Today’s daf is sponsored by Marcia Baum in memory of Sam Baum חיים שמחה בן אהרון הלוי וליבה on his 22nd yartzeit. "My father was a larger-than-life individual whose impact is still felt to this day. He would be immensely proud of his daughters and their progeny! "

What are the laws of bishul akum (food cooked by a non-Jew)? Under what conditions is it permitted and when is it forbidden? If a Jew is involved in part of the cooking process, it is permitted - what type of involvement is necessary?

Today's daf is sponsored by Doreen Samuels for the shloshim of her dear mother, Elaine Charlton, Ella bat Rachmiel v'Riva Leah, z"l, on 23rd July - 27th Tammuz 5785. She was so proud of my Jewish learning."

Rav and Shmuel disagree about the reason and origin of the prohibition on consuming oil from non-Jews. Rav maintains that Daniel instituted the ban to prevent intermarriage, while Shmuel attributes it to concerns of kashrut, arguing that the oil was placed in vessels previously used for non-kosher foods, causing flavor absorption.

Three objections are raised against Rav’s view, prompting revisions based on other teachings. Rav holds that Daniel prohibited the oil within city limits, while Hillel and Shamai's students extended the prohibition to the fields as part of the eighteen decrees enacted on a day when Shamai’s students outnumbered Hillel’s and successfully passed rulings by majority. That same day, wine and bread from non-Jews were also banned due to concerns related to their daughters—potentially leading to idol worship and “something else.”

Two interpretations are offered regarding "their daughters." Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak claims that the rabbis designated all non-Jewish females as possessing nidda impurity from birth, while Genieva, quoting Rav, suggests the concern was intermarriage. The Gemara challenges Rav’s reasoning—intermarriage is already prohibited by Torah law. After a chain of responses and further inquiries, the conclusion is that Rav saw the decree as either a prohibition on marrying non-Jews outside the seven nations (if Torah law applies only to those) or a ban on seclusion with a non-Jewish woman.

To what was the "something else" referring?

The interaction in the Mishna between Rabbi Yehoshua and Rabbi Yishmael regarding this issue is analyzed and is also brought as proof for the previous sugya about the difference between betrothing a woman with the dung of an ox who killed a person and the dung of an animal that was used for worshipping idols. What are the reasons that the rabbis decreed that cheese from idol worshippers is forbidden to eat, but permitted for benefit? Six possible explanations for the decree against cheese are brought by various amoraim.

The Mishna lists other decrees the rabbis instituted regarding items of idol worshippers, such as milk, bread, cooked items, oil, etc. The oil in the end was permitted by Rebbi and his court.

Why is their milk forbidden?

Rabbi Yochanan said that their bread was not permitted by the court. Why did he need to make this declaration?

Do glazed earthenware vessels absorb, and if so, to what extent? Can they be kashered? Meriemar appears to issue contradictory rulings regarding this topic, particularly vessels that contained wine of idol worshippers versus the kashering of vessels for Pesach. How is this contradiction resolved?

Rabbi Akiva was asked three questions, one of which pertained to clay jugs previously owned by non-Jews. Unable to provide answers on the spot, he went to the beit midrash, where he ultimately discovered the correct rulings. The jugs can be used after twelve months of not having been used for wine. 

Grape seeds, grape peels, and fish stew (morayis) mentioned in the Mishna are discussed in detail, along with the halachic issues they raise. Different sages mention items that can be used after twelve months without undergoing any kashering process. 

Why are cheeses from Onaiki forbidden? Reish Lakish proposes an explanation, but his answer is challenged based on a seemingly contradictory statement he made in a different context. The resolution of this difficulty involves a clarification of his original statement. 

Feces from an ox that gored and was sentenced to be stoned are not forbidden, even though the ox itself is. However, feces from an animal that was used for idol worship are forbidden. The distinction between these two cases is clarified through logical reasoning and supported by verses from the Torah. Rava adds that our Mishna can also serve as a textual basis for these rulings.