conversations in the field.

A non-discriminatory data-sharing framework between states so long as the data in question does not infringe on India’s national security can allow India to be integrated digitally worldwide. This can include participation in multilateral technology data-sharing agreements if there are no compulsions to share critical data threatening its internal security and ensuring India's access to similar data from other signatories.

Finally, the state can lead global efforts to set forth universally-acceptable and legally-binding instruments on technologies that threaten the safety and security of all states. A techno-democratic alliance that prevents the control of specific technologies by selective groups, especially those potentially impacting warfare and conflict and detrimental to international security, can be led by India and its diplomatic partners.

Technology has become an integral aspect of international relations, foreign policy, military and defence in the recent past. As an aspiring world power, India should focus on utilising its strengths in the technological realm to advance its strategic interests. This would benefit both the Indian and society in the long run. 

Our Reading Menu

[Book] The Red Rockets’ Glare: Spaceflight and the Soviet Imagination, 1857-1957 by Asif A. Siddiqi.

[Op-ed] Making the case for a new geolocation data privacy paradigm by Jason Sarfati.

[Blog] Takshashila Issue Brief - Public Access to Knowledge Resources.

This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit hightechir.substack.com

Cyberpolitik: The Internet of Yesterday and Tomorrow

— Bharath Reddy

The foundation of the internet was built on three pillars:

* Reliance on the private sector, 

* Light regulatory oversight, 

* Free speech and a free flow of information. 

The hope was that these values would also be accepted as the internet would be accepted across the world. However this utopian vision is far from the reality of today’s internet. Gradually the internet has become less secure, more fragmented and less free. Authoritarian regimes across the world have been able to leverage control of the internet to shape narratives that strengthen their control. The US needs to recalibrate and adapt to this new reality. So begins the Council on Foreign Relations report titled “Confronting Reality in Cyberspace: Foreign Policy for a Fragmented Internet”. 

The authors propose a three-fold approach to confronting the new reality in cyberspace. Firstly, they recommend that allies need to come together to preserve a trusted and secure internet based on international standards. This includes working towards a shared policy on digital privacy, tackling cybercrime, and helping developing nations build cyber capacity. Secondly, there should be discussions and negotiations with adversaries to avoid cyber operations against nuclear command, control and communications systems, election systems and financial systems. This includes holding states accountable for cyber threats originating from their territory. The last recommendation involves getting the domestic house in order, which includes building cyber security talent, minimising domestic cyber security risks and prioritising digital interests in national security strategies.

The predictions of the end of the global internet are growing quite common. The predictions for a fragmented internet range from a splinternet to a bifurcation between a Western and a Chinese internet. With these possibilities appearing more likely each day, India needs to rethink its own approaches to cyber security.

Matsyanyaaya #1: Fission Factor: The Big Bet on Small Reactors

— Aditya Ramanathan

While the world’s attention is drawn to the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant, where Russian and Ukrainian forces are facing off, there are potentially more significant developments underway for the future of nuclear power. 

In July, the United States’ Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)  announced that it would certify the NuScale 50 MWe small modular reactor. NuScale’s reactor is only the seventh design which the NRC has ever approved in the history of nuclear power. It is also the first small modular reactor (SMR) that has received the green light in the United States. 

China is presently ahead of the US in SMRs. A couple of weeks before the NRC announcement, the China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC) began the construction of an SMR demonstration plant in Hainan Province. CNNC calls the project the first “commercial onshore small modular reactor” in the world. Once the 125 MWe reactor is up and running, CNNC claims it will be capable of powering 526,000 households. 

The SMR Promise

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) defines SMRs as reactors with up to 300 MWe capacity. As the name indicates, SMRs are much smaller than traditional reactors and modular in their design. For instance, the NuScale design is touted as being only  

“about 1 per cent the size of a traditional power plant’s containment chamber, though it delivers 10 percent of a plant’s power output.” SMRs are modular for two reasons. Firstly, assemblies and components can be pre-fabricated on a factory floor and then put together on site. Secondly, additional units to t can simply be added on site to increase capacity.

Proponents of SMRs have advocated their widespread adoption for several reasons. For one, SMRs need much lower initial investments and fewer operators and specialists to run them. Two, unlike traditionally large nuclear plants, finding the right patch of real estate for an SMR is much simpler. Three, proponents say SMRs are well suited to serve small communities and provide a reliable base-load for renewables. Four, the modularity of SMRs allows them to be easily scaled up as the needs of a community grow. 

SMR proponents argue that these reactors are safer because they are far less susceptible to human error and rely on passive safety features. For instance, NuScale designs don’t require external power sources to operate the cooling systems for their cores. Finally, if an accident occurs, the consequences with an SMR are likely to be much less severe than in previous nuclear accidents. 

While both the CNNC and NuScale reactors feature novel designs, they nevertheless draw from proven technologies. CNNC describes its Linglong-1 design as being a pressurised water reactor, while the NuScale design is a light water reactor. Both reactors appear to use clever design and engineering to simplify traditional reactors. 

This is a sensible approach to getting SMRs approved and operational. However, other companies are experimenting with more radical designs. The Ultra Safe Nuclear Corporation (USNC) has designed what it calls a Micro Modular Reactor (MMR). The MMR eschews water altogether, using helium as a coolant and transferring heat through molten salt. MMRs also use a ‘Fully Ceramic Microencapsulated’ (FCM) fuel, in which small kernels of Uranium fuel, each about 1 mm across, are encased in layers of ceramic and silicon carbide. According to USNC, this makes the fuel much safer to use and transport, gives it greater temperature stability, and makes it impossible to repurpose for military purposes. In April, the company started running a pilot plant for the production of FCM fuel. USNC expects demonstration units of the reactor itself to be operational by 2026.  

Besides these there are several other SMRs under development, including so-called micro-reactors from start-ups like Oklo and NuGen as well as designs from established giants like General Atomics. Finally, there are companies pursuing larger reactors like the so-called pebble-bed design as well as the Bill Gates-backed TerraPower’s molten salt design.

Nuclear Realities

For all the promises of SMRs, it’s worth keeping in mind that they are still a long way off. Even if SMRs are all they claim to be, it may be another two decades before they dramatically impact the global energy mix. Until then, renewables and traditional nuclear plants will remain important sources of low-carbon energy. 

There also remain many uncertainties around SMRs, many of which feature completely unproven designs. As with every other means of power generation, there are also likely to be some downsides. For example, a Stanford-led study concluded that SMRs could produce much more nuclear waste than traditional reactors. The study looked at designs from NuScale, Terrestrial Energy, and Toshiba and concluded that these small reactors would experience greater neutron leakage, which would, in turn, create more radioactive material. While such studies are by no means conclusive, they highlight how little we will really know until prototype SMRs run for years. 

SMRs are also likely to be subject to the same political and social uncertainties that afflict traditional nuclear power. The supply of Uranium fuel remains highly politicised and dominated by the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). And popular perceptions of nuclear power appear to be poor. Nuclear engineers may point out that the chances of a major radiation event at the Zaporizhzhia plant are very low, despite the ongoing fighting in its vicinity. However, popular perceptions are unlikely to make much allowance for expert opinion. 

Matsyanyaaya #2: How can the US-India iCET Succeed?

— Arjun Gargeyas

I know we talk about the intersection of technology and international affairs in this newsletter. This time I’m trying something different, elucidating the possibility of a new technology in India which can become the global standard and shake things up in the international E-commerce arena if implemented perfectly.

Over the last few weeks, we met with Mr Sanjay Jain, a member of iSPIRIT and an engineer closely working on developing the India Stack applications. This was to understand better the newly launched Open Network for Digital Commerce (ONDC) and how it functions. The ONDC was launched by the Department for Promotion of Industry and Internal Trade, Government of India as an e-commerce aggregator. The primary objective was to challenge the monopoly of E-commerce giants like Amazon and Flipkart while providing the local sellers a platform to be equally competitive. 

After having a couple of conversations with Mr Jain, who brilliantly explained the system’s backend, India had a sense of opportunity to set a global standard through which E-commerce operates. 

What is it?

ONDC is a massive network that acts as a facilitator for buyers and sellers. It is not a platform such as Amazon. It is built on leveraging the network effects and positive externalities of E-commerce platforms, while aggregating all existing platforms to be on the same network. It is currently developed on the Beckn Protocol, an open-source software protocol. Now, for comparison's sake, it is similar to the National Payments Corporation of India (NPCI), which handles all UPI transactions. 

Why has it been introduced?

One of the main reasons for introducing ONDC in India is the movement toward E-commerce while making it inclusive and accessible to the country’s large population. There is also the movement from platform-based to network-based technology in the E-commerce domain so that users are not locked into a particular platform only and can choose from multiple options. Including local merchants, sellers and buyers to make the network have over 15,000 retailers is another key objective of the platform itself. Increasing the share of Indians using E-Commerce (from 9 crores to 25 crores) and improving geographic coverage of E-Commerce (covering 75% of PIN codes) remains the core idea behind ONDC.

How can it become the E-commerce domain standard?

ONDC mainly revolves around two principles: Bundling and Interoperability. It helps separate the buyers and sellers while aggregating both on a single network. It addresses lock-in and unbundles E-commerce’s buying, selling and logistics aspects. Sellers need not register on an existing app but can come together with others to create seller apps with other retailers (location-specific retailer aggregation or delivery-specific services can have their platforms for end users to choose from). There’s no centralised payment processor, but seller-side apps determine the commission for whoever decides to get onboarded.

Can India use ONDC and implement it in different countries just like its digital payments system? ONDC can soon be a perfect solution for preventing monopolies in the E-commerce domain. It can also provide local entrepreneurs with a perfect opportunity to reach the end users directly without being bullied by big firms who prefer to prop their own businesses.  

The US has long been talking about breaking up Big Tech. Now, in the E-commerce space, ONDC has a shot (albeit a very long one currently) to become a credible alternative to the existing model (concentrated with a few giants who have captured the market) that other nation-states can use. With that, ONDC has the possibility of improving India’s own international reach (like UPI), thus helping the country gain some diplomatic heft in the E-commerce space. 

Our Reading Menu

[Book] From Space to Sea : My ISRO Journey and Beyond by Abraham E. Muthunayagam.

[Report] Green energy depends on critical minerals. Who controls the supply chains? by Luc Leruth, Adnan Mazarei, Pierre Régibeau and Luc Renneboog.

[Article] Technology and the construction of oceanic space: Bathymetry and the Arctic continental shelf dispute by Daniel Lambach

This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit hightechir.substack.com

Antariksh Matters #1: Spying on Spy Satellites

— Pranav R Satyanath

In February this year, the United States launched a nondescript satellite simply designated as NROL-87. Those who keep a close of space launches know that the NROL designation stands for national security satellites operated by the National Reconnaissance Office. The satellite likely entered a 284 x 425 km Sub-synchronous orbit with an inclination of 97.25 degrees. The NROL-87, also designated as USA 326, is suspected to be a new generation of electro-optical imaging satellite. This spy satellite, one among many operated by the US, kept to itself with nothing to bother its mission. Until now.

Earlier this month, Russia launched a nondescript satellite on board a Soyuz-2.1V from the Plesetsk launch site. The secret satellite, Kosmo-2558, was launched just as NROL-87 passed above the Russian launch complex. Space watchers like Jonathan McDowell quickly predicted that Kosmos-2558 would likely reach the planar orbit of NROL-87 within 80 km of the American spy satellite’s range. The orbital behaviour of the Kosmos-2558 resembles that of an ‘inspector satellite’, which, in other words, means that Russia launched a satellite to spy on another satellite.

Of course, the presence of inspector satellites in space is not a new phenomenon. Classified under the category of Rendezvous and Proximity Operations (RPO), satellites have been launched to either inspect or potentially attack other satellites in the past. Not all RPO satellites have malign intentions. For example, in the 1990s, Canada proposed using inspector satellites to verify arms control agreements in outer space. 

More recently, however, RPOs have been viewed with suspicion. The sharp increase in the number of satellites being placed in orbit has made it all the more difficult to predict the purpose of satellites which may or may not have military utility. Since countries do not disclose details of the satellites they launch, the lack of transparency does little to decrease uncertainties. 

Policymakers and policy analysts have considered several possible solutions to the problem of transparency. Some scholars propose a pre-launch notification mechanism under which countries not only notify others of the launches of rockets and ballistic missiles that are set to take place but also provide details about the nature of the launch vehicle or ballistic missile.

Pre-launch notification agreements concerning ballistic missiles have been signed in bilateral settings in the past. The United States and Russia signed such an agreement in 1988. India and Pakistan signed a similar agreement in 2005. No attempt has been made to craft similar agreements for space launch vehicles. One reason might be that providing pre-launch notifications might be because countries fear that adversary countries might take countermeasures against potential spy satellites. Such concerns were expressed as far back as 1958, as seen in the memorandum from the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) to the President of the United States.

Another solution that has been proposed to avoid the risk of RPOs is to implement a keep-out zone for satellites. While such an agreement does not require a verification mechanism, countries could choose to use space situational awareness (SSA) capabilities to enforce a keep-out zone agreement. SSA capabilities have their limitations as no single national system can currently provide full coverage of Low-earth orbit (LEO) and geosynchronous Earth orbit (GEO). Establishing a global SSA network is also challenging and expensive.

Although RPOs have not been a problem till date, they may become a problem in the future. Analysts have already begun to take notice of the increase in RPOs in recent years. If countries wish to mitigate the risks associated with RPOs, they must start preliminary negotiations sooner rather than later.

(The author would like to thank Aaron Bateman for providing access to declassified documents related to the US space progaramme.)

Antariksh Matters #2: The Indian Army’s ‘Skylight’ Exercise

— Aditya Ramanathan

It would be unusual for readers of this newsletter to find an entry describing an exercise conducted by the Indian Army. However, there was much about the recently concluded Exercise Skylight that was unusual, and that warranted an entry in Technopolitik. 

What little is known about the exercise comes from scant official information and a few news stories. The Army’s official Twitter handle described it as a satellite communication exercise. It went on to add:

“100% satellite communication assets were activated to ensure operational readiness of hi-tech satellite systems and exercise various contingencies.”

The tweet would indicate Exercise Skylight tested all of the Army’s orbital communications (which are scattered across multiple satellites) and that these systems were tested for ‘contingencies’. What might be these contingencies? ThePrint cited an anonymous source who indicated the Army wanted to validate its ability to use space-based communications as a redundancy during wartime:

“Conflict situations demand space-based communication because we are going by the assumption that the primary means of communication — terrestrial media — gets disrupted”.

Of course, the Army understands the vital advantages space-based communications provide. This is especially evident in the Himalayas along the Line of Actual Control (LaC) with China, where satellites can enable tactical communication well beyond the line-of-sight. 

The Russia-Ukraine war also seems to loom over Exercise Skylight. The Times of India cited an anonymous source as saying the Army was carefully following the use of cyber and electronic warfare in that conflict. In particular, the Army appears to be impressed by the resilience of the SpaceX Starlink satellite internet constellation, which Ukrainian forces have been using to coordinate operations against Russia. In the coming years, the Army is expected to look to acquire easily portable satellite phones and “satellite high speed data backbone,” which would likely require a constellation of low earth orbit  (LEO) satellites link Starlink.

Before it turns to LEO, the Army will be most eager to get its own communications satellite in geostationary orbit. In March, Defence Minister Rajnath Singh cleared the path for developing the GSAT-7B satellite for the Indian Army. At present, the Army shares satellites with the other services and civilian organisations. If the GSAT-7B is put into orbit by the planned date of 2025, the Army will join the Indian Navy (which already operates the GSAT-7A) and the Indian Airforce (which operates the GSAT-7C) in having its own dedicated communications satellites parked over the most suitable spot of orbital real estate.

Matsyanyaaya: How can the US-India iCET Succeed?

— Arjun Gargeyas

A couple of months ago, the United States (US) and India decided to enhance cooperation in the technology domain. President Biden and Prime Minister Modi’s meeting resulted in the Initiative on Critical and Emerging Technologies (iCET) announcement to expand the existing partnership between the two states in specific strategic technology sectors. 

One interesting aspect of the iCET remains the departments spearheading the initiative. Both states' National Security Councils have been responsible for driving forward outcome-oriented projects related to the iCET. The defence and national security angle behind the technology cooperation is clearly visible through this initiative. With certain technology sectors attaining a strategic status, the iCET has the ability to help the two states focus on technologies that might have a massive impact on the security and military side. 

These agreements, when announced can create a flutter of conversation and remain exciting on paper. But what are the actual policy implementations under the iCET which can actually translate into on ground impact for both the states? Are there areas of focus which can improve the effectiveness of the initiative itself is something to look at. 

A People-Centric Approach 

The single point of focus in the initiative should be the human capital model to achieve the desired outcomes. Technical knowledge is central to the overall development of emerging technology areas such as 5G, quantum computing and semiconductors. With human capital being the biggest strength for both India and US, the iCET will thrive if it is made individual-centric. The governments should facilitate this exchange of ideas and foster the talent pool that exists in both countries. 

One of the goals set by the initiative as per the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) was to forge better linkages between government, academia and industry in specific technology areas. This would entail cross-border human capital movement being essential to achieving those goals. Scientists, engineers and other researchers in both countries who are involved in working on critical technologies can have access to research facilities in both countries under the initiative. The exchange of STEM researchers between universities across both countries and industrial leaders and technology entrepreneurs engaged in developing strategic tech can help translate lab-level research into potential applications. 

An important area in the people-centric approach are the students and academic researchers studying in each other’s universities. Although this is heavily skewed towards Indians in the US academic institutions, this initiative can introduce academic fellowships for scholars to work and contribute to specific emerging technology sectors. This would help in IP creation and dissemination across borders as well as cultivate a thriving set of scientists and engineers who can contribute to technology collaboration at the government level.

Focus on Funding Specific Research Projects

As per the White House Press Release, the US-India iCET will involve the scientific government departments from both states. As per the press statement, the National Science Foundation (NSF) of the US, along with the Department of Science and Technology (DST) will drive forward the implementation of research projects under the initiative. The statement also mentioned that the US has agreed to join six of India’s Technology Innovation hubs. This is in the hope of spearheading over 25 projects across emerging domains such as artificial intelligence and data science. This sets the foundation for another area of focus for the success of the initiative. 

One of the main objectives of the iCET must be to secure funding (for research and product development) for outcome-driven projects that employ critical and emerging technologies. Enhancing technological cooperation between the two states and improving the efficiency of the initiative can be done when government bodies would indulge in funding crucial research projects on emerging technologies. 

The iCET must put its resources into funding and supporting specific research projects that can provide a solid output and outcome. The focus must be on emerging technology areas that have the potential to use said technology to create different applications and products to tackle some of the biggest challenges faced by both countries. Improving agriculture output, mitigating climate change effects and similar research can be prioritised for funding. Another aspect would be to identify areas of technology that might dominate in the near future and focus on them. Developing state-of-the-art quantum computer systems, and building telecommunication networks using 6G are just a few among the plethora of technology areas on which the iCET can spend its resources on. 

Our Reading Menu

* [Book] A Technological History of Cold-War India, 1947–⁠1969: Autarky and Foreign Aid by William A.T. Logan.

* [Article] Wargame of Drones: Remotely Piloted Aircraft and Crisis Escalation by Erik Lin-Greenberg.

* [Report] Securing Semiconductor Supply Chains: An Affirmative Agenda for International Cooperation by William Alan Reinsch et. al.

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