By Roger Bate at Brownstone dot org.
When the Trump administration announced its withdrawal from, and defunding of, 66 international organizations and treaty bodies on January 7th, much of the media coverage framed the move as reckless isolationism or short-term budget cutting. That framing misunderstands what is actually happening.
This is not primarily a cost-saving exercise. It is a deliberate strategic break from a model of global governance that increasingly perpetuates problems rather than resolving them, and that relies on the continuous expansion of mandates, budgets, and crises to justify its own existence.
Money matters here, but only insofar as it reveals intent.
What the United States Is Actually Saving
Using the most recent consolidated US government contribution tables, a conservative reading shows that the United States was spending at least $90 million per year on a subset of the 66 organizations now being exited. That figure is a lower bound, based only on clearly identifiable FY2023 obligations tied to a handful of the largest recipients.
Among the biggest recipients of recent US funding on the withdrawal list were the United Nations Population Fund, the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, UN Women, and UN-Habitat. Together, just these four entities account for the bulk of the identifiable spending in the conservative estimate above, with the population fund alone receiving tens of millions of dollars annually from the United States.
Climate-related bodies illustrate particularly clearly what Washington is stepping away from. US funding for the UNFCCC secretariat and associated climate processes has typically run into the low tens of millions of dollars annually, largely through voluntary contributions. These funds do not finance emissions reductions or energy innovation directly; they support the administrative machinery of global climate governance — conferences, reporting frameworks, expert panels, working groups, and compliance processes that expand year after year regardless of measurable climate outcomes.
This design is not accidental. Climate institutions are structured around process rather than resolution. There is no condition under which the UNFCCC can declare success and wind itself down. Progress justifies more funding; failure justifies even more.
The conservative $90 million estimate excludes dozens of smaller agencies among the 66, indirect funding routed through multi-donor trust funds, and future escalations embedded in open-ended commitments. In other words, $90 million is not the headline; it is the floor.
Even if total savings ultimately land in the low hundreds of millions rather than the billions, the scale is large enough to matter and small enough to clarify intent. This is not a budgetary stunt. Washington routinely spends more than this on programs few can recall authorizing. What makes this decision different is where the cuts are aimed.
Why These Organizations Were Chosen
The administration did not withdraw randomly. The organizations selected for exit share a common institutional pathology. Bodies created to solve specific, technical problems have gradually evolved into permanent advocacy platforms. Climate secretariats, population agencies, and norm-setting bodies rarely declare success because success would undermine their relevance and funding base.
Funding models reinforce this dynamic by rewarding the identification of ever-expanding risks rather than measurable improvement. In climate policy, each missed target becomes justification for additional conferences, additional frameworks, and additional global coordination. Over time, this has produced institutions with weak performance metrics but strong moral authority.
Critics of the withdrawals often reveal this logic unintentionally. Climate advocates quoted in The Guardian warned that leaving UN climate bodies would "undermine global cooperation" and abandon "decades of climate leadership." That concern is reveali...