Technopolitik

Matsyanyaaya: The New CHIPS Bill Raises More Questions than it Answers

— Arjun Gargeyas

In the last week, the US Senate decided to advance a bill to promote and support semiconductor chip manufacturing in the country. The bill, known as the CHIPS Act, is an extension to the previous year’s legislation passed by the Senate which approved a $250 billion bill to reinforce US chipmaking to compete with the growing clout of China. 

With the global chip shortage receding and the production getting back to pre-pandemic levels, the US government pushed the bill through with the intention of improving the manufacturing capabilities of the country in the semiconductor industry. With China running its foundries at full-scale even during the height of the pandemic, the state has managed to slowly increase its market share in the global semiconductor manufacturing ecosystem. A recent Bloomberg report showcases how the last four quarters have been dominated by Chinese semiconductor firms and their operations. 

This has raised alarms among the Western states regarding the reduction in influence and market share in the semiconductor domain. But how much can the CHIPS act achieve the goals and objectives that the US government intends to? Will there be any unintended consequences and unfavourable effects that might arise from the act itself?

Subsidies to increase manufacturing output? 

The CHIPS bill seeks to facilitate the semiconductor manufacturing ecosystem in the country through increased subsidies and financial incentives for the domestic players. Considering the multifaceted benefits of improved chip manufacturing capacity, the US government looks to provide subsidies worth $52 billion to domestic semiconductor companies through the CHIPS bill.

One of the main reasons behind the advancement of the CHIPS bill is to reduce manufacturing dependencies on Asian semiconductor manufacturers and increase domestic manufacturing output. Another objective of the bill is to ensure self-sufficiency in the supply of semiconductor chips in case of another global chip shortage. But can subsidies translate into an increase in manufacturing? 

Historically, it's noticed that in technology sectors, pumping in money and favourable industrial policies cannot always translate into necessary outcomes. This is especially true for the semiconductor industry. A case in point is China itself. The Chinese government has provided a plethora of incentives, subsidies and even financed companies with the hope of improving their semiconductor manufacturing output. However, even its major firm, Semiconductor Manufacturing International Company (SMIC) took over two decades to make a mark in the industry. Currently, it still lags behind industry giants such as Intel and Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC). 

Though the CHIPS bill has the potential to positively impact semiconductor manufacturing in the country, the government should not imagine that this would completely insulate the US from supply chain dependencies. This might cover the domestic demand to an extent but international dependency will still remain. TSMC itself is building a new fab in Arizona looking to branch out from Taiwan. Manufacturing equipment still remains an issue with the need to import certain equipment from abroad. 

Also, there is the caveat of the bill stating how semiconductor firms would not be allowed to have any Chinese investments in their company if they benefit from the subsidies provided by the bill. Restrictions over the import and export of semiconductor products to China is also included when availing the benefits of the new legislation. 

The CHIPS bill will help spur semiconductor manufacturing in the country and cater to its domestic demand to an extent. But, expecting the bill to help the US attain self-sufficiency in the supply chain remains a futile expectation. 

Fab vs Fabless 

Another aspect of this legislation is the division of benefits and subsidies. The current CHIPS bill benefits the firms that have the capability to design and manufacture their own semiconductor products. This includes Intel which has the fabrication potential. The bill provides subsidies to build fabrication facilities and provides investment tax credit to purchase tools for use inside their factories.

However, the entire industry is not happy with this. Fabless firms such as NVIDIA, AMD and Qualcomm have expressed disappointment at the legislation. Fabless firms are those semiconductor companies that design their products but outsource their manufacturing to Asian counterparts. The new bill does not have any direct benefits for fabless firms as they do not build foundries or buy equipment. 

Such firms have argued this would help just Intel and is more of a rent-seeking opportunity for Intel to dominate the market. Unfair competition between the fab and fabless firms can result in the government choosing winners (in this case, Intel) is what the other companies are saying. 

These fabless firms actually support an earlier version of the FABS Act (introduced earlier in the House of Representatives) which provides tax credit on both manufacturing and chip design activities giving benefits to both the type of semiconductor firms. This version of the bill was also supported by the Semiconductor Industry Association (SIA). Though not officially opposing the bill, fabless semiconductor firms have questioned the impact of huge sums of money supporting their competitors.

Finally, the fact that the US has the most number of semiconductor fabrication facilities in the world can also hamper the distribution of the subsidies. Will the financial incentives be proportional to the market share of the company or will it support smaller manufacturers also? These are questions that the bill might have to address before finally getting President Joe Biden’s final signature.

Antariksh Matters: Space Dreams and Ground Realities

— Aditya Ramanathan

The Indian government may look to space tourism to sustain its human spaceflight programme. In a response to a Rajya Sabha question, the minister of state for science and technology said India was developing a homegrown capability to support space tourism. According to the minister, this capability would be developed via the Gaganyaan human spaceflight programme.

Singh’s comments come even as the government has acknowledged delays in the Gaganyaan programme, which was originally planned to be launched in 2022, to mark 75 years of India’s independence. That deadline has now been pushed to 2024. Besides the formidable technical challenges involved in any human spaceflight programme, Gaganyaan was also set back by the pandemic, which forced ISRO to scale back operations. Russia’s war with Ukraine will likely add to the difficulties, since Russia’s space agency, Roscosmos, which trained an initial batch of four Indian Air Force cosmonauts, has been heavily sanctioned by Western states. 

“Abort Missions”

Long before any space tourists (or for that matter, cosmonauts) take off on an Indian launch vehicle, there will come a series of tests. The first of these will be a so-called “abort mission,” slated for September and December of 2022. Having already tested the human-rated HS2000 rocket booster in May, ISRO will now conduct uncrewed tests of the survival systems. According to reporting in The Indian Express:

‘For the abort missions, the space agency has developed test vehicles that can send the systems up to a certain height, simulate failure, and then check the escape system. Gaganyaan’s escape system was designed with five “quick-acting” solid fuel motors with a high burn rate propulsion system, and fins to maintain stability. The crew escape system will separate from the crew module by firing explosive nuts.’

The next steps would be to integrate a crew module and an onboard “Onboard Launch Vehicle Health Management System” along with other elements. As ISRO chief S. Somanath recently concluded in an interview, the human-ready launch system “is yet to see the final shape”.

Creating an LEO Economy

India’s ambitious next step for human spaceflight is to launch its own space station. Such a space station is to orbit at altitudes of 300-400 km above sea level and have more than one module. However, Singh’s statement about space tourism is a reminder than human spaceflight missions are expensive and that states - and private companies - need to find ways to recoup their costs. The Gaganyaan project alone has a price tag of INR9,000 crores (about $1.13 billion). Sending Indians into space on a regular basis will cost many times more. 

Other spacefaring nations, in particular, the United States and China, have recognised these realities and are seeking to create self-sustaining low Earth Orbit (LEO) economies. While the International Space Station (ISS) is slated to be deorbited in January 2031, the US is promoting the creation of an ecosystem of privately built and operated space stations to replace it. The US space agency NASA has already selected and commenced funding of three proposed space stations: those by Nanoracks, Blue Origin, and Northrop Grumman. 

While it is possible that some of these stations will fail to work or fail to make money, the very process of designing, building, and operating them will help develop both the technologies and the institutional experience required for a vibrant LEO economy. India remains far behind the world’s leading spacefarers in these efforts. To send Indians into space on a regular basis will ultimately require more than space tourism - it will require a thriving private space industry and international collaboration.

Our Reading Menu

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Matsyanyaaya #1: Material Partnerships Today and Tomorrow

— Pranav R Satyanath

In June 1939, the United States Congress passed the Strategic and Critical Materials Stockpiling Act to ensure the steady supply of raw materials that were deemed to be critical for economic development and national security. Strategic materials at the time included those that were essential for nuclear research, like uranium and thorium. Although these materials were by no means rare in the form of natural ore, the rarity of these materials came in two forms. 1.) They were concentrated in a small number of locations around the world. 2) The process of refining the ore to useful purity was long and expensive. 

Of course, since nuclear energy could be harnessed for both the purposes of economic development and making nuclear weapons, securing these materials for one's own interests while stopping the adversary from doing the same became the top priority. Like-minded nations, therefore, had a keen interest in keeping their knowledge of strategic materials a secret, leading to agreements in the early years such as the Quebec Agreement of 1943, under which the US, Britain and Canada agreed to stockpile strategic materials and censor information regarding nuclear research.

In the early years of the Cold War, the Americans went many steps further to ensure that the Atlantic alliance provided a steady supply of strategic materials. First, through the Marshall Plan’s controlling body, the Economic Cooperation Administration, the US incentivised their European partners to produce strategic materials which were later exported to the US. Second, the US and the NATO members established the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM) to exercise control over the East-West trade on strategic materials. The goal was to restrict the export of material that were in short-supply, rather than use it as a tool for coercion. This is because it was assumed that the Eastern bloc was self-sufficient in most strategic materials.

Alliances and partnerships in the early days of the Cold War played an important role in securing materials that were deemed as essential for national security. But why is this history relevant today? Last month, the United States announced the establishment of the Mineral Security Partnership (MSP), whose goal is to secure critical materials that are deemed essential for economic development. The new partnership includes Australia, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Sweden, the European Commission, the UK, the US, and the US.

Today’s strategic materials (or critical materials) are quite different from the days of the Cold War. Lithium, cobalt, samarium, europium, and neodymium make up a bulk of the elements that are crucial for the production of batteries and electronic components. China has a clear dominance in the supply of rare earths, with nearly 90% of the global supply concentrated in the Bayan Obo region of Inner Mongolia. China’s dominance over rare earth elements has remained a concern for many years, with its monopoly over strategic materials increasing due to the growing demand for green technologies. Other concerns include the exploitative nature of Chinese mining in Africa, particularly the Democratic Republic of Congo.

The success of the MSP will be determined by how effectively the partnering countries can secure the supply of strategic materials and decouple from Chinese dependence. This not only means that the countries within the partnership bring together their own resources, but also successfully negotiate fair agreements with other countries, particularly resource-rich African states.

India currently lacks a coherent strategy for securing strategic materials. Since the security of these materials is highly contingent on India’s ability to partner with resource-rich countries, India must make every effort to join partnerships such as the MSP. Domestically, India must set up a Department of Rare Earths to spearhead India’s rare earth diplomacy and attract investment from foreign players

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Cyberpolitik: Does China See Everything?

— Ranjeet Rane

"Everything is seen in China." These were the famous (last?) words of a member of TikTok’s Trust and Safety team as per a  report by Buzzfeed last month. Tik Tok - the viral video-sharing app owned by Chinese tech company ByteDance - is no stranger to regulatory staredowns in the US. In 2020, President Donald Trump issued an executive order requiring TikTok to be sold to an American company or risk getting banned. TikTok contested the order in court, and later, President Biden revoked it. As it turns out, the reasons the Trump administration gave for issuing the order, namely the rampant collection of user data, including biometric data and its access by Chinese authorities, may not have been entirely incorrect. 

The Buzzfeed report that analysed recordings from internal team meetings points to unhindered access to US data in China despite assurances given otherwise. The chain of events set off by the report included TikTok’s response to a letter by US senators where it acknowledged that certain employees outside the US could access information from American users. The Senate Intelligence Committee has now issued a letter to the Federal Trade Commission asking it to open an investigation into TikTok’s repeated misrepresentations about its data security practices and corporate governance in front of US lawmakers. This was followed by a Federal Communications Commission (FCC) member writing to Apple and Google to ban the app from their respective app stores, citing national security concerns. 

Their concerns are not entirely unfounded. TikTok’s data harvesting and sharing models have come under continued scrutiny across the globe, primarily owing to the possible influence of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) over the leadership of ByteDance. This was particularly laid bare in 2018, when Zhang Yiming, ByteDance’s founder, made a public apology and shut down ByteDance’s joke-sharing app for having “content that goes against socialist core values”.

Interestingly, the executive order issued by President Trump came on the back of a blanket ban issued by India in July 2020 against a slew of Chinese apps, including TikTok, as a reaction to a bloody border skirmish. The explanation given in a widely circulated press release mentioned that these apps are engaged in “stealing and surreptitiously transmitting users’ data in an unauthorized manner to servers which have locations outside India”. National security concerns were being addressed through technology policy interventions for the first time - a template the US administration may now employ for its own interests. 

TikTok has responded with Project Texas - an attempt to keep all American user data on the Oracle server so that the data always stays within the US. But looking at the damage already done, this may be too little and too late.

Matsyanyaaya #2: How India and China can Develop a Geoengineering Governance Framework

— Arjun Gargeyas

In this week’s edition, I am going a little off-topic and discussing environmental policy and climate tech for combating climate change. Here is where the concept of geoengineering comes into the picture. 

What and why it matters

In layman’s terms, geoengineering refers to the human involvement made in the Earth’s natural processes to counteract the effects of climate change. It involves large-scale interventions in the planet’s functioning by human actions in order to mitigate the extent of the crisis. The main principle used in the process is reducing the CO₂ content in the atmosphere through human intervention. This would result in trapping less heat in the atmosphere eventually slowing down the effect of global warming. It is considered both as an alternative to cutting carbon emissions and as a field of ‘scientific taboo’ due to its research infancy and any probable implications on the environment itself.

The main field of geoengineering is the concept of solar radiation management, which involves reflecting a fraction of the incoming sunlight to cool a warming planet. One process is ‘stratospheric injection,’ which involves spraying reflective aerosols into the stratosphere. Attempts have also been made by Russian scientists in what they have called the SPICE Project. The scientists ended up pumping particles through a high-altitude balloon that would scatter them once reaching a specific height in the atmosphere.

However, these experiments were frowned upon by the majority of the scientific community. Fears were raised regarding how tinkering with natural processes might alter precipitation patterns and reduce crop growth in certain areas. Further damage to the ozone layer was also considered a possibility. This kind of blow-back risked unintended consequences for humanity as a whole. With no framework to govern the use of solar engineering methods, there is a need for someone to step in and ensure responsible development of the field.

Development vs deployment?

India and China currently have their task cut out while framing climate-related policies. This is due to the high population and the enormous volume of carbon emissions by both countries. Geoengineering and solar radiation management is a well-thought-out approach to building cost-effective models to tackle the effects of climate change. Natural phenomena and their subsequent aftereffects have buttressed the idea of this concept.

However, there have been recent calls to completely stop any solar radiation management research. The ‘International Solar Geo Non-Use Agreement’ was proposed by over 60 scholars (mostly from the West) arguing for a moratorium on research in the field. They claimed that the concept was still theoretical and that reflecting large amounts of sunlight can damage existing ecosystems and human settlements. While this might be true, it may not justify halting primary research in the field.

India and China have the possibility of driving forward the conversation on continuing credible research in the field of geoengineering. Both countries have been torchbearers for the rest of the developing world at climate conferences and both can work together to formulate a well-rounded governance framework regulating the research and technology in the field. If this is indeed a fast-track solution to tackle climate change, developing countries can indulge in utilising these techniques to meet climate goals.

While ethical considerations should be taken into account, the two countries can develop a holistic model (that also looks at potential negative consequences of geoengineering techniques) to have solar radiation management as a probable climate policy option. National agencies can be set up for funding solar geo-tech research and also keep tabs on the experiments being conducted. Incentivising development in the field must be a priority for both countries.

However, considering the historical criticism of the field as well as the concept of unanticipated consequences of human actions, the framework must be robust enough to account for the pitfalls of the field itself. Advocating for responsible use of these techniques must be a priority for both nation-states. They must ensure that any governing mechanism that deals with geoengineering processes and techniques must address the risks that might result from human intervention. There must also be a mechanism to deploy these technologies when considerable research has been conducted and the potential effects of using these geoengineering techniques have been identified. It is in the interest of both India and China to advocate for an enhanced research environment in the geoengineering field. This can change the way states approach tackling climate change and meeting their climate goals.

(This is an edited version of an article that came out first in Firstpost)

Antariksh Matters: Russia’s Satellite Dazzler

— Aditya Ramanathan

Fresh open-source intelligence suggests Russia is developing a fixed laser-based satellite dazzling system. In a new article in The Space Review, Bart Hendrickx, a veteran observer of Russia’s space programme, presents evidence that Russia is building a satellite dazzling system called Kalina at the Ministry of Defence-run Krona space surveillance facility in the Caucasus. 

According to Hendrickx, construction began on the Kalina project in August 2019. The latest satellite imagery shows a telescope dome is already in place. Hendrickx cites tender documents that suggest Kalina will feature a dome that can separate into two sections in less than 10 minutes and enable “the telescope to scan the entire sky all the way from the zenith to an elevation of 30°”.

Kalina appears to be designed to both transmit lasers and receive them when a target reflects them back, which allows for more accurate tracking. It also features an “adaptive optics system,” which is almost certainly the designed for its specific counterspace role:

“Kalina most likely needs the adaptive optics system to produce images of the target that are sharp and detailed enough to make sure that the laser beams can subsequently be accurately aimed at the object’s optical systems.”

Other Dazzlers Russia claims to already have at least one satellite-dazzling system in operation: the Peresvet mobile laser dazzler. First unveiled in 2018, the Peresvet was reportedly operational by December 2019. According to the Secure World Foundation’s latest Global Counterspace Capabilities report, the Peresvet “consists of a laser connected to a gimbaled mirror, all of which is mounted inside a truck-towed trailer.” 

The Peresvet is deployed with Russia’s strategic forces and is evidently meant to dazzle or disable both low earth orbit (LEO) satellites and aerial reconnaissance vehicles tracking batteries of mobile ICBM launchers such as the RS-24/ Topol-MR.  Hendrickx points out that it’s not clear is whether Peresvet and Kalina are meant to merely “dazzle”, that is, temporarily make the lenses on a target satellite non-operational, or whether they could “blind” a satellite, that is, permanently damage or destroy optics. 

What’s also left to speculation is whether these systems are actually effective: accurately aiming a laser at a satellite, keeping it on target for a sufficient period of time, and overcoming atmospheric attenuation, are all difficult tasks. Furthermore, many satellite lenses can automatically shut off when they are struck by blinding light. This may make it difficult to cause actual damage, but by forcing an adversary satellite to briefly shut its lenses, an attacker like Russia may still achieve its objectives. 

Indeed, one of the key attractions of such lasers is that they can be used in a variety of strategic conditions, ranging from peacetime and crises (in which they may only “dazzle”), all the way up to outright war, (in which they could seek to cause permanent damage to target satellites). Unsurprisingly, China appears to have an anti-satellite laser system deployed in Xinjiang, and reportedly “illuminated” a US satellite in 2006. In the coming years, it’s quite likely leading powers will field such systems on highly mobile land, naval, and airborne platforms. 

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Antariksh Matters #1: India’s Space Policy under IN-SPACe

— Pranav R Satyanath

On 10 June, 2022, Prime Minister Narendra Modi inaugurated the headquarters of the Indian National Space Promotion and Authorisation Centre (IN-SPACe) in Ahmedabad, Gujarat. The setting up of IN-SPACe promises to usher in a new era for India’s commercial space sector, as the organisation is geared to function as a one-stop institution for regulating space activities and providing entities in the private sector access to facilities run by the Department of Space (DOS) and the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO). 

The creation of IN-SPACe was announced in June 2020 within the pages of the Draft National Space Transport Policy published in June 2020, in light of the growing importance of commercial entities for driving innovation in the space sector. IN-SPACe is structured as an independent body within the DOS, and as of this writing, IN-SPACe has authorised two private companies to launch their payloads onboard the PSLV-C53. The structure of INSPACe’s regulatory mechanism is shown below.

Before IN-SPACe

To fully appreciate the significance of a regulatory body like IN-SPACe and identify its shortcomings, we must first see the regulatory arrangement present in India before the coming of this new autonomous body. The image below shows the structure of India’s space enterprise run by the DOS. Under this arrangement, it is clear that the DOS did not have any straightforward mechanism to interact with private space companies or regulate their activities. Since ISRO operated all of India’s launch facilities and a large number of research laboratories, it became a single point of contact for private companies, and therefore, a de facto  space activities regulator.  

The Structure of India’s space ecosystem prior to IN-SPACe Source: ISRO

As the private space industry in India began to grow, the difficulty of gaining access to gaining critical facilities and services made it all too evident that India desperately needed a new space policy. Further, the international regulatory environment on space sustainability also began to take shape under the Long-term Sustainability (LTS) Guidelines of the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (UNCOPUOS). India desperately needed a coherent domestic space policy to keep up with the international standards of regulating private entities and ensuring the safety and security of India’s own space assets. Within this context, the necessity of a new regulatory body for space activities was born.

The Current Structure of India’s space ecosystem Source: ISRO

IN-SPACe now and in the future

The existing structure of IN-SPACe promises a smooth process for private entities to:

* Be granted permission to operate.

* Be given access to facilities operated under DOS.

* Be granted permission to run their own facilities.

IN-SPACe also promises to share technologies and remote sensing data with private companies through a new remote sensing policy. The substance of these promises can only be analysed once the IN-SPACe begins operating in full-swing.

Some of the unintended consequences of IN-SPACe may be that it might act more as a gatekeeper than an enabler. Such risks can be avoided by maintaining the autonomy of IN-SPACe and reducing the role of other stakeholders in the decision-making process. Second, the DOS must eventually ensure that ISRO becomes a scientific research institution and cedes control of its legacy space launch vehicles to New Space India Limited, which must function as a fully private launch entity that competes with other domestic players.

Cyberpolitik: India Needs a Fortified Computing Ecosystem

— Arjun Gargeyas

The advent of the Information Age and the digital economy has brought the concept of computational capacity into the limelight. Advanced computing mechanisms such as high-performance, quantum, and cloud have taken over the field of computing. Nation-states (and even private companies) are embroiled in a high-stakes race to increase indigenous computing power for several strategic purposes. Harnessing this pivotal technological resource remains a priority for a rising technological society like India. With the country’s data generation at an all-time high, there is a need for improving the computational capabilities of the state by utilising emerging advanced computing technologies. 

The announcement of the National Supercomputing Mission (NSM), in 2015 by the government of India, was the first step taken by the state in the field of High-Performance Computing technologies. A jointly funded programme between the Department of Science and Technology (DST) and the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology (MeitY), a total outlay of Rs 4500 crore has been allocated for the mission over a period of 7 years (2016-2023). The main objectives of the mission were to spearhead research in the development of supercomputers and build a National Supercomputing Grid across the country. 

The implementation of the mission was divided into three phases. The first involved assembling supercomputers in India (till the end of 2018) and the second was meant for designing these high-performance computing solutions in the country (completed by September 2021). The final phase, which has officially commenced, involves the indigenous design and manufacturing of supercomputers in the country. 

Till the end of February 2022, there have been 10 supercomputers installed at various host institutions under the mission. However, considering the distribution of the top 500 most powerful supercomputers in the world, India accounts for just 0.6% of the total. While the national mission has kick started work in the field, there is a long way to go before India can develop its own interconnected structure of supercomputers.

The other major advanced computing technology dominating the market is quantum computing. While India has a dedicated supercomputer programme in the form of NSM, there has been no dedicated government policy towards the field of quantum computing specifically. However, the domestic private sector has gotten involved in the development of quantum computing hardware, software, and algorithms. The government has relied on partnership deals with major private firms to advance the quantum computing landscape in the country. 

In 2021, the government of India announced tie-ups with technology giants, Amazon Web Services and IBM India to improve access to a quantum computing development environment for the industrial and the scientific community. This led to the establishment of the Quantum Computing Applications Laboratory to build small-scale quantum computers. The establishment of the Greater Karnavati Quantum Computing Technology Park (GKQCTP), by the government of Gujarat and a research firm, Ingoress looks to house the country’s first-ever quantum computer.

Recent progress by the state in the computing domain has showcased the government’s intent to view computational capacity as a strategic tool to possess. However, the headway has been slow and adequate measures have to be taken to ensure India does not fall behind the pack. A holistic strategy is needed to facilitate the advancement in the computing field.

First, the ability to build advanced computing devices and facilities rests on a wide range of components and raw materials. It would be impossible for any state, let alone India, to indigenously manufacture the whole system from scratch. This is where the reliance on high-tech imports kicks in. Trade barriers such as export control mechanisms and import restrictions that still exist can hamper access to the building blocks of these systems. For example, advanced processors for supercomputers and cryogenic cooling systems for quantum computers are a necessity. But with existing export controls, indigenously developing them will take time for India. Cutting down on import tariffs, especially in the electronics sector, along with embracing multilateral trade agreements like the Information Technology Agreement (ITA 2015) must be the government’s priority. Moving towards a liberalised trade policy that embraces tech imports can help the country accelerate its computing programmes.

Second, there needs to be a more holistic vision for developing a nationwide computing grid. China’s recently announced National Computing Network can serve as a blueprint for India to scale up its computing infrastructure. The Chinese plan talks about a geographical approach to building data centres and computing clusters across the mainland. The concept of ‘Data from east, Computing in the west’ has been proposed, which involves the setting up of computing architecture in the less developed western regions of the country to handle the data stored in centres already established in the tech-aligned eastern region. A computing grid in India can follow a similar pattern with computing clusters scattered across the country. Till now, the government has focused on academic and scientific research institutions as hosts for large-scale computing systems. Dispersing these facilities across other locations can enhance and coordinate regional development also. Creating a better network can improve the functioning and efficiency of an advanced computing grid as well as handle large-scale data processing with ease.

Third, looking at the need to increase computing power from a military and strategic perspective can improve the computing technology being used currently. In an age of information warfare and cybersecurity threats, increased computational capacity is a necessity and a risk mitigation tool. Advanced computing facilities at strategic environments like naval bases, air command control centres and border outposts can help in the faster analysis and real-time data processing that contains critical military intelligence. India must focus on its computing strategy keeping in mind the defence and national security angle. Countries like the US and China are looking at advanced computing systems to simulate military operations and gain key advantages. India needs to leverage its computing capabilities effectively for defence and cannot afford to remain complacent in this domain.

(An edited version of this article came out in the Hindustan Times on 10th June 2022))

Antariksh Matters #2: The UK Wants to be a Big Spacefarer

— Aditya Ramanathan

On 23 June, the UK’s minister for science, announced four sets of proposed plans that he said were intended to encourage sustainable use of space. The minister, George Freeman, unveiled the UK’s Plan for Space Sustainability during a talk at the latest edition of the Summit for Space Sustainability, which is hosted by the US-based Secure World Foundation and the UK government.

The first of Freeman’s proposed plans is to strive “to lead in the global regulatory standards for orbital activities”. The second is to pursue international cooperation in the sustainable use of space. The third is to create what Freeman called “simple, accurate metrics” to gauge space sustainability. The fourth is to create a debris removal programme. 

The UK’s Outsize Ambitions in Space 

The UK has been a particularly active participant in international debates around space governance, sustainability and security. Last year, it released a national space strategy and in February of 2022, it published a defence space strategy. It was an early signatory of the US-led Artemis Accords that seeks to lay out ground rules for lunar exploration and commercial use. The UK was also a key driver behind the setting up of an Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) on space threats, which completed its first meeting in May. 

Commercial concerns are at the heart of the UK’s activism. Freeman’s own remarks at the Space Sustainability Summit made clear the UK’s ambitions: 

“As it was with shipping in the 17th century and cars in the 20th, the key will be regulation which enforces good industry standards and reduces the cost of insurance and finance for a satellite launch which can show it is compliant. With London as a global capital of insurance and venture financing, we have an opportunity to use our historic role in space science to now harness responsible finance for sustainable space.” 

While Freeman’s comments implicitly evoked the legacy of the UK’s historic maritime power, they are in line with the goals of the national space strategy, which set out five goals:

* “Grow and level up our space economy

* Promote the values of Global Britain

* Lead pioneering scientific discovery and inspire the nation

* Protect and defend our national interests in and through space

* Use space to deliver for UK citizens and the world”

The UK’s own space industry is small but growing. According to a report commissioned by the UK government, space-related companies and organisations generated income of £16.5 billion in 2019-2020, a third of which came from exports. Space applications constituted the biggest share of this income, at £12.2 billion, followed by space manufacturing which accounted for £2.27 billion. 

The UK evidently hopes to see this industry grow much larger, but there will be some challenges ahead. While the UK will benefit from its special relationship with the US and traditional ties with Europe, it will face commercial competition from both geopolitical friends and foes. Its ambitions to set regulatory and legal standards are also likely to be contested by China and Russia. And even small-sized rivals like Luxembourg could market themselves as more attractive destinations for the registration of space companies. Notwithstanding these challenges, the UK’s activism also offers a model for other states like India. Freeman is yet to provide details of the proposals he outlined, but there’s no reason India cannot develop proposals of its own, outline a national space strategy, or actively participate in ongoing talks on space security.

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* [Report] Boost-Phase Missile Defense: Interrogating the Assumptions by Ian Williams, Masao Dahlgren, Thomas G. Roberts and Tom Karako.

* [Research Article] Echo Chambers, Rabbit Holes, and Algorithmic Bias: How YouTube Recommends Content to Real Users by Megan A. Brown, James Bisbee, Angela Lai et. al.

This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit hightechir.substack.com

We at the Takshashila Institution like to begin with first principles. Since the beginning of our High Tech Geopolitics Programme, we’ve pondered the key ideas and approaches that ought to inform our approach to the subject. After many discussions, message threads, and chats over lunches, we’ve distilled our thoughts into a short and crisp Techno-Strategic Doctrine. This doctrine provides a foundation which India’s policy wonks and policymakers can use as they craft domestic and international technology policy for the Information Age. Like the lighthouse that graces our institution’s emblem, we hope this doctrine illuminates our path forward and helps us navigate the perilous shoals that undoubtedly lie ahead. 

The Techno-strategic Doctrine has been written in recognition of two important factors:

First, technology has become instrumental in augmenting the national power of states. The development of advanced technologies can help states achieve their national goals.

Second, the creation of technological capabilities, their use and control are highly conducive to cooperation, contestation and conflict along geopolitical lines. 

In recognition of these factors, the Techno-Strategic Doctrine lays down the path that India must take to pursue technological excellence and become a major power in the global order:

* Policymakers and analysts alike must recognise India’s comparative advantages in scientific and technological development, namely a large talent pool and relatively low-cost labour.

* India must pursue international cooperation with the goal of widening access to scientific knowledge, critical supply chains, and advanced technological capabilities.

* India’s technology policy must align with and enshrine the values of the Indian Constitution and the UN Charter.

The doctrine is divided into three sections. The Preamble encompasses the principles and values that guide the rest of the doctrine. The section on Objectives sets the goals that the doctrine must achieve. Finally, the section on Approaches explains what India must do, domestically and internationally, to become a global technology power.

We’d love to hear your thoughts on the doctrine. You can find the PDF version here.

A Techno-strategic Doctrine for India

— Takshashila’s High Tech Geopolitics Team

Preamble

1. Technology is crucial for India’s development in the Information Age. It is also an important element of national power. The acquisition of advanced technologies is not an end in itself but a means to bring peace and prosperity to all Indian citizens. Unhindered access to state-of-the-art and foundational knowledge is, therefore, in India’s national interest.

2. India seeks a global environment where technology is accessible to humanity. It will also promote a global order where technology strengthens the values enshrined in the Indian Constitution and the UN Charter.

3. India shall strive for effective technology governance that can contribute to all aspects of human development.

4. India must be prepared for cooperation, competition, and conflict in the areas of knowledge creation, human capital, influence, raw materials, and norms.

Objectives

1. To establish India as a major power in international affairs.

2. To invest in the development of advanced scientific and technological capabilities in the public, private, and social sectors.

3. To harness India’s capabilities in the technology domain to achieve national goals.

4. To promote sustainability by using technology.

5. To ensure that technology empowers citizens and safeguards constitutional rights.

Approaches

1. Since human capital is India’s biggest strength, it will strive to maintain the largest talent pool in every technological sector.

2. India will advocate the free movement of people, knowledge, and capital across national boundaries.

3. India will adopt governance frameworks that enable research and development, early deployment, and adoption of technological innovation.

4. In order to protect its strategic autonomy in the technological domain, India will champion open technologies.

5. India will possess top-tier capabilities for information warfare.

This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit hightechir.substack.com

Antariksh Matters #1: Fishing out illegal fishing vessels

— Pranav R Satyanath

During the Quad Summit held in Tokyo on May 23, the leaders of Australia, India, Japan and the United States agreed to establish the Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness (IPMDA). This initiative hopes to extend the existing mechanisms for maritime cooperation among the four countries and harness commercially-available data to put together a more accurate picture of the maritime domain.

The Quad countries also plan to use greater cooperation to tackle the issue of illegal fishing by Chinese vessels, as reported by Demetri Sevastopulo in the Financial Times. The report states that the partner countries will use space-based capabilities and existing maritime fusion centres to combat illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing carried out by Chinese vessels in the Indian Ocean. The problem of IUU fishing by Chinese vessels is not new, with the IUU Fishing Index 2021 giving China an overall score of 3.86 (a score closer to 1 being the best) – making China the worst performing among 152 countries.

Space-based capabilities to track maritime activities are not new and remain crucial marine safety and sustainability pillars. However, the Quad initiative to enhance maritime awareness through data exchanges is novel, as it brings together state-capacity, commercial capabilities of the partnering countries and publicly-available data to better monitor the maritime domain. There are three main ways to monitor and track maritime activities, which are likely to be used in tandem by the Quad countries. Each of these methods is described below:

Transponder signatures: Any vessel that ventures into the seas is required to have onboard the Automatic Identification System (AIS), a transponder which transmits data about a vessel’s set course, speed and manoeuvres carried out. Further, it also provides details of the vessel’s registry under the International Maritime Organisation (IMO), the vessel’s dimensions and its call sign. Although AIS transponders are not registered, they can be identified by a vessel’s unique 9-digit Maritime Mobile Service Identity (MMSI), which is included in all transmissions.

The IMO requires all international vessels weighing 300 gross tons or more to carry onboard AIS transponders. This requirement initially served the purpose of avoiding accidents and collisions at sea. Today, the AIS data, which anyone with a correctly configured receiver can access, has become an essential pillar of coastal security, monitoring IIUU fishing, tackling anti-piracy, and enforcing international sanctions.

International Registry: The registry of a vessel under the IMO is an authoritative and legitimate identification of a vessel. IHS Markit assigns each registered vessel a unique 7-digit identification number on behalf of the IMO, which can be publicly accessed free of charge. This number remains permanent, even after a vessel changes its flag (the country where the ship is registered). The IMO registry provides details such as the vessel’s ownership, physical features, and registered flag. It remains the most authoritative form of maritime identification.

Physical identification: The final way of identification is by a vessel’s physical features. Since the details of a vessel’s dimensions are already available in the public domain, it can be verified either by coastal surveillance or through satellite imagery. The use of satellite images has become commonplace in the shipping industry. Besides using optical images, new commercially-available technologies such as synthetic aperture radar (SAR) satellites have made it possible for private entities and NGOs to verify several aspects of illegal maritime activities. Furthermore, the use of machine learning to identify vessels at sea is also an upcoming technology used in the maritime domain.

International cooperation has always been an important initiative in combating illegal maritime activities. The United States, for example, has forged several multilateral partnerships to curtail IUU fishing across the world.

Based on the available details about the Quad’s IPMDA initiative, we can speculate that the fusion centres in India, Singapore, Solomon Islands, and Vanuatu will use the methods mentioned above to monitor and track IUU fishing activities. In addition, data gathered by coastal radars, patrol boats, drones and manned patrol aircraft could act as a force multiplier in their effort to mitigate illegal maritime activities.

Matsyanyaaya: A Roadmap for the Quad’s Emerging Technology Working Group

— Arjun Gargeyas

The official statement released by the White House following the first-ever in-person Quad summit in September, outlined the broad areas that the partners were looking at. From 5G and semiconductors to biotechnology, critical areas were identified for the alliance to develop a strategic advantage in. With the launch of the ‘Quad Semiconductor Supply Chain Initiative’, the group signaled its intent to establish itself in the technology domain.

Notwithstanding this pledge, there still exists uncertainties regarding the commitments made on the technology front. There is also the question of how much progress has been made by the member states regarding critical and emerging technologies. With the remnants of the COVID-19 pandemic and new geopolitical events such as the Russia-Ukraine war still affecting several technology supply chains, the Quad has to focus on three main areas to create an immediate impact in the technology domain.

Bubbles of Trade

Extending the concept of the ‘bubbles of trust’ approach that envisages better diplomatic relations between like-minded states, the Quad should set up a mechanism for the free flow of goods, labour, and capital-related to strategic technologies. Taking the example of the semiconductor industry, it is clear that key technology sectors have burgeoned globally and have relied on international cooperation for their growth and sustainability. This ensures that they cannot be restructured in such a short period of time. Robust infrastructure and an efficient value chain have been developed in high-tech sectors due to free trade.

But the current situation has thrown up several key challenges for the Quad to navigate. This includes protectionist measures resulting in high import tariffs and export control regulations preventing access to critical components for building key technology ecosystems. The military applications of these technologies have also raised the fears of weaponisation resulting in lesser collaboration efforts. 

The Quad should aim for creating a more liberalised and open market policy that helps the four countries indulge in a greater exchange of goods, labour and capital related to strategic technology sectors. Favourable trade policies encouraging the exchange of technology sector-centric trade must be a priority. The governments of the Quad should focus on developing a comprehensive trade policy suited or catered to building strategic technology ecosystems across all the states.

A Robust IP Protection Regime

With the technological rise of China and the fears of economic espionage, there has been a restriction on the transfer of critical technology between states, thereby hampering the level of growth and innovation in certain fields. This can be addressed by the Quad coming together to build a strong intellectual property (IP) protection framework. It can help in formulating transfer of technology agreements in critical technologies between the states without fears of IP theft. 

Securing technology supply chains have become a challenge due to the intrinsic dependencies that have been created in several areas. Technology transfers remain a solid solution to build resiliency in these value chains themselves. However, the qualms of the IP-owning countries have been the fear of these critical technologies leaking out and reaching adversaries.

A starting point for the Quad would be to introduce and ensure the enforcement of strict IP theft rules and regulations to facilitate technology transfer agreements. Prevention of exports, restrictions on domestic operations, and levying fines or penalties for specific firms violating IP theft guidelines will ensure innovation-based competition and create a favorable environment for multilateral collaboration. It must be noted that almost all modern-day technological powers have benefited from the transfer of technology from more advanced states. Hence, it remains in the interest of the Quad to share critical technologies between its alliance members. 

Joint Standards Development

The race for technological superiority has moved from the domination of market share to the establishment of governance mechanisms for certain critical technologies. This is where technology or technical standards come into play. Setting standards in crucial technologies have allowed states and companies to reap economic and geopolitical benefits. The Quad has the collective technical expertise to formulate and set technical standards in various emerging technologies. 

In recent times, there has been a steady increase in governments’ participation in the process of standards-setting. States are now openly advocating for certain technical standards to be adopted as the global ones which would eventually benefit the state and its domestic private sector. The Quad, as a group, must prioritise pre standardisation research as well as advocate and push for jointly developed technical standards at international standard-setting bodies. 

An increase in Chinese influence in these global standard-setting bodies has set alarm bells ringing in the West. The Quad can take over the mantle and establish committees to spearhead standard development activities in technologies like advanced communications, quantum technology, and artificial intelligence. This would put the alliance in the driver’s seat to set and formulate standards that will end up shaping the way future technologies might work.

Antariksh Matters #2: Can you ban space weapons?

— Aditya Ramanathan

Does it make sense for India to pursue arms control in space? The recently concluded session of the Open Ended Working Group (OEWG) meeting in Geneva has infused urgency into this question. The OEWG focused on how space threats could be reduced through norms, principles, and guidelines My colleague Pranav R. Satyanath covered the OEWG in the previous edition of this newsletter.

For our purposes, the OEWG meeting was notable for both the absence of any substantial efforts to ban space weaponry and for the lack of active Indian participation. This Indian reticence will keep it from shaping the future of space security. But to actively intervene in future discussions, Indians will need to agree on a few basics. As Pranav pointed out, states are debating about:

“whether to regulate space capabilities or to regulate space activities; and second, whether to negotiate legally-binding treaties or whether to agree on non legally binding transparency and confidence-building measures.”

This week, I’ll stick to considering the first of these themes: space capabilities. There’s been widespread scepticism about the prospects for arms control in space. One reason for this, as we previously argued, is that space warfare is essentially primitive in its current state – at least when you compared to the highly evolved systems of warfare on Earth that incorporate speciated weapons and platforms fulfilling niche roles on battlefields.

As two scholars with the United Nations Institute of Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) pointed out, potential space weapons are often ‘dual-capable’ systems such as repair satellites that can be used for more hostile purposes. In addition to these dual-capable systems, there exist multi-use capabilities such as direct ascent ASAT missiles, which are largely derived from existing ballistic missile defence (BMD) systems.

If potentially offensive space capabilities are either dual-capable or multi-use, can they really be curbed? To consider this issue, it’s best to look at key factors that usually help decide success in arms control. Paul Scharre suggests three factors that influence the feasibility of a workable deal: “the perceived horribleness of the weapon; its perceived military utility; and the number of actors who need to cooperate for a ban to work.”

We can add two more criteria to this list. One, whether the capability is dual-capable or multi-use. Two, whether verification of compliance with an agreement is feasible.

How do these criteria fare against the implements of space warfare? Since space warfare can be waged on both Earth and in space we must consider each category of weapons. On Earth, space warfare is waged with well-established arms and modes of fighting. The combat aircraft, long-range missiles, or elite infantry forces used to attack Earth-based space assets will not be subject to bans for obvious reasons.

This leaves us with those capabilities that directly target space-based assets. Specifically, these are:

* Electronic warfare and cyber attack capabilities

* Kinetic ASAT missiles (whether direct ascent or co-orbital)

* RPO satellites (such as the aforementioned repair satellites or debris- clearing craft)

* Directed energy weapons (such as lasers and high-powered microwaves)

* Any future space-to-Earth kinetic weapons such as the once-proposed ‘Rods from God’

The proscribing of offensive space capabilities would work best when:

* the perceived horribleness is high

* the perceived military utility is low

* the number of actors that need to agree is low

* the capability in question in not dual-capable or multi-use

* verification is feasible

The table below maps how five types of offensive space capabilities fare against these conditions:

Naturally, there is much that is subjective about arms control. In particular, ‘horribleness’ is a slippery concept. For instance, anti-personnel laser weapons that can blind people are proscribed while lasers that target weapons platforms are allowed along with all manner of other conventional and nuclear weaponry that shred or incinerate human beings. As a rule of thumb, weapons that specifically target humans are subject to much greater scrutiny than those that target things – even if attacks on those things leads directly to human suffering. Therefore, electronic warfare and cyber attacks, RPO satellites, and lasers that attack orbital craft are unlikely to elicit the visceral opposition as blinding lasers. The one exception to this rule is the kinetic destruction of satellites. While kinetic collisions in space may not directly kill anyone (though the resultant debris could notionally endanger spacefaring humans), they create serious practical problems and impose high reputational costs, which could, in turn, have serious diplomatic consequences during a conflict.

Candidates for Arms Control

The table makes clear that only one type of system meets all the ideal conditions for arms control: orbital space weapons meant to attack Earth-based targets, such as the so-called ‘Rods from God’ fanciful proposals for orbital craft that will unleash 20-foot-long tungsten rods that act like artificial meteorites, striking hardened targets such as bunkers or ICBM silos.

Despite their evident horribleness, such weapons would have low military utility simply by virtue of being highly vulnerable. To be able to get weapons on target quickly, the orbiting platforms would have to be in low earth orbit, making them easy targets for Earth-based countermeasures such as ASAT missiles. Any user would also need to maintain a sizeable a constellation of these platforms to ensure adequate coverage.

Besides this, no state has invested serious resources into developing ‘Rods from God’, meaning the number of actors is presently zero. Furthermore, any such platform is not dual-capable/ multi-use and their existence can be easily verified, since these large orbital platforms will resemble nothing else circling the Earth.

The other candidate for some manner of arms control is Earth and space-based kinetic ASAT weapons. On the one hand, these weapons possess some clear utility: destroying a satellite puts it out of action permanently and signals serious intent to an adversary. However, a closer examination reveals these weapons score low on military utility and high on horribleness.

Consider utility: the violence of kinetic collisions narrows down its potential use to the sole circumstance of high intensity conventional conflict. If used first by a spacefaring state, it opens itself up to retaliation in kind. Furthermore, to substantially degrade an adversary’s use of space, several satellites will need to be targeted. While non-kinetic capabilities theoretically offer the ability to disrupt multiple satellites for specific periods of time or over specific ground tracks, attempting something similar with kinetic collision could create enough debris to risk India’s own celestial lines of communication.

With high horribleness, low military utility and a relatively small number of actors (only five states including India have proven ASAT capabilities), kinetic kill ASATs seem like good candidates for a ban. However, the multi-use nature of direct-ascent ASAT missiles and the makes any effective ban impractical. What is possible is a ban on destructive ASAT tests. Back in March, we had advocated India unambiguously back such a ban. The following month, US Vice-President Kamala Harris committed the US to a self-imposed ban on such tests and establishing such a moratorium “as a new international norm for responsible behavior in space.”

Having already conducted a successful destructive test in 2019, India is in a good position to support an international moratorium on destructive tests with direct-ascent ASAT missiles.

Working out a Negotiating Position

India’s stance on space security is likely to evolve in the coming years. While traditional arms control is unlikely to serve as a foundation for its strategy, India may do well to propose outright bans on space-to-Earth kinetic weapons, and back a global ban on destructive DA-ASAT tests.

In the coming weeks and months, Pranav and I will examine the effects of the OEWG on space threats, consider ways in which India can best secure its interests.

[Book] The Shock of the Old: Technology and Global History Since 1900 by David Edgerton.

[Article] “Operational Monitoring of Illegal Fishing in Ghana through Exploitation of Satellite Earth Observation and AIS Data by Andrey A. Kurekin et. al.

[Blog] Artifice and Intelligence by the Center on Privacy & Technology

This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit hightechir.substack.com

Antariksh Matters #1: Dual-use Dilemmas in the OEWG on Space Threats

— Pranav R Satyanath

The first session of the Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) on Reducing Space Threats was held last week between the 9th and 13th of May in Geneva. The OEWG was created under the requirement of the United Nations Resolution 75/36 which called on member states to exchange views on norms, threats and behaviours in outer space.

Deliberations on matters of space security are not new. They’ve been taking place under the framework of the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS), with countries divided between two broad themes: first, whether to regulate space capabilities or to regulate space activities; and second, whether to negotiate legally-binding treaties or whether to agree on non legally binding transparency and confidence-building measures.

The latest set of deliberations have attempted to focus on the norms, principles and behavioural guidelines that can be established in order to make space a secure environment for all countries. However, since space capabilities and space activities carried out by countries are intrinsically linked, and since space assets have both civilian and military applications, any attempt to regulate space activities will have both direct and indirect consequences on the interpretation of international law. 

The dilemma of dual-use capabilities, was highlighted in a presentation made by David Koplow of Georgetown University, who pointed to the intersection of dual-use capabilities in space and the Law of Armed Conflict (LoAC). Koplow argues that by making it harder to distinguish civilian and military assets in space, countries may be violating a vital tenet of the LoAC. During an armed conflict, any asset of a country used for military purposes can be targeted by the adversary. Therefore, countries must separate their civilian and military assets to the greatest extent possible.

Making this distinction in practice is, however, a challenge as countries regularly use civilian assets for carrying out military activities. For example, civilian rockets are used to launch military satellites and the Global Positioning System (GPS) and similar systems are used for both civilian and military purposes. Some countries also use commercial Earth-imaging services for gathering intelligence on an adversary's military capabilities, making them potential targets during a conflict.

One possible solution to this problem was suggested by Almudena Azcárate Ortega, a researcher at the United Nations Institute of Disarmament Research (UNIDIR). Ortega proposed that countries could choose to distinguish their space capabilities into two categories:

Dual-use assets: Space capabilities that are designed to perform both civilian and military functions. GPS satellites and similar systems fall into this category.

Dual-capable assets: Space capabilities that perform civilian functions but that can be repurposed for military functions. Satellites used for debris removal or on-orbit servicing fall into this category.

Categorising space assets as dual-use or dual-purpose may indeed serve useful. However, some capabilities are more difficult to distinguish than others. For example, it is reported that  Ukrainian forces are using Starlink satellites for assisting in drone strikes in Russia. Starlink is a space-based Internet service provided by the American company SpaceX. It is alleged that Russia attempted to cyberattacks on Starlink in order to prevent its use by Ukrainian forces.

As dual-use space technologies proliferate to more countries, the need for regulating both capabilities and activity will likely become a greater challenge for the international community.

Cyberpolitik: China's Position in OEWG (2021-2025) on Information Security

— Megha Pardhi

Between 28 March and 1 April 2022, the UN held the second substantive session of the "Open-ended Working Group on the Security of and the use of Information and Communications Technologies" (OEWG (2021-2025)). This is the second such working group constituted by the UN on information security. The OEWG (2021-2025) was formed in Nov 2020 and commenced in 2021. The final report of the working group will be presented to the UN General Assembly in 2025.

These working groups are the international community's attempts to shape norms governing cyberspace. Developing norms of behavior in cyberspace has been a contested issue for a long time. Russia was among the first countries to propose rules and norms on cyberspace. However, early attempts fell prey to geopolitical tug of war.

In the recently concluded session, many countries have put out statements expressing their position, suggestions, and concerns. In the statement released by the Chinese delegation, the Chinese government seems more worried about cyberspace norms being used against China or basically whoever does not fit into the US' definition of acceptability. 

The Chinese delegation made four key points:

* Maintaining peace in cyberspace is crucial. The division of cyberspace into peaceful and non-peaceful periods would send the wrong signal to the international community.

* Security of cyberspace is necessary for all countries. The statement also has the usual rhetoric of abandoning 'Zero-sum thinking' and 'cold war' mentality.

* First mover advantage in cyberspace should not be weaponized. China objected to the use of unilateral sanctions and weaponizing the first-mover advantage 'some countries' have over others.

* The Chinese statement reflected that some countries are creating "deliberately creating closed, exclusive circles for discussing supply chain issues."

Objections over the division of activities in the peaceful and non-peaceful periods are understandable. Activities in cyberspace tend to intersect personal and state matters. Wars often blur this distinction. However, normalizing such division in cyberspace might set a dangerous precedent for the norms of behavior in cyberspace.

There is a veiled reference to the Quad in the statement. The reference to "closed, exclusive circles for discussing supply chain issues" is similar to the terminology used when Chinese leaders and foreign ministry spokespersons talk about Quad and AUKUS. This again reflects the fact that the Quad and AUKUS have got Beijing worried about similar groupings emerging in cyberspace. Beijing's fear of isolation might seem contradictory as China's own 'Great Firewall' has strived to separate Chinese cyberspace from the world. However, there is a difference between choosing to stay isolated and being forced to isolate. Currently, Beijing decides the rules of operation in China's cyberspace. If states form an alliance to isolate China in cyberspace, the rules would be different. The Chinese government understands it could be detrimental to China's long-term interests.

Additionally, the point of reference to the Quad and AUKUS is not just Beijing's fear of isolation. These references and the complaints of a 'cold war' mentality also mean China is trying to project itself as a norms follower while projecting others as 'arm twisting' bullies trying to get their own way. This is most evident in the fourth point of China's statement which roughly says, "this makes people doubt that the real goal of some countries participating in the UN information security process is to build 'international rules of cyberspace that other countries abide by, but they are above all countries’" (这令人不得不怀疑，某些国家参与联合国信息安全进程的真实目标是，构建 "其他各国都遵守，而其自身则凌驾于各国的网络空间国际规则").

The war in Ukraine also loomed over the second session of the OEWG (2021-2025). Some states expressed concerns over the way Ukraine War will shape behavior in cyberspace and objections and statements over cyber activities during the war. China's objection to the use of unilateral sanctions and weaponizing first-mover advantage by 'some countries' most likely refers to the sanctions imposed by US and allies on Russia. Again, Chinese leaders have used similar terminology to express their displeasure over sanctions on Russia.

Antariksh Matters #2: How Adversaries Might Challenge India’s Use of Space

— Aditya Ramanathan

Sceptics sometimes ask me how, in fact, India’s space assets could be threatened in the future and what forms such threats could take. It’s true that it’s hard to envisage what such attacks might look like. Our understanding of space warfare is limited by a merciful lack of precedence. 

Limited as our understanding may be, it’s worth trying to think of the conditions under which India’s chief adversaries, China and Pakistan, might use space warfare capabilities against it. Broadly, India could face space warfare under three types of circumstances: peacetime (meaning the absence of unusual tensions), crisis (a spike in tensions and/or standoffs, skirmishes) or conflict (a state of violent hostilities in one or more theatres).

In the table below, I attempt to map the tools of space warfare to the circumstances India is likely to face.

Peacetime 

In peacetime, adversaries will focus on demonstrating capabilities, probing defences, mounting disruptive cyber attacks, and infiltrating computer worms and viruses. Demonstrations of capabilities can help an adversary deter future threats. These could include ‘dazzling’ satellites with lasers, electronic jamming or spoofing, or conducting non-kinetic rendezvous and proximity operations around a satellite.

Crises

In crises, adversaries will primarily want to signal not just the existence of a capability but also the resolve to use it imminently if its demands are not met. Therefore, while an RPO craft circling around a satellite in peacetime is mainly a demonstration of capability, in a crisis, it is a coercive act meant to shape the outcomes of high stakes bargaining. 

Conflict

In conflict, the tools of space warfare will most likely be used for effect – to actively deny the use of space and consequently degrade the effectiveness of the adversary’s Earth-based forces. An adversary could strike in six ways during a conflict:

 A splendid first strike could deny India the effective use of space. Such a strike, usually carried out at the outset of a conflict (the frequently discussed ‘space Pearl Harbor’), would probably be part of a broader plan to degrade Indian forces with simultaneous strikes in space and on Earth. 

A graduated response would involve managing an exchange of blows and seeking to end it on favourable terms. This would entail targeting specific space capabilities in retaliation and attempting to dissuade the other side from further action.

A focused strike targets specific capabilities for a finite set of time in a bid to degrade specific Earth-based capabilities. An Indian strike on Chinese ISR satellites over the Indian Ocean is an example of such a strike.

Disruptive strikes create uncertainty about the reliability of space assets. These are low grade, seemingly random strikes that force the state under attack to continually react rather than seize the initiative.

Disproportionate retaliation occurs in response to a smaller strike and is meant to dissuade the adversary from launching further attacks. Disproportionate retaliation must remain partial or temporary to provide the adversary an incentive to halt space warfare.

A catalytic strike seeks to precipitate third party intervention in a conflict and force its termination on the best terms available. The American political scientist Vipin Narang  argues that Pakistan has, in the past, used the catalytic threat of nuclear strikes to hasten American intervention in crises with India. A kinetic attack from a future Pakistani ASAT missile could catalyse frantic calls for ending a conflict that is tilting in India’s favour.

To be clear, none of these types of strikes falls into discrete or self-contained categories. A focused strike can lead to a graduated response, which can, in turn, devolve into disruptive strikes or escalate into disproportionate retaliation. These categories are simply meant to clarify the likely intent behind the waging of space warfare. 

There are reasons for the aforementioned sceptics to be, well, sceptical about the value of an exercise such as this. In the real world, any target state would find it difficult to accurately gauge an adversary’s intentions while an attack is underway. Also, future contingencies are likely to take unexpected forms and contain surprises. However, the value of this sort of undertaking is that it can (a) help clarify the sort of situations that can trigger an attack on space assets, (b) provide clarity on the sort of challenges India will need to deter in the coming years. As the much-used adage goes, plans are useless but planning is indispensable.

Siliconpolitik: The Transatlantic Semiconductor Alliance in the Making

— Pranay Kotasthane

(First published on takshashila.org.in)

Over the last couple of years, we have consistently argued that in order to make the semiconductor supply chain resilient, plurilateral cooperation is a necessity, not a choice. Subsidising semiconductor firms in the hope of achieving national self-sufficiency is counterproductive and futile. Futile in the limited sense that such measures won’t achieve the aim of full indigenisation. Counterproductive because a sole focus on domestic subsidies would displace the opportunity to really make a resilient, China-independent, cutting-edge semiconductor supply chain.

Nevertheless, as it so often happens, subsidies are an easier policy option. This pro-business instrument—as against a pro-market one—also suits semiconductor firms better. Subsidies finance their heavy capital investments in the short term. And so, we had a number of national governments—the US, the EU, Japan, South Korea, China, India, and Taiwan to name a few—launch their own versions of semiconductor subsidy programmes.

However, it does seem that the tide is now turning from a public and foreign policy perspective. Apart from subsidies, governments are now realising the value of coordinating their efforts. In an earlier post, I had discussed a reported semiconductor alliance involving the US, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. Although we haven’t heard about this grouping since then, there is now a new grouping that we need to take note of.

The US and EU announced a new initiative on similar lines as part of the US-EU Trade and Technology Council (TTC) that concluded in Paris on Monday, 16th May. The detailed joint statement shows that the scope of this transatlantic partnership on technology is vast. Initiatives were announced on areas as diverse as solar supply chains, climate and cleantech, rare earth materials, technology standards and semiconductors. For this post, let’s focus on understanding what the announcements on semiconductors mean to the US, the EU, and India.

The Transatlantic Approach for Semiconductors

As part of the initiative, the two parties agreed on two key areas:

* That the US and the EU will coordinate their respective chip investments so that it doesn’t end up being a ‘subsidy race’ to the bottom. In practice, this means that the US and EU are likely to share information with each other on their planned fab investments, the companies they plan to target, and so on. In ideal circumstances, they would like to reach a stage where the EU has enough production capacity for automotive chips, while the US invests in production capacity for leading-edge nodes. In the future, the two partners would also want to agree on preferential treatment for their own fabless companies to access the fabs in each other’s national jurisdiction. For now, they have agreed on consulting each other on subsidies for semiconductor firms.

* The two partners also agreed to develop an early warning detection system for supply chain disruptions. A similar announcement was also made as part of the Quad Semiconductor Supply Chain initiative during the last Summit meeting, where the four members agreed to “map capacity, identify vulnerabilities, and bolster supply-chain security for semiconductors and their vital components.” The motivation for this initiative is to keep a closer eye on wafer capacities across the globe so that stockpiling or additional capacity addition can be coordinated.

Both the moves indicate the willingness to collaborate with partners instead of going it all alone.

The India Angle

These moves are consequential for India. Apart from the US, the EU has a Trade and Technology Council arrangement with just one other nation-state—India. India should use this arrangement and become a part of this semiconductor supply chain alliance. There’s also the opportunity to combine the US-EU effort with the Quad’s Semiconductor Supply Chain Initiative, as the goals of the two mechanisms are identical.

With these new semiconductor alliances taking shape, it’s important for India to become a part of these formations. Foreign Policy in the Information Age needs to go beyond the traditional defensive approach of ‘protecting’ one’s critical technologies and instead become a key driver for enhancing India’s high-tech power.

Our Reading Menu

[Article] Why Drones Have Not Revolutionized War: The Enduring Hider-Finder Competition in Air Warfare by Antonio Calcara, Andrea Gilli, Mauro Gilli, Raffaele Marchetti, Ivan Zaccagnini

[Book] The Atlas of AI: Power, Politics, and the Planetary Costs of Artificial Intelligence by Kate Crawford

This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit hightechir.substack.com

Antariksh Matters #1: Telangana’s SpaceTech Framework

— Aditya Pareek

In its latest policy document, “SpaceTech Framework”, the Government of Telangana acknowledges the central role of private enterprise in the rapidly growing global space economy. The twelve page long document lays down a framework to nurture the state’s own private space tech sector. There is a notable focus on enabling entrepreneurship in both upstream and downstream applications as well as removing many bottlenecks and regulatory hurdles.

The policy seeks to attract global investment and setup partnerships with international entities to boost space related manufacturing in the state. Telangana also wishes to become a globally preferred destination for setting up new space related ventures and as a sandbox or testbed for SpaceTech applications like remote sensing. The framework laid out to achieve these objectives, has four key policy pillars - enabling access to infrastructure, business facilitation & collaboration, skill development & training, promoting research and innovation. The policy also pays due regard to involving varied stakeholders and deriving socio-economic benefits across areas & sectors - such as agriculture, insurance, urban development & planning, disaster management, digital connectivity and ecological protection etc.    

Hyderabad, Telangana’s capital, already has many advantages, including being the base of institutions and high-tech facilities like ISRO’s National Remote Sensing Centre (NRSC) and the International Advanced Research Centre for Powder Metallurgy and New Materials (ARCI). Telangana has also contributed a significant share to ISRO’s national space efforts, most recently with supplying almost 30% of parts used in India’s Mars Orbiter Mission(MOM).

Building on this momentum, the Government of Telangana has identified a “space market value chain”, which stretches from identifying end users to the upstream manufacturing sub sectors. To support this value chain, Telangana aims to encourage public private partnerships and the sharing of expensive high-tech testing and Research & Development(R&D) facilities by both government institutions and startups who can’t afford to set up their own. Some specifically identified R&D and testing facilities apart from the above mentioned ISRO-NRSC and ARCI include - Electronics Corporation of India Limited(ECIL) and the regional complexes of Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO). By identifying some high-impact use cases, the Government of Telangana also aims to prioritise solving problems which are pressing and have a direct impact on the state, its industry, populous and the nation at large.

The government of Telangana also plans to provide competitively priced land in strategic locations inside the state for SpaceTech companies to set up their facilities - including commercial ground stations for satellite constellations. Telangana also has plans for an INR 1,300 crore fund meant for supporting startups under its Information and Communicational Tech.(ICT) policy, the policy explicitly says that space tech startups would also be eligible for support from this fund. 

As a way to harmonise its other high-tech initiatives such as Telangana’s AI Mission (T-AIM) and Open Data Platform, the policy also advocates for the State Government, Union Government and space tech companies involved in geospatial applications like earth observation, to synergise all efforts. Furthering the cause for synergising the state’s development goals and national space endeavours, Telangana hopes to facilitate partnerships between its own space tech industry and national Public Sector Undertakings (PSU), Union Government agencies, and foreign companies.

The Government of Telangana also plans to support individuals and startups in the space tech sector with Intellectual Property (IP) development and preservation by providing advisory services in filing patents and ensuring legal compliance both domestically and internationally. The focus is also on the insurance, banking and financial services sectors. The policy highlights the need for a better understanding in analysing the risk associated with building and operating big ticket items like privately owned and built space launch vehicles and satellites. 

Matsyanyaaya: How Does the India-EU Trade and Technology Council Work?

— Arjun Gargeyas

I had written long back in this newsletter about the proposed US-EU Trade and Technology Council and how it actually reveals the fissures that divide them with respect to technology cooperation and regulation. 

Fast forward to the present and we have the president of the European Union (EU), Ursula von der Leyen visiting India during the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war. An interesting aspect of the visit was the harmony between both India and the EU on most matters with the exception of the Ukraine war. But the highlight of the visit was the establishment of the India-EU Trade and Technology Council modeled after the US-EU agreement. 

This is the first time India has signed any such agreement with any of its partners. It will allow the two partners to address challenges in trade, trusted technology, and security, deepening cooperation in these fields. The primary objective behind the agreement is to ensure both sides can work in collaboratively in fields such as 5G, artificial intelligence, climate modelling, and health-related technology.

While the talks behind the proposed India-EU Free Trade Agreement (FTA) have gone on for over a decade, this agreement comes as a positive step towards building a partnership between India and its third-largest trading partner. It should also be noted that the EU has extended this kind of agreement in technology-related domains only to the US and India thus far. 

Reports say that the Trade and Technology Council will provide the political steer and the necessary structure to operationalise political decisions, coordinate technical work, and report to the political level to ensure implementation and follow-up in areas that are important for the sustainable progress of European and Indian economies. 

The current Technology Council between the US and EU has introduced the concepts of different working groups and departments in charge of translating the political decisions into actual deliverables. These working groups range from investment screening, climate technologies, and supply chain resiliency among others. A similar working setup is likely to be adopted in the India-EU agreement depending on the comparative advantages that both partners have to offer in the technology markets.

But one of the other questions that still needs to be answered is the effectiveness of the agreement. This depends on the extent to which the EU is amenable to sharing critical technology with India. There are some strategic areas of technology that domain leaders like the EU might not be willing to pass on to India. The question of how they can navigate this kind of impasse can determine the extent to which the agreement can flourish. 

Similar to the US-EU Trade and Tech Council agreement, this agreement will have the clouds of technology regulation hanging over it. Both partners view the process of regulating technology from a different perspective. The differences in the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and India’s proposed Personal Data Protection Bill highlights the change in approach taken by both parties. Finding a common ground to important questions like these is imperative if the signed agreement can actually result in deliverables. 

It is indeed a welcome surprise that the India-EU Trade and Technology Council has been initiated considering the indecisiveness that existed in finalising the FTA. This offers a great opportunity for both countries to tap into each other’s strengths and overcome their weaknesses in the technology sector through consistent cross-border trade and flow of labour, capital and IP.

Antariksh Matters #2: ISRO’s Annual Report Looks at Both Hits and Misses

— Pranav R. Satyanath

The Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) released its annual report last month, which highlights the organisation’s major activities in the past year and plans for future missions and satellite launches. Main highlights of the report are as follows:

ISRO’s accomplishments in developing indigenous navigation capability:

The Navigation Indian Constellation (NavIC) consists of a constellation of eight satellites which provide standard positioning services for civilian use and restricted services for the government and military services. According the the report, ISRO has worked towards enabling NavIC services on mobile devices, and integrated the Second Generation Distress Alert Transmission (SG-DAT) to provide services such as the broadcasting distress alerts in remote locations.

Advancements in indigenous launch capabilities

According the ISRO’s annual report, there have been two major improvements in the development of indigenous launch capabilities, First, the development of the three-stage solid-fueled Small Satellite Launch Vehicle (SSLV) which can launch small satellites weighing upto 500 kg into Low Earth Orbit (LEO). Second, the development of the Reusable Launch Vehicle (RLV) is currently under initial ground-testing stage using a demonstration vehicle.

Development of the Gaganyaan Human Space Flight mission

The 2021-2022 annual report provides a greater level of detail into the Gaganyaan Programme in comparison to last year’s year’s report. Information regarding the design of the orbital module, crew module and the parameters of testing along with the results of the initial testing of the service module propulsion systems have been provided. Although an initial date for the launch is yet to be confirmed, it is likely that the first unmanned launch will occur some time in 2023.

Other highlights include ISRO’s steps in building space situational awareness (SSA) capabilities. The report highlights the  use of the  radars and electro-optical telescope for tracking objects up to 10cam or higher in LEO, and tracking objects 40cm or higher in Geosynchronous Earth Orbit (GEO). In March 2022, ISRO released its first report on Space Situational Assessment, which goes into greater detail regarding India’s debris mitigation activities. During the recent US-India 2+2 Ministerial Dialogue, India and the US signed a Memorandum of Understanding on SSA cooperation. The US currently operates the world’s largest SSA network, called the United States Space Surveillance Network and provides open-access data of all indexed objects in space.

Although ISRO’s annual report highlights several developments in the past year, it is also a reminder of some of the key shortcomings that India faces in the space sector. The most prominent of which is the lag in the number of launches. India conducted just one launch of the PSLV between 2021 and 2022. Further, ISRO also faced a major setback when the GSLV F10 failed to launch due to low pressure in the cryogenic upper stage of the rocket. At a time when the world has witnessed a record number of space launches, India’s lack of sustainable launch capability is a reminder that India must build capacity  — in both state-owned and private space industry.

Antariksh Matters #3: Developing an Indian Augmentation for GPS

— Aditya Ramanathan

Last week, ISRO and Airports Authority of India (AAI) made significant progress on the path to operationalizing the homegrown satellite-based augmentation system (SBAS) called GAGAN.

On 28 April, an IndiGO ATR 72 aircraft landed at Kishangarh airport near Ajmer, Rajasthan, using GAGAN-based Localiser Performance with Vertical Guidance or LPV. 

LPVs are similar in concept to the more conventional Instrument Landing System (ILS) used in larger airports, which enables aircraft to land in less-than-ideal conditions. The key difference is that while ILS requires the airport to have the requisite antennae and transmitters, LPV uses satellite signals from an SBAS. In effect, LPVs allow aircraft to land at smaller airports that lack ILS, even when there’s poor visibility or bad weather. 

The SBAS Promise

GAGAN is a relatively new entrant in the SBAS club. The American Wide Area Augmentation System (WAAS), which covers North America, was a pioneer. Other systems include the European Union’s EGNOS and Japan’s MSAS. China is developing an SBAS of its own based on its BeiDou constellation of navigation satellites. South Korea, Australia, Russia are among other states either operating or developing their own SBAS. The primary use of SBAS is for aviation, and any operational SBAS must be reliable and accurate enough for such “safety of life” uses. Besides aviation, SBASs can also be used by ships maneuvering in narrow canals or by public road and traffic management services. 

GAGAN is short for GPS Aided GEO Augmented Navigation. Like all other augmentation systems, it uses a combination of ground stations and satellite-based transmitters. On Earth, 15 reference stations receive GPS signals, which are then collated at two master control centres, which correct them for ionospheric distortion, orbit errors, and timing errors on the atomic clocks that navigation satellites use. Three geostationary satellites (GSAT-8, GSAT-10 and GSAT-15) then broadcast the corrected signal back to Earth. 

Adopting GAGAN

India’s aviation regulator, the Directorate General of Civil Aviation (DGCA) has already made it compulsory for all aircraft registered in the country after July 2021 to have GAGAN receivers onboard. However, for adoption to really take off, SBAS around the world will have to ensure seamless interoperability. India is part of an Interoperability Working Group with representatives from GAGAN, WAAS, EGNOS, and MSAS. But the task of interoperability is only likely to get more complicated in the future, as SBASs begin to rely on multiple satellite navigation constellations and transmit in multiple frequencies. This newsletter will keenly track these developments.

Our Reading Menu

* [Opinion] How should India respond to the US's unilateral ASAT test ban? by Pranav R. Satyanath who is also a contributor to this newsletter

* [Article] How military technology reaches Russia in breach of U.S. export controls by David Gauthier-Villars, Steve Stecklow and John Shiffman

* [Article] Data as a weapon: Psychological Operations in the age of irregular information threats by Jon Reisher, Charity Jacobs and John Beasley

* [Blog] On space barons and global poverty by Harun Onder

This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit hightechir.substack.com

Matsyanyaaya: Russia’s response to Crippling Tech Sanctions

— Aditya Pareek

The Russian government’s response to the devastating series of embargoes, sanctions and export controls barring high-tech components and semiconductor chips is interesting. One of the measures intended for immediate relief is the legalisation of parallel or gray imports. Parallel imports will lead to the Russian market being supplied with products without their Original Equipment Manufacturer(OEM) or Intellectual Property(IP) rights holder’s permission. Gray or parallel imports are generally seen as iterations of a product intended for another market being sold in another - which is either illegal in some jurisdictions or a gray area in others. This gray trade is generally undertaken by intermediaries, stockpilers or resellers who have no formal ties to the OEM or IP owner. The prevalence of gray imports can also lead to lower quality or counterfeit products being supplied, but there are few alternatives for Russia in the short term. 

In the medium term, Russia is also hoping that Chinese foundries and other production facilities will supply the needed semiconductor chips. However, it is unclear if Chinese companies which own these facilities will risk being slapped with secondary sanctions and losing access to much-needed US IP, to fulfil demand from the Russian market. 

As identified in our issue paper on the subject, Russia has a few major players like Mikron Group, Zelnograd Nanotech Center, GS Nanotech. However, these Russian companies only have the equipment to work on trailing edge 250-90nm chips and not cutting edge ones. 

In the long term, Russia plans to invest almost 3.19 Trillion Roubles in setting up more domestic manufacturing capacity. A key goal highlighted behind this new investment is to set up production facilities that can churn out 28nm chips by the year 2030. As identified in these Russian media reports, despite the government throwing money at the problem, it will be a tough nut to crack within 7-8 years as the 2030 timeframe implies. Historical precedent shows that even in more cordial times, it has not been easy for Russia to secure semiconductor manufacturing equipment from foreign sources. Cutting out foreign sources entirely and manufacturing complex photolithography equipment needed for this goal would take even more time, possibly 2-3 decades, by which time the plot will be lost. 

If you enjoy the contents of this newsletter, please consider signing up for Takshashila’s Graduate Certificate in Public Policy(GCPP) Programmes.Click here to know more

Antariksh Matters: Nuance is important in the era of dual-use of space

— Aditya Pareek

While the India-US Space situational Awareness(SSA) agreement is a huge development, it is important to understand the nuance in the fact that which agencies from the two countries signed it.

As I highlighted in this tweet thread:

Transparency around SSA is an issue that ISRO hadn’t prioritised before, as Pradeep Mohandas & I opined in this The Wire Science article in December 2020. Glad to see that things are now changing with ISRO coming out with a “Space Situational Assessment 2021”.

False Information around Russia & Starlink

A worrying claim was circulating on social media around 16th April, that Russia’s military was ordered to destroy Starlink satellites. The reason alleged in the fake statement was that Starlink helped target the Russian Navy’s capital ship “Moskva”. The fake statement was attributed to the deputy chairman of the Security Council of Russia and the chairman of the Russian party in power, “United Russia”.

The website which hosted this fake statement had almost identical content (apart from the fakes) to the genuine website of United Russia.

The fake website appears to have since been taken down, but according to Internet Archive’s Wayback Machine it existed since at least 2004.

Provocative fake content is nothing new in the information domain and has become a major part of modern hybrid wars but the potential for escalation around the conflict in space is a sensitive issue. With the earth’s orbit becoming densely populated with satellites and spacecrafts, any attempts by belligerent countries to take out another’s space objects will also endanger the space assets of countries not involved in any hostilities. Debris generated from a kinetic attack against any space object may indiscriminately damage and destroy anything in its path. This can lead to collaterally affected countries either seeking damages from the country responsible for the attack, or, in a more extreme case, retaliating against it.

Matsyanyaaya: How China is Winning the Quantum Computing Race 

— Arjun Gargeyas

An edited version of this article came out in CNN-News18 on April 14, 2022. 

Recent reports from China have mentioned how researchers and scientists from the country have managed to develop cooling systems using Helium gas as an alternative to the traditional cryogenic cooling systems used in the development of quantum computers. 

Quantum computing has clearly become an area of concern for the US with regard to China’s rise in the domain as well as potential military applications of the technology so it is not surprising that techno-nationalist tendencies have been showcased by the American government in this regard. For instance, the Export Control Reform Act (ECRA) was extended to quantum technology products in 2018. This included critical quantum refrigerators and cryogenics along with software and AI for building quantum computers. This was done in order to make cross-border collaboration with Chinese nationals and academic institutions more difficult. 

China and its Rapid Rise 

While establishing itself as the leader in quantum communications technology, China soon started dedicating its resources to developing alternative quantum computing technologies. As the global leader in patents related to quantum communication and cryptography, China has advanced by leaps and bounds in the quantum computing domain over the last decade. Once behind the West in developing quantum computers, China now houses two of the world’s fastest quantum computers on its soil. The unveiling of ‘Zuchongzhi-2’, the country’s fastest quantum computer, in late 2021 has effectively made the country a powerhouse in quantum computing and on par with the US. 

The pace at which China has adopted quantum computing technology is truly exceptional, with the country claiming ‘quantum advantage’ in both the superconducting qubit and photonic tech (two different types of technologies used to develop quantum computers). Immense state support has been provided by the Chinese government to both academic institutions (University of Science and Technology China (USTC), Tsinghua and Peking Universities) and private companies (Origin Quantum, Qasky, and Huawei Cloud) for the development of quantum computers in the country. The recent advances made by China in the domain of quantum computing have resulted in increased global protectionism in the field.

The Catalysts for the Rise 

Quantum computing works on the principle of ‘qubits’, also called quantum bits that have the ability to store values anywhere between 0 and 1 resulting in more computational capacity. To operationalise these qubits, there are several different technologies that have been developed. Each has its own advantages and dependencies, based on which the choice is made by the government or private sector to invest. 

In China, the role of the state and the government have played an important role in spearheading its scientific and technological progress. The synergy that exists between the state and the domestic private sector has been exemplary in various domains and quantum technology remains no exception. The government has provided funding to academic institutions in setting up labs for quantum computing research and financial support to domestic tech companies engaged in building real-world applications for quantum computers. In a way, the state acts like a bridge and a facilitator, helping translate academic research in the quantum computing space to build actual quantum computers and develop applications for these devices. 

Apart from the role of the government and the state, one of the main catalysts for the rise of China in certain critical and strategic technologies is the ability to bypass restrictions that might prevent its growth and development in the field. There have been numerous export controls and import restrictions in the quantum tech domain on cryogenic (very low temperatures) cooling systems. But Chinese researchers ended up developing breakthroughs in an alternative field of quantum computing technology such as photonic computing that does not need intense refrigeration. Recently, there were also reports about Chinese scientists developing cooling systems using Helium gas that would dilute the existing restrictions in place. Shanghai-based researchers were able to create a device that could create the extremely low temperatures that quantum computers typically operate in. This would mean that China, regardless of the technological sanctions and other restrictions on its industry, continues to rise in the quantum computing field leaving others trailing behind. 

The Chinese government’s role as a facilitator to academia and the private sector ensured continuous uninterrupted technological development. The ability to negate the restrictions placed by the US and its allies in the quantum computing field also entrenched its position in the domain. It has also led to key technological breakthroughs that would not have seemed possible in case the controls were not in place. Hence, this has created a win-win scenario for the Chinese quantum tech industry, generating both IP and reducing dependencies on the West. India should seek to learn from China’s catalysts for growth to succeed in its own quantum computing initiative. 

Our Reading Menu

* [Book] China and Great Power Responsibility for Climate Change by Sanna Kopra

* [Opinion] As Russia Reels Under Cascading Effects of Chip Starvation, China May Not Be a Dependable Partner by Aditya Pareek and Arjun Gargeyas who are also contributors to this newsletter

* [Research Article] Mutually assured surveillance at risk: Anti-satellite weapons and cold war arms control by Aaron Bateman

* [Article] The forgotten history of small nuclear reactors by M.V. Ramana

This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit hightechir.substack.com

Cyberpolitik: Invasion and Infektion

— Prateek Waghre

In a recent edition of The Information Ecologist, I had referred to the activity around the IStandWithRussia and IStandWithPutin hashtags that seemed to include a number of accounts associated with India.

The second India subplot is the presence of seemingly India-associated accounts in Twitter trends such as ‘IStandWithRussia’ and ‘IStandwithPutin’. See this thread by @NovelSci and these threads by (1,2) by @MarcOwenJones.

Since then, we’ve had more investigations looking into this aspect.

A DFR Lab investigation observed [Jean Le Roux - DFRLab]:

* The Top 12 most retweeted tweets belonged to accounts with low follower counts. Despite this, they seemed to gain very few followers. In some cases, accounts started sharing some of these tweets within minutes of their creation (an example in Jean Le Roux’s post references an account that shared 3 of the top 12 tweets within 2 minutes of being created) even though they didn’t follow any of these accounts. If you head over to the post and look at the collage of these tweets, many of the handles appear to have ‘Indian-sounding’ names.

* “A large portion of the sampled accounts appeared to originate in India”. How? (one should bear in mind that OSINT analysis often requires making a lot of educated guesses)

Language cues, tweets about local sports and politics, early follows (likely region-based suggestions), and the time zone in which the accounts were most active all pointed towards India as the origin of many of the accounts in the network.

* And that a “large proportion” of the accounts were created this year, and Feb 24th and Mar 2nd were the dates on which the most accounts were created.

Let’s revisit the ‘appeared to originate in India’ aspect.

While Marc Owen Jones’ sample of 20000 tweets referenced India as a frequently appearing user-reported location (though, in that sample, it wasn’t right on top), he cautions that just because a location is reported does not mean it is accurate.

Last week, the New York Times published an investigation based on data from Marc Owen Jones (I assume more data was collected since the article mentions a 2-week period) [Kate Conger, Suhasini Raj - NYTimes]. (emphasis added, I also wish there were fewer blues, it was hard to differentiate between the other countries)

Users who said they were from India made up nearly 11 percent of the hashtag trend in the two weeks after the invasion. Just 0.3 percent were from Russia and 1.6 percent from the United States during that time.

Around the time Technopolitik 21 went out, Carl Miller posted a network map which indicated that many replies/mentions were directed at accounts in India (if you zoom in, you’ll see accounts of some minsters, Indian embassies, opposition figures and media houses). Worth noting that this map appeared to be account-specific and not hashtag-specific.

Aside 1: One of the network maps on Jean Le Roux’s post did mention Indian and Russian diplomatic accounts (image link).

About 10 days later, Carl Miller posted a map that sub-categorised them based on language clusters, followed by a white paper on March 25th.

Aside 2: If you’re wondering why I was sketching out a timeline, it is because there was a minor subplot developing. Both the tweets I’ve included here reference an information operation. However, researchers like Shelby Grossman (tweet) and Emerson Brooking (replies) pointed out that they provide no evidence of a coordinated information operation.

The white paper, when it came out, didn’t call it a single information operation, either. However, it did make for an interesting analysis. It also highlighted that the information ecosystem is a couple of degrees more complex than we assume and that the way we answer questions like ‘who is winning the information war?’ are influenced heavily by who is asking and what part of it they’re looking at (like the parable about the visually challenged people and the elephant).

While I can’t speak authoritatively about the research methodology and the clustering of accounts based on linguistic similarities, I’ve included an image with some of my notes from the white paper.

Two dates pop up frequently, 24th February (the day the invasion began) and 2nd March (the date of the UN General Assembly vote and ultimately a resolution which “demand[ed] that Russia ‘immediately, completely and unconditionally withdraw all of its military forces from the territory of Ukraine within its internationally recognized borders.’” [UN.org])

Here’s what the white paper said about the mixed Hindi/English cluster.

We also observe that Russia-related message decreases sharply after the UN vote, but overall volumes of messaging does not. Our speculation is that many of the RED accounts are members of a ‘paid to engage’ spam network that can be rented to supply amplification to a number of different clients, and has over our time of study been used to amplify BJP politics, a commercial cinema release and also the invasion of Ukraine.

This is not surprising. It still doesn’t answer the question of who paid, of course, which would require a tremendous amount of investigative work to establish a clear money trail.

Do friends target friends with information operations?

While we may never find who paid for the Indian-language clusters’ amplification of pro-invasion messaging, it is worth taking a queue from Mike Caulfied’s tweet thread and looking at history.

Chapter 22 of Thomas Rid’s Active Measures references a Soviet Active Measure trying to create the narrative that AIDS was a bio-weapon created by the US (that should sound familiar for many reasons) that had an Indian connection. As per the source material he cites, it was, at some point, code-named Operation INFEKTION by the HVA (the foreign intelligence branch of East Germany’s Ministry for State Security).

“AIDS may invade India: mystery disease caused by U.S. lab experiments.” So read the sensational first-page headline in Patriot, an Indian newspaper, on July 16, 1983. Patriot, under a picture of five smiling girls, printed an anonymous letter from a “well-known American scientist and anthropologist.” There was no name in the byline, only “New York.”

The Patriot letter was a masterfully executed disinformation operation: comprising about 20 percent forgery and 80 percent fact, truth and lies woven together, it was an eloquent, well-researched piece that gently led the reader, through convincing detail, to his or her own conclusion.

He points out that The Patriot had been funded by the Soviet Union, when it opened in 1962, “for the explicit purpose of circulating Soviet-friendly stories and publishing disinformation”. And while the article did not seem to have any direct impact (Rid notes that neither was it picked up in India, nor was it noticed in Europe and the US), it did play a role later:

* In KGB's efforts to further a narrative in coordination with partners code-named Denver (in 1985).

The point of departure of the planned active measures campaign, as the KGB told its Soviet bloc partners, was the “factual” article published in Patriot. The KGB then instructed its partners to help spread the theory that AIDS was U.S.-made to “party, parliamentary, social-political, and journalistic circles in Western countries and the developing world.” The “facts” published in the Indian press offered the blueprint

* In October 1985 - it was attributed as a source in another article that, as per Rid, would prove to be consequential in the future.

On October 30, Literaturnaya Gazeta ran the headline “Panic in the West: or, What Is Hiding Behind the Sensation Surrounding AIDS.”23 The paper was the KGB’s “prime conduit in the Soviet press for propaganda and disinformation,” according to Oleg Kalugin. The piece that relaunched the DENVER campaign closely mirrored the earlier measure in the Indian press. Its author, Vitaly Zapevalov, accurately cited details about the new disease and its spread in American cities over the past two years, basing his analysis on authoritative U.S. news reports.

“Why,” he asked ominously, would AIDS “appear in the USA and start spreading above all in towns along the East Coast?” Next, the Gazeta piece outlined several covert American biological warfare programs, again based on verifiable public sources. Zapevalov also cited accurate details about Fort Detrick. The author then referred to the two-year-old Patriot forgery to connect the dots. “All of this information, taken together with the AIDS mystery, leads to serious considerations. The solid newspaper Patriot, published in India, for instance, openly expressed an assumption that AIDS is the result of similar inhuman Washington experiments.”

I’ve just quoted specific sections here, I recommend reading the complete chapter (and perhaps the whole book).

So, do friends target friends with information operations? As my colleagues Nitin Pai and Pranay Kotasthane will tell you - there are no friends in international relations, only interests.

Antariksh Matters: Russia, Ukraine & Space Entanglement

— Aditya Ramanathan

Russia’s war with Ukraine is testing a key feature of any state’s military space strategy: entanglement. 

Entanglement or intertwining is the act of relying on domestic or foreign civilian space assets to conduct military operations. Days after the war broke out, Ukraine pleaded with commercial satellite operators to share their imagery, especially those from synthetic aperture radars (SAR). In a letter later made public, Ukraine’s minister for digital transformation, Mykhailo Fedorov, wrote that his country “badly needed the opportunity to watch the movement of Russian troops, especially at night”. The minister’s letter made four specific requests:

* “Provide high-resolution satellite imagery in the real time to Armed Forces of Ukraine; 

* Provide data from synthetic aperture radar, or SAR, satellites in the [sic] real time to Armed Forces of Ukraine; 

* Cooperate with EOS Data Analytics and Max Polyakov as our representative for data processing and analytics; 

* Stop other types of activities that may support military operations of Russian and Belarus government.” 

According to later reporting by The Washington Post, five private companies have already begun sharing such data.

A more stark example of entanglement comes from SpaceX’s Starlink satellite internet constellation. Following a tweet from Fedorov, SpaceX’s Elon Musk made arrangements for Starlink to go live in Ukraine and began supplying the country with thousands of antennas. It has since emerged that Ukrainian forces are using Starlink to facilitate communications and coordinate attacks against Russian forces. As The Telegraph of London reported:

“Drone teams in the field, sometimes in badly connected rural areas, are able to use Starlink to connect them to targeters and intelligence on their battlefield database. They can direct the drones to drop anti-tank munitions, sometimes flying up silently to Russian forces at night as they sleep in their vehicles.”

For Russia, Starlink embodies the dilemmas of entanglement. If this civilian satellite-based communication system is being used for military purposes, does it become a legitimate target? After all, it’s reasonable to argue that, in this case, Ukrainian forces have failed to separate themselves from civilian infrastructure.  

There are, of course, practical reasons for Russia not to target Starlink. It is obviously not going to use kinetic weapons such as ASAT missiles against a US-owned target. Even lower-order options like cyber capabilities may either not be feasible, may take weeks or months to develop, or contain escalatory potential that Russia seeks to avoid. For the moment at least, Russia is apparently limiting itself to jamming Starlink signals where possible. 

In the years to come, other states may face Russia’s entanglement dilemma, perhaps in starker form. If the Russia-Ukraine war sets a precedent of impunity - essentially leaving space alone as some sort of ‘sanctuary’ - it could encourage other spacefaring states to deepen their own entanglements and share those capabilities with other states at war. 

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Matsyanyaaya: Can Crafty Fintech help De-Dollarise

— Aditya Pareek

Unprecedented sanctions, restrictions and export controls are inflicting enormous costs on Russia’s economy in the wake of the ongoing conflict. As many large Russian banks have been cut off from SWIFT and conducting business in the US dollar, there is a lot of buzz around the prospects of a new de-Dollarising nexus emerging between Russia and China. In a recent research note, Anupam Manur and I explored the question if Central Bank Digital Currencies(CBDC)s can help them circumvent and cushion the blow of US sanctions.

Russia and China have both sought to ban and discourage the use and mining of private cryptocurrencies, citing both financial stability and security concerns. The two have instead chosen to adopt blockchain technologies for their central bank-issued-and-regulated digital currencies. These Central Bank Digital Currencies (CBDC)s have no inherent advantage compared to electronically transferred denominated sums in paper fiat currency counterparts as far as international trade is concerned. As a tool to circumvent sanctions, CBDCs could be theoretically effective in avoiding the US banking system. However,the willingness of another party to accept the CBDC may not always be certain. The value of a currency,whether it be digital or paper,comes from it being widely accepted, which is an uncertain variable at this juncture.

Furthermore, holding CBDCs issued by an isolated and sanctioned nation may not be a desirable prospect. The pariah status of the sanctioned states limits the holder of the CBDC to only conducting transactions with either the issuing states or a small number of other states who might also accept it.  Depending on the international political environment, the holders and accommodators of the pariah nation’s CBDCs could also be at the receiving end of secondary sanctions by the international community, further reducing their desirability. The exchange rate volatility and other associated risks will still apply to Russian and Chinese or any other CBDCs, thus, they make little sense in revolutionising the paradigm of international trade in their current form. The CBDCs could be used to settle a limited set of transactions, for instance,India’s defence deals with Russia, which are not a regular day on day or month on month feature.

Furthermore, even if fintech solutions and alternatives exist to some problems, cooperation between Russia and China has always been lopsided, benefiting China above and beyond.

A clear example of this lopsided cooperation is the adoption rate of China’s payments messaging service Cross Border Interbank Payments System (CIPS),to which over 23 Russian banks have subscribed. Meanwhile, only one Chinese bank has signed up for Russia’s equivalent System for Transfer of Financial Messages (SPFS). China is also likely to insist on conducting the transactions and any financing predominantly in the Yuan, as a key strategic goal for China is to make Renminbi a reserve currency alongside the US Dollar.

To know more about how a de-dollarising nexus between Russia and China may be a mirage, check out the full text of the research note here.

Our Reading Menu

* [Report] Secure World Foundation’s Annual Global Counterspace Capabilities Report

* [Report] CSIS’s Space Threat Assessment 2022 report

* [Report] Arms control in outer space: Status, timeline, and analysis By Jessica West and Lauren Vyse

* [Opinion] Charting a course for India’s Arctic engagement by Aditya Pareek and Ruturaj Gowaikar who are also contributors to this newsletter

This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit hightechir.substack.com

Matsyanyaaya: The Effects of Tech Sanctions on the Russian Economy 

— Arjun Gargeyas

An edited version of this article came out in Hindustan Times on March 16, 2022.   The current actions taken against Russia have mainly been in the form of targeting the Russian economy through sanctions and embargoes, specifically targeting sectors that Russia relies on export revenues. The US has also introduced high-tech sanctions, mainly depriving Russia of access to critical technologies  (like semiconductors, quantum, artificial intelligence, and big data) and their applications.  

This is the first time that specific embargoes have been put in place against the import and export of high-tech components targeting a particular country, in this case, Russia. The sanctions by the United States effectively prevent Russia from importing a range of products, from chips to telecommunications equipment. But what is noteworthy is that the sanctions prevent Russian imports of both American products as well as products manufactured in other countries that use proprietary technology of any American firm or company to manufacture the products under the sanctioned list. This would mean that any firm, located in any country around the world, cannot export certain products even if they have been manufactured on that country’s soil utilising any sort of American technology during the process of design and manufacturing. The sanctions also have the caveat that the export of dual-use devices is also prohibited.   

Another significant aspect of these technology sanctions has been the varied responses by major technology companies themselves. While some companies have to fall in line with the government’s sanctions due to the usage of American IP, some tech giants have taken unilateral decisions to cut off ties with Russia and stop all business from the country. While unilateral decision-making by tech companies is not new, this large-scale shunning of Russia by major tech companies around the world should sound alarm bells to the Russian federation. It is important to understand how these decisions might spell trouble for the overall growth and development of the state’s economy. 

Domestic Consumerism Takes a Hit  

While the official technology sanctions mentioned that the supply of consumer goods to Russia and Belarus would not be disrupted, the actions taken by tech companies themselves can reduce the access to tech products for the average Russian consumer. Major electronic smartphone manufacturers like Apple and Samsung have paused product sales in the country. They have also cancelled all existing and future shipments of finished products (like mobile phones) to Russia. Other electronic goods manufacturers like Dell and HP, both leaders in laptops and personal computers production, have also halted operations and suspended the sale of all their products in Russia. This can hamper access to basic electronic goods like mobile phones and laptops for the domestic consumer. 

It is also not just the individual consumer who will be affected. Companies that supply electronic goods on a large-scale basis to businesses and governments have also joined in the embargoes. Telecommunications equipment dealers like Nokia, Ericsson, and Cisco have all decided to stop all business in the country with no equipment being sold in the near future. On the semiconductor front, major companies like Intel and AMD have decided to stop the supply of chips. Taiwanese giant TSMC has also joined the sanctions train and suspended all chip supply and manufacturing contracts to Russia. This would mean that Russian sectors like the automobile and consumer electronics industry will suffer from a high shortage of semiconductor chips.  

Web-Based Services and Online Sectors  

Apart from the hardware front, the technology services and software industry has also taken a massive hit with the existing sanctions. Microsoft has prevented access to Skype, GitHub, and cloud-based services Azure. Netflix has stopped all streaming services in the country. Another critical company, Cloudfare, has vowed not to provide any protection for all Russian web resources. Website hosting sites like GoDaddy are now shutting down Russian websites and preventing any new ones with the .ru extension from going live. This could affect domestic businesses, with many relying on web-based services and social media for their marketing campaigns.  

It is clear that the United States government sanctions on technology have triggered a chain reaction with each major technology company looking to impose its own restrictions on Russia. Significant economic repercussions must be expected due to these actions taken by companies. Revenues through import duties for technology goods and services would be cut off. There would also be a significant dip in access to technology goods in the market, thereby decreasing domestic consumption. Domestic businesses would bear the brunt of the sanctions with no access to social media sites and other critical software.  

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Cyberpolitik : Tech-Geopolitics at the WTO

— Sapni G K

In this newsletter, we look at multiple interesting angles of the intersection of technology and geopolitics. Encountering trade as a major concern within these contours is not new, given that it is the most manifest expression of the intersection of geopolitics and trade. Around September 2021, there were reports about built-in censorship efforts on Chinese devices that were operated by Lithuanian officials. The matter had escalated to a point where the Lithuanian side decided to openly question the trade relationship between the two nations. The importance of Lithuania as one of the inroads into China’s European trade meant that this was not taken lightly.

By the end of January 2022, the European Union (EU) made a request for consultation at the World Trade Organization (WTO). According to the request submitted to the Dispute Settlement Body, the EU urged that the consequences of sparks that flew between Lithuania and China affected the overall trade in goods and services between the EU and China. It alleged that the measures taken by China violated the terms of the Marrakesh Agreement and the additional agreements such as the Trade Facilitation Agreement and the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures.

The larger complaint raised by the EU concerns the disruption of the supply chain because of China’s actions in its trade with Lithuania. Specifically, the EU accuses the Chinese measures as

* import bans or import restrictions on the products at issue, from the EU;

* export bans or export restrictions on the products at issue from China to the EU; and

* restrictions or prohibitions on the supply of services from the EU or by a service supplier from the EU in the territory of China or in respect of EU consumers of services provided by Chinese service suppliers.

The measures against Lithuania, and in extension, against the EU, challenge the notions of global free trade envisioned by the WTO. It also contributes to the Chinese imposition of censorship through interference, which is an obvious concern to the EU. The specific location of Lithuania makes it an important part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative and is important to both China and the EU. China’s tech prowess has been a comparative advantage for the trade-in this route, particularly in the case of eastern European nations. In the background of the continuous rise of Chinese influence in this sphere, this request for consultations is worth noting. Requests to join consultations have poured in from Australia, Japan, USA, Canada, the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, Matsu, and the UK. Clearly, the quad nations except India are showing an active interest in taking up this matter. India should demonstrate its awareness that the technology game is political, and is a means to many ends in today’s world.

Dhruvapolitik: India’s Arctic Policy

— Aditya Pareek

India published its Arctic Policy last week. India’s engagement in Polar exploration and research goes back quite a while and is primarily motivated by scientific pursuits. There are some highlights from the policy I pointed out in a Tweet thread recently:

With the ongoing Ukraine conflict between Russia and Ukraine, there is a clear threat of food shortage because the two belligerents are major suppliers of grain to the world. Thankfully, India currently has enough grain and can even export. As the policy states, ensuring India can plan for safeguarding its development and food security goals requires studying weather patterns and the melting of ice and thawing of permafrost in the Arctic.

By arguing that the Himalayas are the third pole, India elevates its place in the geostrategic discourse. The centrality of the Himalayas to the global discipline of Meteorology can’t be overstated.

India’s certainly playing an important role in producing pharmaceuticals around the world and indeed as a major link in the global supply chains. However, the mention of traditional systems of medicine like Ayurveda, Sidha and Unani, is an imprint of the direction the Government of India takes to promote India’s cultural heritage. Another reason can be that the Arctic Council (cooperation with which is also a major priority in the policy) features discourse and sub-fora where similar traditions of the indigenous peoples of the Arctic are represented.

It is no secret that India’s oceanography/hydrography capability is well regarded in the world, with India’s National Hydrographic Office being the nodal agency. Indian Navy also plays the central role in not only staffing the NHO but also carrying out the actual surveys with dedicated research vessels in its fleet.

You can find out more about India’s hydrography capabilities in an article I wrote with Aditya Ramanathan in February 2021.

Finally, India does not have an official merchant marine but contributes one of the highest numbers of seafarers and crew to merchant vessels, hydrocarbon carriers(Natural Gas and Crude oil) and container ships worldwide. India can supply crew and professionals who will be important to meet the high demand ushered in by the increased viability of alternate shipping routes like the Northern Sea Route(NSR).

Our Reading Menu

* [Blog] Yes, the UK is trying to Brexit the Internet by Heather Burns

* [Policy Document] Tamil Nadu Data Policy 2022 by Government of Tamil Nadu

* [Issue Brief] India’s Arctic Policy: Building a Partnership for Sustainable Development by Anurag Bisen

* [Opinion] As China Threat Looms over Taiwan, This is How India Can Keep Global Chip Industry Afloat by Arjun Gargeyas, who is also a contributor to this newsletter.

This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit hightechir.substack.com