Daf Yomi for Women - Hadran

The Gemara continues to analyze the dispute between Rav Huna and Rav Yehuda regarding the offspring generations of guaranteed livestock (tzon barzel) that one received from a non-Jew. It evaluates their views against the ruling of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel in the Mishna and against the statement of the tanna kamma in the first clause (reisha) of the Mishna, demonstrating how each Amora reinterprets the words of both Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel and the tanna kamma.

Regarding a ewe that gives birth to a goat-like species or a goat that gives birth to a sheep-like species (nidmeh), a braita brought by Rav Oshaya from Nehardea records that Rabbi Meir obligates the offspring while the Sages exempt it. The Gemara clarifies the subject of their dispute. After rejecting the possibilities that it concerns firstborn status (bekhorah), first shearings (reishit hagez), or slaughtering a mother and child on the same day (oto veet beno), the Gemara returns to state that it indeed concerns firstborn status, but under special circumstances—presenting three options to explain the specific case in which they disagree and the precise point of dispute.

Rabbi Yochanan notes that Rabbi Meir agrees that the Rosh Chodesh goat offering (se'ir shel rosh chodesh) must come from a female goat born to a goat and not from a hybrid offspring (nidmeh). An objection is raised against him: no sacrifice may come from a nidmeh, as derived from an explicit exposition! To resolve this, the Gemara explains that both verse derivations are necessary.

The Gemara discusses the status of wool that came from a nidmeh (such as a ewe born to a goat). Such wool is exempt from the prohibition of mixed species (kilayim/ shaatnez), invalid for tekhelet threads in tzitzit, and immune to garment leprosy (nega'im), as derived by an analogy to flax (pishtan), which cannot have a nidmeh counterpart. Similarly, Rav Ashi rules that wine from a vine draped over a fig tree is invalid for altar libations (nesakhim).

The Mishna addresses a ewe that gives birth to two male lambs whose heads emerge simultaneously. Rabbi Yosi HaGelili holds both go to the kohen based on the plural verse "the males belong to Hashem", whereas the Sages hold exact simultaneity is impossible (i efshar letzamtzem), so one belongs to the owner and one to the kohen. Rabbi Tarfon lets the kohen choose the better lamb, while Rabbi Akiva rules that the kohen receives the leaner one, with the second lamb grazing until it contracts a blemish; it remains liable for priestly gifts (matanot), whereas Rabbi Yosi exempts it. If one lamb dies, Rabbi Akiva rules that the burden of proof rests on the claimant (hamotzi mechavero alav hare'aya) and the animal remains with the owner.

In analyzing the principle of simultaneity/exactness (tzimtzum), the school of Rav Yannai asks whether human precision (beyedei adam) is possible according to the Sages, even if exact simultaneity at birth is impossible. They bring four examples—the red line on the Altar (chut hasikra), the dimensions of Sanctuary vessels, impurity in equal halves of a broken earthenware vessel, and a corpse found equidistant between two cities—to reach a conclusion, but each possibility is rejected.

The Gemara analyzes the braita brought to support Rav Sheshet's position that the fetus of a sanctified animal that became blemished can be redeemed (i.e., designated before the mother is redeemed to be used for the same sacrifice as its mother). First, the Gemara explains what can be derived from the concluding line in each section of the braita, "this is the general rule" (klalo shel davar). Then, an inference from the braita is used to raise a difficulty against Rav Huna's position that offspring of sanctified animals that became blemished cannot be fixed, but must be left to die. However, the Gemara suggests that Rav Huna could read the braita without making that inference.

Two versions are presented regarding one who slaughters a blemished sanctified animal outside the Temple courtyard (azara): in one version, the person is exempt; in the other, obligated. The second position is explained as referring to a blemish in the cornea (dukin she-be'ayin) according to the position of Rabbi Akiva.

Regarding the law of a substitution (temura) for a disqualified sanctified animal: Rav Nachman rules that if it was substituted after the original animal was redeemed, the substitute animal must be left to die, as there is no solution for it (similar to Rav Huna's position above regarding the fetus). Rav Amram disagrees, deriving from the substitution of a firstborn and an animal tithe that such animals can be eaten/slaughtered after becoming blemished. However, Abaye explains why those cases are not comparable. A braita is then brought to support Rav Nachman's position.

The Mishna rules that if an Israelite receives livestock from a non-Jew under a guaranteed livestock arrangement (tzon barzel) where the Jew accepts responsibility for the livestock, agrees to return its value as assessed at the time of the arrangement, and splits the proceeds, the offspring are exempt from firstborn status (bekhora). However, the third generation will be obligated in bekhora, meaning the fourth generation firstborns will be given to the kohen.

If the Israelite substitutes the offspring in place of the mothers to secure the principal, the third-generation offspring are exempt, but the fourth generation offspring are obligated meaning the fifth generation firstborns will be given to the kohen.

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel holds that even up to ten generations are exempt, as the non-Jew can always collect from the animals.

If a ewe gives birth to a goat-like species or a goat gives birth to a sheep-like species, the offspring is exempt from bekhorah, unless it exhibits some physical characteristics (miktzat simanin) of its mother, in which case it is obligated.

The Gemara questions whether tzon barzel remains in the domain of the non-Jewish owner, raising a contradiction from the laws of interest (ribbit), which prohibit an Israelite from accepting tzon barzel from another Israelite because it is considered to be in the recipient's domain and is therefore considered interest. Abaye distinguishes between cases based on whether the giver accepts responsibility for unavoidable loss and market depreciation. Rava rejects this distinction and explains that for bekhora, the exemption applies because if the Israelite fails to pay, the non-Jew can seize the animals or their offspring. Thus, "the hand of the non-Jew is in the middle" (yad goy ba'emtza), which invalidates the requirement of bekhora.

The Gemara analyzes the dispute regarding the generations of offspring when offspring are substituted for their mothers under a tzon barzel arrangement: Rav Huna holds that the second generation is exempt while the third generation is obligated, whereas Rav Yehuda holds that third generation offspring are also exempt and only fourth generation offspring are obligated.

Study Guide

Study Guide

The Gemara discusses a contradiction regarding the time for redeeming a firstborn donkey (peter chamor). One braita states that is can be done immediately, while another states that it cannot be performed before thirty days. Three resolutions are brought. Rav Nachman explains that if one redeemed it within thirty days, it is redeemed post-facto (b'dieved). Rav Sheshet suggests that the thirty-day timeframe teaches that one does not violate the prohibition against delaying the mitzva during this period. Rava resolves the conflicting opinions and explains that the dispute depends on whether one follows Rabbi Eliezer, who compares a firstborn donkey to a firstborn son, or the rabbis, who do not.

The Mishna rules that if the owner does not wish to redeem the firstborn donkey, he decapitates it from behind and buries it. The commandment of redemption takes precedence. The Mishna lists additional mitzvot that have an order of precedence: the commandment of designation (ye'ida) takes precedence over the commandment of redemption for a Hebrew maidservant; the commandment of Levirate marriage (yibbum) originally took precedence over chalitza, but nowadays the commandment of chalitza takes precedence because people do not intend it for the sake of the mitzvah; and the commandment of redemption by the owner takes precedence over any other person in redeeming sanctified non-kosher animals.

At the opening of the second chapter, the Mishna rules that if an Israelite buys, sells, enters a partnership in, or receives on a sharecropping contract (kibalat) a fetus or an animal of a Gentile, the offspring is exempt from firstborn status of kosher animals, as it is stated in the Torah "in Israel," excluding animals under joint or full ownership of Gentiles. Kohanim and Levites are obligated in the firstborn of a kosher animal, as their exemption applies only to pidyon haben and peter chamor.

The Gemara asks why the masechet begins with laws of firstborn donkey and then of kosher animals given that kosher animals possess intrinsic sanctity (kedushat haguf) while a donkey possesses only monetary sanctity (kedushat damim). The Gemara answers that matters regarding non-kosher animals are few, and therefore the matter was concluded first, or because a firstborn donkey is cherished.

Regarding transactions with a Gentile, Rabbi Yitzchak bar Nachmani said in the name of Resh Lakish, who quoted the words of Rabbi Oshaya, that an Israelite who gave money to a Gentile (and a Gentile who gave money to an Israelite) acquires through money alone, and does not require physical pulling (meshikha). This derives this from the verse "from the hand of your neighbor" (mi-yad amitekha), teaching that meshikha is required only between an Israelite and his neighbor, whereas a transaction with a Gentile is effected through money.

Ameimar holds a dissenting opinion – that a transaction between a Gentile and an Israelite is effected through money. The Gemara analyzes how to understand the verse of amitekha according to Ameimar according to the positions of both Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish.

A difficulty is raised from a braita against the position of Rabbi Oshaya regarding one who buys pieces of silver (gruta'ot) from Gentiles and finds an idol inside, where ownership depends on whether money was given or physical pulling (meshikha) was performed. The Gemara resolves the difficulty through four different explanations.

The Mishna lists animals that cannot be used for redemption, including a calf, an undomesticated animal, a slaughtered or treifa animal, a hybrid (kilayim), or a koy (a creature of doubtful status between a domesticated and undomesticated animal). Rabbi Eliezer permits redemption using a hybrid because it is nevertheless a lamb (born to two animals in the sheep family), but forbids a koy. The Gemara explains that the Mishna follows Ben Bag Bag, who derives from a textual comparison (gezeira shava) of the word seh from the Paschal sacrifice that only a standard, kosher lamb or goat fulfills the obligation.

Four questions are asked regarding animals that may or may not be used to redeem a firstborn donkey. The first question: may a fetus that was in the womb of its mother when she was slaughtered (ben pekua) be used? At first, the Gemara assesses that the question is according to the Sages' position regarding a ben pekua, and not Rabbi Meir's. Mar Zutra holds it is invalid because it does not require ritual slaughter, and therefore it is considered equivalent to a slaughtered animal. Rav Ashi permits it because the Torah repeats the word tifdeh (redeem) to include all kosher sheep.

The second question: can an animal that does not resemble its mother (nidmeh) be used for redemption? At first, the Gemara assesses that the question is according to the Sages' position and not Rabbi Eliezer's, since it is clear he would permit it, given that even kilayim is permitted for use. Two sources are brought to answer the question, but in the end, each source is inconclusive.

The third question: may consecrated animals that became blemished (pesulei hamukdashin) be used to redeem a firstborn donkey? Rav Mari son of Rav Kahana proves from the verse comparing them to a gazelle and a deer (k'tzvi v'ka'ayal) that just as a gazelle or deer cannot be used to redeem a firstborn donkey, blemished consecrated animals likewise cannot be used.

The final question: may one use an animal that possesses Sabbatical year sanctity for redemption? One clearly cannot use it to redeem a definite firstborn donkey, as the Torah specifies that Sabbatical produce is designated "for eating" (l'okhla) and not for commerce (l'skhora). To answer the question, a statement of Rav Chisda is brought showing that one may use a Sabbatical year animal to redeem a doubtful firstborn donkey, according to Rabbi Yehuda.

Rav Chisda ruled on other issues regarding animals with the sanctity of the Sabbatical year—that they are exempt from firstborn status and obligated in priestly gifts. A difficulty is raised from a braita regarding halla, but it is resolved.

If an Israelite gives an unredeemed firstborn donkey to a kohen, the kohen is not permitted to keep it until a lamb is designated in its place immediately, as kohanim were suspected of taking firstborn donkeys without properly redeeming them.

If one designates a lamb for redemption and the lamb dies, Rabbi Eliezer and the Sages dispute who bears responsibility. Rabbi Eliezer holds that the owner remains responsible to provide another lamb (comparing it to redemption of a firstborn son, pidyon haben), whereas the Sages hold that the owner is free of responsibility (comparing it to the redemption of second tithe, ma'aser sheni). Testimony from Rabbi Yehoshua and Rabbi Tzadok confirms the Sages' view that the kohen receives nothing if the designated redemption dies before reaching him.

Rav Yosef and Rava subsequently explain the source for Rabbi Eliezer's position.

How much must one give to redeem a firstborn donkey? Rabbi Yosi bar Yehuda requires at least one shekel, whereas the Sages hold that any minimal amount is valid for redemption. Rav Yosef explained that the value of "any minimal amount" can even be a lamb worth a sixth of a zuz. However, in the story involving Rabbi Yehuda Nesia, Rabbi Tarfon presents three options—a generous eye, a stingy eye, and an average eye—ranging between two to four zuzim. To resolve this contradiction, it is explained that Rabbi Tarfon's ruling applies when one comes to consult, but if one acts on their own, a sixth of a zuz is sufficient.

Reish Lakish rules that if the owner does not have a lamb to redeem it with, he may redeem it with its financial equivalent, as the Torah did not specify "a lamb" to be stringent upon him, but rather to be lenient. Initially, it was thought that he ruled in accordance with Rabbi Shimon, but because it is unreasonable to say he ruled like him (for two distinct reasons), his ruling is ultimately explained according to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda.

If a person redeems someone else's firstborn donkey, the redemption is valid. However, the Gemara asks: to whom does the donkey belong after redemption—is it similar to consecrated property (hekdesh) and thus belongs to the redeemer, or not? This question is answered from the law stating that a thief who steals someone else's firstborn donkey pays double damages to the owner, showing that it is not treated as hekdesh.

An Israelite who has ten doubtful firstborn donkeys in his house designates ten lambs for them, tithes them as animal tithe (ma'aser behema), and retains them for himself, since due to the doubt he is not obligated to give them to a kohen. The same applies to an Israelite who inherited ten definite firstborn donkeys from his maternal grandfather who was a kohen, who had inherited them from his maternal grandfather who was an Israelite, or untithed produce under similar circumstances, he sets aside the tithes for them and they remain his.

One who purchases untithed, smoothed produce from a non-Jew in the Land of Israel is obligated to tithe it, because a non-Jew's ownership in the Land of Israel does not exempt produce from tithes. Nevertheless, the tithes belong to him and he does not give them to a kohen, since he can say to the kohen: "My rights to this produce comes from the rights of a person with whom you have no legal claim." A contradictory source is brought, but it is resolved by differentiating between teruma gedola and teruma of maaser (that the Levite gives to a kohen).

In explaining the words of the Mishna, the Gemara clarifies that from the moment the owner redeems the donkey for a lamb, it becomes the property of the kohen and stands in his domain, so that even if it dies in the house of the owner, the kohen can still derive benefit from the lamb.

Even though Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yehuda disagree regarding whether a firstborn donkey (peter chamor) is forbidden for benefit, Rabba maintains that Rabbi Shimon, who permits benefit prior to redemption, agrees that if the donkey was not redeemed and its neck was broken, it becomes forbidden for benefit. Rabba derives this law via a gezeira shava comparing the term "breaking the neck" (arifah) used here to that of an egla arufa, which is forbidden for benefit once its neck is broken.

Rabba attempts to prove his assertion from a braita concerning a dispute between the rabbis and Rabbi Shimon over several items regarding susceptibility to food impurity, including a firstborn donkey. In that braita, Rabbi Shimon holds it is not susceptible to food impurity, which Rabba infers as evidence that it is forbidden for benefit after its neck is broken. However, Rabba's proof is rejected after two alternative explanations for the core debate in the braita are proposed, though ultimately both alternative interpretations are refuted as well. A further challenge is raised against Rabba from another braita, but this difficulty is successfully resolved.

Rav Huna supported Rabba's ruling and cited two braitot to demonstrate that Rabbi Shimon considers the firstborn donkey forbidden for benefit after its neck is broken, yet both proofs are shown to be inconclusive. The Gemara then introduces a different version regarding how Rav Nachman's opinion was framed, connecting it directly to a Mishna that discusses betrothing a woman with a firstborn donkey. An alternative version of the sugya pertaining to that Mishna is presented as well.

The opinion of Rabbi Yochanan (and some say Rabbi Elazar) is brought: he disagrees with Rabba and Rav Huna, holding that according to Rabbi Shimon, the donkey remains permitted for benefit even after its neck has been broken. Resh Lakish, however, agrees with the position of Rabba and Rav Huna.