International report

The legal noose is tightening around Turkey’s main opposition party, with waves of arrests targeting mayors and local officials. But the troubles of the Republican People’s Party (CHP) could deepen further, as a court case threatens the removal of its leadership.

"We are fighting for the future of Turkey's democracy," said party leader Ozgur Ozel to tens of thousands of supporters at a rally in Ankara on Saturday.

Ozel has been travelling the country since March, when Istanbul mayor Ekrem Imamoglu was arrested on graft charges. The case marked the start of a legal assault on the CHP. Ozel now speaks at rallies twice a week, despite his often hoarse voice.

The party is also defending itself in court over alleged voting irregularities at a congress two years ago that elected Ozel as leader. If the court rules against them, Ozel and the rest of the party leadership could be removed and replaced by state-appointed trustees.

"It's unprecedented," said political analyst Sezin Oney of the Politics news portal. "There has not been such a purge, such a massive crackdown on the opposition, and there is no end in sight, that's the issue."

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Arrests and polls

On Wednesday, another CHP mayor in Istanbul was jailed, bringing the total to 16 detained mayors and more than 300 other officials. Most face corruption charges.

The arrests come as the CHP’s new leadership is stepping up its challenge to President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Recent opinion polls give Imamoglu and other CHP figures double-digit leads over the president.

Oney said the prosecutions are part of Erdogan’s wider strategy.

"He's trying to complete the transformation, the metamorphosis as I call it, of Turkey to become a full authoritarian country," she said.

"There is an opposition but the opposition is a grotesque opposition, that can never have the power actually to be in government. But they give the perception as if the country is democratic because there are elections."

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‘Multi-front attack’

Ilhan Uzgel, the CHP’s foreign affairs coordinator, said the party is under siege.

"We are under a multi-front attack from all directions at almost every level, running from one court case to another," he said.

He argued that Erdogan’s ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) is using fear to force defections. "Sixteen of our mayors are in jail right now, and they threaten our mayors. You either join our party or you face a jail term," Uzgel said.

Erdogan rejects any suggestion of coercion and insists the judiciary is independent. Since he came to power more than 20 years ago, however, not a single AKP mayor has been convicted on graft charges – though on Friday at least two local mayors from the ruling party were detained as part of a corruption investigation.

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Political risks

Despite appearing dominant, Erdogan may face a backlash. Atilla Yesilada, a political analyst with Global Source Partners, said the crackdown is fuelling public anger.

"You look at recent polls, the first complaint remains economic conditions, but justice rose to number two. These things don't escape people's notice; that's what I mean when I say Erdogan took a huge political risk with his career," he said.

Erdogan currently trails behind several potential challengers, but elections are still more than two years away.

Yesilada said much depends on the stance of Erdogan’s ally Devlet Bahceli, leader of the Nationalist Movement Party.

"It's quite possible at some point, Bahceli will say enough is enough, you are destroying the country, and may also end the coalition," he said.

Bahceli formed an informal alliance with Erdogan in 2018, when Turkey switched to a presidential system. Erdogan relies on Bahceli’s parliamentary deputies to pass constitutional reforms needed to secure another term.

Bahceli has voiced concern about the pressure on the CHP, which has been trying to win his support. But with the court expected to rule next month on the party’s leadership, the CHP says it will keep fighting.

"The only thing that we can do is rely on our people, our electorate, and the democratic forces in the country. We are not going to give up," said Uzgel.

Following years of tension, the presidents of Turkey and France are finding new areas of cooperation. Ukraine is at the centre of this shift, but the Palestinian territories, the Caucasus and Africa are also emerging as shared priorities. However, analysts warn that serious differences remain, making for an uneasy partnership.

French President Emmanuel Macron is pushing for the creation of a military force to secure any peace deal made between Russia and Ukraine.

Turkey, which boasts NATO’s second-largest army, is seen as a key player in any such move – especially given that Washington has ruled out sending US troops.

For its part, Ankara has said it is open to joining a peacekeeping mission.

“Macron finally came to terms [with the fact] that Turkey is an important player, with or without the peace deal. Turkey will have an important role to play in the Black Sea and in the Caucasus,” said Serhat Guvenc, professor of international relations at Istanbul’s Kadir Has University.

Macron last month held a lengthy phone call with his Turkish counterpart, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, focused on the Ukraine conflict, and thanked him for his diplomatic efforts to end the war.

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Turning point

For Professor Federico Donelli of Trieste University, this marks a dramatic turnaround. Previously, the two leaders have frequently exchanged sharp words, especially over Turkey’s rising influence in West Africa and the Sahel.

“In Paris, public opinion and the press criticised this move by Turkey a lot,” said Donelli. “At the same time, the rhetoric of some Turkish officers, including President Erdogan, was strongly anti-French. They were talking a lot about the neocolonialism of France and so on.”

Donelli added that cooperation over Ukraine has pushed France to reconsider its Africa stance.

“As a consequence of Ukraine, the position of France has changed, and they are now more open to cooperating with Turkey. And they [understand] that in some areas, like the Western Sahel, Turkey is better than Russia, better than China,” he said.

Analysts also see new openings in the Caucasus. A peace agreement signed in August between Azerbaijan, which was backed by Turkey, and Armenia, which was supported by France, could provide further common ground.

Macron last month reportedly pressed Erdogan to reopen Turkey’s border with Armenia, which has been closed since 1993. Turkish and Armenian officials met on the countries' border on Thursday to discuss the normalisation of relations.

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'Pragmatic cooperation'

But clear differences remain, especially when it comes to Syria. The rise to power of Turkish-backed President Ahmed al-Sharaa is seen as undermining any French role there.

“For Erdogan, the victory of al-Sharaa in Damascus on 24 December is the revenge of the Ottoman Empire, and Ankara doesn't want to see the French come back to Syria,” said Fabrice Balanche, a professor of international relations at Lyon University.

Balanche argued that France is losing ground to Turkey across the region.

“It's not just in Syria, but also in Lebanon – the Turks are very involved, and in Iraq, too. We [the French] are in competition with the Turks. They want to expel France from the Near East,” he said.

Despite this rivalry, Guvenc predicted cooperation will continue where interests align.

“In functional terms, Turkey's contributions are discussed, and they will do business, but it's going to be transactional and pragmatic cooperation, nothing beyond that,” he said.

One such area could be the Palestinian territories. Both Macron and Erdogan support recognition of a Palestinian state and are expected to raise the issue at this month’s United Nations General Assembly.

For now, shared interests are likely to outweigh differences – even if only temporarily.

The bombing of the Druzhba pipeline has disrupted oil supplies to Hungary and Slovakia and exposed new political rifts in Central Europe. RFI spoke with Andreas Goldthau of the Willy Brandt School of Public Policy about the wider implications for regional energy security and the shifting dynamics between Russia, Ukraine and the European Union.

The bombing was attributed by Russian and Hungarian officials to Ukrainian drone forces, with Ukraine justifying the strike as part of its broader campaign against Russia following the latter's invasion in 2022.

The strike resulted in oil flows to Hungary and Slovakia being cut off, and also exposed political divides at the heart of Central Europe’s energy security, sparking a diplomatic fallout between Kyiv, Budapest and Bratislava.

"The bombing drives home the point that Russian energy supplies remain a point of contest, particularly in Central and Eastern Europe, which remains dependent on [oil] coming from the east,” said Andreas Goldthau, director of the Willy Brandt School of Public Policy at the University of Erfurt in Germany.

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'Not a matter of supply'

Despite EU-wide efforts to reduce reliance on Russian energy – which Goldthau acknowledges is "no longer a big issue for Europe as a whole" – Hungary and Slovakia stand as outliers, locked into long-term contracts and dependent on the Druzhba line.

When the pipeline was struck multiple times in August and September, forcing a halt to crude deliveries, both governments were forced to draw on strategic reserves.

But how Hungary and Slovakia are coping, is “more a political choice than anything else," Goldthau told RFI.

"It is not a matter of supply, but a matter of price and transport logistics, because it could eat into the margins of refineries if you have to source it from other parts and other geographies."

Central Europe, he added, “could source through ports in Croatia, and they could have done this already by now, but they chose not to”.

'A political decision'

Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s government responded to the strike angrily, calling it “an attack on Hungary’s sovereignty”.

The country's foreign minister, Péter Szijjártó, said: “Ukraine knows very well that the Druzhba pipeline is vital for Hungary’s and Slovakia’s energy supply, and that such strikes harm us far more than Russia.”

Both Budapest and Bratislava have demanded EU intervention and accused Kyiv of jeopardising their security, just as reserves were being tapped to keep refineries running.

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Meanwhile, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky suggested the attacks might hinge on Hungary lifting its EU accession veto, warning: "The existence of the friendship depends on what Hungary’s position is."

Ukrainian officials also say that Hungary and Slovakia have failed to diversify away from Russian oil, despite ample opportunity and EU support.

According to Goldthau, Russian leverage over the EU "is gone, by and large". He explained: "The EU’s main suppliers are now the United States and Norway. Kazakhstan comes into play, but Russia no longer plays a role."

Ukraine, he noted, “no longer gets any Russian oil or any Russian gas, it merely functions as a transit country”.

The attack and subsequent diplomatic spat might have provided Hungary and Slovakia “a perfect occasion to pivot and seek alternative supplies, but it’s a purely political decision to do that or not,” Goldthau said. "Whatever changes that [decision] lies at home, and not abroad."

Turkey's President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has warned of military action against the Syrian Democratic Forces over its failure to honour an agreement to merge its military with the new regime in Damascus.

In a move steeped in symbolism, Turkey’s leader chose recent celebrations marking the Ottoman Turks' defeat of the Byzantine Christians at the Battle of Malazgirt in 1071 to issue an ultimatum to the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF).

"Those who turn to Ankara and Damascus will win," Erdogan bellowed to thousands of supporters on 26 August. "If the sword is unsheathed, there will be no room left for pens and words."

Turkey, a strong ally of Syria, has a military presence in the country and the two governments recently signed a defence training agreement.

But Turkey is unhappy with the presence of the SDF, a coalition of Kurdish and Arab forces, which controls a large swathe of Syria bordering Turkey's own predominantly Kurdish region.

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Buying time

The SDF is affiliated with the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), which has for years been fighting Turkey for greater Kurdish minority rights.

The PKK is listed as a terrorist organisation by Turkey, the European Union and the United States. But Ankara is engaged in a peace process with the Kurdish militants, who have committed to disbanding.

However, Kurdish analyst Mesut Yegen, of the TIM think tank in Istanbul, says the disarmament process would be limited to Kurds from Turkey, and doesn’t include SDF forces in Syria.

Erdogan is now ramping up pressure on the SDF to honour an agreement its leader Mazloum Abdi signed in March with Syria's new President, Ahmed Al Sharaa, to merge his military forces with the new regime in Damascus.

The deal is backed by the US, which has a military force in the SDF-controlled region as part of its war against the Islamic State.

But, according to Fabrice Balanche from Lyon University: "The SDF has no intention of implementing the agreement made in March. Mazloum just wanted to gain time."

Balanche points out that Abdi's SDF is a staunchly secular organisation and remains deeply suspicious of Sharaa's jihadist connections.

Recent attacks on Syria's Druze minority by forces linked to Sharaa appear to confirm the SDF's fears over merging with the Damascus regime, says Balanche.

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'Israel would like a weak Syria'

At the same time, Erdogan is aware that the emergence of an autonomous Kurdish state on its border could be exploited by its rival Israel, which is looking for non-Arab allies in the region.

Aydin Selcen, a former senior Turkish diplomat and an analyst for Turkey's Mediyascope news outlet, said: "Strategically, Israel would like a weak Syria, a weak Damascus, a weak Beirut and a weak Tehran."

Turkey has carried out military incursions against the SDF, and its forces remain massed on the border.

But Balanche says American presence there will likely deter any new Turkish military action. However, he warns that Ankara could seek to fuel Kurdish Arab rivalries within the SDF, with the fall of former ruler Bashar al-Assad last December.

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"It is different now, you have a Sunni leader in Damascus, and many [Arab] tribes, many people, prefer to join Damascus," he explained.

"So the risk is a proxy war. Of course, for the new regime, it would be a disaster. If you have no peace, you have no investment, you have no trust."

The dilemma facing Ankara is that any new conflict against the SDF would likely weaken the Sharaa regime – a key ally.

Turkish armed forces could play a major role in securing any peace deal between Ukraine and Russia. For Ankara, this would be a chance to reassert itself at a time when many fear it is being sidelined by Western allies.

European and US military chiefs last week reportedly presented ideas to their national security advisers on how to guarantee Ukraine’s security if there is a peace deal with Russia.

The discussions followed a summit of European leaders in Washington with US President Donald Trump on ending the conflict.

"It's going to be a big challenge, but they will find ways of tackling that challenge without the US troops on the ground," said Serhat Guvenc, professor of international relations at Istanbul’s Kadir Has University.

"It will be a novelty because Europe has never carried out any peacekeeping or stabilization operation of this magnitude before."

Turkey, with NATO’s second-largest army, is seen as a possible option.

"Turkey is an option, you know. And it seems that there is some talk of Turkish contribution," Guvenc added.

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Ankara signals readiness

On the same day, French President Emmanuel Macron held a phone call with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan to discuss Ukraine’s security.

Ankara has already signalled it could take part in monitoring any peace deal, but Moscow’s approval would be necessary.

"If the parties agree, Turkey may send our troops to peacekeeping operations," said Mesut Casin, a former presidential adviser and professor at Istanbul’s Yeditepe University.

Casin pointed to Turkey’s past record in UN operations.

"Turkey joined many UN peacekeeping operations in the former Yugoslavia, Somalia, and Korea, and in many other peacekeeping operations. The Turkish army is very powerful," he said.

"Also, remember Putin is talking many times with Erdogan, and at the same time, Zelensky is visiting Ankara."

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Balancing Moscow and Kyiv

Since the start of the war, Erdogan has kept good relations with both Russia and Ukraine.

Ankara has refused to apply most international sanctions on Moscow, while at the same time selling vital military hardware to Kyiv. That balancing act has raised questions among European partners.

"Turkey ought to have been at the Washington meeting," said Soli Ozel, an international relations scholar at the Institute for Human Studies in Vienna.

Even though Turkey borders both Ukraine and Russia, Erdogan was excluded from this month’s summit between Trump and European leaders.

"The fact that it wasn't backs the observation that the bigger players or the major partners are not bringing Turkey center stage, they're sidelining it," Ozel added.

Despite this, Ankara remains strategically important.

"They keep it in the play, it's important because if you're going to need troops, you're going to need Turkey. If you're going to talk about the Black Sea security, you need Turkey. And so you cannot really dismiss Turkey," Ozel said.

But he warned that mistrust is limiting Ankara’s role.

"You're not making it part of the process that will hopefully lead to a conclusion or a peace treaty between Ukraine and Russia. There is a lack of trust, and I think that has something to do with the way Turkey has conducted its diplomacy," Ozel said.

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Doubts over influence

Some analysts suggest Ankara hopes Europe’s reliance on Turkish forces or its navy for Black Sea security could help restore influence. But others see limited gains.

"There is no automatic increase in Turkey's influence and credibility as a result of taking part in such operations," said Guvenc.

"It does have a certain impact, but on the other hand, such contributions do not change other Western partners' views of Turkey."

Rather than a reset with Europe, Guvenc sees a continuation of the current dynamic.

"What might happen is yet another manifestation of transactionalism on both sides. And if Turkey contributes to peacekeeping in Ukraine, probably President Erdogan expects concrete benefits that will help him manage the deteriorating economic situation in Turkey.

"Therefore, you cannot build a comprehensive and sustainable relationship built on that transactionalism on both sides."

The signing of a peace deal between Armenia and Azerbaijan in Washington has raised hopes of ending decades of conflict and reopening Turkey's border with Armenia.

The deal, brokered by US President Donald Trump, commits both countries to respect each other’s territorial integrity – the issue at the centre of bloody wars.

The agreement is seen as paving the way for Turkey to restore diplomatic ties with Armenia.

"Ankara has been promising that once there is a peace agreement, it will open the border," says Asli Aydintasbas, of the Washington-based Brookings Institution.

"There was a brief period in the post-Soviet era when it [the border] was opened, but that was quickly shut again due to the Armenian-Azeri tensions."

Aydintasbas says reopening the border could have wide-reaching consequences.

"Armenia and Turkey opening their border and starting trade would be a historical moment in terms of reconciliation between these two nations, which have very bitter historic memories," she adds.

"But beyond that, it would help Armenia economically because it's a landlocked country entirely dependent on Russia for its protection and its economy."

Turning point

In June, Armenia’s Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan met Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan in Istanbul. The meeting was seen as a turning point in relations long overshadowed by the memory of the 1915 Armenian Genocide, which Ankara still officially denies.

"There's now a degree of personal chemistry between the Armenian prime minister and Erdogan. This was seen in a June historic meeting, the first ever bilateral contact, a face-to-face meeting," says Richard Giragosian, director of the Regional Studies Centre, a think tank in Yerevan.

Turkey closed its border with Armenia in 1993 after ethnic Armenians in Azerbaijan seized the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh enclave.

The enclave was retaken by Azerbaijani forces in 2022. Giragosian says the peace deal, along with warmer ties between Pashinyan and Erdogan, could now help Yerevan reach a long-sought goal.

"In the longer perspective for Turkey and Armenia, this is about going beyond the South Caucasus. It's about Central Asia. It's about European markets, potentially a new Iran in the future," he says.

Erdogan congratulated Pashinyan on Monday over the deal, but made no official pledge on reopening the border. That decision may lie with Azerbaijan’s president, Ilham Aliyev.

"They [Ankara] will be looking to Baku. Baku is basically able to tell Turkey not to move on normalisation with Armenia, not to open the border," says Aydintasbas.

"Part of the reason is that Turkey has developed an economic dependency on Azerbaijan, which is the top investor in Turkey. In other words, little brother is calling the shots, and I think that Ankara, to an extent, does not like it, but has come to appreciate the economic benefits of its relationship with Azerbaijan."

Azerbaijani demands on Armenia

Azerbaijan is also pushing for changes to Armenia’s constitution, which it claims makes territorial claims on Nagorno-Karabakh.

"The Armenian constitution refers to the Declaration of Independence of Armenia, which has a clear clause on the unification with Armenia, with Nagorno-Karabakh," says Farid Shafiyev of the Centre for Analysis of International Relations, a Baku-based think tank.

Shafiyev warned that without reform, the peace deal could unravel.

"Let's say, imagine Pashinyan losing elections, a new person says: 'You know, everything which was signed was against the Armenian constitution.' For us, it is important that the Armenian people vote for the change of the constitution," Shafiyev says.

Analysts note that changing the constitution would require a referendum with more than 50 percent turnout – a difficult and time-consuming process.

Time, however, may be running short. Russia is seen as the biggest loser from lasting peace in the Caucasus. For decades Moscow exploited the conflict to play Armenia and Azerbaijan against each other.

Pashinyan is now seeking to move away from Russian dominance and closer to Europe.

Giragosian warned that Armenia’s window of opportunity is limited.

"There is a closing window of opportunity – that is Russia's distraction with everything in Ukraine. We do expect a storm on the horizon, with an angry, vengeful Putin reasserting or attempting to regain Russia's lost power and influence in the region."

Weakening Russia’s grip remains key, he adds. "Armenia, after all, is still a member of the Eurasian Economic Union, the Russian-dominated trade bloc.

"But it's also a country that has a Russian military base. Russia still manages the Armenian railway network, for example. This is why, for Armenia, the real key here is going to be Turkey and normalising relations with Turkey."

At present, Armenia’s only open land borders are with Georgia and Iran – both close to Russia. Opening the Turkish border would give Armenia a vital new route, while also benefiting Turkey’s economically depressed border region.

But for now, Azerbaijan may seek further concessions before allowing any breakthrough.

Turkey and Italy are working more closely on migration, energy and regional influence as they seek to shape Libya’s political future. Both see the North African country as a key shared interest and are moving to consolidate their positions in the conflict-torn but energy-rich eastern Mediterranean.

Earlier this month, the leaders of Italy, Turkey and Libya’s Government of National Accord (GNA) met in a tripartite summit – the latest sign of growing cooperation between the three Mediterranean nations.

“Turkey and Italy have both differing interests, but interests in Libya,” explains international relations professor Huseyin Bagcı of Ankara’s Middle East Technical University.

“Particularly, the migration issue and illegal human trafficking are big problems for Italy, and most of the people are coming from there [Libya], so they try to prevent the flow of migrants.

"But for Turkey, it’s more economic. And Libya is very much interested in keeping the relations with both countries.”

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Migration, legitimacy concerns

Turkey is the main backer of Libya’s GNA and still provides military assistance, which was decisive in defeating the rival eastern-based forces led by strongman Khalifa Haftar. An uneasy ceasefire holds between the two sides.

Libya security analyst Aya Burweilla said Turkey is seeking Italy’s support to legitimise the Tripoli government, as questions grow over its democratic record.

“What it means for the Tripoli regime is very positive. This is a regime that has dodged elections for years," she says.

"Their job was to have democratic elections, and one of their ways to make sure they stay in power was to get foreign sponsors, like Turkey... Now, with this rubber stamp from Meloni in Italy, they can keep the status quo going at the expense of Libyans.”

Years of civil war and political chaos have turned Libya into a major hub for people smugglers. Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, elected on a pledge to curb irregular migration, sees stability in Libya as key to that goal.

“The migration issue has become very, very urgent in general for Europe, but of course for Italy too,” says Alessia Chiriatti of the Institute of International Affairs, a think tank in Rome.

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Mediterranean ambitions

Chiriatti said Meloni’s partnership with Turkey in Libya also reflects broader foreign policy goals.

“There is another dimension – I think it’s directly related to the fact that Italy and Meloni’s government want to play a different role in foreign policy in the Mediterranean space," she says.

"Italy is starting to see Africa as a possible partner to invest in … But what is important is that Italy is starting to see itself as a new player, both in the Mediterranean space and in Africa, so in this sense, it could have important cooperation with Turkey.”

She points out that both Italy and Turkey share a colonial past in Libya. That legacy, combined with the lure of Libya’s vast energy reserves, continues to shape their diplomacy.

Ending the split between Libya’s rival governments is seen as vital for stability. Moscow’s reduced military support for Haftar, as it focuses on its war in Ukraine, is viewed in Ankara as an opening.

“Russia is nearly out, and what remains are Turkey and Italy,” says Bagcı.

He added that Ankara is making overtures to the eastern authorities through Haftar’s son Saddam, a senior figure in the Libyan military.

“The son of Haftar is coming very often to Ankara, making talks. It’s an indication of potential changes... But how the deal will look like I don’t know, we will see later. But it’s an indication of potential cooperation, definitely.”

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Shifting alliances

Libya was discussed when Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan met Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi in Cairo on Saturday.

Sisi backs Haftar’s eastern government. Libya had been a source of tension between Turkey and Egypt, but with relations thawing, both say they will work together on the country’s future.

Turkey’s position in Libya is strengthening, says Burweilla.

“Saddam is pro-Turkey – there is a huge difference between son and father – and the younger generation is pro-Turkey,” she says.

Such support, Burweilla said, stems from Ankara allowing Libyans to seek sanctuary in Turkey from fighting in 2011, when NATO forces led by France and the United Kingdom militarily intervened against Muammar Gaddafi’s regime.

“I think the Europeans underestimated the political capital that gave Turkey. Turkey is winning the game in Libya,” Burweilla says.

She adds that Ankara’s rising influence is also due to a shift in tactics towards the east.

“What they [Ankara] realised was that you can’t conquer the east of Libya by force; they tried and they failed. And the Turkish regime is very much motivated by business... They don’t care about anything else, and they’ve realised they want to make a business," Burweilla says.

They’ve reached out more to the east, and the east, in turn, has realised that if they don’t want to be attacked by Turkey and its mercenaries, they need to make peace with Turkey as well.”

Ankara is aiming to dodge President Donald Trump’s threat of sanctions against countries that trade with Russia. While Turkey is the third largest importer of Russian goods, it has largely escaped international sanctions against Russia over its invasion of Ukraine. However, with Trump vowing to get tough with Moscow if it fails to make peace with Kyiv, that could change.

“I am going to make a new deadline of about 10 or 12 days from today," Trump declared at a press conference on 28 July during his visit to Scotland.

"There is no reason to wait 50 days. I wanted to be generous, but we don’t see any progress being made.” 

The American president admitted his efforts to end the Ukraine war had failed and that his patience with his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin, was at an end.

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Trump later confirmed 8 August as the date for the new measures. With US-Russian trade down 90 percent since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Trump warned that other countries importing Russian goods would also be hit by secondary sanctions.

“If you take his [Trump] promises at face value, then he should look at all countries that import any Russian commodities that is of primary importance to the Russian budget - this includes, of course, crude oil, and here you have China and India mostly,” explained George Voloshin of Acams, a global organisation dedicated to anti-financial crime, training and education.

Voloshin also claims that Turkey could be a target as well. “In terms of petroleum products, Turkey is one of the big importers. It also refines Russian petroleum in its own refineries," Voloshin added.

"Turkey imports lots of Russian gas through the TurkStream pipeline. Turkey is very much dependent on Russian gas and Russian petroleum products."

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Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Ankara insists it is only bound by United Nations sanctions.

Last year, Turkey was Russia’s third-largest export market, with Russian natural gas accounting for more than  40 percent of its energy needs.

Putin has used Turkey’s lack of meaningful domestic energy reserves and dependence on Russian gas to develop a close relationship with his Turkish counterpart, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.

“Putin knows that no matter what Trump wants, Turkey is not going to act in any military or sanctions capacity against Russia and Iran. You know, these are Turkey’s red lines. We can’t do it,” said analyst Atilla Yeşilada of Global Source Partners.

“Trump is 10,000 miles away. These people are our neighbours,” added Yeşilada. “So Putin doesn’t think of Turkey as a threat, but as an economic opportunity, and perhaps as a way to do things with the West that he doesn’t want to do directly.”

Ankara is performing a delicate balancing act. While maintaining trading ties with Russia, Erdoğan remains a strong supporter of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky.

Turkey is a major arms seller to Ukraine, while at the same time, Erdoğan continues to try and broker peace between the warring parties.

Last month, Istanbul was the venue for Russian–Ukrainian talks for the second time in as many months. Such efforts drew the praise of Trump.

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Trump's pressure mounts on energy and trade

The American president has made no secret of his liking for Erdoğan, even calling him a friend. Such close ties, along with Turkey’s regional importance to Washington, analysts say, is a factor in Ankara’s Western allies turning a blind eye to its ongoing trade with Russia.

“I think Turkey has got a pass on several levels from Russian sanctions,” observed regional expert Sinan Ciddi of the Washington-based think tank the Foundation for Defense of Democracies.

However, Ciddi cautions that Trump remains unpredictable and that previous actions are no guarantee for the future.

“Past experience is not an indicator of future happenings. We just don’t know what Trump will demand. This is not a fully predictive administration in Washington,” Ciddi said.

“We do know right now that he [Trump] is very unhappy with Putin. He blames Putin for prolonging the Ukraine war,” added Ciddi.

Change of stance

"And if he feels sufficiently upset, there is a possibility that no waivers will be granted to any country. Turkey will be up against a very, very unappetising and unenviable set of choices to make.”

Trump has successfully lobbied the European Union to increase its purchases of American liquefied natural gas (LNG), replacing Russian imports. Similar demands could put Ankara in a difficult position.

“If Trump pressures Turkey not to buy Russian natural gas, that would definitely be a huge shock,” warned Yeşilada.

“Trump might say, for instance: 'Buy energy from me or whatever.’ But I don’t think we’re there yet. There is no way Turkey can replace Russian gas.”

However, Trump could point to Turkey’s recent expansion of its LNG facilities, which now include five terminals and have excess capacity to cover Russian imports, although storage facilities remain a challenge.

Turkey’s energy infrastructure is also built around receiving Russian energy, and any shift to American energy would likely be hugely disruptive and expensive, at a time when the Turkish economy is in crisis.

Putin retains another energy card over Erdoğan. A Russian company is building a huge nuclear power plant in Turkey, which could account for 20 percent of the country’s energy needs.

Ciddi argues Erdoğan is now paying the price of over-relying on Russia.

Turkey’s Erdogan sees new Trump presidency as opportunity

“There is no need to have resorted to making Ankara this dependent on natural gas, nuclear energy, or for that matter bilateral trade. This was a choice by Erdoğan,” said Ciddi.

“The fact it is so dependent on so many levels in an almost unique way is something that Turkey will have to rethink.”

But for now, Erdoğan will likely be relying on his expertise in diplomatic balancing acts, along with his close ties to Trump and Turkey’s importance to Washington’s regional goals, to once again escape the worst of any sanctions over Russian trade – although Trump may yet extract a price for such a concession.

Azerbaijan is increasingly engaging in tit-for-tat actions towards powerful neighbour Russia amid escalating tensions in the South Caucasus region. This comes as Baku deepens its military cooperation with long-standing ally Turkey.

In a highly publicised move, Azerbaijani security forces in Baku recently paraded seven arrested Russian journalists – working for the Russian state-funded Sputnik news agency – in front of the media. Their detentions followed the deaths last month of two Azerbaijani nationals in Russian custody, which sparked public outrage in Baku.

"That was quite shocking for Baku, for Azerbaijani society – the cruelty of the behaviour and the large-scale violence," Zaur Gasimov of the German Academic Exchange Service, a professor and expert on Azerbaijani-Russian relations told RFI.

"And the Russian-wide persecution of the leaders of Azerbaijani diasporic organisations took place (this month)," he added.

Tit-for-tat tactics

Tensions between Russia and Azerbaijan have been simmering since December, when Russian air defences accidentally downed an Azerbaijani passenger aircraft. Baku strongly condemned Moscow’s lack of an official apology.

The deaths in custody, which Moscow insisted were from natural causes, and the broader crackdown on Azerbaijan’s diaspora are being interpreted in Baku as deliberate signals.

"This kind of news had to frighten Azerbaijani society, which is aware of the fact that around two million ethnic Azeris with Azerbaijani and Russian passports are living in the Russian Federation," explained Gasimov. "So the signal is that we can oust them, and they would come to Azerbaijan. That should be an economic threat."

Gasimov noted that while Baku may have previously backed down in the face of Russian pressure, this time appears different. "The reaction of Azerbaijan was just to react, with tit-for-tat tactics," he said.

Shifting power in Caucasus

Baku’s self-confidence is partly attributed to its military success in 2020, when it regained control over the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh region and adjacent territories from Armenian forces after a six-week war.

"The South Caucasus is changing," noted Farid Shafiyev, Chairman of the Baku-based Centre for Analysis of International Relations.

Shafiyev argues that the era of Moscow treating the region as its backyard is over. "Russia cannot just grasp and accept this change because of its imperial arrogance; it demands subordination, and that has changed for a number of reasons. First of all, due to the Russian-Ukrainian war, and second, due to the trajectory of events following the collapse of the Soviet Union. The third very important factor is Turkey," added Shafiyev.

Turkey, a long-standing ally of Azerbaijan, has significantly increased military cooperation and arms sales in recent years.

Turkish-made drones played a key role in Azerbaijan’s 2020 military campaign. In 2021, the Shusha Declaration was signed, committing both nations to mutual military support in the event of aggression. Turkey also plans to establish one of its largest overseas military bases in Azerbaijan.

"A very strong relationship with Ankara, marked by strong cooperation in the economic and military fields for decades, as also outlined in the Shusha Declaration several years ago, is an asset and one of the elements of Azerbaijan’s growing self-confidence," said Gasimov.

Azerbaijan and Turkey build bridges amid declining influence of Iran

Strategic rivalries 

Turkey’s expanding influence in the South Caucasus – at Russia’s expense – is the latest in a series of regional rivalries between the two powers. Turkish-backed forces countered a Russian-aligned warlord in Libya, and Turkey-supported factions have contested Russian influence in Syria.

These confrontations have strained the once-close ties between Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Russian President Vladimir Putin.

"No doubt that the Putin-Erdogan relationship is not as good as it used to be because we’ve either instigated or become participants in events in the South Caucasus and Syria," said analyst Atilla Yeşilada of Global Source Partners.

Growing military buildup in Azerbaijan and Armenia a concern for peace talks

Nevertheless, Yesilada believes pragmatism will prevail – for now – given Turkey’s dependence on Russian energy and trade.

"The economic interests are so huge, there is a huge chasm between not being too friendly and being antagonistic. I don’t think we’ve got to that point. If we did, there would be serious provocations in Turkey," he warned.

Until now, Turkish and Russian leaders have largely managed to compartmentalise their differences.

However, that approach may soon face its toughest test yet, as Azerbaijan remains a strategic priority for Turkey, while Russia has long considered the Caucasus to be within its traditional sphere of influence.

"We don’t know what will be Russia’s next target. We cannot exclude that Russia might be quite assertive in the South Caucasus in the future," warned Shafiyev.

"I think the easiest way is to build friendly relationships and economic partnerships with the countries of the South Caucasus. Unfortunately, Moscow looks like it’s not ready for a partnership. But if it’s ready, we would welcome it," he added.

With political landscapes across Europe shifting, in this edition of International Report we explore the growing influence of Donald Trump's "Make America Great Again" movement on the continent's politics. 

Conservative think tanks, whose influence was once limited to Washington's corridors of power, are now establishing connections with political actors and organisations in countries such as Poland and Hungary, working to shape Europe's future.

This report delves into the activities of the Heritage Foundation and its burgeoning alliances with groups including Ordo Iuris in Poland and the Mathias Corvinus Collegium in Hungary.

These organisations advocate for conservative cultural and economic reforms, sparking heated debate over national identity, the structure of the European Union and the future of liberal democracy across the region.

Can Europe withstand the ripple effect of the MAGA political wave?

As alliances form and agendas clash, a crucial question looms: are these movements charting a course toward genuine European reform, or steering the continent toward greater division? 

Voices from both sides share their perspectives, revealing the complexity behind this transatlantic ideological exchange.

Our guests: 

Chris Murphy, Senator (D, Connecticut)

Kenneth Haar, researcher at Corporate Europe Observatory 

Zbigniew Przybylowski, development director at Ordo Iuris

Rodrigo Ballester, head of the Centre for European Studies at Mathias Corvinus Collegium (MCC)