Russian information operations are designed to accentuate and exaggerate  the effects of war, but their strategies have been changing since the  attack on the Kerch Bridge. Whereas Russian disinformation sources  previously sought to spread confusion over their interference in  Ukraine, now they use messaging to play up their military attacks on  Ukrainian energy infrastructure and civilians. From supporting the  strategy of plausible deniability, Russian info ops are now wielded as a  terror weapon, to project their ability to threaten, manipulate,  coerce, and of course to exaggerate their ability and willingness to  project extreme violence and inflict economic chaos on their  adversaries.   

Adam Ure is a Russia and Ukraine specialist in security, disinformation,  strategic communications, and open-source exploitation. He provides  consultancy and policy advocacy to Governments (at most-senior levels)  and other institutions and organisations. Adam was Head of Counter  Disinformation Capability and Assessment at the Open-Source Unit at  FCDO, part of the UK Civil Service, where he led a unit building the UK  Government’s ability to leverage open-source intelligence in foreign  policy work. He has also worked as an Expert Analyst for the United  States Federal Government, where he led the OSE Central Asia account and  briefed senior government customers on issues relating to Central Asia,  Russia, and the Former Soviet Union.   I’ve been trying to get Adam on the Podcast for some months, but he has  been in high demand providing insights to decision-makers since start of  the war.