Years after a restaurant was robbed by two masked assailants, an unsavoury witness, or rather, a witness that required a Vetrovec caution at trial, came forward to police and identified the appellant as one of the masked robbers. Until then, the case had remained unsolved for years. The trial judge convicted the appellant, relying almost solely on the identification of the appellant by the unsavoury witness. Because the robbery was captured on video surveillance, the trial judge reasoned that there were points of corroboration between the video and the witness testimony, even though both assailants were completely masked. 

The Court of Appeal agreed with the trial judge, and found that because the trial judge dutifully reasoned why the Vetrovec concerns did not outweigh the weight of the identification evidence, the conviction was sound. The dissenting judge disagreed however, and opined that appellant intervention was required due to the error in law committed by the trial judge when considering the inherent dangers in the unsavoury witnesses’ evidence. The dissenting judge would have ordered a new trial. 

Hello, my name is Monica Bharadwaj and I am a criminal defence lawyer practicing in downtown Toronto. This is the case of R. v. Jennifer Pan and all. 

In this infamous case, Jennifer Pan is alleged to have masterminded a plan for her parents to be killed, employing the assistance of her ex-boyfriend and his cohorts to carry out the attack. In her initial police statements, she described a home invasion by assailants whom she did not know. After a lengthy investigation and further statements by Ms. Pan, she was ultimately charged for her role. At trial, Ms. Pan and her co-accused were convicted by a jury of the first-degree murder of her mother, and the attempted murder of her father who survived the attack and who testified at trial. 

Ms. Pan and her co-accused appealed their convictions. The Court of Appeal remitted the first-degree murder count back for a new trial for all co-accused, citing that the failure to provide the jury with the option to convict on second degree murder or manslaughter, for the death of Ms. Pan’s mother, was an error that deserved a new trial. The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction for the attempted murder of her father. The Crown appealed to Supreme Court, arguing that the conviction for the 1st degree murder of Ms. Pan’s mother should also stand. 

Ms. Pan has cross-appealed, asking the Supreme Court to consider this legal conundrum: by sending one count back to trial and upholding another, what happens if the appellate court, on its own decision, creates the possibility of an inconsistent verdict? The Crown argues that it is implausible that Ms. Pan could have the specific intent to kill her father, as required for a conviction of Attempted Murder, whilst not having the specific intent to kill her mother, because, as the Crown argues, both her parents were equal targets of the attack. Countering this argument, the defence points out that The Court of Appeal was unanimous in its decision to remit the 1st degree murder charge back to the lower court for a new trial and made its decision on sound law. However, in recognizing the inconsistency in upholding the attempted murder conviction, in its cross-appeal the defence has asked the Supreme Court to intervene and to create a new test to prevent inconsistent verdicts provoked by appellate decisions under s. 686(1)(a) of The Criminal Code, ultimately arguing for a new trial on all counts.

This case is about the Taylor test for fitness to stand trial and the separate test for not criminally responsible by reason of mental disorder.

Facts: after several years of deteriorating mental health, the appellant moved into a basement apartment with other tenants. Five days later, the appellant murdered one of the other tenants. The appellant told the police, surrendered himself, and explained how he carried out the murder.

In May 2016, a jury found the appellant unfit to stand trial and he was sent to an in-patient treatment facility to see if he could become fit. At a second hearing in August 2016, after spending over three months in hospital, a second jury reversed the first, finding the appellant fit to stand trial.

A jury convicted the appellant of murder. He appealed to the Court of Appeal for Ontario. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal. The Supreme Court of Canada granted leave to appeal on two issues. First, whether the Taylor test requires that the accused person can make rational decisions about the conduct of their defence. Second, whether the not criminally responsible defence applies when the accused person has the general capacity to know that society would regard their actions as morally wrong, but due to their mental disorder does not have the specific capacity to apply that knowledge to their actions.

When an inmate in a provincial correctional facility in Saskatchewan is charged with a disciplinary offence, the governing legislation requires the institutional authorities to determine, on a balance of probabilities, that the offence occurred in order to establish guilt. The John Howard Society of Saskatchewan asserts that employing this standard of proof violates s. 7 of the Charter. It submits that proof beyond a reasonable doubt is necessary to withstand constitutional scrutiny.

The Saskatchewan Court of Appeal disagreed. The Supreme Court of Canada granted leave to appeal to determine whether and to what extent the presumption of innocence operates as a principle of fundamental justice in non-criminal settings.

The Crown appealed, and the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal agreed with the Crown that the trial judge erred in finding that the evidence of threats and violence towards the complainant was “past discreditable conduct.” However, the Court of Appeal held that the error could not have impacted the trial judge’s findings because a finding of exploitation or attempted exploitation rested on the evidence of the complainant, which was ultimately not accepted at trial. The appeal was dismissed.

 The dissenting judge however, held that had the trial judge not made such a grave evidentiary error, the verdict may very well have not been the same. She emphasized that the Crown was entitled to rely on the evidentiary presumption in S. 279.01(3) of the Criminal Code. The dissenting judge would have set aside the acquittals and ordered a new trial.

The accused was alleged to have committed human trafficking and related offences between 2006-2011. At trial, the trial judge did not accept the complainant’s evidence. Yet, the trial judge did find that the accused had engaged in threats, intimidation and injury towards the complainant. However, the judge found that this was “past discreditable conduct” and not evidence that could be applied to make a finding on the actus reus of the charged offences. The accused was acquitted.

The Crown appealed, and the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal agreed with the Crown that the trial judge erred in finding that the evidence of threats and violence towards the complainant was “past discreditable conduct.” However, the Court of Appeal held that the error could not have impacted the trial judge’s findings because a finding of exploitation or attempted exploitation rested on the evidence of the complainant, which was ultimately not accepted at trial. The appeal was dismissed.

 The dissenting judge however, held that had the trial judge not made such a grave evidentiary error, the verdict may very well have not been the same. She emphasized that the Crown was entitled to rely on the evidentiary presumption in S. 279.01(3) of the Criminal Code. The dissenting judge would have set aside the acquittals and ordered a new trial.

Mr. Campbell was convicted of trafficking, and heroine and Fentanyl, and possessing those drugs for the purpose of trafficking them, contrary to the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act. At trial, Mr. Campbell argued that his rights under Section 8 of The Charter had been violated because he had privacy interests in text messages that he was sending a local dealer. When police arrested that local dealer, incoming text messages were visible on the lock screen that suggested the sender was selling a quantity of drugs to the local dealer. Police impersonated the local dealer and responded to the messages, directing the sender where to attend. Mr. Campbell arrived in accordance with the police instructions for the fictious transaction. He was arrested and 14.33 grams of heroine mixed with fentanyl was found after a search incident to arrest. The trial judge dismissed the Charter application, citing that Mr. Campbell had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the text messages, and that there were exigent circumstances present for police to act because the texts clearly indicated Fentanyl was to be trafficked. The Court of Appeal agreed that the trafficking of Fentanyl is of such grave public concern that it constituted exigent circumstances, but found that Mr. Campbell did in fact have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the lock screen texts. However, given the police had exigent circumstances, there was no finding that his Section 8 rights were breached and accordingly, his appeal was dismissed by the Court of Appeal.

Bonjour et bienvenue à un autre épisode de Canada’s Court présenté par l’Association des avocats de la défense. Je m’appelle Jade Roberts et je suis une avocate de la défense basée à Toronto. Je vous présente aujourd’hui le dossier de Boudreau contre sa Majesté le Roi

Gabriel Boudreau est déclaré coupable de conduite dangereuse causant des lésions corporelles suite à une collision qui s'est survenu entre M. Boudreau et la plaignante. La juge de première instance a conclu qu'il avait participé à une course avec un autre conducteur. En appel, l'appelant fait valoir que la juge de première instance a erré en concluant qu'il avait participé à une course avec un autre conducteur. Les juges majoritaires à la Cour d'appel du Québec rejettent l'appel puisqu'ils sont d'avis que le verdict n'est pas déraisonnable.

Cependant, la juge dissidente a remarqué que la juge de première instance a commis deux erreurs : premièrement, la version de l'appelant était compatible avec le site des dommages en plus d'avoir été confirmée par le témoignage de la plaignante; et deuxièmement, la conclusion de la juge selon laquelle la plaignante circulait dans la voie de gauche bien avant l'impact était contredite par le témoignage de la plaignante. Ces conclusions sont au cœur de l’analyse de doute raisonnable. L’appelant soutien toujours que le verdict est déraisonnable.

This is a bonus episode that features oral argument for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. The applicants, Mr. Flemmings and Mr. Agpoon, received a stay of proceedings at trial under sections 11(b) and 24(1) of the Charter because of unreasonable delay in bringing them to trial.  The heart of the issue was the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on delay. The Crown preferred a direct indictment to mitigate delay caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. However, the applicants successfully argued at trial that the direct indictment was brought unreasonably late. The Court of Appeal overturned the stay and ordered a new trial. That case was called Agpoon.

An accused person is entitled to an oral hearing to argue leave to appeal to the Supreme Court when, as here, a court of appeal overturns an acquittal or stay on an indictable charge and orders a new trial.

The applicants sought leave to the Supreme Court, submitting that this case was the Court’s first and best chance determine how COVID-19 delay should be treated under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The Appellant, Daniel Hodgson, was charged with second-degree murder following a death at a house party. The victim, a large man, had become aggressive towards the house owner and refused to leave. Mr. Hodgson, who was asleep in a nearby bedroom, was asked by a guest to help remove the victim from the house. The victim died after Mr. Hodgson applied a one-arm choke hold on him.

Mr. Hodgson was acquitted at trial in the Nunavut Court of Justice. The trial judge had reasonable doubt as to whether Mr. Hodgson had the requisite intent for murder. On the lesser included offence of manslaughter, the Court held that the Crown had not disproven beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Hodgson acted in self-defence, pursuant to s. 34 of the Criminal Code. The Crown appealed to the Nunavut Court of Appeal, who set aside the acquittal and ordered a new trial. The Court of Appeal agreed with the Crown’s submission that the trial judge improperly took a solely subjective approach to assessing Mr. Hodgson’s response to the perceived threat posed by the victim.

Mr. Hodgson sought leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada, which was granted. Mr. Hogson argues, among other grounds of appeal, that the Court of Appeal erred in concluding that the trial judge erroneously approached the issue of the reasonableness of his response under s. 34(2)(c) from a purely subjective perspective.

Bonjour et bienvenue à un autre épisode de Canada’s Court présenté par l’Association des avocats de la défense. Je m’appelle Jade Roberts et je suis une avocate de la défense basée à Toronto. Je vous présente aujourd’hui le dossier de Agénor Archambault, et al, contre sa Majesté le Roi.

En juin et juillet 2019, dans deux dossiers distincts : M. Archambault est accusé de commettre un attentat à la pudeur d’une personne de sexe masculin, survenu entre 1958 et 1960, et M. Grenier est accusé de commettre les infractions de contacts sexuels et agression sexuelle, entre 2003 et 2007. À partir de 2019, ces infractions sont passibles d’un emprisonnement maximal de 14 ans. Cependant, ces infractions étaient passibles d’un emprisonnement maximal de dix ans au moment où ils auraient été commis.

Le 19 septembre 2019, l’art. 535 du Code criminel est modifié, et le droit à l’enquête préliminaire est aboli lorsqu’un prévenu est inculpé d’un acte criminel passible d’une peine d’emprisonnement de moins de 14 ans.

Les deux intimés présentent une demande d’enquête préliminaire après le 19 septembre 2019. Les deux demandes sont rejetées par la Cour du Québec pour absence de compétence après la modification à l’art. 535 du Code criminel. Les deux intimés ont fait appel devant la Cour supérieure du Québec, qui refuse le contrôle judiciaire dans chacun des deux cas.

La Cour d’appel du Québec détermine que la modification à l’art. 535 du Code criminel s’applique prospectivement et elle renvoie chacun des dossiers à la Cour du Québec pour une enquête préliminaire.