Coffee and a Case Note

“Our parents’ citrus farm is a partnership asset!”

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Two siblings in partnership, P and D, ran a citrus farming business, having received it from their parents in the 2000s: [1]

(P, the parents’ exec, sought access to the parents’ privileged documents after death. As exec, P could waive privilege, however doing so was for themselves and not in the interests of the estate or benefs. Noting an exec’s duty to avoid conflict, access was denied: [4] - [10])

In the 1990s the parents gifted D the “Lot”, a part of the citrus farm: [29] - [31], [45], [50], [268]

In 1999, P bought a nearby farm with the parents providing both deposit and guarantee. P rented the house on the nearby farm out and continued to live with the parents at the citrus farm: [54], [60]

The orchards on the nearby farm were deployed in the parents’ business but there was no suggestion P’s nearby farm was a partnership asset: [55], [149]

In 2001, the parents gifted P and D the citrus farm and the business: [61], [62]

The farm was transferred before the commencement of P and D’s partnership and, being a gift, was not paid for with partnership funds: [142]

From around 2018 relations between D and P soured: [104] - [107]

As P’s nearby farm was not providing fruit for the partnership (and even though P continued to work for the partnership) payments to P were reduced: [121], [122]

Valuations were obtained as part of a potentially unwinding process. During this, P’s lawyer shared comments on a Deed (apparently made on P’s instructions) acknowledging P’s ownership of the Lot: [123]

P said that, in 2022, they attended D’s home to demand their share of partnership profits and were rebuffed. Police became involved and an AVO was obtained: [125], [126]

From around this time P was not paid by the partnership and did no further work for it: [129]

Shortly after this, P’s lawyer asserted the farm, including the Lot, was an asset of the partnership: [131]

The Court found the partnership ended on the date of the altercation, noting that from that time, P did no work and received no payment: [140]

P sought a declaration that the citrus farm, including the Lot, was a partnership asset: [141]

Although the evidence was imperfect, the Court was not convinced by P’s argument that the citrus farm was a partnership asset. This was based in part on its tax treatment via instructions given by P and D to an accountant over the years: [153]

P was found to have an equitable interest in the farm, namely in the Lot: [155] - [223]

The Court declined to make an s66G order and instead made a Woodson order, requiring P to offer their remaining interest in the farm to D at market value. If D was not willing or able to buy, a sale should proceed: [249]

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www.gravamen.com.au

The most fun James has ever had guesting on another podcast!

There's laughter, James' advice for how to enjoy Drake, there's more laughter, and there's also some depth as James, Jordan and Nathan reflect on what it means to be progressive (and to question some of the central tenets of capitalism) while also doing financial and corporate work.

A wonderful chat - James just hopes he gets invited back!!!

In April 2024 James sat down with Roger Christie, MD of Propel, to talk about the use of LinkedIn for building a legal practice (but it's extremely interesting and includes James having to take a pause because Roge has said something pretty moving and insightful).

You can catch the Digital Reputation Podcast here: https://propelgroup.com.au/podcast/

Gaaaah! James got to be the first ever private practice lawyer on Mel Storey's incredible in-house counsel themed podcast, Counsel!

This pod was recorded IMMEDIATELY after James launched his firm Gravamen at the Happy Lawyer Happy Life retreat in November 2023.

Grab yourself a mimosa and enjoy this incredible chat.

A link to Mel's podcast is here: https://www.counselpodcast.com

“Give me back my job selling diamonds!”

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A Co that sold diamonds and jewellery had 4 shareholders, entities related to the Co’s directors who were P1, D2, D3, and D4: [1], [9]

P1 and their sibling, P2, were fired by the Co from their roles as CEO and sales director respectively: [3]

The Ps (including P1’s shareholding entity) sued alleging the Co’s conduct was oppressive to P1 and seeking inter alia P1 and P2’s reinstatement on the basis of s232 oppression: [4], [5]

A Terms Sheet and employment contract governed P1’s relationship with the Co and Dirs: [11], [12]

Following slackening performance the Dirs met in Nov 2023. They resolved to reduce P1’s salary by 11%. P1 mentioned that P1 and P2 may not be compatible with the Dirs into the future: [24], [25]

In December 2023 P1 offered to sell their and P2’s shares (on the basis P2’s option had vested) for $750K: [27], [28]

D2 responded that P1 could expect a response in January 2024: [29]

Apparently with no further word in the intervening period, in April 2024 P1 and P2 received letters purporting to terminate their employment immediately: [30], [31]

P1 and P2 sought reinstatement and were then prevented from entering the Co’s premises: [35]

The Co’s Sydney office was closed. An industry publication informed other jewellers of P1’s and P2’s departure. Allegations were made regarding P1’s use of their Co credit card: [37], [38], [40]

The Court had to consider (i) whether there was a serious question to be tried, and (ii) whether the balance of convenience weighed in favour of reinstatement: [41] - [43]

The Court accepted there was a serious question to be tried because - apparently in breach of the Terms Sheet - a resolution was reached to terminate P1 and P2, and to close the Sydney office, in the absence of P1: [48]

A complexity arose: P1’s employment contract gave the Co broad termination rights that, arguably, meant the Co’s approach was not oppressive: [50] - [52]

The Ps failed on their balance of convenience argument for four reasons: (i) the inconsistency between an interlocutory order for reinstatement and final order for a share buyout [54] - [56]; (ii) damages being adequate, noting any final share valuation will account for oppressive behaviour [57]; (iii) reinstatement would upset, not maintain, the status quo as new people were performing P1’s and P2’s roles [58]; and (iv) generally, the Court’s reluctance to make reinstatement orders over the wishes of majority business owners: [59] - [62]

The Court declined to order the interlocutory relief sought: [63]

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James got to sit down for a chat about his progression through the world of legal practice with the legal Amogh Kadhe, of the ChatterMatters Podcast in early 2024.

Please enjoy!

You can find the ChatterMatters LinkedIn page here: https://www.linkedin.com/company/chattermatters-podcast/?originalSubdomain=au

“I’ve retired as a partner. I want market value with no discounts!”

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In 2018, 4 Cos entered into a partnership agreement. The business related to growing and selling tea: [1], [5]

P retired from the partnership. The agreement provided that the partnership would not be dissolved on a partner’s retirement: [2]

The question was: what value should P receive for its partnership stake?P argued for, in essence, a pro rata distribution according to its 19% stake: [3]

The Ds, who were the remaining partners, argued for a market value approach i.e. including discounts for P’s lack of control and the lack of marketability of P’s stake: [4]

The partnership agreement provided that the partners were entitled to the property and goodwill of the partnership in their respective shares: [8]

P sued, and initially applied for the appointment of a receiver to the partnership’s assets without pressing this application: [21]

By consent, the parties sought orders appointing a referee, a valuer, to value P’s interest in the partnership including goodwill at the date of retirement: [22] - [24]

The valuer sought further instruction on the basis of the valuation; fair value, market value, equitable value etc: [25]

Following an informal conference with the parties and the valuer the details of which were not in evidence, the valuer prepared their report on the market value basis: [27]

P’s view of what a market valuation entailed differed from the D’s views in that P resisted the suggestion that a discount ought to be applied for lack of control and a lack of marketability; or if those discounts were to be applied they ought to be reduced: [27]

The Ds said P had “agreed” to the more traditional market value approach: [28]

P said it was entitled to recover its share from the partnership as a debt due: [33]

The Ds denied P was entitled to an account and instead considered the valuation as a “stepping stone” to a potential transaction or (if their valuation position was accepted) grounds for a Syers order requiring P to sell to the Ds at the relevant value: [34]

The Court was receptive to P’s suggestion that if P were forced into a minority discount, and the Ds then sold the partnership’s business the Ds would enjoy a windfall: [50]

The Court accepted P’s entitlement to an account noting the parties could have agreed on a different outcome if they wished: [51]

The Court found the P did not “agree” to the minority discount as part of the market valuation process, having openly argued against it through the valuation process: [52] -[57]

The Court accepted P’s view on valuation of its interest and considered as a preliminary matter that legal costs be paid from the assets of the partnership: [65], [68]

The parties were invited to provide SMOs reflecting the outcome: [74]

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“You tried to kick me out of the law firm partnership!”

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A partnership operated a law firm. A deed governed the partners’ relationship. The partners were either fixed draw (“salaried”) partners or (often more lucrative) capital partners: [1], [2]

Each partner was a trustee of a separate trust: [2]

P was a capital partner, purportedly expelled from the partnership in November 2020: [5]

P said the purported expulsion was contrary to the deed; meaning P remained a partner or was entitled to damages: [6]

The Ds characterised the partnership as “easy in, easy out” - partners did not make a contribution to join, and were not “paid out” on their exit: [13]

When a capital partner exited, that exit was a “complete, forced, and absolute divorce from the firm”: [29]

The Ds proposed P’s expulsion by email with a “voting button” mechanism and also proposed that the technical requirements for expulsion (e.g. the giving of 7 days notice) be waived or abridged: [38] - [40]

Crucially, only one button was required to be pressed in order to vote on both proposed Extraordinary Resolutions (which the deed said needed 80% of the vote to pass): first (i) expulsion, and then (ii) waiver of technical requirements: [39]

P said this process was invalid because (i) the waiver of technical requirements (like notice) should come before the substantive expulsion vote, and (ii) the question of waiver and the substantive expulsion vote should have had separate voting buttons, allowing partners to vote separately on each resolution: [41]

The Court found the requirement of notice was for a purpose including, potentially, the marshalling of support by the capital partner at risk of expulsion: [48]

The Court found it undermined the seriousness of the consequences of expulsion for the question to be bundled up with the technical variation resolution (or, in the alternative) before it: [49]

The Court found what had taken place was a “plainly invalid process”: [50]

P’s expulsion from the partnership was, therefore, invalid: [51], [101] - [103]

This view was bolstered by the Court’s finding that the Extraordinary Resolution (as defined in the deed) required 80% of all partners to vote in its favour in order to be passed.This was by contrast to the Ds’ position, who asserted that only 80% of the *voting* partners were needed for such a resolution to pass: [52] - [57]

Noting the solemnity of the outcome of an Extraordinary Resolution, and based on the general tenets of commercial construction, the Court found 80% of the partnership was required to pass an extraordinary resolution, not merely 80% of partners engaging in the vote: [58], [59]

P therefore succeeded in their liability argument, with a cost order made in their favour: [122]

The argument about damages was saved for another day.

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If you get a moment please give Coffee and a Case Note, James d'Apice, and / or Gravamen a follow on your favourite platform.

In March 2024 James had a chat with Josh Lawlor and Monica Walmsley from the Personal Branding Unlocked podcast.

It's a wide-ranging chat that features James' views on his own branding *journey* with some lessons you can apply in your practice.

You can find the PBU pod here: https://www.personalbrandingunlocked.com.au/

“Compensate the company. Then pay that money to me!”

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P, a former shareholder, sought to bring a claim on behalf of the Co and then have the proceeds paid to themselves: [1] - [3]

s237(2)(a): the Co was not going to bring the claim itself: [8]

s237(2)(d): the Court considered (i) whether the pleaded case could be proved, and (ii) if so whether that would ground the relief sought: [12]

When practising, P was the sole shareholder of the Co and principal benef of the trust the Co operated. That way, P’s work earned income for the Co: [16]

P chose that structure, and form of income distribution, likely due to financial advantages P considered arose - and so was bound to the risks arising from that choice: [17]

P made an agreement with some the Ds that would see advisory work referred to the Co, and would see NewCo established to do additional work: [19]

From 2013 the relationship between P and the Ds deteriorated with the Ds allegedly not referring work to NewCo and otherwise breaching the agreement: [24]

The Ds purported to remove Co from controlling NewCo thereby displacing P NewCo and diverting NewCo’s business to themselves: [31]

In 2017 P was made bankrupt, and later removed as beneficiary of the trust with the Ds buying P’s shares in Co from P’s bankruptcy trustee: [37], [53]

Despite a contract claim being out of time, it appeared there was “apparent unlawfulness” and claims that the Ds breached their duties to NewCo: [32], [35]

Importantly, the relief P sought chiefly was for distribution to be made to them as former benef of the trust, requiring the Co to on-pay its compensation to the P: [36], [40]

P attempted to characterise the Co’s loss as P’s loss due to their benef status at the time: [44]

P was unable to show (i) the Co’s income would inevitably be distributed [45], (ii) that if distributed that it would go to P solely, noting she was not the sole beneficiary [47], or (iii) that all the money paid to the Co would be distributed and not otherwise applied to e.g. costs of administering the trust etc: [48]

The Court found there was no entitlement to the distribution relief sought by P: [49]

An argument that P’s bankruptcy trustee may have entitlement did not require determination: [51]

The Court found there was no serious question to be tried as to P’s final relief, leaving other prayers arguably intact. However the problems with the relief meant the s237(2)(c) best interests test was not met: [56[

s237(2)(c): P’s claim was only for P’s benefit and without regard for the Co’s other obligations or objectives. It was not in the best interests of the Co that it be brought: [58] - [65]

s237(2)(b): In seeking an unlitigated determination that the Co pay all compensation to her the Court found P was not coming in good faith: [82], [83]

Having failed to meet the s237(2) criteria, P’s application was dismissed: [90]

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