Technopolitik

Antariksh Matters: Let’s Not Destroy Satellites in Peacetime

— Aditya Ramanathan

Is it in India’s interests to support a ban on destructive anti-satellite tests? It’s a question Delhi may have to find an answer to in the near future. The trigger for this question is Russia’s ASAT missile test on 15 November 2021. The broader context is a series of moves that could eventually lead to substantial talks on space security. 

On 15 November, Russia apparently used an A-235 PL-19 “Nudol” Anti Ballistic Missile Interceptor to destroy a defunct Celina-D electronic intelligence satellite at an altitude of 480 kilometres. The collision unleashed 1,500 pieces of debris that could potentially threaten both satellites and inhabited craft such as the International Space Station and the Chinese space station Tiangong. 

A little over a month after the test, the UN General Assembly passed resolution 76/231 on 24 December, committing itself to convening an open-ended working group that will meet multiple times through 2022 and 2023 to discuss ways to reduce threats in space “through norms, rules and principles of responsible behaviours”. While the working group is likely to consider a range of space-related matters, destructive ASAT missile tests are likely to figure prominently. Partly this is because the resumption of destructive ASAT missile testing since 2007 has created growing concern about space debris. The other reason is that the idea of a ban on destructive tests appears to be gaining ground. A number of prominent authorities on space are calling for a ban. These include Takshashila’s own director, Nitin Pai, as well as scholars from the US-based Secure World Foundation (SWF), a researcher at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), and academics. 

The Return of ASAT Missiles

During the Cold War, the USSR and the US considered banning ASAT missiles entirely as a class of weapons. These efforts culminated in negotiations in 1978-79 that eventually failed as both states prioritized nuclear arms control and as their relations began to sour over the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. However, from December 1985, the US and the USSR effectively upheld a voluntary moratorium on destructive tests. 

The moratorium was shattered on 11 January 2007 by the most destructive kinetic ASAT test in history. On that day,  China struck one of its own satellites with an SC-19 missile at an altitude of 865 kilometres. The test left behind at least 3,000 pieces of tracked debris along with perhaps 32,000 pieces of untracked flotsam.  In 2008, an American sea-based SM-3 ballistic missile interceptor struck a malfunctioning satellite at an altitude of 370 kilometres. In 2019, an Indian Prithvi Delivery Vehicle Mark-II was tested against a target satellite at an altitude of 282 kilometres. This was followed, most recently, by the Russian test.

While states have also continued to carry out both non-destructive tests of ASAT weapons and tests of missile interceptors, it is the destructive ASAT tests that have sparked the greatest concern because of the dangerous debris they generate. 

The Case for a Ban

The upside of a ban is easy to see. Orbital debris from such tests can pose a serious threat to satellites and space stations, especially those in low Earth orbit (LEO). By eliminating this source of debris, spacefaring states make the-already crowded orbits safer for themselves and others. The second (and more uncertain) advantage of a ban is that it could slow down other states pursuing direct ascent ASAT capabilities. However, this advantage is, at best, notional, since ballistic missile defence systems capable of high altitude interceptions, can be easily repurposed into direct ascent ASAT missiles. 

The potential downside of a ban is that it might affect the development of India’s own ASAT capabilities. This downside is also more notional than real: having already unambiguously demonstrated its ability to intercept and destroy a satellite in LEO, India has no real need to perform destructive tests. While DRDO may consider it necessary to conduct more tests to validate India’s direct-ascent ASAT capabilities, these do not require actual kinetic interception. Indeed, the challenge of intercepting a long-range ballistic missile is far more challenging than that of intercepting an LEO satellite on a known trajectory. 

What about intercepting satellites at higher altitudes? Here, the limitations of kinetic ASAT weapons become evident. For one, striking satellites in high Earth orbit (HEO) requires purpose-built missiles of much greater range. Furthermore, such missiles would take so long to reach their targets that it would make it much easier for the adversary to take evasive action. Finally, creating debris fields at such altitudes would cause much greater and indiscriminate destruction, endangering India’s own satellites. At higher altitudes, India, like many other states, would be better off employing electromagnetic radiation to disrupt or destroy satellites. 

In summary, a ban on destructive testing would not constrain India’s own ASAT capabilities and would make the orbits safer for everyone’s satellites. Such a ban is also a low-hanging fruit that could open the door for further negotiations with other states on specific space weapons and space operations more generally. India would do well to unambiguously support a ban on destructive tests.

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Cyberpolitik: Deplatforming or Unplatforming a country

— Prateek Waghre

Ukraine’s appeals

Ukraine’s Vice Prime Minister and Minister of Digital Transformation Mykhailo Fedorov’s Twitter account has made appeals to various technology companies to act against Russia by stopping services, providing information, etc. I’ve compiled some of these in a work-in-progress mega note about internet and information ecosystem governance-related aspects of this situation [SochMuch].

Another set of significant appeals was made through letters to ICANN and RIPE NCC to [Pastebin, via Internet Governance Project]:

* Revoke, permanently or temporarily, the domains “.ru”, “.рф” and “.su”. This list is not exhaustive and may also include other domains issued in the Russian Federation.

* Contribute to the revoking for SSL certificates for the abovementioned domains.

* Shut down DNS root servers situated in the Russian Federation

* (to RIPE NCC) Withdraw the right to use all IPv4 and IPv6 addresses by all Russian members of RIPE NCC (LIRs - Local Internet Registries), and to block the DNS root servers that it is operating.

The European Union, for its part, called for an EU-wide ban on Russian state media and announced that it was building tools the block their disinformation in Europe [Politico.EU]. However, there were questions around whether it was legally allowed to do so.

We’ll get to some responses, but it is worth noting that these appeals cover large swathes of the internet stack from social media platforms, web services, IP intelligence services, CRM services to Internet Registries. And if you look at the dates, there is something of a pattern here. The appeals start at the user-facing end of the stack and then extend to the more infrastructural parts of it. Now, Ukraine is well within its right to make the appeals it thinks will protect its interests. How other countries, private corporations and people, in general, respond will set some precedents.

Company Responses

Since this is a developing space, I will not try to put down a comprehensive list, but the following resources should give you a sense (note that this is mainly for technology companies):

* A long thread by Anna Rogers.

* RestofWorld’s compilation (which does not look like it has been updated for a few days).

* Techmeme filtered for Russia and Ukraine (utility may drop as the news cycle shifts).

Social media platforms started off with limiting ads/monetisation capabilities, more labelling/fact-checking - and, in response to the EU’s calls, restricted Russian state media in Europe. However, evelyn douek is right when she says there seems to be no normative framework. In this instance, social media platforms may have done what many wanted, and a number of interests aligned, as Rasmus Kleis Nielsen stated. But that doesn’t take away from the reality that these actions were arbitrary (note, I am not arguing at this stage, whether they were necessary or not).

And as Mike Masnick points out - it won’t always be this way. Because precedent is wielded by whoever thinks they can take advantage of it.

Or, if you assume that bad-faith actors will do certain things anyway (which is not an unreasonable assumption, to be fair), then also consider that they will use said precedent as a pretext or justification or weave it into their whataboutery. As Ben Thompson noted [Stratechery (potential paywall)]:

Given this, Facebook being available in Russia seems like a net win, and, by the way, I would question exactly what effect banning Russian state media in the E.U. will actually have on this conflict; it seems clear that Russia is losing the battle of public opinion to a degree that no number of pro-Russia articles could undo. It doesn’t matter either way in the short term, but I do worry about the long-term: if Facebook is clearly following the government’s lead in the E.U., it is going to be difficult to see how the company stands up to other governments in the future, even if their requests are more problematic to the readers of this newsletter.

Note that not all technology companies acted in response to direct appeals from Ukraine or demands/pressure from EU countries. Many acted of their own accord to stop operations, sales, software updates, close offices, etc., in Russia.

Hammers and Splinters

One aspect common to Ukraine’s appeals and actions that were taken by various technology companies is that they move in the direction of effectively deplatforming Russia and Russia-based users. And while I can’t speak to the complete nature of support/opposition for the war against Ukraine among large sections of the Russian population and whether that should serve as justification for attempts to ‘cease the means of communication’ - one has to wonder about the long term ramifications of such actions.

Mahsa Alimardani recounts that it can be counterproductive based on the Iranian experience. The unintended consequences of such actions are, in the short term, leaving domestic populations at the risk of greater control, exposure to lower quality information and propaganda, resulting in further isolation. And in the medium-long term, further splintering (perhaps even accelerating) of the internet as many sovereign states will want to avoid being in a similar situation. And this may not stay limited to the realm of the internet but extend to any ‘foreign’ firms.

Some take solace in the fact that the internet, as we know it, today does not understand international boundaries. I would caution that it does not mean it never will. Here’s an extract from a conversation between Cloudflare’s CEO Mathew Prince and Ben Thompson [Stratechery (paywall)]

Right. But given the nature of the internet, isn’t that the whole problem? Because, anyone in Germany can go to any website outside of Germany.

MP: That’s the way it used to be, I’m not sure that’s going to be the way it’s going to be in the future. Because, there’s a lot of atoms under all these bits and there’s an ISP somewhere, or there’s a network provider somewhere that’s controlling how that flows and so I think that, that we have to follow the law in all the places that are around the world and then we have to hold governments responsible to the rule of law, which is transparency, consistency, accountability. And so, it’s not okay to just say something disappears from the internet, but it is okay to say due to German law it disappeared from the internet. And if you don’t like it, here’s who you complain to, or here’s who you kick out of office so you do whatever you do. And if we can hold that, we can let every country have their own rules inside of that, I think that’s what keeps us from slipping to the lowest common denominator

Unplatforming

Let’s look at the Russian Government’s response in this limited context (over the last 5-6 days):

* It has throttled and reportedly blocked the likes of Facebook and Twitter as well as the websites of many western news outlets. There are also question marks over whether it will try to disconnect itself from the internet. As per Oleg Shakirov, that does not appear to be the plan as of now (stress on the as of now).

* It has updated its criminal code to add a possible 15-year prison term for spreading ‘fake news’ [Reuters].

Lawmakers passed amendments to the criminal code making the spread of "fake" information an offence punishable with fines or jail terms. They also imposed fines for public calls for sanctions against Russia.

"If the fakes lead to serious consequences then imprisonment of up to 15 years threatens," the lower house of parliament, known as the Duma in Russian, said in a statement.

In response to these changes, TikTok restricted live streams and new videos in Russia [BBC] and news outlets such as BBC, CNN, Bloomberg have suspended reporting from the country [Hindustan Times].

There is a possibility that the Russian government may ‘unplatform’ itself and its citizens from the global internet before it gets deplatformed.

An India-related subplot (but not the one you think, i.e. the U.N. votes)

In a December 2021 edition of The Information Ecologist (54: Committee Reports), I was critical of certain aspects of the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Communications and Information Technology reports on:

* Suspension of Telecom Services/Internet and its impact relating to the Ministry of Communications (Department of Telecommunications)

* Ethical Standards in Media Coverage relating to the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting

There were suggestions to explore “banning of selective services, such as Facebook, WhatsApp, Telegram, etc.” in Report 1, and “develop some legal provisions to counter as big a challenge as fake news” in Report 2. Russia’s own anti-disinformation law, when passed in 2019, included a provision for a 15-day prison term in case of repeated offences [The Moscow Times].

The Russian Government’s actions over the last few months and recent responses tell us that once you have a hammer…

Basically, be careful which hammer you give to whom. This also holds for the EU’s as-yet-unspecified plans for ‘anti-disinformation’ tools.

Cyberpolitik #2 : The conflicts question for DCNs

— Sapni G K

This is adapted from Sapni’s OpEd in the Hindu. Read the full piece here.

Through the previous editions of this newsletter, we have discussed DCNs at length. Per our definition, social media platforms such as Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, etc., are examples of DCNs. As we study this space, the evolving conflict in the Russian aggression towards Ukraine raises more significant questions around DCNs. This time, predominantly civilian technology has become a realm of geopolitical show of power, as against the earlier instances where military power and natural resources were the most intertwined with conflict. In the absence of norms around how social media platforms should function as a technology and how these corporations should act, we continue to be a gray area.

The challenges specific to the case now are not new. Armed conflicts within and between states have played out in cyberspace for years. It is no surprise then to see the same dynamics play out on social media platforms. The world outside Europe and North America has seen more than its share of conflicts, materialising and exacerbating the troubles of kinetic conflict through cyberspace. Social media platforms have gone by the mantra of “tech neutrality” to avoid taking decisions that may be considered political for too long. The years that have passed have seen an active ignoring of the concerns around social media platforms during a conflict. The lack of clear systems within social media companies that claim to connect the world is appalling. It is time that they should have learned from multiple instances, as recent as the Israeli use of force in Palestine.

There was no unpredictability over conflicts in the information age spilling over to social media platforms. It did not even require pre-emption, since these have been recurrent events in the past decade. The international community and the liberal world order had to be proactive but failed to do so. We have missed the chance to have established a clear protocol on balancing the business interests of social media platforms and their intersection with global public life in critical situations. Though late, it would be valuable to have insights and clear frameworks to guide the behaviour of states and these corporations in cases of conflict, which will inevitably spill over to social media platforms in today’s information age.

This space appears to be one where India could pursue a diplomatic course. Once these tensions abate, India could initiate conversations on setting norms on responses by social media platforms while conflicts are underway. It would be an opportunity to regain some of India's lost currency in the global order by attempting to establish a rule-based system in a fairly gray area. It is in our national interest and that of a rule-based global polity that social media platforms be dealt with more attention across spheres than with a range of reactionary measures addressing immediate concerns alone.

Our Reading Menu

* [Opinion] The role of space in the Russia-Ukraine War by Aditya Pareek who is also a contributor to this Newsletter

* [Opinion] Ukraine war is bound to affect India's space programme by Aditya Ramanathan who is also a contributor to this Newsletter

* [Opinion] Ukraine War Won’t Affect Global Semiconductor Supply, But Will Hit Russia Hard by Arjun Gargeyas and Aditya Pareek who are contributors to this Newsletter

* [Opinion] In conflict, a ‘settings change’ for social media by Sapni G K who is also a contributor to this Newsletter

Cyberpolitik #1: Wanted - Greater scrutiny of content takedown orders

— Prateek Waghre

Last week, reports suggested that the Union Government of India had issued an order to ban 54 apps. This would constitute the fifth such instance since June 2020 (when TikTok and 58 other apps were blocked), three of which have been accompanied by press releases.

* June 2020: 59 apps (accompanied by a press release)

* July 2020: 47 (not accompanied by a press release)

* September 2020: 118 apps aka PUBG ban (accompanied by a press release)

* November 2020: 43 apps (accompanied by a press release)

At the time of writing, this latest instance has not been accompanied by a press release. In response to queries from the press, Google has indicated that it received orders to remove apps from the Play Store. In a video discussion, Sarvesh Mathi of Medianama noted the potential existence of a pattern - in that the July 2020 instance (which did not come with a press release) mainly covered cloned/renamed apps. That appears to be the case here too. A senior official from the ministry was quoted as saying:

“Many of the apps from the stable of Tencent and Alibaba, have changed hands to hide ownership. They are also being hosted out of countries like Hong Kong or Singapore, but the data was ultimately going to servers in Chinese destinations,” said a senior official while pointing out that “even apps such as ByteDance-owned TikTok and Tencent’s WeChat were available for download through alternative means such as APK files, and the government has taken cognizance of it.”

These orders have been passed under Section 69A of India's IT Act.

There have been other recent instances where content takedown orders were accompanied by press releases too.

* In December 2021: 20 YouTube channels and 2 websites operated by groups from Pakistan as per a press release.

* In January 2022: 35 YouTube channels and 2 websites operated by groups from Pakistan as per a press release.

These orders have been issued under the emergency rules included in the IT Rules and Digital Media Ethics 2021 (Rule 16).

Transparent when convenient

The Information Technology (Procedure and Safeguards for Blocking for Access of Information by Public) Rules, 2009, which specify the procedure to be used when restricting access to information, include a clause for confidentiality. There have been instances in the past when the fact that blocking orders were issued were only discovered because one of the companies that received them voluntarily disclosed them via the Lumen Database. In my opinion, when such orders are accompanied by press releases or information is provided by unnamed sources to the press, one should assume it happens because it is convenient to do so. This is perhaps why Google’s suggested “win-win for both sides” in a meeting between officials from the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting and representatives from Google, Facebook, and Twitter, as reported by Reuters, was not viewed as one.

Executives from Google told the I&B officials that one way to resolve that was for the ministry to avoid making takedown decisions public. The firms could work with the government and act on the alleged fake content, which could be a win-win for both sides, Google said, according to one of the sources.

The idea was summarily rejected by the government officials, who said the takedowns also publicise how the companies weren't doing enough to tackle fake news on their own, the person said.

The proverbial house, as they say, always wins.

A higher burden of proof and greater scrutiny

As Raman Chima points out, such orders are escaping scrutiny. And while it is not the intention of this author to bat for TikTok in any way whatsoever - the charges against it do not seem to have been substantiated. And while much of the cheerleading surrounding the move played up the economic impact it would have, TikTok has since surpassed 1 billion active users - while creators from India appear to have been denied a global audience.

The two emergency takedown orders issued in December 2021 and January 2022 also present an interesting case study. While both press releases indicate aggregate view counts and membership numbers across the YouTube channels listed - they do not explain what portion of those views were from India - as YouTube view counts do not break down viewership numbers by country. In attempting to highlight the impact of these 'digital strikes', the 2 press releases also include a 'combined subscriber base'. However, these numbers appear to be just a total of the subscriber numbers across the listed channels, without accounting for the (highly likely) possibility that one account is subscribed to more than one channel - meaning that the number overstates the real 'combined subscriber base' and the impact. These are the kind of elementary questions that would be asked if such orders were being subjected to basic levels of scrutiny.

Matsyanyaaya: Understanding China’s High-Tech Espionage Efforts

— Arjun Gargeyas

An interesting aspect of the November 2021 Department of Defense (DOD) report on China’s military was the focus on Beijing’s industrial espionage efforts on certain advanced technologies which the government thinks holds the key to enhancing the quality of their military systems. There are four main areas that the PLA is targeting and it is imperative to understand how these technologies can help develop advanced military systems. 

First, the report mentions specialised integrated circuits (ICs) specifically meant for military use as one of China’s targets. This includes radiation-hardened ICs and monolithic microwave ICs, which are tailor-made for withstanding military-grade conditions. These specialised electronic components consume very little power and need enhanced fabrication processing to immunise the system against any kind of latch-up when exposed to extreme radiation or temperature. Their applications can range from nuclear warheads to any weapons or platforms that might be subject to radiation effects from nuclear attacks. Due to the complex method of manufacturing these components, the technology remains concentrated with certain players only which makes it a lucrative target for China.

Second, the focus on memory chipsets in the report has raised eyebrows on China’s potential military plans. The growth of non-volatile (NV) memory, which are memory chips that can retain the data stored in it even after the removal of power supply, has created interest in the possibility of using such components in military vehicles. The two key factors of retention ability and endurance remain on the higher side for these kinds of chipsets. Military electronics manufacturers now advocate the use of NV memory chips (like NVSRAMs) in military equipment due to their faster read and write speeds, long-term data storage, and high reliability. An application where these chips are in massive demand is in the development of autonomous weapon systems. High-grade memory chips being a potential target of Chinese espionage efforts opens up a possibility of new weapon systems being developed by their forces for modernising the existing military systems.

Third, the use of sensors to develop tools like accelerometers and gyroscopes is on China’s radar. These components are used for adequate measurements and sensing especially in building tactical weapon systems. Gyroscopes, especially, have been crucial in the transition of low to high-grade precision and navigation systems. They have been used in long-range missiles for precision guidance as well as in improving the accuracy of the armed forces’ navigation systems. China’s interest in these devices validates that tracking, detection, and accurate sensing remains absolutely critical during warfare. New technologies have also improved the quality of devices like accelerometers that are now used by uncrewed military vehicles. The sensors in the accelerometers help in providing precise data on additional parameters like wind speed, temperature, and physical strain movement for improving the lifespan of the vehicle. It would be a major development if China manages to acquire such technology that would significantly improve the efficiency and effectiveness of their forces.

Finally, there are mentions of advanced communication systems specialising in electronic warfare being one of China’s foremost high-tech espionage targets. A specific area of these systems that the Chinese are looking to develop technical expertise is in military communication jamming equipment. When deployed, these jamming systems help defence forces in gaining a crucial advantage in the electronic warfare domain by preventing any wireless communications from taking place on the battlefield. It is no surprise that China is looking to focus on jamming systems as a way to disrupt any sort of communication between the opponent’s control towers and the ground. The possession of modern electronic warfare systems has become one of China’s priorities in its pursuit of military technologisation which can be severely detrimental to its foes.

China’s recent border skirmishes with India have brought technology and its importance in building robust and secure military systems into the limelight. The DOD report has clearly outlined what the Chinese might be going after when looking to build a stronger and better force. It is essential that counter intelligence and intellectual property protection remain India’s and other technologically advanced states’ priority to ensure that these critical technologies stay out of the hands of the Chinese military.

Cyberpolitik #2: An Indian perspective on Online Harms on DCNs

— Sapni G K

The land of technology regulation is one that never stops giving. Every edition of this newsletter has enough thought on policy and regulatory measures to leave observers amused. Newer ideas (sometimes beneficial, often not) have had a sustained presence here. In the land of cyberpolitik, the hue and cry for "regulation of the internet" has been a political moot point for over a year now, thanks to Jan 6, 2021 incident in the US Capitol. Yet, the claims of the internet and its most prominent avatar - social media - being the "wild west" is insincere. It is a sentiment that has caught the attention and sympathies of regulators and the public alike, across the globe. 

Readers would recollect our inquiries into this space, as has been detailed earlier here and here. Our inquiries into the governance of Digital Communication Networks (DCNs) previously looked at harms and benefits. We defined DCNs as composite entities which had the components of capability, operator, and networks. This time around, I looked at the current legal framework on online harms on DCNs in India. I define online harms as a set of actions that can occur on DCNs that can cause legal injuries to users, whether individuals or groups of individuals. This is distinct from the approaches taken by Australia and the UK, where proposals attempt to regulate the entirety of the internet from the perspective of addressing harms. The framing of the debate on online harms on DCNs often ignores available remedies that can adequately address many legal injuries that occur on DCNs, paving the way for censorship. 

In an attempt to exhaustively study these remedies, I categorised identifiable online harms as clearly defined by the law and harms having a less clear definition. Claims that certain legal injuries are not actionable simply because there are no laws governing them appear insincere. The document identifies that many incidents could still be remedied by the law currently in place. An innovative interpretation of the law can be useful in cases where ambiguity persists to help victims get speedy justice for legal injuries that occur on DCNs. The big picture shows that these long-established provisions have their fair share of drawbacks that need to be remedied. However, these have been moulded for the better through judicial interpretation and practical implementation over the years. The conversation about changing the regulatory landscape around DCNs is progressing in India. At this juncture, it is critical to take note of the system that is currently in place. As a frontier for the exercise of the freedom of speech and expression, any change in the framework regulating this space should be wary of the risks of overregulation and censorship.  

Read the full issue paper as a PDF here. 

This is a work in progress, as part of our investigations into the ecosystem of DCNs. If you have thoughts/comments on the same, do reach out via Twitter DMs (@SapniGK) or email me ( AT takshashila.org.in).

Our Reading Menu

* [Blog] How Cambodia’s Internet gateway will harm the Internet by Adrian Wan and Charles Mok, Internet Society

* [Opinion] Regulators are Playing a Dangerous Game on the Internet by Carey Lening

* [Article] A recent spy case shows how China has been able to pull off its whirlwind military modernization by Stavros Atlamazoglou

* [Blog] DoD's 2021 China Military Power Report: How Advances in AI and Emerging Technologies Will Shape China’s Military by Adam Segal

MineralPolitik: REEs, If the Price is Right

— Aditya Pareek

The global contention for securing Rare Earth Elements(REE) supply chains is in full swing. Since the COVID-19 pandemic began, three countries have primarily been the movers and shakers of the REE world, the current market hegemon China, Australia, and the US.

This is directly consequential to India’s national interests, as China is its strategic adversary, and the US and Australia are its Quad allies willing to cooperate with New Delhi to counter China. However, apart from a Competition Commission of India(CCI) probe into India’s state-owned India Rare Earths Limited(IREL) for abuse of “its dominant position”,  “by indulging in prohibitive increase in the sillimanite prices”, there has been little movement or development in India’s own REEs sector.

China

China has moved to centralise and consolidate a major chunk of its heavy REE industry under one state-controlled and supervised company, China Rare Earth Group. 

As this briefing by renowned business consultancy, Dezan Shira & Associates says, 

* The new conglomerate will make up 62 per cent of China’s national heavy rare earth production.

* The move is meant to ensure China’s effective control on the pricing of key heavy REEs “such as dysprosium and terbium”, this will have consequences for the worldwide pricing of these heavy REEs and their supply chains.

* The prohibition of  “foreign investments in exploration, mining, and beneficiation of rare earth, radioactive minerals, and tungsten”, under broader state-issued negative lists. Contrary to the Hainan Free Trade Port negative list, which says no restrictions on foreign investment will be applicable in the REE sector.

* Another consolidated conglomerate with light REE producers and processing companies in China may be constituted soon for similar reasons of controlling the price of REEs.

Consistent with the picture painted by Dezan Shira & Associates, this report in Bloomberg talks of a meeting between China’s automakers, electronics producers and the Chinese Ministry of Industry and Information Technology. The meeting was reportedly aimed at discussing measures to bring down the surging prices of REEs, which is leading to higher production costs and affecting several key high tech industries.

It is also interesting to note that the Laotian Ministry of Plans and Development has been warm to China’s Tong Lee Seung Industrial Development Company exploring REEs on Laotian territory. To make matters a little complicated, this Radio Free Asia report talks about the possible uprooting of villagers from the Laotian land in question.  

Australia

Among the Quad countries, Australia has emerged as the most proactive threat to China’s REEs sector dominance. The much talked about Lynas Rare Earths Ltd has seen record profits and revenue, which, according to this Reuters report is due to strong demand for Electric Vehicles(EV). Lynas was the recipient of much Australian government aid and investment recently, and the growth in its revenue and business is a positive development.

According to this FT report, Australia is looking to repeat this success with another company called Hastings Technology Metals which has set up a mine called Yangibana REEs mine in Western Australia’s Gascoyne region. The Australian government will provide “A$140mn (US$100mn)” of the total A$400mn( approx. US$ 286mn) borrowed capital needed for the project. 

As the FT article says, If all falls in place, 

* It is likely that Hastings can become the second-largest exporter of Australian REEs. Hastings can potentially supply as much as “8 per cent of global demand for neodymium and praseodymium”, which are critical REEs used in manufacturing high-efficiency magnets for industrial and defence applications, among others.

* The REEs supplied by Hastings will primarily go to the European auto industry, including vendors like Thyssenkrupp(which also makes naval submarines and warships under its HDW subsidiary).

*  Australia can capture as much as 30% of the total REEs market globally in the future. This is in contrast to China’s existing control of 70-90%(according to varying estimates) of the worldwide REEs market.

US

A new bill has been introduced in the US Senate, sponsored by Republican Sen. Tom Cotton and Democrat Sen. Mark Kelly, aimed at breaking China’s vice on the global REEs supply chain. Called the “Restoring Essential Energy and Security Holdings Onshore for Rare Earths (REEShore) Act”, it seeks to stop the use of Chinese REEs in US Department of Defence supplies. 

Under the bill, 

* US Defence contractors will be required to source their REEs from elsewhere within a 4-year time frame(by 2026), with waivers applicable only in special cases. The waivers will only be allowed if REEs of the required “quantity and quality are not available at reasonable prices from sources outside of” China, and if “such a waiver is in the interests of national security”.

* The manufacturers of weapons supplied to the US Department of Defence will be required to declare where the REEs used in their products were sourced from.

* The US would need to establish a strategic REEs and REE products reserve that can support them even in case of a supply chain disruption for over a year.

* The US will investigate China’s policies and practices in the REEs sector and if any sanctions by the US for any transgressions are required.

* The US would encourage the production and use of REEs sourced domestically and from its allies instead of adversaries like China.

CyberPolitik: Moving ahead on deep synthesis tech regulation

— Sapni G K

2022 started with interesting developments on the technology regulation front. As discussed in the previous edition of this Newsletter, China’s regulatory experiments on emerging technology are underway in full swing. This week we have more information and analysis on further tech regulation experiments from China. The Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC) released the draft Provisions on the Administration of Deep Synthesis Internet Information Services last week. These draft regulations cover a broad range of technologies that use deep synthesis, which is defined as the use of technologies using generative sequencing algorithms to make text, images, audio, video, virtual scenes, or other information, as represented by deep learning and virtual reality. Media coverage of the same appears to place more emphasis on deepfakes, which is only one amongst the many use cases of deep synthesis technologies. 

The provisions envision regulation as a mix of increased self-regulation alongside state supervision. Unlike other laws and drafts published recently, this draft misses a lot of granularity in the approach towards institutional capacity on regulation. It provides for contentious and controversial provisions such as real-name identity verification for users of deep synthesis services. Interestingly, this might be one of the first pieces of regulation that may have been drafted with the metaverse in mind, as the draft points to Virtual Reality as a field of application. The lack of free rein to experiment in a space where American companies have a demonstrated advantage could result in displeasure from Chinese Tech giants. This could also have interesting consequences in the application of deep synthesis technologies in military tech, as my colleague Megha wrote here. 

The presumed leaders of developing global norms on regulation have been slow in catching up against such technologies. Law and regulation have historically trailed miles behind technology. It is fascinating to see changes in this dynamic. However, caution must be exercised in replicating such exercises. Multitudes of emerging technology essentially expand the horizon of expression. Deepfakes have been famously used as media of criticism, parody, and sarcasm. It is not to discredit the harms that have been perpetrated through the use of deep synthesis technology – notoriously the cases of revenge porn and financial crimes. Clearly, the line between regulation and censorship is thin. This draft also reflects the continued trend of China's heightened attempts to regulate cyberspace under the guise of preventing the propagation of false information in the interest of national security and social stability. It can only be hoped that the Chinese population and their freedoms are not sacrificed for these regulatory experiments.

Matsyanyaaya: A Four-Point Action Plan for Quantum Technologies 

(An edited version of this article came out in the Hindustan Times on January 15th, 2022)

— Arjun Gargeyas

In the 2020 Budget speech, finance minister Nirmala Sitharaman announced the National Mission for Quantum Technologies and Applications (NM-QTA) with a total outlay of ₹8000 crores over five years for strengthening the quantum industry in the country. A Lok Sabha question posed in July 2021 enquired about the status and progress of the mission. In response, the Minister of State for Science and Technology, Jitendra Singh, mentioned that the mission had not yet received approval. Singh also announced that no funds were allocated, disbursed, or utilised under NM-QTA during the financial year 2020-21.

With no credible advancements made by the government, there is a need to rethink how the proposed NM-QTA will evolve if India plans to harness the benefits of quantum technology. The focus should be to develop an overarching strategy for the next 10-15 years.  Adequate attention to those who can contribute to developing quantum technology must be the government’s top priority. In the current scenario, our view is that the government must follow a four-fold path to build a robust quantum ecosystem in the country.

First, the primary focus must be on establishing centres of excellence dedicated to quantum science and technology within academic institutions as well as government research institutes. Quantum technology remains a field highly concentrated in long-term research and development (R&D). Even the famed quantum industry of China started in a university laboratory, led by Pan Jianwei at the University of Science and Technology of China in 2008. In 2022, China boasts of developing the world’s first quantum satellite, creating a quantum communication line between Beijing and Shanghai, and owning two of the world’s fastest quantum computers. This was the result of a decade of research carried out in the hope of achieving critical breakthroughs. Hence, a majority of the Indian government’s outlay has to be pumped into institutions specialising in quantum R&D.

Second, the establishment of “quantum innovation hubs” in partnership with selected state governments can help direct investments efficiently and build a well-connected quantum research network in the country.  These hubs, set up with the help of government resources, can serve as centres of collaboration between academia and the private sector. Finally, it is the responsibility of both the union and state governments to establish a conducive fiscal and legal environment to foster innovation. This can potentially attract international firms to conduct their research in the country while involving local talent.

Third, the power of startups and large corporations, like Google, Microsoft and IBM, involved in developing quantum technology and applications must be harnessed. The government must recognise the leaps made by these companies. While academic institutions are largely involved on the research side, quantum tech corporations and startups are vital in converting and commercialising this research into products that can be of use. The government must facilitate connections between academic institutions and industry to translate research into real-world applications.

Finally, the necessity of international cooperation cannot be ignored. The quantum value chain remains highly complicated, and it will be hard for India to remain self-reliant to build a successful quantum ecosystem. The first step could be for the government to engage with its allies in key groupings such as Quad and BRICS. Technology alliances are gaining traction, and India must look at signing some bilateral or multilateral agreements to leverage others’ growth in the domain. This is imperative for India to win critical technology transfer deals, get external technical advice or mentoring, and establish state-of-the-art facilities for joint R&D on quantum technologies.

The government has taken the first step by acknowledging the importance of quantum technologies through its plan of kick-starting a national mission in the country. The global quantum industry has already taken incredible strides and seen massive investments made by both governments and the private sector in recent years. India, which has fallen behind other technologically advanced states in the field of quantum technology, cannot afford to miss the bus this time.

Read the full discussion document on ‘Building India’s Quantum Ecosystem’ published by The Takshashila Institution.

Matsyanyaaya: Pardesi, Pardesi, Aana Nahin!

— Pranay Kotasthane (@pranaykotas)

Over the last few weeks, a few reports suggest that Technopolitik has intensified in another critical dimension: cross-border movement of high-tech human capital.

Nikkei reported that South Korea intends to keep a close tab on the movement of chip engineers across its borders. The purported objective is to discourage Chinese companies from poaching engineers and prevent tech leaks.

In January, SCMP reported that Australia and Japan now require foreign students enrolled in "sensitive" science and technology subjects to hand over detailed background data. Of course, the primary motivation, in this case, is again China.

These actions follow related developments in the US. In the first week of the year, a Chinese national pleaded guilty to stealing trade secrets from Monsanto and transferring it to the Chinese government. There was also a rather embarrassing case against an MIT professor of Chinese descent, alleging that he had failed to disclose his affiliation with Chinese institutions. The US government subsequently dropped the case.

All these incidents point towards a significant shift in technology geopolitics. As some technology areas get labelled as "critical" or "strategic", movements of professionals and international tie-ups involving China will be scrutinised closely. In other words, human capital movement restrictions will be the next frontier in pursuit of high-tech self-sufficiency.

The movement of human capital is an underrated aspect of technology geopolitics. It is a force multiplier in high-tech research and is perceived as such by nation-states. This is especially true in today's high-tech areas where international collaborations are easy, efficient, and effective. For instance, MacroPolo, a think tank, notes that over half of all top-tier AI researchers are immigrants or foreign nationals working in another country.

The host and source countries both benefit due to a dense comingling of researchers. While the benefits for the host country are obvious, the source country benefits over a longer-term — through connections to a better research ecosystem, by way of returning immigrants, or in rare cases, through blatant economic espionage.

China's attempt at tech self-sufficiency through talent transfer has three independent aspects.

First, the party-state has tried to use industrial espionage for strategic advantage.

Second, attracting human capital is seen as a legitimate path to indigenisation. Talent poaching may sound evil but is a fair strategy to build a local ecosystem by attracting talent from outside, in the hope that their prior knowledge will accelerate homegrown efforts.

Third, there has been an organic movement of Chinese researchers back home with better living conditions and opportunities — outcomes of robust economic growth for nearly three decades.

It is tough to estimate which of the three aspects have contributed more to China's rapid strides in gaining high-tech expertise. Regardless, as a whole range of technologies gets labelled as “strategic”, the first of the three aspects will gain narrative dominance, leading to stricter controls on tech transfer and people movement.

Such moves will have significant costs to both China and the host countries. But once technologies start getting defined in national security terms, cost-benefit calculations fall aside. While other countries might suffer costs, they are likely to go ahead and put barriers to the movement of people into China. To be sure, China has invited these moves onto itself because of its geopolitical conduct.

The mileage of restricting human capital movement may vary widely. For instance, nearly 10 per cent of Australia's university students are Chinese. For the government to align interests and develop the capacity to effectively screen them all is going to be a gargantuan task. Similarly, the flow of technology ideas and professionals from China into the US is too large to restrict.

Ultimately, the second-order effects at the level of international collaborations might be more significant. Scientists from these countries are likely to reduce collaborations with their Chinese counterparts, fearing government restrictions on funding and higher scrutiny on outputs.

This augurs well for India and Indians though. The China sized gap in students and researchers can only be filled by one other country. We will keep a close eye on this dimension of Technopolitik.

Our Reading Menu

* [Opinion] US hawks and Chinese communists agree: no rare earths for Pentagon by Alex Lo

* [Column] The Future Of EVs Depend On Rare Earths. Should The US Still Delegate To China? by Ken Silverstein

* [Opinion] Rare Earths: Fighting for the Fuel of the Future by y Brendan P. Dziama, Juan Manuel Chomón Pérez, and Andreas Ganser

* [Article] How Quantum Tech Could Upend Global Power Structures by Taylor Owen

* [Report] Is seeing still believing? The deepfake challenge to truth in politics by William A. Galston

CyberPolitik: China’s Norm-game

— Sapni G K

In the 8th edition of this newsletter, I had written about the draft "Internet Information Service Algorithmic Recommendation Management Provisions" released for comments by the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC). After a few months of deliberations, including their process of public consultation, the draft was finalised this month. The newly released “Internet Information Service Algorithmic Recommendation Management Provisions” lays down rules around the use of algorithmic recommendation technology in internet-based services. This includes a wide range of internet services ranging from social media platforms, gig work platforms, and e-commerce. It could also have potential ramifications on the much-hyped Metaverse and the generative algorithms used in these virtual spaces.

A majority of the principles in the draft version are replicated in the provisions. It is interesting to note that the final version of the provisions has been issued jointly by the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, the Ministry of Public Security, the competition watchdog State Administration for Market Regulation, and the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC), where the latter is responsible for overall coordination. The new additions include a provision that bars providers from unreasonable use of algorithms to engage in monopolistic behaviour or restrict other providers, implying a heightened interest in antitrust action through the provisions.

The changes also pertain to giving more attention to “algorithmic fake news”. A new Article 13 mandates licensing for algorithmic recommendation service providers operating in online news and prohibits algorithmic generation of fake news. The elderly have been identified as a new protected category by the provisions. Accordingly, covered providers are required to take special care while providing their services to the elderly. The earlier draft had a clear mandate against the use of discriminatory tags to classify users. However, the provisions have omitted the anti-discriminatory user tag clause. This peculiar change is worthy of attention, given the cons of the vagueness in language as against practices of recommendation algorithm providers to use discriminatory tags.

The provisions are set to be effective from 1 March 2022. Its impact will be visible across services, including independent providers of recommendation algorithm services, who do not have a user-facing business model. Algorithm regulation is a policy issue that cannot be avoided for long. China’s efforts in this sphere can act as an international norm because of its first-mover advantage. The state overtures in these provisions should not guide the baseline for algorithmic regulation. This will be consequential to all players – states, businesses, civil society organisations, and users. Nuanced and informed thought must be employed as regulatory policy is formulated in this sphere, but it must pick up pace.  

Matsyanyaaya #1: Why did China just release a National Standardisation Development outline?

— Arjun Gargeyas

(This section is adapted from the Takshashila Issue Paper on China’s Technical Standardisation Framework)

China’s ‘Standards 2035’ project gained headlines in April 2020 at the height of the COVID-19 pandemic. October 2021 saw the release of the National Standardisation Development (NSD) outline document as the first official document detailing China’s ambitions in the coming decade on technical standardisation processes. The NSD visualizes a standardised system that promotes high-tech innovation and “opening up” of the technology sector, while also leading to high-quality development. The core points covered in the document provide a glimpse into the Chinese state’s strategic approach towards technical standards.

But the question is why is the Chinese government pulling out all the stops in the current political climate on its standardisation programme? An analysis of the outline document provides an insight into the State Council’s aspirations in the standard-setting domain and the current objectives of the national technical standardisation strategy. Some key takeaways from the document help us understand the timing and the necessity of the project for the Chinese state.

Standards and Tech Innovation

With the development of critical and emerging technologies, there is a definitive need for the upskilling of technology ecosystems across the world. China feels the need to remain relevant and updated on the usage and creation of applications related to critical technologies. Significant investments in advancing emerging technologies remain one of China’s priorities. The Chinese government now is banking on technical standards to achieve technical competence and excellence in critical technologies which remain integral to the global economy in the coming decades. Gaining technical expertise would in turn help in influencing the standard-setting process allowing China to dictate the terms of technological innovation in certain critical technologies. China feels that it is the ripe time for them, as a technically adept state, to mutually support technological growth as well the ability of Chinese companies to set standards in the domain. 

Improving Industrial Standards’ Level 

Though a manufacturing powerhouse, China’s exports as a share of GDP have halved over the past decade. This has made the Chinese government understand the importance of establishing norms that govern the systems according to which goods are produced and the flow of these products or services. This is the critical aspect of technical standards which can provide better economic gains in the form of licenses and royalties for the already established manufacturing sector in the country. The Chinese government believes that the strategic and geopolitical game is no longer limited to market domination and is inherently influenced by system design and rulemaking. The standardisation process is essentially the aspect of making global rules according to which industries function. This can facilitate the country’s industrial transformation by acquiring the first-mover advantage in key sectors.

A Base for ‘Green’ Development 

Climate goals remain integral to the country’s commitment to following certain sustainable development models. The reason for China’s focus on creating climate-specific standards for local companies to adhere to is in its pursuit to tap into the renewable energy sector. With a significant head start compared to other countries, China has successfully captured the renewable energy market being the global leader in solar, EV batteries, and nuclear power. The threat of climate change looms large which makes the renewable energy markets an economic opportunity for a country like China. Technical standards in the realm are just a way of controlling the extremely lucrative renewable energy markets. China sees the 2020s as an opportune time for driving a robust green energy infrastructure-led growth model which would eventually help them capture market space in the domain. Technical standards related to climate reinforce both China’s commitment towards ‘green development’ as well as use that development as leverage for geoeconomic gains.

With different objectives in mind, the government’s recent ‘National Standardisation Development’ outline has officially kicked off the ambitious ‘Standards 2035’ project of China. It remains to be seen if they are actually successful in their attempt to control the global technical standards domain. 

Antriksh Matters: NATO’s Vision for Space

— Aditya Pareek

The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation(NATO) recently published its aptly titled “overarching space policy”. The most striking feature of the policy is its consistency with other familiar aspects of NATO. Below are some distilled highlights of the text:

* The policy declares that NATO doesn’t wish “to become an autonomous space actor”, meaning, it will be heavily reliant on the national space programmes of its constituent members. This mirrors the alliance’s stance in other domains and theatres, where the personnel and equipment used by NATO comes directly from the forces of its members. 

* Another important point is the emphasis on the voluntary nature of capabilities that NATO members may provide for the alliance’s operations in space. Furthermore, the voluntary provision of these capabilities would be in line with the granting state’s “national laws, regulations and policies”.

* The policy declares that NATO wishes to serve as the platform for “political-military consultations” related to the alliance’s mandate on “relevant deterrence and defence related space developments”. The goal behind it being the facilitation of “information sharing” between the members so that NATO’s combined “situational awareness”, “decision making”, and “readiness and posture management” can be handled well.

* The point about ensuring that NATO’s concerns about space are relevant “across the spectrum of conflict” also signals that NATO wisely considers space to be just one part of wider strategic context.

* Another point to note is the stated intention to engage with other international fora and organisations on “the development of legal and behavioural norms”. This is doubtless a reference to various UN General Assembly resolutions, and a newly constituted Open Ended Working Group(OEWG) aimed at figuring out the rules of the road for responsible behaviour in outer space.

*  It is interesting that the policy also insists NATO members should work towards developing a common understanding of concepts related to the role of space in crisis or conflict. Another focus of the policy is considering “ways to improve space resilience”. This would undoubtedly extend to satellites and other space objects that may provide ISR (Intelligence, Search and Reconnaissance) capabilities to members of the alliance. The policy states that the desired reliability which may enable this resilience would be achieved through “exploiting force multiplier redundancies”. 

Matsyanyaaya #2: Over thinking China’s foray into ‘Mind Control’ technologies

— Ruturaj Gowaikar

Current Affair

The year 2021 didn’t end on a pleasant note for two dozen Chinese private technology companies and a dozen government research institutes. These entities were blacklisted and sanctioned by the US for alleged involvement in research related to mind control technologies. Notable among these is the Academy of Military Medical Sciences (AMMS). As per US news reports these technologies were being developed with China’s ethnic minorities in mind but could also be easily deployed abroad. These sanctions are aimed at preventing any technology being developed in the US to be exported to these blacklisted Chinese entities as well as to restrict their funding.

But none of the reports clearly mention what these technologies could be. Most of the private firms are involved in facial recognition and AI based research. These can be easily used for surveillance but lack any mind-control elements. The government research institutes seem to be involved primarily in biotechnology research. There are two possible explanations that might have led to the clubbing of these entities together into a black-list. And that could be the way research is planned and regulated in China.

The broader philosophy of Civil-Military fusion in technology development, adopted by the PLA is part of a national strategy to leverage academic and commercial developments. And the creation of the CMC steering committee on Military Scientific Research handling both research related to biotechnology and brain-machine interface.

The bogey of China possessing mind-control weapons was raised previously in 2019 and might be raised again for political reasons. There exists a lot of confusion regarding the nature of research involved in this domain. Recent developments are cause for us to consider the types of research in the field of neuroscience and their military applications.

Neuroscience research or can be broadly classified into three areas.

1) Assessment technologies

(Imaging -fMRI, electrophysiological recordings, genetics)

2) Interventional Technologies

i) Performance enhancement

Better sensory perception, control over sleep patterns, faster cognition etc

(chemical/biological entities, Brain machine interfaces (BMI), brain

Stimulation, brain implants)

ii) Performance degradation

Loss of consciousness , sedation, hallucination, incoherence, paralysis,

disorientation etc

(chemical/biological entities, electromagnetic/energy )

iii) Delivery systems

Microbes, nanoprobes, direct contact

3) Ethical dialogs and frameworks

Side effects, dependency, dual use nature of technologies

Interventional technologies are the most sought after by the militaries of the world as they can be either used to improve the cognitive performance of one’s own soldiers or degrade the performance of the enemy. There are several challenges in both these sub-fields. The major one in the neuro-enhancement research is the possibility of dependence and withdrawal in case of chemical agents. And in the case of a cortical stimulation devices, there is the large time requirement to customise such a device for an individual operator. Efficient delivery mechanism remains a major challenge for neuro-degradation technology.

The only confirmed product developed by China that can fall under the above classification so far is by the now black-listed AMMS. It is a chemical named Night Eagle that can suppress sleep for 72 hours. Various militaries have dabbled in such chemicals to give an edge to their armed forces. Others are likely to explore this field further.

Our Reading Menu

* [Essay Collection] Getting the Multi-domain Challenge Right Edited by Brad Roberts from Center for Global Security Research, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory.

* [Article] The remnants of diplomacy: how Moscow and Washington are fighting "Russian hackers" by Oleg Shakirov.

* [Article] The COVID-19 pandemic: territorial, political and governance dimensions of the crisis by Klaus Dodds.

CyberPolitik #1: When can Governments Snoop on your Personal Data?

— Sapni G K

Over the past couple of weeks in this newsletter, we have covered the varying aspects of benefits that DCNs bring us. In earlier editions, we covered the harms that are associated with DCNs. Personal data and its governance has been a recurring theme within both these analyses. In addition to the dynamics of private entities dealing with data, it is important to consider government access to data. After all, open-source intelligence (OSINT) already gives away a lot of sensitive information to private, state, and non-state actors. In this context, the might of the state must not be misused to exploit the availability of large quantities of personal data.

There are no agreed international standards on government access to data yet. Broad principles such as respecting the privacy of individuals and the business interests of companies are acknowledged. In 2020, the OECD embarked on an initiative to formulate common principles on the basis of which governments could access personal data held by private companies for national security and law enforcement purposes. Such conversations becomes crucial as invasive products such as the Pegasus snoopware become widely avaialable.

Theodore Christakis, Kenneth Propp, and Peter Swire wrote about the developments in this sphere in Lawfare. It highlights practices employed by governments to access personal data held by private companies. Practices such as the purchase of personal information from data brokers are inimical to trust in government processes. The use of direct access methods, such as hacking, also weakens legal provisions. The challenge, therefore, is to identify reasonable steps that can help maintain the rule of law and provide some protection to citizens.

The group tasked with identifying principles appear to have broadly come to a consensus on the following seven principles:

* Legal bases: that law enforcement acts only within a clearly established legal framework.

* Pursuit of legitimate aims: that such a legal framework ensures that the scope of data acquisition and use is consistent with narrow, specified purposes echoing the idea of proportionality.

* Requirements for approval: that such framework has procedural safeguards for government access requests that respect individual rights.

* Handling of personal data: that the handling of personal data is commensurate with principles of minimisation, maintenance of data integrity and security, and minimal retention.

* Transparency: that such framework be as transparent as is feasible.

* Oversight: that a range of oversight mechanisms be provided to abate non-compliance and provide remedies for the same.

* Redress: that effective redress in the form of independent courts and impartial entities be provided by the legal framework.

The conversations at the OECD are currently stalled due to disagreements between two factions. One faction, which included the US, is arguing for immediate consensus on all concerns barring direct access. The other faction, led by the EU, wants more comprehensive coverage by including direct access methods such as hacking and espionage. Even if a consensus is reached, it will remain non-enforceable, as OECD instruments are non-binding. However, when multiple countries across the globe are thinking of revaluating their surveillance and personal data protection regimes, these developments are worth noting.

CyberPolitik #2: In Apple, CCI Antitrusts?

— Prateek Waghre

Back in September 2021, a non-profit called Together We Fight Society (TWFS) had filed a complaint against Apple for its app store practices, with the Competition Commission of India (CCI). The specific charges were unknown at the time, but Medianama (paywall) had a deep dive into the complaint. On the eve of 2022, CCI issued an order in the case, instructing the Director-General (DG) to carry out a more detailed investigation. As actions from antitrust regulators/watchdogs around the world continue to pick up steam (aside: Channele2e attempts to track them by country and company), it is instructive to look at the this initial ruling by India’s antitrust regulator. It is worth noting that CCI is also currently investigating Google/Alphabet and Whatsapp. But we’ll look at those cases in future editions of Technopolitik.

While these investigations are fairly intensive processes, at a high-level an antitrust complaint should do the following:

* Define a relevant market.

The complaint defined 3 markets. Medianama’s deep dive notes:

1. The market for non-licensable smart mobile device operating systems in India: This market includes smartphone operating systems that cannot be licensed by third-party original equipment manufacturers (OEMs). Apple’s iOS falls under this. It is different from the licensable smart mobile devices operating system market under which Android falls. This key distinction makes it easier for the complainant to establish market dominance.

2. The market for app stores for Apple iOS in India: This market comprises all the channels through which developers distribute their apps to iOS device users.

3. The market for apps facilitating payment through UPI: This refers to the market for apps that enable UPI payments, but the complainant does not provide any rationale as to why this market is of interest in this particular antitrust case.

* Make the case for the firm’s dominance in that market. The 1st and 2nd market definitions in the complaint essentially narrow down the market to Apple’s App Store, where it is the only firm.

* Prove that the firm has abused its dominance.

Broadly, the complaint alleged that:

* Review guidelines on the App Store are arbitrary.

* The 30% commission that Apple charges on in-app purchases (IAP) is excessive.

* Developers are forced to use IAP as the only method for payment processing, along with a number of other restrictions.

Notably, Apple had contested these relevant market definitions on the grounds that they are too narrow. They also cited market research data from IDC which put Apple’s share at 0-5% of the smartphone market in India, to counter any assertion that they were dominant. The CCI, however, accepted the definition “The market for app stores for Apple iOS in India” drawing a distinction between the markets for consumers (where Apple’s use of smartphone market share data would have been relevant), and developers. It also said that a prima facie case violating various clauses of The Competition Act, 2002 existed (paraphrased in the table below), which needed to be investigated in detail.

The DG’s investigation will be worth watching out for. Rohan, Sapni and I had also discussed these developments on an episode of All Things Policy that went out earlier this week.

Incidentally, back in September 2021, Reuters had reported that a CCI investigation concluded that Google had abused its dominance in Android.

Antariksh Matters: China tells UN its Space Station Narrowly Dodged Starlink Satellites

— Aditya Pareek

In early December, China apprised the United Nations(UN) and the international community of two separate instances involving near misses between its space station “Tiangong” and US private sector owned communications satellites. 

The satellites in question, which were being de-orbited after reaching end of their service life, belong to one of Elon Musk’s SpaceX Starlink mega constellations. 

Starlink satellite constellations are generally spread out at altitudes of about 550 km. 

Starlink-1095 approached an orbit of 382 km, converging with “Tiangong” in July 2021. Starlink-2305 followed a similar collision course with Tiangong around 21st October 2021. The Tiangong which currently has only its core module “Tianhae” in orbit will be coupled with two more laboratory modules “Wentian” and “Mengtian” which are yet to be launched, by the end of 2022.

Starlink hopes to be a worldwide wireless internet service provider with a constellation made up of tens of thousands of individual satellites.There are provisions for redressal if any actual damage is caused, under the Outer Space Treaty(OST) of 1967 and the UN convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects. 

Nothing is specified in any international law or treatise for near misses beyond keeping the UN Secretary General apprised. 

In the communiqué to the UN, China has also highlighted that any damage caused by a space object would be the responsibility of the state to which it belongs. Even if the object is owned and operated by a private entity like SpaceX, the responsibility and financial liability would fall solely on the state in which the private company is headquartered.

The UN General Assembly and an Open Ended Working group constituted by it is currently engaged in figuring out “norms, rules and principles of responsible behaviors relating to threats by States to space systems.” 

The stated purpose of this process is to create a set of norms that would be accepted by all space faring states. These norms are supposed to bolster co-ordination between states and help avoid close passes and convergences in orbit.

Elon Musk has rejected criticism about the mega constellations SpaceX is deploying in low earth orbit, which already houses a vast number of artificial space objects. 

China’s state-backed outlet Global Times has published a unique take on the issue, with Chinese experts opining that the move was meant as a test of China’s Space Situational Awareness(SSA) and collision avoidance capabilities.  

Siliconpolitik: The TSMC Question

— Pranay Kotasthane

Taiwan has been front-and-centre of the current moment in semiconductor geopolitics. Last week, there was some more action on this front. An article in the US Army War College Quarterly titled Broken Nest: Deterring China from Invading Taiwan argues that:

* China can be deterred from invading Taiwan short of a full-scale war

* One of the items in a deterrence package should include an explicit threat that Taiwan would self-destroy TSMC should a Chinese invasion occur.

This is not the first time this argument has been made. Nevertheless, the authors go further than others in developing it. Detailing #2, the authors argue:

If Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company’s facilities went offline, companies around the globe would find it difficult to continue operations. This development would mean China’s high-tech industries would be immobilized at precisely the same time the nation was embroiled in a massive war effort. Even when the formal war ended, the economic costs would persist for years. This problem would be a dangerous cocktail from the perspective of the Chinese Communist Party, the legitimacy of which is predicated on promises of domestic tranquility, national resilience, and sustained economic growth.

This is an interesting thought. Since the purpose is deterrence, two lines of enquiry are relevant here. The first is "would such a threat be a credible one?". The second is "even if such a threat is credible, would it alter China's decision making?"

The authors have tried to address the first question in some detail:

Chinese decisionmakers must absolutely believe Taiwan’s semiconductor industry would be destroyed in the event of an invasion. If China suspects Taipei would not follow through on such a threat, then deterrence will fail. An automatic mechanism might be designed, which would be triggered once an invasion was confirmed. In addition, Taiwan’s leaders could make it known now they will not allow these industries to fall into the hands of an adversary. The United States and its allies could support this endeavor by announcing plans to give refuge to highly skilled Taiwanese working in this sector, creating contingency plans with Taipei for the rapid evacuation and processing of the human capital that operates the physical semiconductor foundries.

In a section aimed at the Taiwanese people and government, the authors recommend:

No doubt the Taiwanese will have grave concerns about threatening China with a defensive war that likely cannot be won. The prospects of implementing scorched-earth and guerilla-warfare tactics will be similarly unappealing. It will therefore be a major challenge to make these threats credible to China, though perhaps not as difficult as convincing Beijing that Taiwan and the United States are willing to risk a great-power war over Taiwan’s political status. Paradoxically, however, it is only by making these threats credible that they will never have to be carried out. In any case, the threats outlined above—even if carried out to the maximum extent—will be far less devastating to the people of Taiwan than the US threat of great power war, which would see massive and prolonged fighting in, above, and beside Taiwan.

I am interested in the second line of enquiry — even if the credibility-enhancing steps suggested are followed, would it change China's decision-making calculus? I don't think so, for two reasons.

* Invasion directly implies TSMC's downfall. If such an action is being debated, the costs of losing TSMC will be assumed by China, regardless of a scorched-earth strategy. That's because a China-controlled TSMC would still be dependent on ASML for EUV machines, on Japanese companies for photoresists, and on many US firms for other critical manufacturing equipment. In case of an invasion, all these lines are highly likely to be cut off. Thus, China's decision to invade will rest on the assumption that TSMC becomes a diminished entity in the semiconductor space. If anything, the status quo works better for China where it can poach TSMC engineers to build its own manufacturing industry. A scorched-earth strategy doesn't change China's payoffs from invasion.

* TSMC is neither irreplaceable nor indelible in the long run. TSMC's credentials are impressive indeed. But many countries, including China, can replicate its success over time if it were ever to be destroyed. The monetary and opportunity costs would be huge, no doubt. But given a few years, others can catch up. The key ingredients are access to adequate human capital, humungous capital investment, and most crucially continued access to global vendors and customers. And so, an invasion can't be deterred because the economic loss of such an action is temporary and reversible.

For more, read this two-part (1,2) series in The Diplomat by John Lee and JP Kleinhans.

Our Reading Menu

* [Article] Three Takeaways From China’s New Standards Strategy by Matt Sheehan, Marjory Blumenthal and Michael R. Nelson.

* [Opinion] India Can Take Lessons From China’s Technical Standardisation Strategy by Arjun Gargeyas who is also a contributor to this newsletter.

* [Book] Routledge Handbook of Space Law Edited by Ram S. Jakhu and Paul Stephen Dempsey

* [Article] Norwegian Undersea Surveillance Network Had Its Cables Mysteriously Cut

Antriksh Matters: Russia’s in Cooperative Mood on Space Stations

— Aditya Pareek

Despite the ubiquity of remotely operated space vehicles, inhabited orbital stations remain a symbol of prestige and scientific endeavour. In Russia’s case, much of its spacefaring tradition is tied to its history as a pioneer of the final frontier.

Russia has continued to support the International Space Station(ISS) and has launched another module, this time a docking node called “Prichal”, the Russian word for pier. The Prichal is the second module launched and successfully integrated to the ISS by Russia this year, and according to RIA Novosti it might be the last one Russia has planned for the ISS as of now. The Prichal has five docking slots that can accommodate cargo and crew spacecraft wishing to dock to the ISS. It is also interesting that Russian state space company ROSCOSMOS, according to another RIA Novosti article, is in discussions with NASA on how SpaceX’s Crew Dragon can dock with Prichal. According to the article:

a docking interface, that is, a special adapter, would be required for American spacecraft.

ROSCOSMOS has acknowledged the revolutionary role SpaceX has played in bringing new efficiencies to spacefaring. Significantly for the Russians, SpaceX has given NASA an alternative to the Soyuz missions for sending crews and cargo to the ISS.

Only India among the BRICS can Help

While Russia has not closed the door on the ISS, it has nevertheless started pursuing its own alternative, a unilateral space station tentatively called “Russian Orbital Service Station (ROSS)”. The project was at one point envisioned to be undertaken with BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India and China) partners. However, no significant support in terms of financial commitments came through from BRICS or any other partners. Now ROSCOSMOS is moving ahead with the design of ROSS with Russian state funding.

Furthermore, China has started assembling its own unilateral space station, the “Tiangong” with its core module “Tianhe” already operational in orbit.

Brazil and South Africa do not seem to have similar financial wherewithal or short-medium term ambition on sustained human presence in orbit. That leaves only India. The country’s human spaceflight efforts are set to begin with the Gaganyaan mission which, as ISRO chairman Dr. K. Sivan recently said, is a major thrust area for international cooperation, especially with Russia. It would be interesting to see if Russia is able to persuade India to work with it on a joint space station derivative of, or integrated with, ROSS project.

According to a report in Russian business newspaper Kommersant, Russian Ambassador to India Nikolai Kudashev said India and Russia are also discussing joint production:

The ambassador also noted that in the field of space, Russia and India "are discussing not only the supply of engines, but are also talking about joint engine building, joint development of launch vehicles - heavy, light and ultralight, joint creation of satellites.”

The ambassador also indicated joint Lunar exploration is still on the Russia-India agenda, though this was yet to be discussed in detail by both countries.

If you like the content of this newsletter consider signing up for our Post-Graduate Programme in Public Policy (PGP). The course is targeted at dynamic individuals who wish to enter the growing professional sphere of policy, public affairs, governance and leadership, while pursuing their current occupations. The PGP equips participants with a core set of skills in policy evaluation, economic reasoning, effective communication and public persuasion.

Matsyanyaaya: China’s ‘Quantum Leap’ Overhyped or Genuine Threat?

— Arjun Gargeyas

(An edited version of this article first appeared in The South China Morning Post on 23rd December 2021.)

President Xi Jinping, back in 2016, established a national strategy for China to become technologically self-reliant and soon surpass the United States as the global leader in emerging and critical technologies. At the heart of this was quantum innovation and research. Apart from allocating funds for a long-term quantum mega project, President Xi also announced the establishment of a National Laboratory for Quantum Information Sciences. 

An announcement made by a group of Chinese scientists in late 2021 buttresses the country’s growth in the field. They declared the creation of a quantum communication network in space using their quantum satellite to secure the national power grid against blackouts and other long-distance attacks. This is a massive leap forward in building secure communication networks using quantum science and technology. It also underlines the strides made by China in the field and the significant advantage it has gained over its competitors in the recent past. 

It was in 2008 that a certain Pan Jianwei returned to China in the hope of facilitating quantum research in the country. Hailed as the ‘Father of Quantum Physics’ in China, Jianwei founded a lab at the University of Science and Technology of China (USTC) dedicated to achieving quantum breakthroughs. This ushered in a quantum revolution in the country with extensive research projects on quantum science, especially communications, taking shape. This focus on quantum communications resulted in advanced telecommunications and cryptography systems being developed by the scientific community in the country.

The Beijing-Shanghai communication line, which was opened in 2017, was a result of this decade-long quantum research. It was hailed as the world’s longest un-hackable communication line. Though not a fully realised quantum connection, the line is divided into multiple nodes (based on the distance traveled by each photon before succumbing to noise) which provided a high level of security. China also launched the world’s first quantum satellite in 2016 that was pushed to a higher orbit for a wider coverage to develop the quantum internet. The satellite programme was started in the hope of securing communications between military outposts, embassies, government bodies, and financial institutions. These advancements have effectively made China the global leader in quantum communications. 

In terms of quantum computing and its applications, China was behind the United States in both investments and technological superiority until this year. The revealing of Zuchongzhi, a Chinese-made quantum computer comprising of superconducting 66 qubits easily surpasses the speed and computing power of Google’s quantum computer, Sycamore. There was also a  major improvement to their photonic quantum computer raising the number of qubits from 76 to 113. Owning two of the fastest computers in the world, China now is the only country to achieve a quantum advantage in both photonic and superconducting quantum computing. 

With China pulling ahead in the quantum race, there are also threats of the Chinese government exploiting and weaponising critical quantum technologies for military purposes. This would mean that the Chinese military might develop capabilities to neutralise many offensive and defensive military technologies of its rivals. A Chinese company, Electronic Technology Group Corporation, has claimed having developed Quantum Radar which is supposedly capable of determining the type of airplane and the weapons the airplane is carrying. This would render any stealth technology useless. The Chinese National Academy of Science has reported the development of a quantum submarine detector using extremely sensitive sensors called SQUIDs (Superconducting Quantum Interference Devices). This has the ability to detect a submarine from a long distance away creating limitations for all opposing forces. If these technologies are functional as the Chinese claim, the possibility of China gaining a military quantum advantage is imminent. 

China has definitely made incredible progress in building its quantum ecosystem. With quantum research driven by the state and concentrated in a few university research labs, the funding provided by the Chinese government consistently remains on the higher side. This has resulted in critical breakthroughs in the domain. However, inherent challenges remain for China to navigate before officially winning the quantum race. 

CyberPolitik #1: DCNs Reporting for National Security Duty

— Prateek Waghre

In August 2021, the actions that the likes of Facebook, Twitter were about to take (or not take / or had not taken in the months/year before it) in the aftermath of the Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan were the subject of intense scrutiny and debate. These were yet another reminder of how entangled DCN firms are in decisions that have significant geopolitical implications as well as the national security of individual states.

Literature on the role of DCNs primarily invokes the lenses of competition, privacy and speech. However, a recent paper, ‘National Security by Platform’ by Elena Chachko, proposes a framework for analysing their role in the privatisation of national security functions.

Before going into the framework, there are some key points the paper makes which are worth considering upfront. I’ve paraphrased my interpretation here:

* Ad hoc developments: The growing role of DCN firms in geopolitics and national security weren’t the product of a deliberate, consensus-building exercise. Instead, these were ad hoc, piecemeal and incremental steps in response to significant events such as terrorist attacks, concerns over election integrity, etc.

* Contradiction with Competition: While competitive markets envisage many private firms taking part, a market with a limited set of large-scale operators is better suited for cooperation with the national security apparatus and rapid, uniform responses/actions.

* DCN capabilities and intent: Are DCN firms capable of meeting national security challenges, and are they likely to prioritise addressing them over profits?

Chachko makes the following points about the relationships between DCN firms and governments (I’ve separated them into bullet points for better readability) :

* … Involve threat analysis and policy development cooperation, information sharing, and platforms replicating government practices and methods.

* A mutually beneficial, at times even symbiotic, relationship has emerged between platforms and government agencies in addressing certain important national security and geopolitical challenges.

* On other fronts, however, platforms and government have clashed.

These trends can be considered to be forms of ‘indirect, informal national security privatization’, and proposed the following categories:

A. Hard Structural Constraints

There can be institutional or constitutional limitations/constraints on state actors. For example, state actors likely have neither the capability to detect/respond to sophisticated disinformation operations nor the authority to control what information can or cannot be posted/shared in other jurisdictions. DCN firms, on the other hand, exercise more control over these spaces (at least the ones they operate) and have the tools/capabilities/expertise to understand these threats better than state actors. This creates a need for state actors to rely on private actors.

B. Bureaucratic Workarounds

Even in the absence of ‘hard constraints,’ state actors may choose to rely on / cooperate with DCN firms to work around legal/administrative requirements and/or political opposition, speed up response times, limit the visibility of their role, etc.

Both categories A and B require varying degrees of cooperation between state actors and DCN firms. They are also not mutually exclusive.

C. Platforms as Substitutes

In cases of inaction by state actors, or when their desired/preferred actions are at odds with government policy prescriptions/direction, DCN firms may resort to acting unilaterally, essentially substituting for state actors.

And while privatisation in the context of national security, both formal and informal, are not unique to platforms, Chachko argues that it is the change in scope that is significant:

The breadth of security and geopolitical policy and execution discretion that platforms currently exercise is striking. Questions such as what to do about genocide in Myanmar, what kinds of coordinated behavior constitute security threats and require enforcement, what foreign government blowback might ensue following such enforcement, what is necessary to secure the Indian election and protect its integrity, how to respond to Turkish demands to silence opposition,or what constitutes credible information about COVID-19 are complex and open-ended. They require far broader and more diverse expertise and greater exercise of policy discretion than identifying individual terrorism suspects or monitoring violent groups, finding breaches of computer systems, exposing zero-day vulnerabilities, or even attributing computer breaches to perpetrators.

CyberPolitik #2: Consider the benefits of Digital Communication Networks

— Sapni G K

This entry is adapted from one of the sections of a forthcoming discussion document by Prateek Waghre and Sapni G K on the opportunities and benefits associated with Digital Communication Networks.

As Prateek had written in the previous issue of this Newsletter, the discourse around Digital Communication Networks (DCN) tends to be dominated by the harms they have caused. Literature around DCNs focuses heavily on the myriad of troubles they have exacerbated with little consideration of their benefits, particularly from the Indian perspective. In our latest discussion document, we attempt to examine the potential opportunities and benefits that could be attributed to DCNs. We broadly look at how DCNs interact with the market and the society at large. In this section, I will write about the interaction between DCNS and the market, which has contributed to the creation of new economic opportunities and efficiencies.

DCNs have facilitated the growth of business models that were thought to be highly improbable or previously associated with high transaction costs. This includes the booming creator economy with its turbocharged growth during the pandemic. They even enabled new job categories such as social media managers and curators, which did not exist in the world before DCNs. They also help many people to reach out to their extended networks for job opportunities, which has facilitated the freelance economy. Since DCNs transcended geographies and economic divides, a range of new opportunities was created and amplified. This benefitted Indian businesses in multiple ways. Their operations were globalised, with small and medium enterprises also eyeing the global market. Analytics and visualisation tools that are a part of most DCNs helped firms understand trends in real-time and modify their business practices. DCNs also facilitated the opening up of entirely new markets, such as the thrifting- used clothes retail, that has historically been looked down upon. The advertisement model that DCNs presented helped businesses to move into targeted marketing. Many DCNs operate on the advertisement-supported business model where they provide access to their services in return for tracking users’ activities, both on and off the platforms, and serving them targeted advertisements.

Calculating the economic efficiency of different domains is an inherently difficult task. At the level of algorithm design, calculations have historically considered informativeness as the near equivalent of economic efficiency. Through the document, we identify increased informativeness and online social graphs as tools for creating economic efficiency, which has led to the compounding of benefits created by DCNs.

While the points mentioned above only represent a small portion of our document, they serve the purpose of reiterating why it is important to reorient our perspectives on conversations about the governance of DCNs. We argue that these cumulative benefits should not be lost out as proposals for governance and regulation are presented across the globe. India, in particular, has benefitted immensely from DCNs, and caution must be exercised when we think of regulating them.

You can read the entire document here. This is a work in progress, as part of our investigations into the ecosystem of DCNs. If you have thoughts/comments on the same, do reach out via Twitter DMs (@SapniGK) or email me ( AT takshashila.org.in ).

Our Reading Menu

* [Chapter]Approaching the Third Rail? A Trilateral Treaty to Prohibit Space-Based Missile Defenses

* [Report] Getting the multidomain challenge right

* [Paper] State policy against information war by Dmitry Shibaev and Nina Uibo

* [Paper] The role of internet media in informational counteracting between Ukraine and Russiaduring the war in the East by Nadia Herasymchuk and Anatolii Yakovets

Matsyanyaaya: The US-Australia Quantum Tech Agreement 

— Arjun Gargeyas

The Quantum race has just heated up. November saw an official agreement between the United States and Australia on quantum technology cooperation. An official statement underlined the importance of science and technology in the information age along with the need for collaborative and transnational efforts in the pursuit of scientific discovery and societal benefit. The statement also described quantum technology, as being a critical and emerging technology that could enable the development of faster computers, secure communication networks, and more accurate sensors. 

This new agreement comes at a time when the global quantum ecosystem is developing across the globe with increased participation from different states. This includes the realisation of the field’s benefits with the hope of new quantum-enabled economies coming up. 

What does the Agreement Entail?

The agreement goes into the prospects of new theoretical and practical applications of quantum technology along with the translation of credible research in the field into potential applications that would be of mutual benefit to both countries. It also emphasizes the need for joint research and development along with critical technology transfers between the two countries. 

There is also a focus in the agreement on building a quantum technology market with the help of the private sector and other industry bodies. The agreement is also a step towards diversifying supply chains in this field. 

The agreement delves into the need for improvement in the field of quantum education in both countries. Cross border education in the field can help in fast-tracking significant research in the field and can build a competent workforce for the future. The exchange of skills and development can help in the protection of intellectual property along with building safe and secure research environments. Finally, the sharp focus on quantum technology can help the two states collaborate in developing and setting technical standards that foster interoperability, innovation and transparency. 

Other than the objectives of the agreement, there was also a mutual decision taken between the two governments in holding the Quantum Policy Dialogue that would involve senior government officials, who are experts in quantum technologies, meeting regularly to flesh out the subsequent agendas for the cooperation agreement. This would eventually help in the identification of practical initiatives that can be taken forward by both governments. 

With China pursuing quantum technology, this agreement looks to be a joint effort between two technologically advanced states to counter their common adversary. The applications of quantum technology are broadening with strategic angles to the technology driving forward this focus. There is still a long way to go before computing power or stable communication networks using quantum technologies can be deployed on a large scale. But the race to achieve what is commonly known as ‘Quantum Supremacy’ has definitely begun. It is something worth watching out for. 

CyberPolitik #1: Can Digital Communication Networks have benefits?

— Prateek Waghre

This entry is adapted from one of the sections of a forthcoming discussion document by Prateek Waghre and Sapni GK on the opportunities and benefits associated with Digital Communication Networks.

Back in July, we had published a paper categorising the various kinds of harms attributed to Digital Communication Networks as potential market failures, social problems and cognitive biases. I’m including some screenshots from the tables just to give you a sense of it - for the complete tables, do look at the original document.

In the course of writing that paper and a bunch of discussions during and after it on whether benefits are self-evident or not - we also realised that much of the analysis around the benefits/opportunities hadn’t really evolved much since the early/mid-2010s. Maybe we were just looking at the wrong sources… but what we found were either variations of the ‘Democratising Force’/Arab Spring angles or very specific and narrow use-cases.

So we signed off saying:

In subsequent work, we plan to identify the benefits that DCNs enable, assess overlaps and contradictions between proposed/enacted DCN governance measures, and explore the role of global internet governance mechanisms with the aim to define appropriate frameworks to govern DCNs.

This was back in July, mind you, long before the Facebook Files/Papers/Documents sent our heads spinning. Nevertheless, as Dean Eckles points out in his testimony to the US Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation (on Pages 1 and 5); or as Rebekah Tromble said in this episode of the TechPolicy.Press podcast; or as Rebeca Mackinnon noted in this episode 2 of the Internet of Humans podcast - we don’t have a grasp on the benefits.

So, in a forthcoming paper, we try to list out potential opportunities and benefits in the context of markets and societies. In this section, I’ll write a bit about how we approached their role in imparting social benefits.

One of the things we did in the harms paper was to define the concept of Digital Communication Networks (DCNs).

DCNs as composite entities consisting of:

* Capability: Internet-based products/services that enable instantaneous low-cost or free communication across geographic, social, and cultural boundaries. This communication may be private (1:1), limited (1:n, e.g. messaging groups), or broad (Twitter feeds, Facebook pages, YouTube videos, live streaming), and so on.

* Operator(s): Firms/groups that design/operate these products and services.

* Networks: The entities/groups/individuals that adopt/use these products and services, and their interactions with each other.

And while the term may not ever catch on, its usage was deliberate.

The purpose of introducing a new frame is to encourage the study of DCNs from the perspective of their effects on societies as a whole rather than a specific focus on a specific set of firms, technologies, sharing mechanisms, user dynamics, and so on.  

In the context of societies, we tried to focus on the role of capabilities and networks, and not the firms themselves - though, it isn’t possible to always ignore them.

First, we had to try and visualise what societies look like. When attempting something like this, there will always be layers of abstraction - and no model (no matter how good) can perfectly capture systems as complex as modern societies. Nevertheless, we found that the model that Christian Fuchs and Daniel Trottier propose in Social Media, Politics and the State could be a useful one. Some key points from it:

* It contains the following subsystems: overlapping state and economic spheres, a cultural sphere, and a civil sphere that mediates the cultural and overlapping state and economic spheres.

* The civil sphere is composed of socio-political, socio-economic, and socio-cultural movements.

* These movements are struggles for different ends by various social roles within the subsystems.

* The Movements are:

* Socio-political: For the “recognition of collective identities via demands on the state.”

* Socio-economic: For the “production and distribution of material resources created and distributed in the economic system.”

* Socio-cultural: Have “shared interests and practices relat[ed]  to ways of organising one’s private life.”

* The Roles:

* Trottier and Fuchs use the tripleC framework to explain that DCNs allow actors to perform tasks of creation (cognition), share them with others who can respond (communication), and modify them (cooperation) in an integrated manner, and that they can all occur in the same social space (capability built by DCN operators).

Then, building on this model, we identify five types of actions that DCNs enable. Note that these are not mutually exclusive. And, in most cases, they overlap. We had to use a non-exhaustive set of examples in the paper to show where DCNs played a role in minimising harms or enabling benefits through a combination of one or more of these actions, since many of these effects could not be quantified.

* Information Production/Consumption: Low entry costs and capabilities for users to generate and share content enable participation in DCN Networks at scale. Under this action, we refer narrowly to the ability to transmit information or receive information.

* Interaction: Interaction involves receiving and then responding to information. This can manifest itself in various ways. It can mean mutual communication between two or more actors belonging to any of the societal subsystems. This communication can also be directed at a completely different set of actors and may or may not include the original set of actors. Responses need not be limited to communication / sharing on DCN networks but can also include actions taken off them such as physical actions, internalising information, or any of the five kinds of actions identified in this section.

* Identity Formation/Expression: Identity formation and expression are complex processes. User profile-centric DCN services provide a natural home for the performance of identity, which itself can lead to the accumulation of social capital. Identities also evolve as actors across the subsystems consume information, interact with information and other actors across DCN networks. These identities (individual or collective) may then be further expressed using DCN capabilities and features.

* Organisation: A combination of DCN capabilities and networks reduces barriers for groups of people to cooperate and act towards achieving common or similar goals. They can also aid the scaling phase of self-organising or spontaneous movements. It should be noted that the mere existence of DCN capabilities and networks is not sufficient. The networks also need to include motivated actors with incentives to do so.

* Financial Transactions: In this context, we refer to transactions where DCNs play a connective role, and not where the DCN operators are themselves a party to the financial transaction (ad revenue sharing, creator pay-outs, create their own tokens, news partnerships, funds for research and civil society organisations, and so on).

We don’t have a link yet but we’ll include one in the edition right after the document is published.

In the meanwhile, if you want to talk to me about it / see a draft - you can reach out via Twitter DMs (@prateekwaghre) or email me ( AT takshashila.org.in

If you like the content of this newsletter consider signing up for our Post-Graduate Programme in Public Policy (PGP). The course is targeted at dynamic individuals who wish to enter the growing professional sphere of policy, public affairs, governance and leadership, while pursuing their current occupations. The PGP equips participants with a core set of skills in policy evaluation, economic reasoning, effective communication and public persuasion.

Siliconpolitik: India’s Semiconductor Strategy Needs to Focus on Five Areas

— Pranay Kotasthane & Arjun Gargeyas

(An edited version of this article first appeared in Hindustan Times on 2nd December 2021)

With a short-term approach of securing a deal to establish a manufacturing facility in the country, the conversation currently solely rests on the path of India’s foray into semiconductor manufacturing. Setting up one fab manufacturing facility won’t significantly reduce India’s strategic vulnerability in the domain.

There is a clear need for a shift in the government approach and a change in mindset at the highest decision-making level to improve India’s position in the entire semiconductor ecosystem. Looking at the experiences of other leading countries in the domain, the time taken to build robust domestic semiconductor industries remains a marathon process. A similar strategy needs to be envisioned for India right now. 

First, India needs one 20-year semiconductor roadmap. This needs to begin with an audit of the chips that form the core of key defence equipment and critical infrastructure. Once this vulnerability assessment is done, the government needs to ensure that over time, such equipment should have chips produced end-to-end within the trusted semiconductor ecosystem.  

Second, the 20-year roadmap needs a 20-year financial support plan. The roadmap needs to sequence semiconductor initiatives depending on the government’s financial wherewithal. For instance, focusing on getting a leading Taiwanese or South Korean ATMP player to India could be considered immediately, at a lower opportunity cost. Co-investing in a chip production unit at a trailing-edge, speciality chip fabrication unit could then be the next big step for the government. Concurrently, the government can focus on funding new semiconductor materials research, new design architectures for critical equipment, intellectual property protection, and technical standards. Over a two-decade period, this could well give the confidence to global investors to co-invest in a leading-edge fab here. 

Three, plurilateral strategic cooperation on semiconductors is a necessity for India, not a choice. The Quad Semiconductor Supply Chain Initiative, announced in the first in-person leadership summit meeting in September 2021, is a good starting point. India now needs to push for a Quad Supply Chain Resilience Fund with the goal of ensuring redundancy in this supply chain to immunise it from geopolitical and geographic risks. For instance, while the US focuses on restarting manufacturing at leading-edge nodes (5 nanometres and below), the group should be able to fund specialised analog, memory fabs operating at trailing-edge nodes (45 nanometres and above) in India, Japan or Australia. Over time, this initiative can coalesce other major semiconductor powers such as Taiwan, South Korea, the EU, and Israel.

Fourth, favourable trade policies are critical for building a plurilateral semiconductor ecosystem. Over the past few years, the union government has been increasing import duties using the rhetoric of Aatmanirbharta. Such policies have major implications on the semiconductor industry globally. For example, even Taiwan, which produces over fifty per cent of contract manufactured chips needs specialised equipment that needs to be imported. Unsurprisingly, a reduction in tariffs was reportedly a major issue of contention in talks between India and Taiwan over a semiconductor collaboration earlier this year. Similarly, considering the nascent domestic market for semiconductor chipsets, foreign entities manufacturing chips in India will primarily be exporting their products. In essence, a fab in India will still be deeply connected with the world — buying equipment from some countries and selling chips to others. 

Finally, the 20-year roadmap needs a robust infrastructure plan. Significant quantities of reliable water and electricity supplies are non-negotiable requirements for fabs. It is not possible to meet these specialised requirements all across the country. Fabs will be clustered in a few states that have the risk appetite to get into this sector. Hence, it’s important that the union government works with interested state governments to build the necessary infrastructure.

CyberPolitik #2: Norms for AI - UNESCO’s Recommendations

— Sapni G K

The 41st General Conference of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) concluded on 24 November 2021 with a major step on the global development of norms on the use and regulation of Artificial Intelligence (AI). 193 member states of UNESCO signed and adopted the draft AI Ethics Recommendation. It can be touted as the first globally accepted normative standard-setting instrument in the realm of AI. The voluntary, non-binding commitment is a major point of cooperation in identifying principles of ethics in the regulation of AI systems. This is one step further in conversations that presume the inevitability of AI systems’ involvement in decision making. Consequentially, it could be a first in outlining the foundations of global AI governance. Given the encouragement for multilateral and intercultural efforts, these recommendations appear to be a good starting point for engaging further in the discussions for rulemaking and governance. The structure of the document, dividing the recommendations into values and policy actions facilitates the same.

Values and Value-based Policy

In addition to furthering UNESCO’s longstanding values, the recommendation also suggests policy actions to translate these principles into globally accepted normative standards. It calls for establishing compliance mechanisms to ensure human rights and rule of law are upheld, in consonance with the constitutional provisions of the signatories. It urges the signatories to incorporate ethical impact assessments as part of operationalising AI systems. It nudges states to include a transversal gender impact assessment as part of such ethical impact assessments, which is a welcome suggestion that is seldom raised in conventional conversations around AI ethics. As recommendations spanning the field of AI systems and applications, future policies on the regulation on AI in various specific scenarios, including DCNs, military, and welfare applications can draw from these recommendations.

Geopolitical Significance

Barring China, there is little broad-based regulation of AI that can affect a sizeable population of the world. The United States of America is not a member of UNESCO, which leaves it outside the list of signatories to the recommendation. The European Union’s proposed AI Act hopes to set the norm, repeating the feat achieved by the General Data Protection Regulation in 2017. The new recommendation could be reflected in the path that the AI Act chooses, essentially becoming the normative standard for decades to come. As far as India is concerned, being a passive observer of these developments might not augur well for establishing its interests in the regulation of emerging technologies.

Our Reading Menu

* [Paper] International Cooperation in Space Activities amid Great Power Competition by Ludmila V. Pankova, Olga V. Gusarova, Dmitry V. Stefanovich

* [Article] Quantum USA Vs. Quantum China: The World's Most Important Technology Race by Paul Smith-Goodson

* [Article] Semiconductors – the Next WaveOpportunities and winning strategies for semiconductor companies

* [Opinion] AI Strategic Competition, Norms, and the Ethics of Global Empire by Joseph Bouchard

Antariksh Matters: Will Debris-Swallowing Satellites Eat Space Norms for Breakfast?

— Aditya Ramanathan

On the morning of 23 October 2021, a Chinese Long March 3b rocket shot into space, putting a satellite into geosynchronous transfer orbit, the elliptical path into which any satellite must first enter before moving into a geosynchronous orbit.

Under normal circumstances, the launch would have received little attention, but this Long March rocket’s payload was different. According to the state-run Xinhua, the satellite, named Shijian-21, would be “used to test and verify space debris mitigation technologies.” These seemingly innocuous words immediately drew the attention of space-watchers, since any debris removal satellite is also a potential space weapon. 

Chinese authorities have not released any details about the Shijian-21. However, in early November, reports indicated that the US Space Force had detected another object, possibly a rocket body component, that was orbiting alongside the Shijan-21 in geosynchronous orbit. 

China’s Shijan-21 test is shrouded in secrecy, which is only bound to provoke speculation. However, we must acknowledge that removing space debris is likely to be increasingly necessary and may present commercial opportunities. 

How do you solve a problem like space debris?

Space debris is perhaps the most challenging governance problem in orbital space. About 27,000 pieces of debris are routinely tracked. Besides these, there are an estimated 100,000 pieces of debris between 1 cm and 10 cm in size, another 900,000 less than 1 cm and greater than 1mm, and some 130 million pieces of debris that are less than 1mm. 

In lower orbits, debris can fly at speeds of 28,000 km per hour or about 7.8 km per second. For reference, a standard 4 gram (62 grain) bullet from a full-size M16A2 rifle has a muzzle velocity of about 853 metres per second. 

The problem of space debris is likely to get worse without the creation of clear guidelines to which space actors will adhere. A major culprit is likely to be the planned mega-constellations of low earth orbit (LEO) satellites that are to provide everything from satellite internet to military surveillance. Following the incredibly destructive Chinese ASAT test in 2007, the UN General Assembly backed a set of Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines. However, more rules will need to be put in place to slow down the accretion of orbital debris. 

In the meantime, some of the debris already in orbit needs to be removed. China is not the only state or entity experimenting with debris-mitigating satellites. In March, a Japanese start-up called Astroscale launched an experimental satellite to test “space debris docking and removal.”

The European Union is also funding a project called RemoveDebris, which seeks to develop a “low cost in-orbit demonstrator mission” that will engage in active debris removal (ADR). According to a description of the mission:

“A microsatellite called here RemoveSAT, will release, capture and deorbit two space debris targets, called DebrisSats, in sequence using various rendezvous, capture and deorbiting technologies thus demonstrating in orbit, key ADR technologies”.

In 2018, one of the experimental RemoveDebris satellites deployed a net at an altitude of 300 km to ensnare a simulated piece of debris. Other proposals include a Chinese one for a laser-wielding orbital craft to burn space junk, and an Airbus plan to harpoon a defunct French satellite. 

Of Ploughshares and Swords

Every one of the proposed methods of debris mitigation has obvious anti-satellite applications. Whether such crafts use robotic arms, harpoons, nets, lasers, or kamikaze-hugs that result in de-orbiting, they can all be employed on active satellites. These platforms can also serve an effective coercive function in international politics: the very act of placing a laser-armed craft next to an adversary’s satellite can send a powerful signal and change the adversary’s behaviour. Such platforms are also far more usable than kinetic-kill weapons like ASAT missiles: given the very nature of debris-mitigating technology, using one of them to put an active satellite out of commission is unlikely to affect satellites in orbit. 

Today, there are few, if any, dedicated space weapons. Even Direct Ascent- ASAT missiles are largely derived from ballistic missile defence (BMD) platforms. At present, the US Space Force has only one publicly-acknowledged weapon for space warfare: an Earth-based jammer that can target communications satellites. Russia also fields the Tirada-2S, which performs the same function, and China is reportedly developing similar platforms. 

While there has been talk of a secret US space weapon, information in the public domain tells us states are yet to turn their space ploughshares into swords. That means any attempt at arms control that seeks to limit hardware is likely to fail at this time.  What has greater chances of success are the efforts to put in place norms for behaviour in space. As states haggle over the details in the coming weeks and months, we’ll keep you posted on the developments. Watch this space. 

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Cyberpolitik: Blurred Battle Lines on DCNs

— Sapni G K

France is all set to go polls next year, which could prove decisive for the incumbent President Emmanuel Macron. Two days before the final vote during the 2017 elections that Macron won, “Macron Leaks” – a series of materials that accused Macron and his campaign team of committing tax evasion and election fraud. This had limited effects on the result of the polls itself, arguably due to the near-total pre-electoral silence period mandated by French law. The limited availability of time played a crucial part in preventing the spread of these sets of claims. It was later discovered to be a coordinated operation involving hackers affiliated with the Russian Federation’s Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU), its foreign military intelligence agency. The information that was part of the leaks was found to be false information interspersed with select genuine campaign material.

Repeated attempts to orchestrate such incidents, as recent as Russia’s alleged involvement in disinformation campaigns on Facebook in Sudan, is cause for worry in France. Reports also suggest that foreign information operations on social media platforms have been identified in other European countries, including Spain and Germany. Given this background, France is taking proactive steps to reduce and counter politically destabilising events on DCNs. In January 2021, France created an office called VigiNum dedicated to detecting and analysing foreign media manipulation. This office has been functioning under the Prime Minister’s office since October 2021, in consonance with the intelligence services and the election regulator.

Interestingly, French Defense Minister Florence Parly presented a new cyber influence doctrine last month called lutte informatique d’influence, roughly translating into the doctrine of computer influence warfare. According to the doctrine, these are “military operations conducted in the informational layer of cyberspace to detect, characterize and counter-attacks, support strategic command, provide information (intelligence) or deceive, either stand-alone or in combination with other operations”.  Under this doctrine, French armed forces are permitted to use social media for information operations, within the bounds of State and international laws. These operations are primarily to “detect, characterize, and counter” adversarial operations, but also to “provide information; conduct deception; or support strategic communication”. 

It is amusing to see transparency from a country on Information Operations, while the undercurrents of States covertly conducting these operations on social media and other networked platforms have been around for long. However, with this shift in narrative and transparency, the vulnerabilities of DCNs ( as we have discussed earlier in this newsletter) are evident. They have brought intelligence and war-like operations closer to the ordinary citizen, effectively blurring the line between a civilian and an actor in a military conflict. It also depicts the incapability of large private corporations that operate DCNs to prevent such coordinated operations or take action to protect the users from manipulation. Course correction might no longer be an option for DCNs, as such incidents are facilitated by features that have been entrenched into their mechanics. 

With decisive state elections pending in 2022 in Uttar Pradesh, Punjab, Manipur, etc., these are developments that India should keep a close watch on. Information manipulation campaigns need not be restricted to foreign interference. They can be conducted within the country by vested interests of varying kinds. India must re-evaluate its methods to ensure that free and fair elections can take place without the electorate being subject to information operations. It is time India adopts a defensive strategy for manipulation from external actors on networked information ecosystems, including DCNs. However, ensuring that deterrent mechanisms of the State are not used for information operations within the country is critical. Treading that thin line is challenging but crucial to sustaining democratic processes. 

Matsyanyaaya #1: Signals and Signalling from Syndey

— Arjun Gargeyas

Last week saw the world’s first-ever conference dedicated to emerging and critical technologies. The Syndey Dialogue, a brainchild of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), was held virtually from 17th to 19th of November. The presence and the delivery of keynote addresses from key political leaders emphasised the criticality of the dialogue. In the current digital and information age, emerging technologies have become both an intrinsic part of everybody’s lives as well as tools of statecraft. There was a common vision that echoed throughout the discussions at the dialogue: the design, deployment, and usage of these technologies need effective regulations to minimise the harms and maximise the benefits that critical and emerging technologies have to offer.

Shaping global technology governance by democratic states and institutions across the globe was the single point of focus by the different panelists and dignitaries at the event. Finding the right balance of governance in the technology domain remains essential for the betterment of modern society. This can be achieved through the governance of technical standard-setting processes, design principles, ethical frameworks, and legal enforcement of technology legislations. Ensuring all democratic states a seat at the table for creating a uniform technology governance framework remains a primary objective as more technologies emerge that can prove to be economically and geopolitically significant. 

The need for democratic states to come together on technology governance was underlined by the challenges technology creates for government institutions. Technology remains a double-edged sword creating vulnerabilities for every advantage it creates. Tackling these vulnerabilities and challenges remains critical for ensuring a safe environment for those using technology as an enabler in their daily lives. The abuse of technology platforms for spreading disinformation by non-state actors has resulted in catastrophic consequences (COVID-19 vaccine misinformation resulted in the loss of many lives) for citizens and has resulted in some states piggybacking on online harms for gaining strategic advantage. There is also the fear of technology abuse by authoritarian regimes resulting in stifling their own citizens’ voices. 

The Quad’s recent take on technology has laid the groundwork for democracies around the world working towards fostering an open, accessible, and secure technology ecosystem. The all-important issue of protecting the privacy rights of individuals, especially in the wake of the Pegasus revelations, remains at the forefront of government tech policy objectives. Governments across the globe have the responsibility to keep the internet ‘open’ - away from surveillance and towards an inclusive, transparent system of data flows. The socio-economic influence of ‘Big Tech’ companies raises question marks over the issue of governments’ sovereignty in the technology domain. Basic regulatory practices, specific to the technology sphere, are the need of the hour for finding the right balance between protecting individuals and the industry’s rights.

The Syndey Dialogue was a major step forward taken by technologically advanced states around the world to signal their governments’ intentions of playing a role in presiding over global technology governance frameworks. Emphasis was placed on the fact that certain rules cannot be left to the whims and fancies of private companies. Stress on the need for crucial legislation concerning the utilisation of technologies was signalled through the keynote addresses from major political leaders. The dialogue also underlined the commitment towards organising multi-group forums with the presence of private technology companies, government bodies, and civil society organisations for formulating effective policies concerning technologies. 

The lessons from Syndey show the intent of collaboration between democratic states to protect technology and its growth. Governments are now finding it imperative for their presence in the field. The sight of governments taking on an active role in shaping discourse related to critical and emerging technologies is something to watch out for. 

Matsyanyaaya #2: Pegging China’s Tech Power

— Pranay Kotasthane

(Crossposted from Anticipating the Unintended — a public policy newsletter by Pranay and RSJ)

If one were to judge the technological prowess of a nation-state on the basis of daily news, China comes across as heads and shoulders above the rest. Hardly any day passes by without reports reminding us that China is well on its path to creating a self-reliant technology industry.

While China’s technological progress is quite real, I want to list three caveats to make you recalibrate exponential growth projections and over-optimistic predictions about China’s tech ecosystem.

1. CCP’s self-preservation imperative

Across many critical sectors such as defence and technology, the CCP exaggerates its capabilities. This strategy is not meant to be just an information operation aimed at other nation-states. It is also a domestic imperative for the CCP, to create a perception that it has things under control at all times.

Projecting control requires demonstrating success. For this reason, CCP propaganda projects promising initiatives by individual companies as world-beating solutions. What we forget is that such reportage is prone to survivorship bias — it overlooks the many companies and initiatives that have failed.

Take the example of Tsinghua Unigroup — which made a lot of news in 2015 for its bid to buy the American memory chipmaker Micron. Once touted as China’s leading chip design house, it has failed to make any significant breakthroughs. As of now, it is reeling under debt, and the government is coordinating its buyout to another player. Similarly, companies such as the Wuhan Hongxin Semiconductor Project (HSMC), once projected to unleash China’s first seven-nanometer foundry, went bust last year. But you’ll hardly see reports about the costs and consequences of such failures.

2. US’ Need to Align Domestic Vectors

The second reason we should be wary of tall claims is that it is in the interest of the US military-industrial complex to overplay China’s technology capabilities. Few things can fire national imagination like a well-equipped, seemingly more advanced adversary.

Just as the Sputnik moment aligned the domestic constituencies in the US and resulted in path-breaking institutions such as the DARPA, overplaying China’s technological advances creates room for prioritising expenditure on key technologies and their governance structures.

It’s not surprising then that the first National Strategy for Critical & Emerging Technologies (C&ET) put out by the Trump administration explicitly cautions against China’s pursuit to become a global leader in Science & Technology.

As an example, consider the debate over semiconductor policy in the US. China’s shadow over East Asia has allowed the US semiconductor industry to make a persuasive case for higher incentives and government support.

3. Opportunity Cost Neglect

A lot of China’s technological success is being financed by governments at the city, provincial, and central levels. While the benefits and successes of these initiatives make news, the costs do not. And as a student of public policy, the first question that comes to my mind is: what is the opportunity cost of China’s governments pouring money, attention, and time into this quest for all-around self-reliance?

Predicting a linear growth path based on current trends misses asking the opportunity cost question completely. In my view, the odds of getting anywhere near the US’ technological capabilities are stacked against China for three reasons.

One, China’s per capita GDP is one-eighth of the US GDP per capita. Simply put, every dollar used in pursuit of one technology goal in China is eight times as costly as a dollar used for the same purpose in the US. With limited resources available, China might well be able to take a lead in a few areas, but the opportunity costs are likely to catch up much before it reaches anywhere near self-reliance.

Two, until now, the opportunity costs were partially being borne by other countries, particularly the US. FDI from the US and uninhibited access for its citizens to the technology ecosystems of other countries allowed China to make rapid progress in key technology domains. That party is now over. The US is now acutely aware of the asymmetric advantage that China enjoyed in the old-world globalisation period. The US has already started putting in place restrictions on the movement of knowledge and capital to China. Under this changed geopolitical scenario, China’s technological superiority is far from inevitable.

Take the example of the recent Alibaba announcement of Yitian 710 - a cutting-edge server chip. The Taiwanese foundry TSMC is the only company that can mass-produce this chip. And there are already murmurs in the US to restrict TSMC from accepting orders from Alibaba on the grounds that this chip can potentially have military applications.

And three, the US still remains a vibrant destination attracting the best tech talent from across the world. Chinese governments, at various levels, can throw money but are unlikely to attract top global talent in the same manner. And in the high-tech domain, skilled labour holds the key.

And so, the next time you come across another technological breakthrough in China, take a deep breath and consider if any of the three factors outlined in this note modulates the hype.

Our Reading Menu

* [Paper] Algorithmic Governance and the International Politics of Big Tech by Swati Srivatsava. Perspectives on Politics. Cambridge University Press, pp. 1–12. doi: 10.1017/S1537592721003145

* [Article] How the Kremlin has weaponized the Facebook files by Jessica Brandt

* [Book] The Palgrave Handbook of Digital Russia Studies

* [Takshashila Unredacted Note] about Russia's Direct Ascent Anti Satellite Test on 15th November 2021 by Aditya Pareek and Aditya Ramanathan, who are also contributors to this Newsletter.

Cyberpolitik #1: France’s Influence Operations Doctrine

— Prateek Waghre

In October, France announced a new doctrine for Information Warfare. This development has received surprisingly little attention in English-language discourse over the last three weeks. It was initially reported by Francesco Busseletti, who highlighted:

Objective: to counter the growing spread of fake news and disinformation, aimed at weakening the image of Paris and weakening its armed forces, especially abroad such as the Sahel. Considering that its adversaries no longer hesitate to use the weapon of social media against its military operations, France intends to “win the war before the war”. Its strategy boils down to “being on the offensive” …

The Defence Minister Florence Parly’s speech also highlighted this aspect of the “war before the war”. Here’s an excerpt from a google-translated version of her speech.

“When used wisely, the weapon of information allows you to win without fighting.”

What does the doctrine say?

The doctrine identifies six characteristics of the “informational layer of cyberspace”:

* Contraction of space and time.

* Ability to conceal/falsify origin due to anonymity.

* Difficulty with erasing information since it can be duplicated, moved, and re-used without the original context.

* Any individual can produce and broadcast information. (The minister’s speech seems to have gone as far as stating these individual and anonymous actors are at par with media organisations)

The point is that social networks have an equalizing power: on Twitter, the voice of an anonymous user counts as much as that of a major media whose essential function is to inform (sic).

* Continuous innovation such as deepfakes, AI, AR/VR, etc.

* The presence of operators who impose their own regulations. A challenge for law enforcement as the space is ‘dematerialised.

It defines two types of actors that threaten armed forces:

Noting that information war is already an everyday reality for the military, it goes on to say that ‘mastery’ in the information field is now a pre-condition for ‘operational superiority’. And that cyberspace offers opportunities to create effects in ‘both information and physical environments’.

The document is peppered with many important statements about Lutte Informatique D’influence (L2I).

* Definition:

military operations conducted in the informational layer of cyberspace to detect, characterize and counter attacks, support StratCom, provide information or (perform) deception, independently or in combination with other operations.

* L2I stands at “the confluence of cyber defence and influence”. And that it requires skills in common with LID (defensive cyber operations) and LIO (offensive cyber operations).

* L2I offers opportunities for ‘intelligence gathering’ and ‘deception' operations’. (The minister’s speech defined some boundaries explicitly)

the French armies will not conduct an information operation (within) the national territory. The French armies … will not destabilize a foreign state through information actions that would target, for example, its electoral processes.

As future challenges, the doctrine identifies the need to build skills and tools, as well as cooperation with firms that specialise in the field and coalitions with allies to coordinate responses.

Operationally, this would fall within the purview of the Chief of Staff of the armed forces, who would further rely on the Cyber Defense Commander (COMCYBER) and specialised military units.

Two more questions

For France to come out and explicitly state its doctrine is undoubtedly a significant step. But this also raises two broader questions.

* What should other democracies do?

* What will DCN operators do?

Camille Francois rightly points out that it raises the question of what democracies can/should do in this space and the possibility of gaining a better understanding of techniques used by countries not named - Russia, China, or Iran.

Thomas Rid, in his book Active Measures, argues that liberal democracies cannot be good at disinformation.

“For liberal democracies in particular, disinformation represents a double threat: being at the receiving end of active measures will undermine democratic institutions—and giving in to the temptation to design and deploy them will have the same result. It is impossible to excel at disinformation and at democracy at the same time. The stronger and the more robust a democratic body politic, the more resistant to disinformation it will be—and the more reluctant to deploy and optimize disinformation. Weakened democracies, in turn, succumb more easily to the temptations of active measures.”

Then, there’s the question of Digital Communication Networks which have become the battlefield for such operations. As Lukasz Olenik notes in his overview of the French doctrine, Facebook has taken action against Coordinated Inauthentic Behaviour it identified originating from a network with links to the French Military in December 2020:

We found this activity as part of our internal investigation into suspected coordinated inauthentic behavior in Francophone Africa. Although the people behind it attempted to conceal their identities and coordination, our investigation found links to individuals associated with French military.

Now that France has explicitly stated its doctrine (and maybe others will follow), will platforms act more aggressively, considering they are already under fire for either enabling or not doing enough to mitigate the fallout from influence operations? Or, will there be wink-wink-nudge-nudge arrangements between them and a particular set of states?

Note: Google Translate was used for French to English translations.

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Siliconpolitik #1: AI Chips 

— Arjun Gargeyas

What are They?

One of the emerging applications of semiconductor devices is the concept of Artificial Intelligence (AI) chips. With new and emerging technologies cropping up, there is an increased need for chipsets with increasing computational power and capabilities. Technologies like Machine Learning and Deep Neural Networks, which are part of the AI ecosystem, have a tremendous workload that cannot be fulfilled by traditional chipsets. AI algorithms work on parallel processing or parallelism, which is the ability to multitask and simultaneously run different computational processes. AI chips, in recent years, have tried to incorporate the needs of AI algorithms into chipsets that can be used both in the cloud as well as at network edges (in smartphones, tablets, and other consumer devices).

The diverse applications of AI chips have increased its role in the global economy with companies from various industries all looking to maximise the benefits of AI chip technology. Robotics and autonomous driving, for example, need AI algorithms for efficient and effective working, with the computational power of the chipsets needing incredibly fast processing speeds. This has evolved the role of chipsets with AI capabilities from only being used in the cloud or servers to being used in consumer products at the network edges. However, applications such as Biometrics and Image Recognition need AI chips in the cloud or servers for maintaining a large amount of data. The use of AI chips remains integral in data centers which eventually reduces operational costs and improves information management. 

Why They Matter

The market for AI chips has consistently increased in the last decade with AI chipsets projected to account for 22% of the global AI revenue by 2022. A strong compounded annual growth rate of 54% has been projected for the AI chips market with technologically advanced regions like the Americas and Europe dominating the market in the future. AI chips also rely on a variety of companies, ranging from smartphone manufacturers like Apple, Samsung, and Huawei, to traditional chip designers like Qualcomm and MediaTek, to intellectual property (IP) license providers like ARM. With most of the major semiconductor companies across the world in the business, AI chips look to be the next big thing for the industry. 

Semiconductor companies have already thrown their hats in the AI ring with the development of advanced AI chips like Graphical Processing Units (GPUs). NVIDIA has a dedicated application programming language called CUDA used in parallel computing on GPUs. Other targeted AI chips like Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs) and Application Specific Integrated Circuits (ASICs) are developed for specific applications of AI technology. Companies like Microsoft and Google have also invested in the manufacture of these chipsets keeping in mind specific needs such as the speech processing unit of Google Assistant.

With increasing global economic revenue and a large market ripe for capture, the presence of China in the AI chips has also been increasing. AI chip funding activity in China has been driven by the hope of creating industry-leading capabilities in machine learning, deep compression, pruning, and system-level optimization for neural networks. Chinese technology companies like Alibaba and Huawei have invested heavily in the manufacture of AI chips for smartphones and other devices. Some Bitcoin mining equipment manufacturers are also getting into the AI optimization game. With domestic AI research in China still playing catch up to the capabilities of Western countries like the United States, these local manufacturing companies have relied on tweaking existing algorithms to create modified AI models. But increased investments along with state support and financing, similar to the semiconductor industry in China, has made AI chips an important technology worth pursuing in technologically adept states. The race for the domination of the global AI chips markets is something to watch out for in the very near future. 

Cyberpolitik #2: Are Norms Possible?

— Sapni G K

Since the last edition of this newsletter, much has happened on cyberspace and international action for establishing norms for its operation and regulation. The United States of America joined the Paris Call for Trust and Security in the cyberspace. The 2018 Call led by the French, proposes a multi-stakeholder model for laying down norms for activity in cyberspace during peacetime. This includes, but is not limited to cybersecurity and the concerns of systemic harms to individuals and critical infrastructure. The Call details nine principles that are open for states, local governments, companies, and civil society organizations to support.  

* Protect individuals and infrastructure

* Protect the internet 

* Defend electoral processes 

* Defend intellectual property

* Non-proliferation 

* Lifecycle security 

* Cyber hygiene 

* No private hack back 

* International norms 

They incorporate norms of international law, including the ideas put forth by the UDHR, customary international law, and state laws on the governance of information and communication technologies. This operates as a non-binding, non-enforceable set of principles that are to guide the supporters of the Call and their actions. Most major US tech companies including Microsoft, Google, Facebook Inc (now Meta) are already supporters of the Call and have engaged closely with the various associated working groups. However, the US officially supporting the Call signals that it is no longer holding back in international norm-setting in cyberspace. This could also be read as a furtherance of the USA’s reinvigorated interest in cyber norms, both in peacetime and military applications, as evidenced by recent documents such as the 2021 Interim National Security Strategic Guidance and the recent report by the Department of Defense. However, it is noteworthy that the US has not yet made any concrete steps to sign up to the Global Commission on the Stability of Cyberspace, an effort led by research institutes in the Netherlands and Singapore with the support of the French, Dutch, and Singapore governments,  which is also engaged in drawing out international norms for cyberspace during peacetime and armed conflict. 

China, Russia, Israel, and Iran are other major actors in cyberspace that have not supported the call yet. This is indicative of the fissures in international norm-setting on cyberspace, particularly when China is marching ahead creating a regulatory environment that can have ripple effects internationally. India has not officially supported the Call, but several Indian enterprises and the Karnataka Centre of Excellence of Cybersecurity have joined the Call. It is a proposal worth consideration for the Indian government. An early head start can give India a definitive say in the development of doctrines as well as import legislative principles that can be beneficial to the many millions of Indians who go online every day.  

Siliconpolitik #2: US-China-Chips — It’s Complicated

— Pranay Kotasthane

Three recent news reports have turned the world's attention back to the links between the US and China in the semiconductor domain. Until now, the commonplace understanding is that the US is focused on constraining China's progress in the semiconductor domain, a weak link in China's otherwise impressive technology stack. These news reports contest this narrative by suggesting the constraints don't seem to be working, as many US investors and firms are still flocking to China.

* WSJ reports that between 2017 and 2020, many US companies, including Intel, have invested in Chinese design companies. The number of deals (58) has more than doubled when compared to the 2013-2016 period.

* Bloomberg reports Intel wanted to start a manufacturing plant in Chengdu, but the White House officials discouraged it.

* These reports come on the heels of another big claim in mid-October, when Alibaba unveiled a 5nm server chip, making many heads turn. This news seemed to indicate that China's pursuit of semiconductor self-sufficiency is bearing fruit despite the geopolitical headwinds.

Connecting the Dots

Intel seems to be interested in China a lot. While the WSJ report showed that Intel is among the active investors in a Chinese Electronic Design Automation (EDA) firm, the Bloomberg report points out that Intel also wants to build a fab in Chengdu. It’s notable that both these stages of the semiconductor value chain are precisely where the US had planned to restrict Chinese access during the Trump administration. Reportedly, the US NSA Jake Sullivan and a few senators, want to change the investment screening methods to prevent such deals in the future.

Why are US companies still rushing to China?

* The supply side: The Chinese government's incentives are 'crowding in' investments from Chinese firms and global semiconductor players alike.

* The demand side: A significant number of customers of chip makers are based in China - laptop manufacturers, phone manufacturers, servers etc. Companies still want a piece of that pie because homegrown alternatives in China are not enough, yet. It's a mouth-watering market, still.

My initial assessment

* The number of investment deals between 2017-20 (58) doesn't sound that big in the overall scheme of things. They also mostly appear to be in chip design firms. What this does suggest is like many industrial policies, there is a crowding-in of capital. When a player the size of the Chinese government throws big money at a problem (starting the Chip Fund in 2014), this is expected to happen. There will be national champions and duds, both. The question really is, how long such subsidies can be sustained.

* The time period 2017-2020 suggests that the US companies rushed into China before the Trump administration tightened the export controls.

* Intel's investment in a Chinese EDA firm and a possible fab is indeed worrying. Although, the tone of the Chengdu fab proposal suggests it is more a tactic to get the CHIPS Act passed in the US, which will guarantee big subsidies for the likes of Intel back home. The report had no numbers, or plans, just a few unnamed sources.

* The demand side question is an important one. As long as China remains the hub for electronics Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs), chip makers will find it attractive to sell their products to China. Solving this will require a plurilateral effort to move electronics manufacturing -- and not leading-edge chip manufacturing alone -- out of China.

* Finally, the Alibaba server chip news report has many unknowns. Unveiling a chip is different from being able to produce it. Manufacturing at 5nm is not possible in China. They must rely on TSMC (and now Samsung) for this purpose. Moreover, the processor IP is still ARM, something that Alibaba hasn't been able to displace.

* The reportage of the kind WSJ, Bloomberg is putting out is indicative of the change in mindset in the US. A few years ago, no one would have even cared about such investments. These are front-page news items now.

* I expect some more export controls and more subsidies from the US government, both.

Our Reading Menu

1. [Full Text] of the Paris Call for Trust and Security in the cyberspace

2. [Full Text] 2021 Interim National Security Strategic Guidance of the White house 

3. [Policy Study] Principles for Content Policy and Governance by Chris Riley, R Street 

4. [Article] by Oleg Shakirov discussing the US-Russia rapprochement on Information and Cyber Security

5. [Blog] by Oleg Shakirov explaining why US-Russia cooperation on countering Ransomware threats makes sense

Siliconpolitik: India and Taiwan Want to Complement Each Other’s Strengths 

— Arjun Gargeyas

There were reports earlier this month that Indian and Taiwanese officials had met to discuss the possibility of a $7.5 billion investment in India by the Taiwanese government and its premier semiconductor foundry, Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC). This was to set up a long-pending state-of-the-art semiconductor manufacturing facility in the country. While India has been strong at semiconductor IC design, it has also made efforts to create a presence in fabrication. Taiwan, on the other world, dominates the semiconductor manufacturing market, with two of its major companies, TSMC and UMC, jointly accounting for over 60% of the global revenue in manufacturing and fabrication. With Taiwan’s presence in the semiconductor IC design also growing gradually with companies like MediaTek looking to challenge the fabless American firms, the Indian semiconductor fraternity’s experience in the design cycle is attractive for Taiwanese design firms looking to upscale their operations.

Semiconductor manufacturing has been at the heart of a possible technology alliance between the two states. However, with both India and Taiwan having their own comparative advantages in the semiconductor industry, there is significant potential for collaboration in other areas of the semiconductor supply chain. 

Research and Development: The government of India has, for a long time, envisioned setting up a semiconductor fabrication facility in the country that can indulge in cutting-edge research. Its attempt started way back in the 1980s with the establishment of the Semiconductor Company Limited (SCL). But a major fire and sluggish innovation have now restricted SCL to research in specific fields like space technology. Taiwan’s semiconductor success story lies in its consistent investments, funded by the Taiwanese government itself in research and development to improve semiconductor manufacturing processes. India and Taiwan should look to invest in an R&D center that can bring together both semiconductor firms and universities from both states.

Design: Though Taiwan’s stranglehold over the semiconductor industry originates from its ‘Pure Play Foundry’ business model focusing on manufacturing semiconductors for its clients, the IC design ecosystem in the country has gradually grown, dominated by firms like MediaTek. However, these semiconductor design firms indulge in the low-cost design of trailing edge nodes as an alternative to the Western companies’ products. The major market for Taiwanese design firms remains the Chinese mainland. With relations deteriorating between the two countries, Taiwanese firms will look at alternative markets. India, with its ever-increasing demand for high technology products, can step into the role. A thriving semiconductor design services market in the country can also help Taiwanese firms reach the level of American firms with the Indian workforce’s expertise in the field.

Assembly and Testing: While India’s ambitions to invest in a semiconductor fabrication facility are commendable, the costs associated with semiconductor manufacturing remain very high. Exorbitant equipment costs and the need to pump in investments regularly can hamper India’s plan to become a major player in the foundry business. Instead, India, which has already gained expertise in downstream assembly and testing processes can look at Outsourced Assembly and Test (OSAT) opportunities. With low-skilled labor only needed, unlike semiconductor manufacturing, India can serve as a source of low cost and low skilled labor for Taiwanese firms like ASE Technology and Powertech Technology, which look to outsource such operations offshore. The Indian government’s Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology (MeitY) has also released schemes like SPECS to attract foreign firms for OSAT operations. The Scheme for Promotion of Manufacturing of Electronic Components and Semiconductors (SPECS) will provide a financial incentive of 25% on capital expenditure for the identified list of electronic goods that comprise downstream value chain of electronic products, i.e., electronic components, semiconductor/ display fabrication units, ATMP units, specialized sub-assemblies and capital goods for manufacture of aforesaid goods, all of which involve high value-added manufacturing. 

India and Taiwan’s technology trade has gradually increased in the last two decades. With increasing technological cooperation between the two countries, the semiconductor industry, and both their complementary strengths in it offer a great opportunity for better collaboration in the domain. This can cover a wide area in the supply chain, going beyond just the talk on semiconductor manufacturing and fabrication facilities. 

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Yogakshema: Is it Worth Debating Responsible Behaviour in Cyberspace and Outer Space?

— Aditya Pareek

The Japanese Defence Minister Nobuo Kishi recently remarked that

"An invasion may begin without anyone realizing it, and a war may be fought without the use of military forces."

The challenges Kishi alludes to are aggravated when taking hightech domains like cyberspace and outer space into account. There is a lot of shadowy, hard-to-attribute activity associated with rendezvous and proximity operations(RPO)s in outer space as well as in cyber attacks. With near misses in outer space and major attacks against infrastructure and finances via the use of cyberspace, a lot of finger pointing between states ensues.

There is a multilateral push for figuring out rules of the road or more formally, to establish some mechanism to set norms for responsible behaviour in cyberspace and outer space. Two draft resolutions have been submitted to the UN General Assembly’s First Committee that try to address these topics. The first is earmarked as agenda item 95 titled

“Developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security, and advancing responsible State behaviour in the use of information and communications technologies”. 

The second is earmarked as agenda item 98 (d)

“Prevention of an arms race in outer space: reducing space threats through norms, rules and principles of responsible behaviours”.

India and China are both absent from the list of sponsors of both resolutions for the moment, but this may change as the time nears for the UNGA to take a general votes on the resolutions.

At first glance the subject and titles of the two draft resolutions might seem to be signalling some sort of consensus emerging in the UNGA simultaneously over norms of responsible behaviour in cyberspace and outer space. However, on closer study, the two draft resolutions are reflective of the same tense international relationships which are the cause for friction in these domains in the first place. 

On the draft dealing with cybersapce, as Elena Chernenko of Kommersant (a Russian business media outlet) points out in her reporting, 

The development of a joint draft document by Russia and the United States can be considered an important event, if only because in recent years the two countries have often acted in the UN as rivals or even adversaries. And the subject of cybersecurity, until recently, was no exception in this regard.    

As expected of a document prepared as a compromise between geopolitical adversaries, it features very amenable language while clearly highlighting that its contents are aimed at “voluntary, non-binding norms” which “do not seek to limit or prohibit action that is otherwise consistent with international law” in cyberspace.

The draft dealing with responsible behaviour in outer space features sponsors countries that enjoy good relations with the US. Some of these sponsors are lesser adversaries in their own right to Russia, like the United Kingdom and Poland. 

The draft notably has several references to “a combination of legally binding obligations and political commitments” as being essential on issues ranging from “instruments on the prevention of an arms race in outer space” to a more broadly focused issue of “space security”.

These references to legally binding obligations will likely dissuade a lot of state including some major powers that prefer to achieve their political goals via the use of asymmetric means.

If a consensus is not likely and some major powers will continue to keep their options open, then the whole point of the resolutions becomes moot. Whatever toothless guidelines the resolutions incorporate will be ignored and worse may even be flouted, degrading the momentum and credibility of the international efforts that went in the drafting of these resolutions.

Cyberpolitik: Going Meta

— Sapni G K

Mired in controversy and bad press, the Facebook Company has been having some of the worst days of its existence. The last couple of months saw it facing suits that pushed for breaking up the company to whistle-blower revelations which contradicted multiple positions it took while addressing allegations raised against it. Amidst these serious allegations, it has also been trying to reinvent itself to attract and retain more users on its various platforms. After weeks of conversations led by CEO Mark Zuckerberg on the metaverse, the company has found a home in that idea to find a better future for itself.

The term "metaverse" has its origins in Snow Crash, the 1992 dystopian science fiction novel by Neal Stephenson ( who clarified that he has got nothing do with the company). The book envisions metaverse as a full-fledged alternate reality built in a virtual space. Life is brutal on the metaverse, but it is worse in Snow Crash's real world. This virtual escape fuelled further science fiction writing on the idea, now culminating in the world's largest social media company changing its name to " Meta" to reflect its interest in building the metaverse future. Meta now holds the range of apps such as Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, and technologies such as Oculus.

In the keynote introducing Meta, Zuckerberg outlined his vision for the metaverse as a space different from the siloed worlds created by the social media age. He sees it as a collection of protocols that are interoperable and not owned by one company. Here users can jump into the virtual to connect with others and have experiences in different worlds. Meta is not pioneering the idea. Epic Games and Roblox have already created similar worlds, where some failed decades ago. However, it is trying to shift the status quo from today's walled gardens to open protocols. This is a huge leap in Meta's ethos (RIP the Facebook Company) which rallied ahead by creating siloed spaces. It is also reflective of how our platformised lives are moving further towards gamification.

Critics and industry observers have called this a gimmick to divert attention from the pressing issues raised against the company. Even if that were the case, changing the name of the company will do little to save it from public ire and demands for addressing these concerns better. However, it is worth noting this change in priorities as we continue to look to fix the problems in the social media platforms. While Zuckerberg proclaimed that 'since the Metaverse isn't here yet, this offers a chance for policymakers to stop playing catch up with technology but direct its development and regulation', Meta would not be the desirable choice for many to drive this change. Its shady track record in norm-setting on platform governance only exacerbates worries.

For India, this change might currently have no visible difference. Access to today's Metaverse is limited, mostly through expensive VR headsets. The penetration of such technologies in India is limited, though growing. However, learning from the smartphone boom, India could see this as an opportunity to amp up the capabilities in manufacturing of the devices and development of software that are necessary for interacting in the metaverse. The manufacturing and design economies can gain from this. A thriving design and manufacturing economy could also have knock-on effects creating more professionals who understand the functioning of the "metaverse" better. Finally, it can give India a seat on the table in virtual reality/metaverse regulation and policymaking, which in current nascent stages in restricted to China, the EU and, the USA.

Yogakshema: Hyperbole Over Hypersonics

— Aditya Ramanathan

In a television interview on 27 October, the chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Mark A. Milley acknowledged reports of recent Chinese tests of hypersonic weapons. Presumably seeking to strike a balance between underplaying and overplaying the significance of the tests, Milley described them as “a very significant event,” adding that  “I don’t know if it's quite a Sputnik moment but I think it’s very close to that.”

The cliche of a “Sputnik moment” refers to the dawn of the space age. The Soviet launch of the world’s first artificial satellite, on 4 October 1957, sparked fears in the US that it was being left behind, and spurred its own space programme. In the years since, politicians have used the phrase to evoke the sense of a much-needed wake-up call for the US . President Barack Obama called the recession of 2008-09 a “Sputnik moment” and Senator John Kerry used the term in the context of clean energy technology.  Roger Launius, senior curator of the NASA museum’s space history division summarised the parable of the “Sputnik moment” the best:

"A Sputnik moment is a trigger mechanism, an event that makes people collectively say that they need to do something, and this sets a course in another direction".

Are China’s new capabilities significant enough for the US to rejig its defence priorities? Not quite. 

The Hypersonic Rationale: Let’s begin by trying to understand what exactly it was that China tested in July and August of this year. On 21 October, The Financial Times reported that China used a Long March rocket to launch a “fractional orbital bombardment” system that, in turn, carried a hypersonic glide vehicle. 

The Soviets experimented with fractional orbital bombardment systems (FOBS) in the 1960s. The broad idea of FOBS was to evade US early warning systems that were largely focused towards the North Pole. It would achieve this by launching a craft that would only complete a partial orbit before de-orbiting and plunging towards its target on Earth. Theoretically, a FOBS system would allow the Soviets to attack the US via the South Pole, and achieve complete surprise. The Soviets deployed small numbers of such systems for about two decades during the Cold War.

That leaves us with hypersonic boost glide vehicles. While regular long-range ballistic missiles such as ICBMS use space as a rapid-transit zone to reach distant spots on Earth, boost glides fly at much flatter trajectories, below the 100-kilometre that marks the boundary between the upper atmosphere and space. The key advantages of boost-glides are that their flatter trajectories allow them to hide behind the Earth’s curvature for longer periods (thus delaying detection) and that navigation technologies allow them to manoeuvre unpredictably on their approach to a target, possibly making interception even harder. 

So why is China developing such systems? The short answer is the US ballistic missile defence (BMD) programme. And China is not alone in this effort. In 2018, Russia unveiled a series of experimental systems designed specifically to evade US ballistic missile defences. These included a long-range ballistic missile that could approach the continental United States via the South Pole as well as a cruise missile with a nuclear-powered engine that would give it unprecedented range. 

If the Russians and Chinese are resorting to such exotic weapons, we must ask two questions. One, are they the only solution for tackling US BMD? And two, do hypersonic boost glides have problems of their own?

The Uncertain Glory of BMD: The current US BMD programme has its origins in 2002, when the country withdrew from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. The political pretext for this move was the 9/11 attacks. The technological rationale was the revolution in sensory and computing technology that allowed for far more accurate tracking and targeting of incoming missiles. Some also argue that US BMDs also continue to provide it with negotiating leverage in any future arms control talks.

However, while US BMDs are far more effective today than they were even a decade ago, they still face two fundamental obstacles: they have at best a 50% chance of successfully intercepting a ballistic missile, and they’re far more expensive. In short, BMDs are expensive and only partially effective. US BMDs are not meant to defend against a full-fledged attack by another state; they’re only meant to stop stray missiles, either from a rogue launch or from the remnants of an adversary’s nuclear arsenal after most of it has been destroyed. The reality is that an arsenal of regular ICBMs, each  with bristling with  multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs) and decoys is more than a match for BMDs. Exotic weapons like boost-glides are at best an augmentation to existing capabilities. 

The Limited Advantages of FOBS and Boost Glides: While FOBS and boost-glides may have their place, there’s a reason why the USSR did not rely heavily on such systems during the Cold War. FOBS weapons need a small rocket to de-orbit, meaning a reduced payload. And today’s boost-glides can carry only a single warhead. Therefore, a combined FOBS-boost glide system will only carry a single, relatively small warhead. Also, since boost-glides actually travel at lower speeds than ICBM warheads on re-entry, they may actually become easier to intercept in the future. 

The Prospects: Nothing is settled in the matter of long-range missiles. New developments could make boost glides and FOBS more accurate and capable of delivering greater payloads. BMD systems could also become more effective in the future. As of now, however, we must acknowledge that whatever China tested earlier this year, was probably not revolutionary, and hardly amounts to a Sputnik moment.

Our Reading Menu

* [Opinon] Facebook and YouTube’s vaccine misinformation problem is simpler than it seems by Will Oremus on Wahsington Post

* [Opinons] Why Facebook has become Meta on Financial Times by Hannah Murphy and Madhumita Murgia

* [Book] Tiger Technology: The Creation of a Semiconductor Industry in East Asia

* [Article] Russia, China, The US: Who will win the Hypersonic Arms Race?

* [Paper] Outer Space and Cyberspace: A Tale of Two Security Realms