The Appellant, Daniel Hodgson, was charged with second-degree murder following a death at a house party. The victim, a large man, had become aggressive towards the house owner and refused to leave. Mr. Hodgson, who was asleep in a nearby bedroom, was asked by a guest to help remove the victim from the house. The victim died after Mr. Hodgson applied a one-arm choke hold on him.

Mr. Hodgson was acquitted at trial in the Nunavut Court of Justice. The trial judge had reasonable doubt as to whether Mr. Hodgson had the requisite intent for murder. On the lesser included offence of manslaughter, the Court held that the Crown had not disproven beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Hodgson acted in self-defence, pursuant to s. 34 of the Criminal Code. The Crown appealed to the Nunavut Court of Appeal, who set aside the acquittal and ordered a new trial. The Court of Appeal agreed with the Crown’s submission that the trial judge improperly took a solely subjective approach to assessing Mr. Hodgson’s response to the perceived threat posed by the victim.

Mr. Hodgson sought leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada, which was granted. Mr. Hogson argues, among other grounds of appeal, that the Court of Appeal erred in concluding that the trial judge erroneously approached the issue of the reasonableness of his response under s. 34(2)(c) from a purely subjective perspective.

Bonjour et bienvenue à un autre épisode de Canada’s Court présenté par l’Association des avocats de la défense. Je m’appelle Jade Roberts et je suis une avocate de la défense basée à Toronto. Je vous présente aujourd’hui le dossier de Agénor Archambault, et al, contre sa Majesté le Roi.

En juin et juillet 2019, dans deux dossiers distincts : M. Archambault est accusé de commettre un attentat à la pudeur d’une personne de sexe masculin, survenu entre 1958 et 1960, et M. Grenier est accusé de commettre les infractions de contacts sexuels et agression sexuelle, entre 2003 et 2007. À partir de 2019, ces infractions sont passibles d’un emprisonnement maximal de 14 ans. Cependant, ces infractions étaient passibles d’un emprisonnement maximal de dix ans au moment où ils auraient été commis.

Le 19 septembre 2019, l’art. 535 du Code criminel est modifié, et le droit à l’enquête préliminaire est aboli lorsqu’un prévenu est inculpé d’un acte criminel passible d’une peine d’emprisonnement de moins de 14 ans.

Les deux intimés présentent une demande d’enquête préliminaire après le 19 septembre 2019. Les deux demandes sont rejetées par la Cour du Québec pour absence de compétence après la modification à l’art. 535 du Code criminel. Les deux intimés ont fait appel devant la Cour supérieure du Québec, qui refuse le contrôle judiciaire dans chacun des deux cas.

La Cour d’appel du Québec détermine que la modification à l’art. 535 du Code criminel s’applique prospectivement et elle renvoie chacun des dossiers à la Cour du Québec pour une enquête préliminaire.

The appellants, Emanuel Lozada and Victor Ramos, were both charged with manslaughter. They, along with one another male, were involved in two fights, the second of which resulted in the fatal stabbing of the victim. At trial, the Crown argued that the appellants were liable as co-principals or as aiders or abettors of the stabber. A jury found both appellants guilty of manslaughter.

The appellants appealed to the Court of Appeal for Ontario, alleging, among other grounds, that the trial judge erred in his jury instruction on the law of causation regarding co-principal liability. The majority dismissed the appeal, finding that the jury instructions, read as a whole, accurately reflected the law of causation as it applied to the appellants. In dissent however, Justice Paciocco would have allowed the appeal, would have quashed the conviction, and ordered a new trial.

He concluded that the trial judge had misdirected the jury by understating the standard of “reasonable foreseeability” that the jury could use in deciding whether the appellant’s unlawful act amounted to a “significant contributing cause” of the victim’s death.

Mr. Lozada and Mr. Ramos both appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada as of right.

Bonjour et bienvenue à un autre épisode de Canada’s Court présenté par l’Association des avocats de la défense. Je m’appelle Jade Roberts et je suis une avocate de la défense basée à Toronto. Je vous présente aujourd’hui le dossier de Landry contre sa Majesté le Roi

L’appelant, un policier, était en arrêt de travail temporaire en raison de troubles médicaux. Lors d’une réunion avec un médecin-arbitre qui devait déterminer si l’incapacité de l’appelant était permanente, celui-ci a dénaturé ses activités de travail auprès des agences de voyage de son ex-épouse. Le médecin-arbitre a conclu à l’incapacité permanente de l’appelant, qui avait en conséquence droit à une indemnité permanente d’invalidité de son employeur. L’employeur avait connaissance de certaines des activités de travail de l’appelant, mais il n’en a pas informé le médecin-arbitre.

Le juge du procès a conclu que tous les éléments de l’infraction de fraude dépassant 5 000 $ étaient établis. L’appelant a été reconnu coupable d’un chef d’accusation de fraude. La Cour d’appel a confirmé à la majorité la décision du premier juge. La juge Cotnam de la Cour d’appel a exprimé sa dissidence et aurait substitué un verdict de tentative de fraude.

La dissidence de la juge Cotnam a accordé à M. Landry le droit de faire appel de la décision devant la Cour suprême du Canada.

Private D.T. Vu was charged with sexual assault. It was alleged that he performed a sex act on the complainant who was incapable of consenting to the act by reason of advanced intoxication. The military judge concluded that the Crown did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the complainant failed to consent.

The Crown appealed to the Court Martial Appeal Court. The appeal was dismissed. However, in dissent, Justice McVeigh concluded that the military judge erred in law by failing to consider all of the evidence cumulatively, which led him to speculate improperly about alternative theories. These errors might have reasonably had a material bearing on the verdict. Further, the military judge erred by relying on improper inferences which, in effect, amounted to an insistence that the complainant’s intoxication had to be corroborated beyond the available evidence in this case.

The Crown appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada as of right.

Bonjour et bienvenue à un autre épisode de Canada’s Court présenté par l’Association des avocats de la défense. Je m’appelle Jade Roberts et je suis une avocate de la défense basée à Toronto. Je vous présente aujourd’hui le dossier de Tayo Tompouba contre sa Majesté le Roi

Monsieur Tayo Tompouba est inculpé d’agression sexuelle. Lors de sa première comparution, il n’est pas avisé de son droit de faire une demande de subir son procès en français, malgré l’obligation de la cour de l’en informer selon le par. 530(3) du Code criminel. Il est reconnu coupable après un procès en anglais. La Cour d’appel reconnait l’erreur de ne pas avoir avisé M. Tayo Tompouba de son droit, mais elle applique la disposition réparatrice afin de rejeter son appel. La Cour d’appel statue que le droit prévu au par. 530(3) s’agit d’un droit procédural et non d’un droit substantiel.

Bonjour et bienvenue à un autre épisode de Canada’s Court présenté par l’Association des avocats de la défense. Je m’appelle Jade Roberts et je suis une avocate de la défense basée à Toronto. Je vous présente aujourd’hui le dossier de Sergent S. R. Proulx, et al, contre sa Majesté le Roi.

Les appelants sont des membres des Forces armées canadiennes. Chacun faisant face à diverses accusations. Ils ont chacun déposé une requête préliminaire en cour martiale pour demander l’arrêt des procédures en alléguant une atteinte au droit constitutionnel d’être jugé par un tribunal indépendant et impartial que leur garantit l’al. 11d) de la Charte canadienne des droits et libertés. Selon les appelants, la possibilité que des juges militaires soient poursuivis pour des violations alléguées du code de discipline militaire constituait une atteinte au droit d’être jugé par un tribunal indépendant et impartial. Et en plus, ils ont demandé au juge militaire de déclarer que les art. 12, 17, 18 et 60 de la Loi sur la défense nationale étaient aussi une atteinte au droit d’être jugé par un tribunal indépendant et impartial. Le juge militaire de première instance a conclu qu’il y avait une atteinte au droit des accusés prévu à l’al. 11d) de la Charte.

La Cour d’appel de la cour martiale du Canada a accueilli les appels de la Couronne, statuant que le code de discipline militaire s’appliquait à juste titre aux juges militaires et elle a rejeté l’appel incident des accusés.

In the case of Derrick Michael Lawlor v The King, Mr. Lawlor, the appellant, appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada as of right from the Court of Appeal for Ontario, on the basis of a dissenting judge.

The appellant had engaged in a sexual encounter with the deceased and another man at a park. Hours later, the body of the deceased was found, and the cause of death was determined to be neck compression. The appellant suffered from mental illness and had consumed both psychiatric medication and alcohol around the time that he was in the park. The appellant had made statements before and after the deceased’s death stating that he wanted to kill gay men. In the days following, the appellant had searched the internet for news with respect to a body being found in a park.

The appellant was convicted by a jury of 1st degree murder. He appealed his conviction on the basis of several deficiencies in the jury charge. The majority at the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal on the basis that the instructions to the jury were appropriate. Justice Nordheimer, dissenting, would have allowed the appeal on the basis that the judge failed to instruct the jury with respect to the appellant’s mental health and level of intoxication as it related to the intent for murder, and on the basis that the judge failed to provide a limiting instruction for the use of after the fact conduct evidence.

CASE SUMMARY- TREVOR LINDSAY V. HIS MAJESTY THE KING

At what point should a police officer lose the protection offered by section 25 of the Criminal Code, justifying the use of as much force as necessary, so long as the officer acted on reasonable grounds and used that force for something the officer was required or authorized to do?

This appeal comes to the Supreme Court of Canada as of right from the Court of Appeal of Alberta. Officer Lindsay was charged with aggravated assault against an individual in his custody following an incident, much of which was captured on video. Following a brief interaction with the prisoner, Officer Lindsay was seen punching him in the face and, after another interaction, three more times to the back of the head. The most significant injury, a skull fracture, occurred when, during the course of either throwing the man to the ground or, as the officer testified, lowering him to the ground, the man’s head hit the pavement. 

The officer explained that he was concerned initially that the prisoner, whom he had been advised was an intravenous drug user with a history of being aggressive to police, might have a serious infectious disease such as hepatitis C, which could pose a risk should he spit at him or his partner in the cruiser. This concern grew after the first blow, which bloodied the man’s nose, after which he spit some blood at the cruiser.

The officer went on to explain that he meant to lower the man to the ground by the collar of his hoodie but inadvertently got hold of the hood. The slack between the hood and the collar resulted in his not being able to lower him in the controlled fashion he meant to employ, and the resultant contact led to injuries sufficiently serious that defence counsel conceded they were enough to constitute aggravated assault, should the judge conclude that an assault had, in fact occurred.

The trial judge found that there were no reasonable grounds for the first strike as there was no objective basis for any fear. The force used thereafter was excessive.

The majority of the Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge’s finding that neither section 25 nor section 34 were of assistance to the officer. Wakeling, J.A., in dissent, felt that the trial judge ought to have considered several key questions, including whether a reasonable person with the officer’s training would have considered the assessment of risk reasonable; whether the officer felt the force used was no more than necessary; whether a reasonable person with the officer’s training would have considered that the belief in the need for force and the use of no more force than necessary was reasonable; and whether the harm likely to result to the officer if less force was used should be considered in the context of the degree of harm the detainee might suffer with the use of force chosen.

In particular, he emphasized the need for the trial judge to consider what act(s), in particular, constituted the offence here, as it was essentially the act of putting the man to the ground which resulted in the significant head injury, and what level of intention would have to be proven with respect to the harm which resulted from that conduct.

In today’s society, the use of force by police has been the subject of considerable scrutiny, whether in Canada or elsewhere. The Supreme Court is in a position to provide important clarification on the extent to which such use of force may be justified, such that a criminal conviction ought not to result therefrom.

The appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada originates from Court Martial Appeal Court (CMAC). Prior to the appeal being filed, multiple decisions came out by military judges which held that there is a lack of institutional independence because of their risk of prosecution under the military’s code of Service Discipline. It leaves military judges at risk of being influenced by a senior member of the Canadian Armed Forces. The separate roles is a fundamental postulate of the rule of law. Therefore, judicial independence must not only exist in fact, but it must also be seen to exist to a reasonable person.

The appellants are members of the Canadian Armed forces who had various charges laid against them. The appeals focus on whether the role and status of military judges as military officers in the chain of command compromises their institutional independence, denying the appellants their right to a hearing under s.11 (d) of the Charter.

The question in issue before the Supreme Court of Canada are the following:

1)    Since Genereux, do military judges deciding cases still raise a reasonable apprehension of bias?

2)    Has there been significant societal change which dissipates this court’s concern that a trial before a military judge is a matter of practical necessity?

3)    If so, does the military status of judges, prescribed under the National Defence Act’s legislative scheme, lead an informed person, viewing the matter realistically and practically, to conclude that there is an apprehension of bias contrary to s.11 (d) of the Charter?

4)    If so is this violation saved under s 1 of the Charter?

5)    If not, what is the appropriate constitutional remedy under s 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982?