By Chris Mayer National Security and Strategy Consultant
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The podcast currently has 101 episodes available.
The fighting in the Kursk Oblast is still ongoing, and it would be much to soon to derive any lessons to be learned from this event. This episode picks up from the previous episode, examining how this campaign might offer examples of concepts presented in previous podcasts of the Ancient Art of Modern Warfare. Ukraine continues maneuver warfare at the tactical level, although as of this writing, nothing approaching the level of decisive action. Russia continues its World War I style offensive in the east, while the south has some interesting long-range strikes. The contrast between attrition warfare in the east and maneuver warfare in the north, combined with drones, deep fires, and partisan activity in Russian occupied areas all indicate that no prior form of warfare is obsolescent and all can exist simultaneously with modern techno-warfare.
Reference: (As always) Clausewitz, C, On War, Edited and Translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret ©1984
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The war in Ukraine has taken a very interesting, and I think, exciting turn of events. The advent of combined arms maneuver warfare reminiscent of armored offensives in that region eight decades ago. It is impossible to conduct an in-depth analysis at this time. There is too much going on and we really know little about order of battle or Ukrainian objectives. StilI, I felt the need to talk about this ongoing battle for a several reasons. Most important of these is that it is an example of the type of maneuver warfare that is possible and should be a feature of this war.
Reference: (As always) Clausewitz, C, On War, Edited and Translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret ©1984
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Clausewitz’s descriptions of friction, taken with the often antagonistic interplay among his trinity of passion, policy, and probability, keep war in theory separate from war in practice. How does this look in real war? In this episode, I make my best guess about how friction and chaotic trinity might affect Russia’s “special military operation” in Ukraine.
If you missed the previous two episodes, I recommend that you take the time to do so before listening to this one.
https://admin5.podbean.com/mayhemxpc/episodes/form/00XlnMhGdsld
https://admin5.podbean.com/mayhemxpc/episodes/form/zpdgaRh85TV2
Reference:
(Note that I do not cite a specific publication of On War. I use different translations and the original German. Find a version that work best for you.)
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Clausewitz wrote that there are three forces at work when a nation goes to war: “unbridled passion,” reason, and the play of chance and probability. Things only work well when each of these is held in equilibrium by the other two. The people, the government, and the military represent these forces and the government should, in theory, maintain that equilibrium. In practice, this never happens. Instead, the interplay among these is random and seemingly chaotic. Each aspect of the nation and the force it represents, must deal with friction within their group and friction from and within the other groups. The pendulum that swings among these power centers is also influenced by external forces including, but certainly not limited to, the enemy. This, with the friction described in the previous episode, adds to the apparent irrationality of war and generates diversions along the path to peace.
Reference:
(Note that I do not cite a specific publication of On War. I use different translations and the original German. Find a version that work best for you.)
Music: (Chosen because I was looking for chaotic music.)
War is really very simple, but Clausewitz cautioned that by saying that in war, even the simplest thing is difficult, sometime insurmountable. This idea, which he called “Friction” he maintained was the one thing that made war in theory different from war in practice. The elements that create friction in war also apply to the effort to move from war to peace; and the primary source of friction? Human nature.
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Wagner, R. and the USMC Band, Siegfried’s Funeral (Public Domain)
The Army Strings, GarryOwen (Traditional) (Public Domain)
Kilstoff, Jan, The Cavalry (Licensed)
If the only acceptable outcome of war is a peace, and the only sustainable peace is a just peace, then it is essential to answer the question, “what is peace?” This is a simple question, but without a simple answer. It has been debated from Plato up until the present day. This lack of definition may be one reason why the transition from war to peace is so difficult.
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Disclaimer: The information in these podcasts is my own analysis and opinion and does not represent the views of the Department of Defense or any organization I am or have been affiliated with.
The subject of Just War, or Justum Bellum, is a frequent topic in these podcasts. If, however, the only acceptable justification for any war is to establish a more just and lasting peace, shouldn’t there be a similar framework for Just Peace, or Justum Pacem? Just War theory goes back to Plato and Aristotle, but Just Peace thinking is a product of the last century. Despite a lack of concrete formulation, past examples of successful post-conflict transitions included efforts to establish a just peace. Sadly, there are more examples of unjust peace, which -- as Immanuel Kant noted -- plants the seeds of future war.
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Photo:
Perpetual Peace Lily, Aganpanthus Africanus (Wikimedia Commons)
In Chapter 17 of the Prince, Nicolo Machiavelli wrote that a prince ought to desire to be thought of as clement and not cruel. It is more important, he said, to generate a respectful fear which, in then end, is actually more merciful than those who pursue reputations of mercy. Under no circumstances, however, should the prince become hated. This concept also applies to war, moving from war to peace, and the justice sustained peace requires.
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Just as it takes two parties to agree to fight a war, it takes both parties to agree to peace. Getting both warring parties to agree to peace sometimes requires a third party. This third party provides “good offices” to help both sides agree on what peace should look like. It also helps when each party understands the political objectives of the others – and the “disinterested” third party has its political objectives, too!
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Image: Bakhmut, Ukraine; Ukrainian Army Photo
Ending a war begins when one side or the other believes that the cost of continuing to fight exceeds any expectations of success. This could be a simple cost benefit calculation, it could be that continuing to fight after a major defeat is unlikely to bring success, or that the war aims have already been achieved and any further violence is unjustified. In each case, one side or another has to make the decision to seek peace, or at least to end the fighting. That decision, however necessary, is only one step on the difficult path to bring peace out of war (and it isn’t even the first step.)
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Image: Bakhmut, Ukraine; Ukrainian Army Photo
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