This case is about the Taylor test for fitness to stand trial and the separate test for not criminally responsible by reason of mental disorder.

Facts: after several years of deteriorating mental health, the appellant moved into a basement apartment with other tenants. Five days later, the appellant murdered one of the other tenants. The appellant told the police, surrendered himself, and explained how he carried out the murder.

In May 2016, a jury found the appellant unfit to stand trial and he was sent to an in-patient treatment facility to see if he could become fit. At a second hearing in August 2016, after spending over three months in hospital, a second jury reversed the first, finding the appellant fit to stand trial.

A jury convicted the appellant of murder. He appealed to the Court of Appeal for Ontario. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal. The Supreme Court of Canada granted leave to appeal on two issues. First, whether the Taylor test requires that the accused person can make rational decisions about the conduct of their defence. Second, whether the not criminally responsible defence applies when the accused person has the general capacity to know that society would regard their actions as morally wrong, but due to their mental disorder does not have the specific capacity to apply that knowledge to their actions.

When an inmate in a provincial correctional facility in Saskatchewan is charged with a disciplinary offence, the governing legislation requires the institutional authorities to determine, on a balance of probabilities, that the offence occurred in order to establish guilt. The John Howard Society of Saskatchewan asserts that employing this standard of proof violates s. 7 of the Charter. It submits that proof beyond a reasonable doubt is necessary to withstand constitutional scrutiny.

The Saskatchewan Court of Appeal disagreed. The Supreme Court of Canada granted leave to appeal to determine whether and to what extent the presumption of innocence operates as a principle of fundamental justice in non-criminal settings.

The Crown appealed, and the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal agreed with the Crown that the trial judge erred in finding that the evidence of threats and violence towards the complainant was “past discreditable conduct.” However, the Court of Appeal held that the error could not have impacted the trial judge’s findings because a finding of exploitation or attempted exploitation rested on the evidence of the complainant, which was ultimately not accepted at trial. The appeal was dismissed.

 The dissenting judge however, held that had the trial judge not made such a grave evidentiary error, the verdict may very well have not been the same. She emphasized that the Crown was entitled to rely on the evidentiary presumption in S. 279.01(3) of the Criminal Code. The dissenting judge would have set aside the acquittals and ordered a new trial.

The accused was alleged to have committed human trafficking and related offences between 2006-2011. At trial, the trial judge did not accept the complainant’s evidence. Yet, the trial judge did find that the accused had engaged in threats, intimidation and injury towards the complainant. However, the judge found that this was “past discreditable conduct” and not evidence that could be applied to make a finding on the actus reus of the charged offences. The accused was acquitted.

The Crown appealed, and the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal agreed with the Crown that the trial judge erred in finding that the evidence of threats and violence towards the complainant was “past discreditable conduct.” However, the Court of Appeal held that the error could not have impacted the trial judge’s findings because a finding of exploitation or attempted exploitation rested on the evidence of the complainant, which was ultimately not accepted at trial. The appeal was dismissed.

 The dissenting judge however, held that had the trial judge not made such a grave evidentiary error, the verdict may very well have not been the same. She emphasized that the Crown was entitled to rely on the evidentiary presumption in S. 279.01(3) of the Criminal Code. The dissenting judge would have set aside the acquittals and ordered a new trial.

Mr. Campbell was convicted of trafficking, and heroine and Fentanyl, and possessing those drugs for the purpose of trafficking them, contrary to the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act. At trial, Mr. Campbell argued that his rights under Section 8 of The Charter had been violated because he had privacy interests in text messages that he was sending a local dealer. When police arrested that local dealer, incoming text messages were visible on the lock screen that suggested the sender was selling a quantity of drugs to the local dealer. Police impersonated the local dealer and responded to the messages, directing the sender where to attend. Mr. Campbell arrived in accordance with the police instructions for the fictious transaction. He was arrested and 14.33 grams of heroine mixed with fentanyl was found after a search incident to arrest. The trial judge dismissed the Charter application, citing that Mr. Campbell had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the text messages, and that there were exigent circumstances present for police to act because the texts clearly indicated Fentanyl was to be trafficked. The Court of Appeal agreed that the trafficking of Fentanyl is of such grave public concern that it constituted exigent circumstances, but found that Mr. Campbell did in fact have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the lock screen texts. However, given the police had exigent circumstances, there was no finding that his Section 8 rights were breached and accordingly, his appeal was dismissed by the Court of Appeal.

Bonjour et bienvenue à un autre épisode de Canada’s Court présenté par l’Association des avocats de la défense. Je m’appelle Jade Roberts et je suis une avocate de la défense basée à Toronto. Je vous présente aujourd’hui le dossier de Boudreau contre sa Majesté le Roi

Gabriel Boudreau est déclaré coupable de conduite dangereuse causant des lésions corporelles suite à une collision qui s'est survenu entre M. Boudreau et la plaignante. La juge de première instance a conclu qu'il avait participé à une course avec un autre conducteur. En appel, l'appelant fait valoir que la juge de première instance a erré en concluant qu'il avait participé à une course avec un autre conducteur. Les juges majoritaires à la Cour d'appel du Québec rejettent l'appel puisqu'ils sont d'avis que le verdict n'est pas déraisonnable.

Cependant, la juge dissidente a remarqué que la juge de première instance a commis deux erreurs : premièrement, la version de l'appelant était compatible avec le site des dommages en plus d'avoir été confirmée par le témoignage de la plaignante; et deuxièmement, la conclusion de la juge selon laquelle la plaignante circulait dans la voie de gauche bien avant l'impact était contredite par le témoignage de la plaignante. Ces conclusions sont au cœur de l’analyse de doute raisonnable. L’appelant soutien toujours que le verdict est déraisonnable.

This is a bonus episode that features oral argument for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. The applicants, Mr. Flemmings and Mr. Agpoon, received a stay of proceedings at trial under sections 11(b) and 24(1) of the Charter because of unreasonable delay in bringing them to trial.  The heart of the issue was the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on delay. The Crown preferred a direct indictment to mitigate delay caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. However, the applicants successfully argued at trial that the direct indictment was brought unreasonably late. The Court of Appeal overturned the stay and ordered a new trial. That case was called Agpoon.

An accused person is entitled to an oral hearing to argue leave to appeal to the Supreme Court when, as here, a court of appeal overturns an acquittal or stay on an indictable charge and orders a new trial.

The applicants sought leave to the Supreme Court, submitting that this case was the Court’s first and best chance determine how COVID-19 delay should be treated under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The Appellant, Daniel Hodgson, was charged with second-degree murder following a death at a house party. The victim, a large man, had become aggressive towards the house owner and refused to leave. Mr. Hodgson, who was asleep in a nearby bedroom, was asked by a guest to help remove the victim from the house. The victim died after Mr. Hodgson applied a one-arm choke hold on him.

Mr. Hodgson was acquitted at trial in the Nunavut Court of Justice. The trial judge had reasonable doubt as to whether Mr. Hodgson had the requisite intent for murder. On the lesser included offence of manslaughter, the Court held that the Crown had not disproven beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Hodgson acted in self-defence, pursuant to s. 34 of the Criminal Code. The Crown appealed to the Nunavut Court of Appeal, who set aside the acquittal and ordered a new trial. The Court of Appeal agreed with the Crown’s submission that the trial judge improperly took a solely subjective approach to assessing Mr. Hodgson’s response to the perceived threat posed by the victim.

Mr. Hodgson sought leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada, which was granted. Mr. Hogson argues, among other grounds of appeal, that the Court of Appeal erred in concluding that the trial judge erroneously approached the issue of the reasonableness of his response under s. 34(2)(c) from a purely subjective perspective.

Bonjour et bienvenue à un autre épisode de Canada’s Court présenté par l’Association des avocats de la défense. Je m’appelle Jade Roberts et je suis une avocate de la défense basée à Toronto. Je vous présente aujourd’hui le dossier de Agénor Archambault, et al, contre sa Majesté le Roi.

En juin et juillet 2019, dans deux dossiers distincts : M. Archambault est accusé de commettre un attentat à la pudeur d’une personne de sexe masculin, survenu entre 1958 et 1960, et M. Grenier est accusé de commettre les infractions de contacts sexuels et agression sexuelle, entre 2003 et 2007. À partir de 2019, ces infractions sont passibles d’un emprisonnement maximal de 14 ans. Cependant, ces infractions étaient passibles d’un emprisonnement maximal de dix ans au moment où ils auraient été commis.

Le 19 septembre 2019, l’art. 535 du Code criminel est modifié, et le droit à l’enquête préliminaire est aboli lorsqu’un prévenu est inculpé d’un acte criminel passible d’une peine d’emprisonnement de moins de 14 ans.

Les deux intimés présentent une demande d’enquête préliminaire après le 19 septembre 2019. Les deux demandes sont rejetées par la Cour du Québec pour absence de compétence après la modification à l’art. 535 du Code criminel. Les deux intimés ont fait appel devant la Cour supérieure du Québec, qui refuse le contrôle judiciaire dans chacun des deux cas.

La Cour d’appel du Québec détermine que la modification à l’art. 535 du Code criminel s’applique prospectivement et elle renvoie chacun des dossiers à la Cour du Québec pour une enquête préliminaire.

The appellants, Emanuel Lozada and Victor Ramos, were both charged with manslaughter. They, along with one another male, were involved in two fights, the second of which resulted in the fatal stabbing of the victim. At trial, the Crown argued that the appellants were liable as co-principals or as aiders or abettors of the stabber. A jury found both appellants guilty of manslaughter.

The appellants appealed to the Court of Appeal for Ontario, alleging, among other grounds, that the trial judge erred in his jury instruction on the law of causation regarding co-principal liability. The majority dismissed the appeal, finding that the jury instructions, read as a whole, accurately reflected the law of causation as it applied to the appellants. In dissent however, Justice Paciocco would have allowed the appeal, would have quashed the conviction, and ordered a new trial.

He concluded that the trial judge had misdirected the jury by understating the standard of “reasonable foreseeability” that the jury could use in deciding whether the appellant’s unlawful act amounted to a “significant contributing cause” of the victim’s death.

Mr. Lozada and Mr. Ramos both appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada as of right.

Bonjour et bienvenue à un autre épisode de Canada’s Court présenté par l’Association des avocats de la défense. Je m’appelle Jade Roberts et je suis une avocate de la défense basée à Toronto. Je vous présente aujourd’hui le dossier de Landry contre sa Majesté le Roi

L’appelant, un policier, était en arrêt de travail temporaire en raison de troubles médicaux. Lors d’une réunion avec un médecin-arbitre qui devait déterminer si l’incapacité de l’appelant était permanente, celui-ci a dénaturé ses activités de travail auprès des agences de voyage de son ex-épouse. Le médecin-arbitre a conclu à l’incapacité permanente de l’appelant, qui avait en conséquence droit à une indemnité permanente d’invalidité de son employeur. L’employeur avait connaissance de certaines des activités de travail de l’appelant, mais il n’en a pas informé le médecin-arbitre.

Le juge du procès a conclu que tous les éléments de l’infraction de fraude dépassant 5 000 $ étaient établis. L’appelant a été reconnu coupable d’un chef d’accusation de fraude. La Cour d’appel a confirmé à la majorité la décision du premier juge. La juge Cotnam de la Cour d’appel a exprimé sa dissidence et aurait substitué un verdict de tentative de fraude.

La dissidence de la juge Cotnam a accordé à M. Landry le droit de faire appel de la décision devant la Cour suprême du Canada.