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A Case Study: Should We Enforce a Blockade of Kaliningrad?


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Some grow frustrated with our progress in convincing Russia to leave Ukraine. We could take deliberate steps to increase our negotiating strength.

Just as a thought experiment, a case study—should we enforce a blockade of Kaliningrad?

June 24, 1948. Joseph Stalin, the Soviet leader during World War II, directed a blockade of all supplies going into West Berlin, Germany, by road, rail, or river. Despite controlling the surrounding territory, the Soviets could not stop air transit into and out of the isolated city.

The US and our allies responded to the Soviet blockade by airlifting all supplies for two million people into and out of West Berlin for the next 322 days. Planes brought coal for heat and electricity, as well as oil and gas. They brought food, coffee, medicine, raw materials for clothing, and other essentials. Planes even brought candy, highlighting a human touch during political tensions. At the peak of the Berlin Airlift, a plane filled with supplies landed in Berlin every 45 seconds.

May 12, 1949. The Soviets stopped the blockade due to the demonstrated American and Allied commitment to West Berlin. This airlift foreshadowed the enduring geopolitical tensions that would characterize the Cold War. It highlighted the enduring importance of resilience, innovation, and international cooperation in the face of adversity.

A key point here is that, even if it failed, the Soviets illustrated that a blockade is an acceptable strategy to exert negotiating pressure on America and our Western European partners.

The other key point is that the Soviet blockade failed due to determined American and Allied commitment.

The legacy of the Berlin Airlift echoes across the modern geopolitical landscape, particularly in the face of continued Russian ambitions to exert influence beyond its borders.

February 24, 2022. Russian forces directed by Vladimir Putin invaded Ukraine. The invasion drew widespread international condemnation and led to a series of sanctions against Russia.

Two years later, in a statement on February 23, 2024, American President Biden reiterated that Russian aggression in Ukraine is a threat to all of Europe and the rest of the world, including the United States.

The same day, US Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III outlined America’s goals for Ukraine. He stated that as a global coalition, we intend to:

Ensure that Ukraine has the capabilities that it needs to defend its people from Russian aggression, and

Take back its sovereign territory

Secretary Austin III highlighted, “This historic coalition has committed more than $87 billion in security assistance to Ukraine since the start of Putin's war—including 15 U.S. allies that, as a percentage of GDP, contribute more to Ukraine's capability needs than the United States.”

Unfortunately, the sanctions and aid supplied to Ukraine have not resulted in Russian forces leaving Ukraine. Russian forces are entrenched. Forcibly removing them from Ukraine is a challenging task.

How might we reinforce our negotiating position with Russia?

Successful negotiation starts from a position of strength. This strength relies on strategic preparation and a superior Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement, or BATNA. Roger Fisher, William Ury, and later Bruce Patton introduced the BATNA concept in their 1981 book Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In.

A strong BATNA means having a robust and viable plan that can be executed if negotiations fail. This ensures negotiation isn’t the only path to achieving your objectives, thereby reducing desperation and improving leverage.

Strength in negotiation also comes from assessing and influencing the other party's BATNA. Understanding and weakening the other party's alternatives enhances your position.

Our BATNA is a stronger North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), improved already by enhanced military readiness (Steadfast Defender 24 exercises), new memberships (Finland and Sweden), and increased defense spending. That’s not to say we aren’t committed to Ukraine. Our commitment to our partners highlights our resolve to uphold the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity.

We can assess Russia as desiring a frozen conflict. In a frozen conflict, active, large-scale military hostilities cease, but the nations don’t agree to peaceful terms. These conflicts often linger indefinitely, with sporadic outbreaks of violence. This would enable Russia a degree of control and influence over the contested area without the full costs of war. Russia currently has frozen conflicts in areas of Moldova and Georgia.

One strategy to enhance our negotiating leverage against Russia would be to enforce a blockade of Kaliningrad.

Kaliningrad is strategically important to Russia. It’s Russia’s only deep-sea port that remains ice-free year-round. It serves as a critical military and logistical hub.

Kaliningrad is physically separated from the rest of Russia. It borders open water or a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) nation on all sides. Its unique geographical position—isolated from the Russian mainland and surrounded by NATO members and the Baltic Sea—renders it particularly vulnerable to blockade strategies. This isolation is a leverage point in negotiations. Russia acts nervous about Kaliningrad’s isolation. In June 2022, Russia claimed Lithuania blockaded Kaliningrad when Lithuania began enforcing European Union sanctions that were a result of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

There’s another relevant geographic feature in the region. The Suwalki Gap is a strategically significant stretch of land approximately 60 miles long, located on the border between Poland (a NATO member) and Lithuania (also a NATO member). This narrow corridor is strategically important because it is the only land connection between the Baltic States of Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and the rest of NATO. It separates Belarus, a Russian ally, and Kaliningrad. Securing this stretch of land would be paramount to maintaining the integrity of NATO's eastern flank.

Kaliningrad isn’t a Russian city. Its real name is Königsberg. Königsberg was a Prussian (German) city for 700 years before being annexed by the Soviets after World War II. Kaliningrad has a complex identity that distinguishes it from other Russian cities. This historical and cultural distinction complicates Russia's claims over the territory.

Implementing a blockade of Kaliningrad would apply pressure that Russia could not easily ignore. The strategy would require careful planning, support, and coordination among NATO allies and a readiness to manage potential escalatory responses from Russia. As a permanent member of the United Nations (UN) Security Council, Russia would veto the blockade if it were brought to a vote there.

The ultimate goal of the blockade wouldn’t be to escalate hostilities. It would be to bring Russia to the negotiating table with a genuine interest in coming to an agreement to end the blockade of Kaliningrad. Our bargaining chip? Russian forces leaving Ukraine.

The blockade of Kaliningrad could serve as a tangible demonstration of NATO's capability and willingness to impose significant costs on Russia for its aggression in Ukraine and elsewhere.

The biggest risk of enforcing a blockade of Kaliningrad? A blockade is a deliberate act of war. An act of war against Russia in a NATO nation risks increasing the likelihood of expanding the war to include all of NATO.

Back to our question. Should we enforce a blockade of Kaliningrad to reinforce our negotiating position with Russia?

We should consider a perspective from one of NATO’s newest members, Finland. Finland shares an 835-mile border with Russia.

Recent remarks from Finland’s new president emphasize “a Finnish approach” to the Russian situation, i.e., “cool, calm, and collected, but determined.” This perspective highlights the importance of a levelheaded approach.

Another point regarding a determined approach: our NATO partners supported operations in Afghanistan for 18 years alongside America. Just like their support, our commitment to Ukraine and our NATO partners isn’t a short-term event.

Over the long term, patient diplomacy and economic partnership are more decisive than military operations.

That’s not to say we aren’t ready to take decisive action. Blockading Kaliningrad is a viable course of action to increase pressure on Russia without resorting to full-scale conflict. However, as it directly impacts their regional security, we would require strong consensus with our NATO partners. It's their backyard, and their willingness to support the strategy is essential for its legitimacy.

The imagined scenario to blockade Kaliningrad would be a drastic measure. It carries significant risks and challenges. It would be an act of war.

A blockade of Kaliningrad would be possible but dangerous.

History doesn’t predict future events, but looking back at the Soviet blockade of West Berlin offers a lesson: the Berlin blockade didn't win the day; patient determination won.

Diplomacy, strong partnerships, and continued economic support to Ukraine and our partners in Europe are more decisive than immediate incendiary action.

May God bless the United States of America.



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I BelieveBy Joel K. Douglas

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