By Chris Mayer National Security and Strategy Consultant
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The podcast currently has 106 episodes available.
In a recent episode of my podcast series of “The Ancient Art of Modern Warfare” (E104) I described possibilities for an end to the fighting in Ukraine. Of course, any end to any armed conflict requires the agreement of both (or all) parties to the conflict. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is no different. It is entirely possible, perhaps likely, that one party does not want an end to the fighting. The other party, on the other hand, is not willing to accept peace, or even an armistice that rewards an invasion of their nation. I do not have any answers. This short episode is an addendum to Episode 104 in which I bring up some issues I think we should consider before any armistice or peace proposal is rejected.
As usual, the opinions in these podcasts are my own and do not necessarily represent the opinion of the Department of Defense, anyone else in the U.S. Government, or any other organization I am or ever have been associated with.
Music: Wagner, R. and US Marine Corps Band, Siegfried’s Funeral March and Finale (Götterdammerung) from “Music of Richard Wagner” (1981) (Public Domain)
Last week, I attended the annual “Summit” meeting of the International Stability Operations Association, or #ISOA. This association includes 200 private corporations that support U.S. and friendly government engagement across the spectrum of stability, conflict, and post conflict operations. Presentations included speakers from the US Departments of Defense, State, Justice, Commerce, and USAID. Other speakers included representatives of the Ukrainian government, experts in cyber technology and artificial intelligence, and speakers representing companies currently providing private sector support in hostile environments, such as #Ukraine. The subject material was fascinating for what was said, and sometimes what was not said. A continuous stream of thought was why we were there. Why was it that these government agencies use private sector support in armed conflict, post-conflict, and disaster relief. That is the subject of this episode of the Ancient Art of Modern Warfare.
Disclaimer: The information in these podcasts is my own opinion and does not represent that of the Department of Defense, ISOA, or any other organization I am or have been affiliated with.
Reference: Kramer, F., The sixth domain: The role of the private sector in warfare, Atlantic Council (October 2024); https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/the-sixth-domain-the-role-of-the-private-sector-in-warfare/
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Is a negotiated peace possible, or even desirable between Russia and Ukraine? How can this be done without validating Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and encouragement of future aggression? These are critical questions to address as the incoming U.S. administration states that negotiating an end to that war and our involvement in it as one of its first priorities.
As usual, the opinions in these podcasts are my own and do not necessarily represent the opinion of the Department of Defense, anyone else in the U.S. Government, or any other organization I am or ever have been associated with. (Although, if the Advanced Warfighting Working Group was still in existence, I would probably have convinced the members to endorse this.)
PS: Apologies for the sound of my voice as I am recovering from something or other.
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We often hear that this or that military attack caused disproportionate civilian casualties. Most often, these accusations are directed against Israel, when they are not directed against the United States. I will be generous and presume that most of these accusations are based on a misconception of what proportionality in armed conflict means, and how it is different from proportionate use of force civil or human rights law circumstances. Proportionality in war is the subject of this episode of the Ancient Art of Modern Warfare.
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What is the common theme to mercenaries, natural resources, hypersonic missiles, Gaza, and exploding pagers? I can think of several, but in a recent conversation with a colleague of mine, that common thread was challenges to the Law of War, or International Humanitarian Law. Can the notion of the law of war even survive in modern manifestations of armed conflict? I think it can, and it is just as important, if not more so, than in the mythical era of conventional war.
As usual, the views in these podcasts are my own and do not necessarily represent the views of the Department of Defense, any other organization, or any person I am or ever have been associated with.
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The fighting in the Kursk Oblast is still ongoing, and it would be much to soon to derive any lessons to be learned from this event. This episode picks up from the previous episode, examining how this campaign might offer examples of concepts presented in previous podcasts of the Ancient Art of Modern Warfare. Ukraine continues maneuver warfare at the tactical level, although as of this writing, nothing approaching the level of decisive action. Russia continues its World War I style offensive in the east, while the south has some interesting long-range strikes. The contrast between attrition warfare in the east and maneuver warfare in the north, combined with drones, deep fires, and partisan activity in Russian occupied areas all indicate that no prior form of warfare is obsolescent and all can exist simultaneously with modern techno-warfare.
Reference: (As always) Clausewitz, C, On War, Edited and Translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret ©1984
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The war in Ukraine has taken a very interesting, and I think, exciting turn of events. The advent of combined arms maneuver warfare reminiscent of armored offensives in that region eight decades ago. It is impossible to conduct an in-depth analysis at this time. There is too much going on and we really know little about order of battle or Ukrainian objectives. StilI, I felt the need to talk about this ongoing battle for a several reasons. Most important of these is that it is an example of the type of maneuver warfare that is possible and should be a feature of this war.
Reference: (As always) Clausewitz, C, On War, Edited and Translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret ©1984
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Clausewitz’s descriptions of friction, taken with the often antagonistic interplay among his trinity of passion, policy, and probability, keep war in theory separate from war in practice. How does this look in real war? In this episode, I make my best guess about how friction and chaotic trinity might affect Russia’s “special military operation” in Ukraine.
If you missed the previous two episodes, I recommend that you take the time to do so before listening to this one.
https://admin5.podbean.com/mayhemxpc/episodes/form/00XlnMhGdsld
https://admin5.podbean.com/mayhemxpc/episodes/form/zpdgaRh85TV2
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(Note that I do not cite a specific publication of On War. I use different translations and the original German. Find a version that work best for you.)
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Clausewitz wrote that there are three forces at work when a nation goes to war: “unbridled passion,” reason, and the play of chance and probability. Things only work well when each of these is held in equilibrium by the other two. The people, the government, and the military represent these forces and the government should, in theory, maintain that equilibrium. In practice, this never happens. Instead, the interplay among these is random and seemingly chaotic. Each aspect of the nation and the force it represents, must deal with friction within their group and friction from and within the other groups. The pendulum that swings among these power centers is also influenced by external forces including, but certainly not limited to, the enemy. This, with the friction described in the previous episode, adds to the apparent irrationality of war and generates diversions along the path to peace.
Reference:
(Note that I do not cite a specific publication of On War. I use different translations and the original German. Find a version that work best for you.)
Music: (Chosen because I was looking for chaotic music.)
War is really very simple, but Clausewitz cautioned that by saying that in war, even the simplest thing is difficult, sometime insurmountable. This idea, which he called “Friction” he maintained was the one thing that made war in theory different from war in practice. The elements that create friction in war also apply to the effort to move from war to peace; and the primary source of friction? Human nature.
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Wagner, R. and the USMC Band, Siegfried’s Funeral (Public Domain)
The Army Strings, GarryOwen (Traditional) (Public Domain)
Kilstoff, Jan, The Cavalry (Licensed)
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