Engaging the Eagle - Exploring U.S. Foreign Policy in Southeast Asia

U.S.-ASEAN ties have been in the spotlight since news emerged that U.S. President Joe Biden would not be attending the 43rd ASEAN Summit in Jakarta. While the U.S. has repeatedly affirmed in strategic documents and public statements alike that it supports ASEAN centrality, the absence of its Chief Executive at the grouping’s main Summit casts a pall over its approach to the region. In fact, given how Washington seems to be advancing its ties with individual ASEAN states such as Vietnam and the Philippines instead of the overall grouping, there are questions about Washington’s commitment and approach to ASEAN, especially as it enters an election year in 2024. 

Join us as we discuss the state of U.S.-ASEAN ties in this episode. Beyond discussing developments during the ASEAN Summit, we will also cover the mutual frustrations of the two parties, ASEAN’s response to great power competition, and the prospects for U.S.-ASEAN ties as we go into 2024. 

Singapore, the tiny island-state in Southeast Asia, has a close relationship with the United States. Singapore is Washington’s largest trade partner in Southeast Asia, while Washington is the republic’s largest foreign investor. The two also share close security ties, with US forces allowed to access Singapore’s air and naval bases on a rotational basis since 1990. The two are frequent participants in joint exercises and are also exploring cooperation in emerging and novel areas such as cybersecurity and blockchain payments.  

The strength of the US-Singapore relationship is beyond doubt – however, a more interesting question concerns the limits and future of this relationship. While Singapore has benefitted greatly from the US-led international order, it is also a close partner with China, and its leaders have increasingly warned of the dire implications of disruptive trends such as decoupling between the US and China. As tensions rise, it is unclear how Singapore will adjust its approach to its ties with Washington and Beijing.  

After the U.S. pulled out of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF) was styled as the new anchor of U.S. trade policy in the region, with the lofty ambition of establishing the “rules of the road” for regional trade. For the most part, however, it has yet to match this ambition with substance. Beyond a supply chain agreement and an agreement to launch a framework for cooperating on hydrogen technologies, IPEF has yet to provide concrete deliverables for its members. 

Some observers have noted that IPEF is not a traditional trade deal and should not be judged like one. However, the fact remains that without a new economic anchor, Washington risks ceding its leadership on trade issues and over-securitising its relationship with regional governments. Even as Washington expresses hope that a broader deal will be announced at the APEC summit in November, the stakes remain high.  

The Shangri-La Dialogue (SLD) is a track 1 intergovernmental security conference held in Singapore that gathers participants from across the region to discuss issues such as U.S. leadership in the Indo-Pacific. Though U.S. Defence Secretary Lloyd Austin did not meet Chinese Defence Minister Gen. Li Shangfu for substantive discussions, concerns about the relationship between Washington and Beijing underpinned every session. Whether during the respective addresses by Secretary Austin and Gen. Li, or during sessions on resolving regional tensions and assessing Asia’s evolving maritime security order, participants explored how this rivalry would shape the future of the region. Join us for this short episode as we explore what happened at this year’s SLD.

When the Republican Party took control of the U.S. House of Representatives following the 2022 midterm elections, many observers expected the Republican Party and the White House to engage in a showdown over the debt ceiling. Beyond economic fallout and damage to U.S. prestige in Asia, a default could also have had serious consequences for Washington’s ability to commit to its foreign policy-related expenditures. Now that the dust from the crisis is settling, it’s a good time to break down the bipartisan budget agreement struck between President Joe Biden and House Speaker Kevin McCarthy to understand what it included, how it compares to previous deals struck by President Barack Obama, and how it could affect U.S. foreign policy in Asia.  

As geopolitical tensions between Washington and Beijing increase, Washington’s credibility as a security presence and partner in Asia is under scrutiny. A hawkish stance that promotes military deployments would raise questions about Washington’s willingness to commit to a potential war in Asia. Converse, a dovish approach that cedes parts of Asia to China’s sphere of influence would severely damage Washington’s credibility with its allies. Finding a middle ground between these two credibility issues will be an important objective for U.S. strategy in the region. 

Security and foreign policy observers in Southeast Asia have been abuzz about announcements surrounding the Australia-United Kingdom-United States (AUKUS) trilateral defence agreement, but reactions in Southeast Asia have been mixed. Some observers have fretted over the agreement auguring an Asian version of the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance (NATO), while others have expressed concerns about the agreement triggering a nuclear arms race in the region. Above all, there are unanswered questions about what this agreement means for regional stability, and how it dovetails with the U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy. 

Join us for this short episode as we explore the details of this grouping, its role amid the broader U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy and how Southeast Asian countries are responding to the news. 

Described as a “critical swing state” by Kurt Campbell, Coordinator for Indo-Pacific Affairs on the National Security Council, Vietnam has been increasingly viewed as a key partner for the U.S. due to its strategic location and their common interest in opposing Chinese maritime aggression. Yet, the relationship between Washington and Hanoi has ostensibly cooled over the past year, with no major visits by U.S. leaders to Vietnam in 2022. U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken cancelled his visit to Hanoi in July, while the anticipated visit by the aircraft carrier USS Ronald Reagan and a requested visit from President Joe Biden failed to materialize.

There have been numerous suggested reasons for this relative freeze in ties with the U.S., ranging from frictions over the Russian invasion of Ukraine to the ouster of former-President Nguyen Xuan Phuc and Hanoi’s desire to reaffirm economic

The past few months have seen a flurry of activity in U.S.-Philippines ties. Under US President Joe Biden and Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr, Washington and Manila are resuming and expanding security cooperation under the 2014 Enhanced Defence Cooperation Agreement, or EDCA, which permits the U.S. to deploy conventional forces in the Philippines on a rotational basis. Cooperation is also growing in areas such as energy security, with U.S. Vice President Kamala Harris unveiling a host of new initiatives such as a geothermal plant and a new energy dialogue during a state visit in November 2022. President Marcos even remarked that he does not see a future for the Philippines that does not include the U.S.

Still, there are limits and speedbumps to Manila’s engagement with Washington. Tensions in cross-strait relations are a sensitive issue, with President Marcos noting that it is hard to imagine a scenario where the Philippines would not get involved in a cross-strait conflict given their geographic location. There are also questions about how Marcos’ strategy will develop or whether foreign policy will be used to further his personal interests.

To discuss these important topics, USP invited Professor Mely Caballero-Anthony and Professor Renato De Castro to share their views. Tune in to hear their evaluation of the relationship and its prospects for development in 2023.

After languishing during the Trump Administration, U.S.-Indonesia ties appear to be on an upswing. In August 2021, Indonesian Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi remarked during a meeting with U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken that a “new era” of bilateral ties would be central to the establishment of a secure and prosperous Indo-Pacific region. Bilateral military cooperation and investments by U.S. tech giants have increased significantly, and the U.S. recently joined the Indonesia Just Energy Transition Partnership to mobilise US$20 billion of public and private finance to help Indonesia meet its emissions targets.

However, there are limits to what Washington should expect from Jakarta and vice versa. Indonesian leaders have stressed their neutral stance of maintaining close ties with all nations, including the U.S. and China, and are ramping up their economic cooperation with Beijing. Moreover, U.S. engagement tends to be less visible in comparison to the slew of China-backed infrastructure and industrial projects in Indonesia. Navigating these concerns and challenges will be important for the relationship. 

To discuss these important topics, USP invited Professor Dewi Fortuna Anwar and Dr Adhi Priarmarizki to share their views. Tune in to hear their evaluation of the relationship and its prospects for development in 2023.