Study Guide Sanhedrin 34

Today’s daf is dedicated in memory Staff  Sgt. Oron Shaul whose body was returned by the IDF to Israel yesterday and to Emily, Romi and Doron - who were released yesterday after 471 days in captivity. Their courage is a model to us all! We pray for the speedy return of the rest of the hostages.

The Mishna teaches that anyone present may argue in favor of acquitting the defendant, but arguments for conviction are restricted. The Gemara explores whether this rule applies only to the students observing the proceedings, or if it extends to the witnesses as well.

The Mishna further states that once a judge initially supports acquittal, they cannot later argue for conviction. Rav clarifies this rule, explaining that it only applies during the preliminary deliberations. However, when the court reaches its final decision-making phase, a judge may change their position, even to favor conviction. Though four tannaitic sources are presented to challenge Rav's interpretation, the Gemara successfully reconciles each one.

Regarding the timing of court proceedings, the Gemara discusses the source of the rule that monetary cases must commence during daylight hours but may continue after nightfall. Rabbi Meir presents a dissenting view on this matter, and the Gemara examines the textual basis for his position.

Study Guide Sanhedrin 33

Today's daf is sponsored by Leah Brick in memory of her great niece Nava Tova bat Yehoshua Yisrael Leib v'Liora Charna Cherney, on her third yahrzeit. "In her zechut may we see all of the hostages released now, and refuah shleima to all cholei Yisrael."

The Mishna states that monetary rulings can be overturned in either direction - whether to find someone liable or to exempt them. However, this contradicts a Mishna in Bechorot 28b which rules that when a court makes a mistake, their ruling stands and the judge must personally compensate for any monetary difference. Three approaches have been suggested to resolve this contradiction and the Gemara raises difficulties with each approach and resolves them.

In capital cases, a verdict can only be overturned to acquit the defendant, never to convict them. This principle derives from the Torah, though there is one notable exception: in cases where someone has seduced others to worship idols, the verdict can be changed from innocent to guilty. What verses in the Torah serve as the basis for this principle and the exception?

This rule about overturning verdicts applies beyond capital cases to two additional categories: cases involving exile to a city of refuge (for accidental killing), and cases involving corporal punishment (lashes). Both of these extensions are derived through a gezeira shava (textual comparison) from the laws of capital murder.

There exists one additional exception to this rule: if the court's mistake involved a clear and explicit Torah law, then the verdict can be overturned in either direction.

In both monetary and capital cases, the judges thoroughly question the witnesses. This is derived from a Torah verse that equates monetary law with capital law. The Mishna delineates many differences between monetary and capital cases, such as how many judges, what kind of majority is needed, how much of a push is made to find the person innocent. 

The Gemara questions the need for thoroughly questioning the witnesses in monetary law from a Tosefta Makkot 1:4 where it seems there was no thorough questioning as the document's date did prove to be the correct date. First, the Gemara asks why the question wasn't asked from a Mishna Shvi'it 10:5. Then Rabbi Chanina, Rava and Rav Papa each suggest a different answer. 

The first difference listed in the Mishna is that in capital cases, they start first by looking to exonerate the defendant. How do they do this? The rabbis suggest six different answers, the first two are rejected. 

Today's daf is sponsored by Cheryl & Avi Savitsky and family in loving memory of Cheryl's father, Dr. Steven F. Stein, Shimon Feivish Ben Yirsroel Yitzchak haKohen, on his 41st yahrzeit. "His simchat hachayim was palpable to anyone who met him and that is something we strive to emulate each and every day." 

Today's daf is sponsored by Suri Davis in loving memory of Suri's father, haRav Reuvain ben Chaim. "He loved learning Torah and particularly the daf. May his neshama have an aliyah."

Today's daf is sponsored by Rachel and Oren Seliger in loving memory of Allen Kronisch, Avner Yosef ben Zelta Priva v'Yehuda Aryeh on his 35th yahrzeit. "He made the decision to be a chozer b'tshuva and in turn his children and grandchildren are following in his footsteps. Both of his children learn the daf. He is missed."

The court in Nehardea established that for monetary cases, witness testimony is admissible even when witnesses disagree about details like the currency's color during their detailed questioning (bedikot). Initially, this ruling was attributed to Rabbi Yehoshua ben Karcha's view, which accepts testimony from two witnesses who observed an event separately. However, this explanation was later rejected. Instead, Nehardea's ruling was aligned with Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar's interpretation of Beit Hillel: when one witness testifies to a loan of one hundred zuz and another to two hundred zuz, the debtor must pay one hundred zuz, since both witnesses agree on at least this amount.

The rabbis and Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel disagree about deadlines for submitting new evidence in two distinct cases. The accepted law follows the rabbis' opinion in one instance and Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel's view in the other.

When a loan document is held by a third party, there is a question about whether that person can credibly testify that the loan was repaid. Rav Nachman made a ruling in such a case, but the Gemara presents two different versions: in one, he trusted the woman holding the document; in the other, he did not. Each version includes Rava raising an objection to Rav Nachman's decision.

Rav Dimi brings Rabbi Yochanan's ruling on the dispute between the rabbis and Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel. However, since his ruling was unclear, the Rav Shmuel brings a different version of Rabbi Yochanan to clarify his position.

Regarding whether one party can compel the other to have their case heard in a larger court in another city, the answer varies depending on which side makes the request.

Today's daf is sponsored by Suri Davis in loving memory of Yedid ben Shai Tzvi and Esther Shifra. 

When a legal document of admission is written in formal judicial language but bears only two signatures, should we be concerned? The issue is whether this indicates the document was approved by only two judges instead of the required three, potentially invalidating the document.

A braita discusses three scenarios involving orphans and hidden money. In these cases, the orphans learn about money their father had concealed - either from a third party during their father's life, from their father before his death, or through a dream after his death. The money in question was either owed to others or was maaser sheni (second tithe). The text examines whether the orphans may retain this money, analyzing how the different circumstances affect the ruling.

Regarding judicial disagreements, there is a three-way debate about how to record the verdict. Rabbi Yochanan, Reish Lakish, and Rabbi Elazar each propose different approaches: recording only the final verdict, naming which judges held which positions, or using the formula "from the statement of the judges... was deemed innocent." Their reasoning has practical implications, particularly in cases where judges err and must compensate for losses their mistakes caused.

The Mishna describes court proceedings and mentions bringing "them" back in after the judges reach their decision. There is a discussion about whether "them" refers to the witnesses or the litigants.

Two key questions arise regarding witness testimony: Must witnesses observe the event together, and must they testify together in court? A related issue is whether testimony is valid when two witnesses describe identical circumstances (such as a loan of the same amount between the same parties) but are actually describing separate events. These matters are debated, with arguments based on both logic and Torah verses. The resolution may differ depending on whether the case involves land or moveable property.

Finally, Rav Yehuda ruled that in monetary cases, we accept witness testimony even if there are discrepancies in the bedikot (detailed questioning). The rabbis debate which types of details this ruling encompasses.

Today's daf is sponsored by Suri Davis in honor of the first birthday of her granddaughter, Hallel Ruth bat Shai Zvi and Esther Shifra Goldman.

Today's daf is sponsored by Harriet Hartman in loving memory of her grandson, Ephraim ben Liat and Shmuel (Jackman) H’YD, on his first yahrzeit. "He fell in Gaza one year ago. He was a faithful daf yomi learner, even in his “namer” tank, and an inspiration to us all for his dedication to Torah, his beautiful “middot,” his maturity and humility, and the love he shared with his family."

Today's daf is sponsored by Michelle Feiglin in loving memory of her father, Natan ben Devorah v'Shlomo Elimelech on his 9th yahrzeit and in loving memory of their grandson, Neriya Yosef Hoshea ben Gidon v'Avital. "My father was liberated from Buchenwald and rebuilt his life in Melbourne, Australia. He inspired my love of learning Torah and every lunchtime in the middle of his working day could be found in front of his Gemara. He had great success in business, but he always said that his biggest success was his family." 

Rabbi Yehuda ruled in the Mishna that if two people were related by marriage and the marriage ended, but there were children from that marriage, they are still considered relatives. Do we follow Rabbi Yehuda's ruling?

Rabbi Yehuda also ruled that a close friend is disqualified from being a witness. However, the rabbis clarify that this only applies to a friend from the wedding party, and only during the week of the wedding or perhaps only on the wedding day itself.

Rabbi Yehuda's ruling that a close friend or enemy is disqualified from testifying is derived from Numbers 35:23.

The Mishna outlines court procedures: First, witnesses are warned to tell the truth, then they are questioned separately. In monetary cases, only designated witnesses can testify. After a majority decision is reached, it is forbidden for a judge to leave court and reveal that they disagreed with the ruling, wanting to acquit when others voted to convict, as this constitutes rechilut (gossip), a form of lashon hara (harmful speech).

What warning is given to witnesses to ensure truthful testimony? Rav Yehuda, Rava, and Rav Ashi each propose different warnings, with each successive suggestion addressing perceived flaws in the previous ones.

The Mishna supports Rav Yehuda's position that borrowers must formally designate witnesses. If undesignated witnesses hear a borrower's admission of debt, the borrower can claim it was said in jest. However, if the borrower denies making any admission and witnesses testify otherwise, Abaye rules that the admission is valid and the debt must be repaid. Rav Papa son of Rav Acha bar Ada quoting Rava disagrees, arguing that the borrower might have been joking and forgotten about it, since people typically don't remember trivial interactions.

Another way to invalidate an admission is to claim it was made only to appear less wealthy. Can this argument be applied to deathbed statements? Do we assume that someone on their deathbed would want their children to appear less wealthy, or does this concern only apply to protecting oneself?

Under what circumstances can witnesses document an admission? For loans, documenting creates a lien on the borrower's property. Therefore, documentation is permissible only when this was clearly the creditor's intention.

Presentation of Relatives

Today's daf is sponsored by Dianne Kuchar. "My love and gratitude to Rabanit Michelle for her teaching, Goldie and Debbie for their hospitality and friendship and all you dafferot/im during my wonderful time here at home in Israel, leaving today back ASAP."

Today's daf is sponsored by Vitti Rosenzweig-Kones in loving memory of her brother, Eliyahu David ben Sara and Shmuel.

From where do we derive that cousins cannot testify for each other, that relatives cannot testify together for other people, and that relatives from the mother's side are disqualified as well. The verse that serves as the main source for these laws is Devarim 24:16, whose topic is capital punishment. From where do we derive that these laws apply to monetary law as well?

Rav brings a list of relatives who cannot testify for him and he cannot testify for them. However, the Gemara raises a difficulty with his ruling in light of the Mishna as he forbids a second-generation relative with a third (his cousin's son) and the Mishna only listed first and second-generation relatives. Three answers are suggested - the first two are rejected. In conclusion, Rav does not hold like the Mishna but partially agrees with Rabbi Elazar's position.

Rav Nachman listed relatives through one's mother-in-law - her brother and the sons of her siblings. He then explains that these cases can be found in our Mishna as the son-in-law of his sister's husband is the same relationship viewed from the other direction. Rav Ashi does the same thing with the relatives through the father-in-law.

When Rav was asked if a man could testify for his stepson's wife, Rav answered that he could not. Two versions of his answer were quoted either a husband is like his wife or a wife is like her husband. Rav Huna brings a source for this from Vaykira 18:14.

If the son of his mother's husband is his brother, why is it necessary to list it separately in the Mishna? Two answers are brought, each based on a different understanding of the case - is it his mother's son or her husband's son from a different wife?

Rav Chisda rules that the parents of the wife can testify for the parents of the husband as they are not considered relatives.

Raba bar bar Hana permits a man to testify for a woman to whom he is betrothed. However, Ravina limits his ruling and the Gemara rejects it entirely.

The Mishna listed that a stepson is disqualified, but not his son and stepson. Two braitot show a debate between Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Yosi about whether that is true for the stepson or the brother-in-law, and perhaps both. The Gemara tries to understand the position of each of them and which opinion fits with our Mishna and which opinion disagrees with our Mishna.

Shmuel ruled like Rabbi Yosi. Rav Yosef thought that the ruling related to Rabbi Yosi in our Mishna was that only relatives that inherit each other are forbidden, but Abaye suggested that it could mean Rabbi Yosi above in his debate with Rabbi Yehuda.

Presentation of Relatives

Today's daf is sponsored by Ronit and Shlomi Eini in honor of their son Avichai Avraham's marriage to Shilat.

If someone is convicted as a false witness (ed zomem), when does their disqualification begin - from the time they testified falsely or only from the time of conviction? Abaye rules it begins from the time of the false testimony (retroactively), while Rava holds it begins only from the time of conviction. Two explanations are offered for Rava's position. The first suggests that we only believe the second group of witnesses who contradict the first because of a unique ruling derived from the Torah, and therefore the original witnesses are only considered liars upon conviction. The second explanation proposes that while Rava theoretically agrees with Abaye, he only disqualifies them from the time of conviction to prevent losses to those who relied on their testimony before knowing they had lied in court. What is the practical difference between these two explanations? This debate is one of only six cases (ya'al k'gam) where we rule like Abaye against Rava.

If someone eats non-kosher meat specifically to express contempt for God, rather than for financial reasons or personal desire, are they disqualified from being a witness? This case is also debated between Rava and Abaye, and is another instance where we rule like Abaye.

Does the debate between Rava and Abaye parallel a debate between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yosi regarding whether an ed zomem who lied in a monetary case is also disqualified from testifying in capital cases? Initially, the debates are compared, with Abaye's position aligned with Rabbi Meir and Rava's with Rabbi Yosi, but this comparison is ultimately rejected.

We follow Rabbi Meir's ruling that a witness who lied in a monetary case is disqualified from testifying in capital cases because there is an unattributed Mishna that holds his position. A story is brought where witnesses were disqualified as per Rabbi Meir's position and the ensuing discussion in the court was to find the Mishna which holds like Rabbi Meir to support the court's ruling.

Which relatives are disqualified from serving as witnesses? What is the Torah source for the prohibition against relatives testifying for each other?

Those who sell produce during the Sabbatical year are disqualified from testifying. Rabbi Shimon (in the Mishna) explains that initially, these people were called collectors of Sabbatical produce. However, when tax collectors (anasim) became more numerous, the term changed to "sellers of Sabbatical produce." The Gemara presents two interpretations of this unclear passage, with the first interpretation being rejected.

Reish Lakish was following two rabbis who were traveling to Asya to intercalate the year, as he wanted to observe their process. During their journey, they encountered people plowing and harvesting during the Sabbatical year. When Reish Lakish questioned why the rabbis weren't stopping these apparent violations, they offered possible explanations for how each person's actions might be permissible. Upon reaching their destination, the rabbis went to the second floor to deliberate about the intercalation. They climbed up using a ladder and immediately removed it to prevent Reish Lakish, whom they considered bothersome, from following them. Reish Lakish later complained to Rabbi Yochanan, declaring the rabbis to be a kesher reshaim (conspiracy of wicked people) who should not participate in the year's intercalation. The Gemara then traces the origin of the term kesher reshaim through stories about Shevna, who served as Hizkiyahu's steward.

Rabbi Abahu, citing Rabbi Elazar, states that the court must publicly announce when someone is found to be disqualified from serving as a witness. Until such an announcement is made, the witnesses retain their qualification to testify. There is a specific debate regarding whether this announcement requirement applies to shepherds.

Regarding wrongdoers such as those who accept charity from gentiles, engage in forbidden sexual relationships, or eat from fields during harvest season - there is a discussion of their eligibility to testify. Rav Nachman presents his views on these three cases, and the Gemara either restricts the scope of these rulings or presents opposing viewpoints.

Can Rami bar Hama's interpretation that gambling is prohibited due to asmachta (conditional commitment) align with the Mishna's position? What factors determine this alignment?

Rava expanded the disqualification of witnesses to include not only those who lend with interest, but also those who borrow with interest.

How should we understand mafrichei yonim (dove-handlers) in the Mishna? Two interpretations exist: either those who engage in bird racing (a form of gambling) or those who train doves to lure other birds.

When someone repents, what evidence must they show the community to regain their eligibility as a witness? Does the path to rehabilitation differ between a butcher who fraudulently sold non-kosher meat as kosher and other disqualified witnesses like gamblers or usurers?

Which other categories of people were initially qualified to serve as witnesses but later became disqualified? What led to these changes in status?