Suncor Energy (U.S.A.) Inc. v. Commissioners of Boulder County | 10/05/26 | Docket #: 25-170

25-170 SUNCOR ENERGY, INC. V. COMMISSIONERS OF BOULDER COUNTY
DECISION BELOW: 2025 WL 1363355
IN ADDITION TO THE QUESTION PRESENTED BY THE PETITION, THE PARTIES ARE DIRECTED TO 
BRIEF AND ARGUE THE FOLLOWING QUESTION: WHETHER THIS COURT HAS STATUTORY AND 
ARTICLE III JURISDICTION TO HEAR THIS CASE.
SEPTEMBER 
28
, 
2026
:
JUSTICE ALITO WILL NOT CONTINUE TO PARTICIPATE IN THIS CASE.
 
 
CERT. GRANTED 2/23/2026
QUESTION PRESENTED:
Whether federal law precludes state-law claims seeking relief for injuries allegedly 
caused by the effects of interstate and international greenhouse-gas emissions on the global 
climate.
 
LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 24SA206

Suncor Energy (U.S.A.) Inc. v. Commissioners of Boulder County | 10/05/26 | Docket #: 25-170 25-170 SUNCOR ENERGY, INC. V. COMMISSIONERS OF BOULDER COUNTY DECISION BELOW: 2025 WL 1363355 IN ADDITION TO THE QUESTION PRESENTED BY THE PETITION, THE PARTIES ARE DIRECTED TO BRIEF AND ARGUE THE FOLLOWING QUESTION: WHETHER THIS COURT HAS STATUTORY AND ARTICLE III JURISDICTION TO HEAR THIS CASE. SEPTEMBER 28 , 2026 : JUSTICE ALITO WILL NOT CONTINUE TO PARTICIPATE IN THIS CASE. CERT. GRANTED 2/23/2026 QUESTION PRESENTED: Whether federal law precludes state-law claims seeking relief for injuries allegedly caused by the effects of interstate and international greenhouse-gas emissions on the global climate. LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 24SA206

Suncor Energy (U.S.A.) Inc. v. Commissioners of Boulder County | 10/05/26 | Docket #: 25-170

25-170 SUNCOR ENERGY, INC. V. COMMISSIONERS OF BOULDER COUNTY
DECISION BELOW: 2025 WL 1363355
IN ADDITION TO THE QUESTION PRESENTED BY THE PETITION, THE PARTIES ARE DIRECTED TO 
BRIEF AND ARGUE THE FOLLOWING QUESTION: WHETHER THIS COURT HAS STATUTORY AND 
ARTICLE III JURISDICTION TO HEAR THIS CASE.
SEPTEMBER 
28
, 
2026
:
JUSTICE ALITO WILL NOT CONTINUE TO PARTICIPATE IN THIS CASE.
 
&nbsp;
CERT. GRANTED 2/23/2026
QUESTION PRESENTED:
Whether federal law precludes state-law claims seeking relief for injuries allegedly 
caused by the effects of interstate and international greenhouse-gas emissions on the global 
climate.
 
LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 24SA206

Suncor Energy (U.S.A.) Inc. v. Commissioners of Boulder County

Salazar v. Paramount Global | 10/14/26 | Docket #: 25-459

25-459 SALAZAR V. PARAMOUNT GLOBAL
DECISION BELOW: 133 F.4th 642
CERT. GRANTED 1/26/2026
QUESTION PRESENTED:
     
The Video Privacy Protection Act 
(“
VPPA
”) 
contains a one-sentence liability clause. It 
prohibits a 
“
video tape service provider
” 
from 
“
knowingly disclos[ing], to any person, 
personally identifiable information concerning any consumer of such provider.
” 
18
 U.S.C. § 
2710
(b)(
1
). The statute defines 
“
consumer
” 
broadly to include a 
“
subscriber of goods or 
services from a video tape service provider.
” 
Id.
 § 
2710
(a)(
1
). It defines 
“
personally identifiable 
information
” 
to include information that 
“
identifies a person as having requested or obtained 
specific video materials or services from a video tape service provider.
” 
Id. 
§ 
2710
(a)(
3
). And it 
defines 
“
video tape service provider
” 
to include those in the business of delivering audiovisual 
materials.
 Id
. § 
2710
(a)(
4
).
      
Paramount is a 
“
video tape service provider.
” 
Both courts below assumed as much. Michael 
Salazar subscribed to Paramount
’
s online newsletter, which he used to view videos. Paramount 
then disclosed Mr. Salazar
’
s Facebook ID and his video-watching history to Facebook. That 
information counts as 
“
personally identifiable information.
” 
Again, both courts below assumed 
as much. 
     
The question here is whether the phrase 
“
goods or services from a video tape service 
provider,
” 
as used in the VPPA
’
s definition of 
“
consumer,
” 
refers to 
all 
of a video tape service 
provider
’
s goods or services or only to its 
audiovisual
 goods or services.
LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 23-5748

Salazar v. Paramount Global | 10/14/26 | Docket #: 25-459 25-459 SALAZAR V. PARAMOUNT GLOBAL DECISION BELOW: 133 F.4th 642 CERT. GRANTED 1/26/2026 QUESTION PRESENTED: The Video Privacy Protection Act (“ VPPA ”) contains a one-sentence liability clause. It prohibits a “ video tape service provider ” from “ knowingly disclos[ing], to any person, personally identifiable information concerning any consumer of such provider. ” 18 U.S.C. § 2710 (b)( 1 ). The statute defines “ consumer ” broadly to include a “ subscriber of goods or services from a video tape service provider. ” Id. § 2710 (a)( 1 ). It defines “ personally identifiable information ” to include information that “ identifies a person as having requested or obtained specific video materials or services from a video tape service provider. ” Id. § 2710 (a)( 3 ). And it defines “ video tape service provider ” to include those in the business of delivering audiovisual materials. Id . § 2710 (a)( 4 ). Paramount is a “ video tape service provider. ” Both courts below assumed as much. Michael Salazar subscribed to Paramount ’ s online newsletter, which he used to view videos. Paramount then disclosed Mr. Salazar ’ s Facebook ID and his video-watching history to Facebook. That information counts as “ personally identifiable information. ” Again, both courts below assumed as much. The question here is whether the phrase “ goods or services from a video tape service provider, ” as used in the VPPA ’ s definition of “ consumer, ” refers to all of a video tape service provider ’ s goods or services or only to its audiovisual goods or services. LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 23-5748

Salazar v. Paramount Global | 10/14/26 | Docket #: 25-459

25-459 SALAZAR V. PARAMOUNT GLOBAL
DECISION BELOW: 133 F.4th 642
CERT. GRANTED 1/26/2026
QUESTION PRESENTED:
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
The Video Privacy Protection Act 
(“
VPPA
”)&nbsp;
contains a one-sentence liability clause. It 
prohibits a 
“
video tape service provider
”&nbsp;
from 
“
knowingly disclos[ing], to any person, 
personally identifiable information concerning any consumer of such provider.
”&nbsp;
18
&nbsp;U.S.C.&nbsp;§&nbsp;
2710
(b)(
1
). The statute defines 
“
consumer
”&nbsp;
broadly to include a 
“
subscriber of goods or 
services from a video tape service provider.
”&nbsp;
Id.
&nbsp;§&nbsp;
2710
(a)(
1
). It defines 
“
personally identifiable 
information
”&nbsp;
to include information that 
“
identifies a person as having requested or obtained 
specific video materials or services from a video tape service provider.
”&nbsp;
Id. 
§&nbsp;
2710
(a)(
3
). And it 
defines 
“
video tape service provider
”&nbsp;
to include those in the business of delivering audiovisual 
materials.
 Id
.&nbsp;§&nbsp;
2710
(a)(
4
).
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
Paramount is a 
“
video tape service provider.
”&nbsp;
Both courts below assumed as much. Michael 
Salazar subscribed to Paramount
’
s online newsletter, which he used to view videos. Paramount 
then disclosed Mr. Salazar
’
s Facebook ID and his video-watching history to Facebook. That 
information counts as 
“
personally identifiable information.
”&nbsp;
Again, both courts below assumed 
as much. 
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
The question here is whether the phrase 
“
goods or services from a video tape service 
provider,
”&nbsp;
as used in the VPPA
’
s definition of 
“
consumer,
”&nbsp;
refers to 
all 
of a video tape service 
provider
’
s goods or services or only to its 
audiovisual
 goods or services.
LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 23-5748

Salazar v. Paramount Global

Beaird v. United States | 10/13/26 | Docket #: 25-5343

25-5343 BEAIRD V. UNITED STATES
DECISION BELOW: 2025 WL 1410410
THE MOTION OF PETITIONER FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS IS GRANTED. THE 
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI IS GRANTED LIMITED TO THE FOLLOWING QUESTION: 
WHETHER 
STINSON V. UNITED STATES
, 
508
 U. S. 
36
 (
1993
), STILL CORRECTLY STATES THE RULE 
FOR THE DEFERENCE THAT COURTS MUST GIVE THE COMMENTARY TO THE SENTENCING 
GUIDELINES.
Order of May 
6
, 
2026
ANTHONY J. DICK, ESQUIRE, OF WASHINGTON, D. C., IS INVITED TO BRIEF AND ARGUE THIS 
CASE, AS 
AMICUS CURIAE
, IN SUPPORT OF THE POSITION THAT 
STINSON V. UNITED
 
STATES
, 
508
 U. S. 
36
 (
1993
), STILL CORRECTLY STATES THE RULE FOR THE DEFERENCE THAT COURTS 
MUST GIVE THE COMMENTARY TO THE SENTENCING GUIDELINES.
 
 
 
 
 
 
CERT. GRANTED 4/20/2026
QUESTION PRESENTED:
I. Whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) comports with the Second Amendment?
II. Whether 
Stinson v. United States
 still accurately state the level of deference due to the 
Commentary of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines?
III. Whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) permits conviction for the possession of any firearm that 
has ever crossed state lines at any time in the indefinite past, and, if so, if it is facially 
unconstitutional?
 
LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 24-10764

Beaird v. United States | 10/13/26 | Docket #: 25-5343 25-5343 BEAIRD V. UNITED STATES DECISION BELOW: 2025 WL 1410410 THE MOTION OF PETITIONER FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS IS GRANTED. THE PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI IS GRANTED LIMITED TO THE FOLLOWING QUESTION: WHETHER STINSON V. UNITED STATES , 508 U. S. 36 ( 1993 ), STILL CORRECTLY STATES THE RULE FOR THE DEFERENCE THAT COURTS MUST GIVE THE COMMENTARY TO THE SENTENCING GUIDELINES. Order of May 6 , 2026 ANTHONY J. DICK, ESQUIRE, OF WASHINGTON, D. C., IS INVITED TO BRIEF AND ARGUE THIS CASE, AS AMICUS CURIAE , IN SUPPORT OF THE POSITION THAT STINSON V. UNITED STATES , 508 U. S. 36 ( 1993 ), STILL CORRECTLY STATES THE RULE FOR THE DEFERENCE THAT COURTS MUST GIVE THE COMMENTARY TO THE SENTENCING GUIDELINES. CERT. GRANTED 4/20/2026 QUESTION PRESENTED: I. Whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) comports with the Second Amendment? II. Whether Stinson v. United States still accurately state the level of deference due to the Commentary of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines? III. Whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) permits conviction for the possession of any firearm that has ever crossed state lines at any time in the indefinite past, and, if so, if it is facially unconstitutional? LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 24-10764

Beaird v. United States | 10/13/26 | Docket #: 25-5343

25-5343 BEAIRD V. UNITED STATES
DECISION BELOW: 2025 WL 1410410
THE MOTION OF PETITIONER FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS IS GRANTED. THE 
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI IS GRANTED LIMITED TO THE FOLLOWING QUESTION: 
WHETHER 
STINSON V. UNITED STATES
, 
508
 U. S. 
36
 (
1993
), STILL CORRECTLY STATES THE RULE 
FOR THE DEFERENCE THAT COURTS MUST GIVE THE COMMENTARY TO THE SENTENCING 
GUIDELINES.
Order of May 
6
, 
2026
ANTHONY J. DICK, ESQUIRE, OF WASHINGTON, D. C., IS INVITED TO BRIEF AND ARGUE THIS 
CASE, AS 
AMICUS CURIAE
, IN SUPPORT OF THE POSITION THAT 
STINSON V. UNITED
 
STATES
, 
508
 U. S. 
36
 (
1993
), STILL CORRECTLY STATES THE RULE FOR THE DEFERENCE THAT COURTS 
MUST GIVE THE COMMENTARY TO THE SENTENCING GUIDELINES.
 
 
&nbsp;
&nbsp;
&nbsp;
&nbsp;
CERT. GRANTED 4/20/2026
QUESTION PRESENTED:
I. Whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) comports with the Second Amendment?
II. Whether 
Stinson v. United States
 still accurately state the level of deference due to the 
Commentary of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines?
III.&nbsp;Whether&nbsp;18&nbsp;U.S.C.&nbsp;§&nbsp;922(g)&nbsp;permits&nbsp;conviction&nbsp;for&nbsp;the&nbsp;possession&nbsp;of&nbsp;any&nbsp;firearm&nbsp;that&nbsp;
has ever crossed state lines at any time in the indefinite past, and, if so, if it is facially 
unconstitutional?
 
LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 24-10764

Beaird v. United States

Department of Air Force v. Prutehi Guahan | 10/07/26 | Docket #: 25-579

25-579 DEPT. OF AIR FORCE V. GUAHAN
DECISION BELOW: 128 F.4th 1089
CERT. GRANTED 3/9/2026
QUESTION PRESENTED:
The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. 6901 
et seq
., is a 
comprehensive environmental statute providing for cradle-to-grave regulation of hazardous 
waste through a scheme of cooperative federalism. Under RCRA, the United States 
Environmental Protection Agency may authorize state and territorial regulators to administer 
permitting programs for hazardous-waste-treatment facilities in their respective jurisdictions, 
including facilities operated by the federal government. The questions presented are as 
follows:
1. Whether the federal government's submission to a state or territorial regulator of an 
application to renew a RCRA permit is "final agency action" that is immediately reviewable 
under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 704.
2. Whether the federal government must comply with the general environmental-
review procedures of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. 4321 
et seq
., 
before submitting a permit-renewal application under RCRA, which sets forth its own specific 
procedures to review environmental impacts in the context of hazardous-waste treatment.
LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 22-16613

Department of Air Force v. Prutehi Guahan | 10/07/26 | Docket #: 25-579 25-579 DEPT. OF AIR FORCE V. GUAHAN DECISION BELOW: 128 F.4th 1089 CERT. GRANTED 3/9/2026 QUESTION PRESENTED: The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. 6901 et seq ., is a comprehensive environmental statute providing for cradle-to-grave regulation of hazardous waste through a scheme of cooperative federalism. Under RCRA, the United States Environmental Protection Agency may authorize state and territorial regulators to administer permitting programs for hazardous-waste-treatment facilities in their respective jurisdictions, including facilities operated by the federal government. The questions presented are as follows: 1. Whether the federal government's submission to a state or territorial regulator of an application to renew a RCRA permit is "final agency action" that is immediately reviewable under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 704. 2. Whether the federal government must comply with the general environmental- review procedures of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq ., before submitting a permit-renewal application under RCRA, which sets forth its own specific procedures to review environmental impacts in the context of hazardous-waste treatment. LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 22-16613

Department of Air Force v. Prutehi Guahan

Anderson v. Intel Corp. Investment Policy Committee | 10/06/26 | Docket #: 25-498

25-498 ANDERSON V. INTEL CORP. INV.
DECISION BELOW: 137 F.4th 1015
CERT. GRANTED 1/16/2026
QUESTION PRESENTED:
Under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), a plan fiduciary is 
subject to a "[p]rudent man standard of care," which requires the fiduciary to "discharge his 
duties with respect to a plan" with the "care, skill, prudence, and diligence" that a prudent 
person "acting in a like capacity and familiar with such matters would use." 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)
(1)). As this Court has recognized, a court's inquiry into whether a plaintiff has adequately 
alleged that a fiduciary breached ERISA's duty of prudence "will necessarily be context specific" 
because the content of that duty "turns on 'the circumstances ... prevailing' at the time the 
fiduciary acts." 
Fifth Third Bancorp. v. Dudenhoeffer
, 573 U.S. 409, 425 (2014) (quoting 29 
U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B)). As a result, "categorical" pleading rules are "inconsistent with the 
context-specific inquiry that ERISA requires." 
Hughes v. Nw. Univ
., 595 U.S.170, 173 (2022).
The question presented is: Whether, for claims predicated on fund underperformance, 
pleading that an ERISA fiduciary failed to use the requisite "care, skill, prudence, or diligence" 
under the circumstances and thus breached ERISA's duty of prudence when investing plan 
assets requires alleging a "meaningful benchmark."
LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 22-16268

Anderson v. Intel Corp. Investment Policy Committee | 10/06/26 | Docket #: 25-498 25-498 ANDERSON V. INTEL CORP. INV. DECISION BELOW: 137 F.4th 1015 CERT. GRANTED 1/16/2026 QUESTION PRESENTED: Under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), a plan fiduciary is subject to a "[p]rudent man standard of care," which requires the fiduciary to "discharge his duties with respect to a plan" with the "care, skill, prudence, and diligence" that a prudent person "acting in a like capacity and familiar with such matters would use." 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (1)). As this Court has recognized, a court's inquiry into whether a plaintiff has adequately alleged that a fiduciary breached ERISA's duty of prudence "will necessarily be context specific" because the content of that duty "turns on 'the circumstances ... prevailing' at the time the fiduciary acts." Fifth Third Bancorp. v. Dudenhoeffer , 573 U.S. 409, 425 (2014) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B)). As a result, "categorical" pleading rules are "inconsistent with the context-specific inquiry that ERISA requires." Hughes v. Nw. Univ ., 595 U.S.170, 173 (2022). The question presented is: Whether, for claims predicated on fund underperformance, pleading that an ERISA fiduciary failed to use the requisite "care, skill, prudence, or diligence" under the circumstances and thus breached ERISA's duty of prudence when investing plan assets requires alleging a "meaningful benchmark." LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 22-16268

Anderson v. Intel Corp. Investment Policy Committee

Rimini Street, Inc. v. Oracle USA, Inc. | 01/14/19 | Docket #: 17-1625

Rimini Street, Inc. v. Oracle USA, Inc.

Thacker v. TVA | 01/14/19 | Docket #: 17-1201

Thacker v. TVA

Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Hyatt | 01/09/19 | Docket #: 17-1299

Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Hyatt

Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com, LLC | 01/08/19 | Docket #: 17-571

Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com, LLC

Herrera v. Wyoming | 01/08/19 | Docket #: 17-532

Herrera v. Wyoming

Obduskey v. McCarthy & Holthus LLP. | 01/07/19 | Docket #: 17-1307

Obduskey v. McCarthy &amp; Holthus LLP. | 01/07/19 | Docket #: 17-1307

Obduskey v. McCarthy & Holthus LLP.

Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp. v. Albrecht | 01/07/19 | Docket #: 17-290

Merck Sharp &amp; Dohme Corp. v. Albrecht | 01/07/19 | Docket #: 17-290

Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp. v. Albrecht

Gamble v. United States | 12/06/18 | Docket #: 17-646

Gamble v. United States

Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. | 12/04/18 | Docket #: 17-1229

Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc.

Biestek v. Berryhill | 12/04/18 | Docket #: 17-1184

Biestek v. Berryhill

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