Why does the Mishna begin with the bull offering of Yom Kippur as its first example? Given that the primary halakha regarding slaughtering in the northern part of the Azara (Temple courtyard) is derived from the burnt offering, one might expect that to be the opening case. Why would the inner sin offerings appear before regular sin offerings?

The verse that establishes the requirement of slaughtering in the North appears in the context of the sheep burnt offering. From this, the rabbis extrapolate the same requirement for burnt offerings brought from cattle. This derivation hinges on the presence of a connecting vav ("and") in the verse about sheep, which links it to the preceding section discussing cattle. The vav serves as a bridge, allowing the laws of the later section to inform those of the earlier one.

However, the Gemara challenges this method of derivation, questioning how it can be valid for those who reject such connections and brings a braita to prove that there is a debate regarding this issue. The debate is about whether one brings a hanging guilt offering if one is in doubt that one committed mei'la, misuse of consecrated property. After initially suggesting that the disagreement was about whether one can derive laws of one section from another if they are connected by a vav, this explanation is rejected, and three alternative interpretations are proposed. Of these, only the final one is accepted.

The sin offering, like the burnt offering, must be slaughtered in the North of the Azara. This is derived from Vayikra 4:29, which states that the sin offering is slaughtered "in the place of the burnt offering." Additional verses establish that not only must the blood be received in the North, but the priest receiving it must also be standing in the North. These requirements are shown to be essential and not merely ideal.

In Vayikra 4:24, the verse says, "And he shall slaughter it in the North." The Gemara analyzes the word "it" to determine what it might exclude. Four possibilities are considered, and after rejecting three, the Gemara concludes that the correct interpretation is that the animal itself must be in the North, but the person performing the slaughter need not be.

Since the sin offering is invalid if not slaughtered and its blood received in the North—and this requirement is derived from the burnt offering—a logical argument is made that the same strict requirement applies to the burnt offering itself.

A sin offering that is slaughtered for the sake of a non-sacred animal, the sacrifice is valid. However, if the owner slaughtered it thinking that the animal was not sacred, it is disqualified. The second category is called mitasek, one who did not at all intend to do the act. The source for this disqualification is brought from two verses, as two are necessary to prove that the intention for the act of slaughtering a sacrifice is an essential component.

The Gemara explains that both tanna kama in the Mishna and Rabbi Yosi hold that the intention that is necessary, and can disqualify, is that of the kohen performing the sacrificial rites (or non-kohen who slaughtered). However, Rabbi Elazar b'Rabbi Yosi holds that the owner's intention can disqualify a sacrifice.

Abaye brings two others who seem to have a similar opinion to Rabbi Elazar regarding other areas of halakha. Each case involves an instance where one person is performing an action on someone else's item, and the owner's intent can determine the status of the item. One case deals with slaughtering for idol worship, and the other is whether or not an item is considered significant enough to be liable for carrying on Shabbat.

The fifth perek specifies details relating to all the sacrifices, including the location of the slaughtering and acceptance of the blood, where the blood is placed, etc. It begins with kodshei kodashim, a higher level of sanctity. The slaughtering of these sacrifices must take place on the northern side of the Azara.

Before the Mishna details each of the offerings, it begins with a general statement about all kodshei kodashim and says their slaughtering is performed in the North. Why didn't it also mention another issue that is true for all of them - that their blood is collected in a sacred vessel? The Gemara explains that at first, they thought the blood of the leper could be collected in the kohen's hand, but they then realized that his hand can be used only for the blood going on the leper's ear, finger, and toe. The blood that is placed on the altar must first be placed in a sacred vessel. Since they originally thought otherwise, and two kohanim accept blood, each in a different manner, this is omitted from the opening line of the Mishna.

What is the source in the Mishna for the halakha that one is not liable for the laws of notar and impurity when eating blood?

Rabbi Shimon and the rabbis disagree about whether one is liable for eating items that are not fit for consumption while in a state of impurity. Is their dispute limited to items that themselves became impure, or does it also apply to a person who is impure and eats sacrificial items that are pure?

Sacrificial offerings are slaughtered with six intentions: for a specific sacrifice, for a specific person, for God, for consumption by fire, to produce a pleasing aroma, and to be accepted by God. In addition, sin and guilt offerings must be slaughtered with intent for the specific sin they atone for.

Rabbi Yosi stated that even if the slaughterer did not explicitly have all these intentions in mind, the offering remains valid. This is due to a stipulation enacted by the court that the slaughterer should not articulate all these intentions, in order to prevent errors that could invalidate the sacrifice, as the intention is performed by the one slaughtering/offering the sacrifice, not the owner of the sacrifice.

The halakha was decided according to the opinion of Rabbi Elazar in the name of Rabbi Shimon regarding pigul in the inner sin offerings. Rava (and some say Rav Yosef) wondered: Why is halacha being decided on a matter that is no longer relevant in our times? To this, Abaye responded: "Expound and receive reward."

Is there a difference between offerings brought by non-Jews and those brought by Jews? Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yosi disagree on this matter. From which verses does Rabbi Shimon derive that certain laws do not apply to offerings brought by non-Jews?

A baraita is brought which states that the tzitz (forehead plate of the High Priest) does not atone for offerings brought by non-Jews. Does this baraita align with the opinion of Rabbi Yosi as well?

The prohibition against eating notar (leftover sacrificial meat) and tamei (impure items) applies even to offerings that do not have elements permitting consumption. What is the source for these halakhot?

Study Guide

Zeiri explains a very complicated braita referring to leniencies and stringencies regarding an impure person eating consecrated items and why each needed to be mentioned explicitly in the Torah.

A braita is brought to explain the source of the law that one receives karet for eating part of a sacrifice that became pigul only if there is an action that permits it to be eaten or burned on the altar. The braita brings drashot on the verse in Vayikra 7:18 explaining how it applies to sacrifices other than peace offerings. It also specifies what items can and cannot become pigul.

The braita says the oil of the leper can become pigul, but libations that are brought with a sacrifice cannot. This seems to contradict, as the oil follows Rabbi Meir's position and the libations follow that rabbi's position. Three possible solutions are suggested, but the first is rejected.

From where do we derive that the meat of the bird sin offering is permitted for the kohen to eat?

Rabbi Elazar cites a position of Rabbi Yosi that while there is pigul in the sin offerings whose blood is brought on the inner altar, it is only if both the action when the pigul thought occurs and the action that the thought is about occurs outside the sanctuary, in the Azara.

Study Guide

The Mishna enumerates items that cannot become pigul - meaning that even if the offering is rendered pigul due to improper intent during the sacrificial process, consuming these items does not incur the punishment of karet. This is because pigul applies only to items that are permitted through another action. For example, sacrificial meat becomes permitted only after the imurim (the parts of the sacrifice designated to be burned on the altar) are burned.

Items that cannot become pigul include the kometz (a handful of meal offering), incense, meal offerings that are entirely burned, and others. Some items are subject to tannaitic debate, such as the libations that accompany sacrifices and the oil used in the ceremony for leper purification. The libations may be considered an integral part of the sacrifice, and therefore become pigul, just like the sacrifice itself, and the oil may be permitted only after the placement of the blood from the guilt offering, which would also then enable it to become pigul.

Conversely, the Mishna lists items that can become pigul, as they are permitted through a specific action. In some sacrifices, like a burnt offering, the sprinkling of blood permits the meat to be burned on the altar; in others, like a sin offering, it permits the meat to be eaten by the kohanim. Rabbi Shimon maintains that pigul applies only to sacrifices offered on the outer altar.

Ulla presents an ambiguous statement: he claims that if a kometz becomes pigul but is nevertheless burned on the altar, its pigul status is nullified. He supports this by arguing that if the kometz were not considered properly offered (due to its pigul status), it could not serve as a valid matir (an enabling act) for the remainder of the meal offering to become pigul.

The Gemara explores Ulla's intent. Initially, it suggests that one who eats a kometz rendered pigul is not punished by karet, but this is rejected as it is explicitly stated in the Mishna. The second suggestion is that, although ideally it should not be placed on the altar, if it is placed there, it should not be removed. This too is taught in a Mishna. The third suggestion is that if it were placed on the altar and fell off, it may be returned. However, this is also addressed in a Mishna, which rules that it should not be replaced. The Gemara ultimately concludes that Ulla refers to a case where the kometz fell off after the fire had begun to consume it. Although Ulla discusses this elsewhere, the teaching here emphasizes that this principle applies not only to a limb of an animal that is partially burned, where even the unburned portion is considered connected, but also to a kometz, where even if only part was burned, the entire portion is treated as a single unit and may be returned to the altar.

Rabbi Yochanan is quoted as saying that pigul, notar, and impure items that were offered on the altar lose their forbidden status. Rav Chisda challenges the inclusion of impure items, arguing that the altar does not function like a mikveh to purify them. Rabbi Zeira responds by qualifying Rabbi Yochanan's statement: it applies only when the item was already being consumed by the fire. Rabbi Yitzchak bar Bisna raises a difficulty from a braita that categorizes sacrificial meat as something whose impurity cannot be removed. This challenge is resolved in three distinct ways: by Rava, whose answer is rejected, and by Rav Papa and Ravina.

The braita above is then cited in full. It includes four different drashot that aim to prove that the verse in Vayikra 7:20 refers to a person who was impure and ate sacrificial meat, rather than a pure person who ate meat that had become impure. One of the opinions presented is difficult to understand in terms of its derivation. Rav Yitzchak bar Avdimi is praised for offering a clear and insightful explanation, which is then brought and elaborated upon.

Study Guide

This week's learning is sponsored by Aunt Elayne, Fredjs, Hageges, Somers, Greenstones, and Pilichowskis in honor of Lana Kerzner's birthday. "We admire so much how you continue the Greenstone family legacy of intellectual curiosity coupled with daily dedication to learning and Judaism."

Reish Lakish interprets Rabbi Meir's position in a Mishna in Menachot as holding that an offering becomes pigul not due to improper intent during part of the matir (the enabling act), but rather when improper intent occurs during the first stage, and the second stage is performed without any intent, the second stage is still governed by the initial improper thought.

Rabbi Shmuel bar Yitzchak disagrees, asserting that Rabbi Meir maintains one can render an offering pigul even through improper intent during part of an action.

Two difficulties are raised against Reish Lakish's explanation based on two halakhot in the Tosefta. Regarding the first, three attempts are made to resolve the contradiction, but each faces its own challenge. One difficulty is also raised against Rabbi Shmuel bar Yitzchak's position, but it is successfully resolved.

Study Guide

Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi (Rebbi) interprets the first mention of "bull" in Vayikra 4:20 as referring to the bull offering of Yom Kippur, even though the verse's context concerns the communal sin offering. According to Rebbi, this verse teaches that the Yom Kippur bull is comparable to the bull brought by the kohen gadol who sins, referenced by the second mention of "bull" in the same verse.

Rabbi Yishmael disagrees with Rebbi, arguing that the laws of the Yom Kippur bull can be derived through kal va'chomer (a fortiori) reasoning. However, the kal va'chomer argument he proposes is not fully spelled out in the text, and the Gemara clarifies which cases are being referenced and what laws are derived.

Since Rabbi Yishmael does not interpret the word "bull" as referring to the Yom Kippur offering, but rather to the communal sin offering, the question arises: why use the term "bull" instead of simply saying "it"? Rav Pappa explains that the unnecessary word comes to teach a law not explicitly stated in the verses about the communal offering, but found in the kohen gadol's sin offering - that the lobe of the liver and the kidneys are burned on the altar. Although this law could have been derived by juxtaposition, the inclusion of the word "bull" makes it as though it were written explicitly, which then allows it to be used to derive the same law by juxtaposition to the communal sin offering for idol worship.

A braita is brought to support Rav Pappa's explanation and shows how the juxtaposition between the communal sin offering and the communal offering for idol worship (from Bamidbar 15:25) is established. However, another braita derives the juxtaposition from the verse in Vayikra 4:20. Both derivations are considered necessary, as each teaches a different law.

Rebbi's position is cited earlier to support Rav Pappa's explanation that the word "bull" serves to compare the Yom Kippur bull to the kohen gadol's sin offering for specific laws derived from the words "et," "b'dam," and "taval." However, Rebbi himself states that the comparison teaches that all the laws are the same, not just those three. This discrepancy is explained as stemming from two different tannaitic positions.

Two braitot from the school of Rabbi Yishmael are brought, each explaining why certain words or laws appear only in the kohen gadol's sin offering and not in the communal one. Both are interpreted through parables that reflect God's relationship with His people.

Finally, a Mishna in Menachot presents a debate between Rabbi Meir and the rabbis regarding whether a pigul (disqualifying intent) during the taking of the handful of the meal offering, but not during the taking of the frankincense (or vice versa), renders the offering pigul. Reish Lakish explains Rabbi Meir's position: the offering becomes pigul not because intent during part of the matir (the enabling act) can render an offering pigul, but because later actions follow the original intent. That is, if improper intent occurred during the first stage, and the second stage was performed without intent, the second stage is still governed by the initial thought. Reish Lakish supports this interpretation by asserting that our Mishna must align with Rabbi Meir's view. However, Rabbi Shmuel bar Yitzchak disagrees and interprets the Mishna according to the rabbis' position.

Study Guide

The Gemara cites a braita to locate the source for the halakha that all placements of the sin-offering blood performed in the inner sanctuary are essential. The braita's author treats the seven sprinklings as essential because they are treated as essential elsewhere - this statement is explained as referring to seven sprinklings in the rituals of the red heifer and the purification of a leper.

The ruling that the four placements are essential is derived from the phrase "and as such he should do." Why not derive them from the phrase "and he should do like he did," which is used to teach the seven sprinklings - why can't both be derived from the same verse? Rabbi Yirmiya and Abaye offer different answers.

The braita explains that the word "bull" mentioned first in Vayikra 4:20 refers to the bull of Yom Kippur. Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak teaches from this that the blood placements are essential. Rav Papa, however, maintains that the essential nature can be derived from the verses of Yom Kippur and therefore understands the verse as teaching three specific laws about dipping the finger in the blood, laws drawn from the sin offering of the kohen gadol. A braita is brought in support of Rav Papa's position.

Rabbi Yishmael held that the laws for the bull of Yom Kippur could be derived by kal va'chomer reasoning and therefore understood the "bull" in the verse to be referring to the communal sin offering.

Rav Papa cites a proof based on an inference from a Mishna in Zevachim 93a: if blood splashes onto one's clothing from the blood designated for placement on the altar, specifically from the three sprinklings following the initial one, then the garments must be laundered in the Azara (Temple courtyard), a process known as kibus. This inference is challenged, as the Gemara suggests that the Mishna reflects the opinion of Rabbi Nechemia, who is more stringent in his treatment of the remainder of the blood (shirayim) that is to be poured into the base of the altar, and the Mishna does not adhere to the mainstream view. Ultimately, this suggestion is dismissed, since there is no definitive evidence that Rabbi Nechemia requires kibus for the remainder of the blood before it is poured on the base of the altar.

Nonetheless, the inference remains problematic for Rav Papa, as it implies that blood requires laundering even before it is sprinkled on the altar, an implication that aligns with no known position. Ravina offers a resolution: while the term "from the keren" (corner of the altar) excludes the law of kibus before placement on the keren, the Mishna's use of "from the base" includes blood that is awaiting placement on the base.

A braita is introduced to explain the source of the halakha in the Mishna, that all placements of blood of sin offerings performed in the inner sanctuary are essential. This ruling is derived from a verse in Vayikra (Leviticus) 4:20, in the context of the communal sin offering. The verse is fully expounded to draw parallels between the bull sin offering of the kohen gadol, the bull offering of the kohen gadol on Yom Kippur, and the communal sin offering for idol worship. The exposition also distinguishes between essential and non-essential components of the offerings whose blood is applied to the inner altar.