Litigator Libations

Send us Fan Mail

This week, Sam and Trevor cover two cases, United States v. Braum, __M.J.__, No. 25-0046/AF, 2026 CAAF LEXIS 343 (C.A.A.F. Apr. 8, 2026), and United States v. Talley, No. ACM 40828, 2026 CCA LEXIS 171 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. Apr. 9, 2026). In Braum, another divided Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (CAAF) found there was no prejudice when the Government refused to turn over the complaining witness’s cellphone extraction in its possession, custody, or control. The duo lament how the lead opinion did not answer whether the military judge erred by failing to order disclosure of the phone to the defense. But the two are hopeful that the CAAF may soon answer that question in United States v. Wicks, __M.J.__, No. 26-0062/AR, 2026 CAAF LEXIS 302 (C.A.A.F. Apr. 3, 2026). 

In better news, the Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals found that the military judge abused his discretion by excluding evidence under Mil. R. Evid. 412 and set aside the finding of guilt for a sexual assault conviction. As Sam and Trevor explain, both cases deal with complaining witnesses turning their rights into a sword against the accused and what trial defenders can do to disarm such “chutzpa[dik]” witnesses. See Braum, __M.J.__, No. 25-0046/AF, 2026 CAAF LEXIS 343, at *28 (Ohlson, C.J., dissenting) (labeling the colloquial terms for the victim’s approach as “chutzpah”).

Note: We apologize for any audio issues you may notice during listening. We are aware of the microphone issues and are working to fix it for future episodes. As always, we welcome your questions, comments, and feedback at [email protected]!

Send us Fan Mail

The case you've all been waiting for! *drumroll please* 

United States v. Rocha, No. 25-0157, 2026 CAAF LEXIS 254 (C.A.A.F. Mar. 16, 2026), the child-like sex doll case, is back and finally resolved! This week, Sam and Trevor spend most of the time breaking down the various opinions in Rocha. Spoiler alert: the CAAF affirms the lower court's decision to set aside the conviction, but perhaps not in the way you'd expect. While the CAAF doesn’t address the liberty interest under Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), Sam and Trevor do. While talking about liberty interests, they also discuss United States v. Marcum, 60 M.J. 198 (C.A.A.F. 2004), and United States v. Goings, 72 M.J. 202 (C.A.A.F. 2013). 

After tackling what is sure to be the most controversial decision of the CAAF term, the duo turn to United States v. Hurtado, No. 25-0212, 2026 CAAF LEXIS 273 (C.A.A.F. Mar. 23, 2026). There, the CAAF found that the appellant's rights invocation was clear and unequivocable, despite the law enforcement agent, the lower court, and two CAAF judges thinking otherwise...I'd like my lawyer, dawg, now please. See State v. Demesme, 228 So. 3d 1206 (La. 2017) (finding that requesting a "lawyer dog" was an ambiguous invocation).    

As always, we welcome questions and comments from our fans at [email protected].

Send us Fan Mail

On this week's episode, Sam and Trevor focus on a recent case from the Supreme Court, Villarreal v. Texas, 2026 U.S. LEXIS 1103 (U.S. 2026). Villarreal explains the limits on how and when a judge can prevent a testifying defendant from talking to his or her attorney during a recess. The Supreme Court discusses two major cases in resolving this issue: Geders v. United States, 425 U. S. 80 (1976), and Perry v. Leeke, 488 U. S. 272 (1989). 

Following their discussion about Villarreal, Sam and Trevor turn to a recent Navy-Marine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals case, United States v. Gonzalez, No. 202500333, 2026 CCA LEXIS 115 (N-M Ct. Crim. App. Mar. 6, 2026). There, the duo discusses how old sentencing tips remain valuable even after the changes to Article 66, UCMJ, that turned appellate "sentence appropriateness" review into an assessment over, amongst others, whether a sentence is "plainly unreasonable." 

 Questions, comments, feedback? Email us at [email protected]!

Send us Fan Mail

This week, Sam and Trevor start off by answering a listener question about one of last episode’s cases: United States v. Kruse, No. 202500370, 2026 CCA LEXIS 13 (N-M Ct. Crim. App. Jan. 21, 2026). After a brief recap and debate, the two tackle United States v. Matti, No. 25-0148, 2026 CAAF LEXIS 189 (C.A.A.F. Feb. 17, 2026), a recent Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (CAAF) decision on improper argument. Matti reveals the frustration of the CAAF judges, who appear tired of repeatedly dealing with the same improper arguments by Government counsel. To educate the field, the CAAF published an appendix to Matti, which un-exhaustively lists twenty-two improper arguments, and encouraged all military judges and counsel to read the appendix to protect against future errors. 

But a week after Matti, the Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals issued United States v. Kindred, No. ACM 40607 (f rev), 2026 CCA LEXIS 87 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. Feb. 24, 2026). In this case, the Air Force Court seemingly disagreed with the CAAF’s determination that certain arguments were improper. Sam and Trevor discuss Kindred and how the Air Force Court got it right for at least one improper argument that implicated constitutional rights, but got it wrong for others.       

Questions, comments, concerns? Send them our way at [email protected]! (Since, apparently, we can’t respond to Buzzsprout fan mail immediately…)

Send us Fan Mail

This week, Sam and Trevor tackle two cases that foretell the risks of prioritizing expediency over process. First, after eight years, United States v. Jacinto, No. 24-0144, 2026 CAAF LEXIS 116 (C.A.A.F. Feb. 2, 2026), comes to end. This case went up and down on appeal due to a denied continuance and in camera review request concerning medical records disclosed on the “eve” of trial. While the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (CAAF) found the denied continuance harmless, this case should be in any trial practitioner’s back pocket when seeking a continuance. 

Second, the duo debate United States v. Kruse, No. 202500370, 2026 CCA LEXIS 13 (N-M Ct. Crim. App. Jan. 21, 2026), a published Navy-Marine Corp Court of Criminal Appeals case that addresses how convening authorities can refer what looks like a covered offense after the Office of Special Trial Counsel defers prosecution…so long as it’s not labeled as “a covered offense.” Sam and Trevor’s spirited debate ends with a reminder about ensuring jurisdiction in each case and testing the bounds of Kruse. 

Questions, comments, concerns? Send them our way at [email protected]!

Send us Fan Mail

This week, Sam and Trevor discuss four of the latest Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces opinions. The first case they cover is United States v. Malone, No. 25-0140, 2026 CAAF LEXIS 62 (C.A.A.F. Jan. 20, 2026), which addresses how defense counsel can waive multiplicity issues. But the CAAF’s reasoning also strongly suggests that ineffective assistance of counsel claims may increase following this decision. 

The second case the duo covers is United States v. Moore, No. 25-0110, 2026 CAAF LEXIS 73 (C.A.A.F. Jan. 23, 2026), which is the latest installment of the Mendoza-Casillas saga. Moore is one of three cases that the CAAF decided, which appear to, once again, limit the once-powerful reach of United States v. Mendoza, 85 M.J. 213 (C.A.A.F. 2024). See United States v. Casillas, 86 M.J. 94 (C.A.A.F. 2025) (tailoring Mendoza to a sexual assault case that included sleep). The other two cases the CAAF decided with Moore are United States v. Serjak, No. 25-0120, 2026 CAAF LEXIS 74 (C.A.A.F. Jan. 23, 2026), and United States v. Hennessy, No. 25-0112, 2026 CAAF LEXIS 72 (C.A.A.F. Jan. 23, 2026). While Sam and Trevor focus on Moore because it espouses three "new" legal principles for sexual assault cases without consent, all three cases provide insight into how Article 120(b)(2)(A), UCMJ, cases may evolve.

As always, send us your comments or questions to [email protected].

Send us Fan Mail

For the 100th episode of Litigator Libations, Sam and Trevor keep it short and sweet. They discuss two recent decisions. First, they talk about Case v. Montana, No. 24-624, 2026 U.S. LEXIS 432 (Jan. 14, 2026), from the Supreme Court. Case reaffirms Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398 (2006), which discussed the proper test for the emergency assistance exception to the warrant requirement, but addresses it in the context of a suicide attempt. Second, they discuss United States v. Marschalek, No. ACM S32776, 2026 CCA LEXIS 6 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. Jan. 16, 2026), from the Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals. Based on United States v. Jones, 66 M.J. 704 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 2008), and United States v. Robbins, 52 M.J. 159 (C.A.A.F. 1999), Marschalek reaffirms that preemption cannot be waived by a guilty plea. 

As always, feel free to reach out with questions or comments at [email protected].

Send us Fan Mail

Happy New Year, everyone! This week, Sam and Trevor cover two cases where the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (CAAF) analyzes the purported arbitrary application of military rules of evidence. The first is United States v. Maebane, No. 24-0196, 2025 CAAF LEXIS 772 (C.A.A.F. Sep. 18, 2025). In this 3-2 decision, the CAAF overturned a conviction where a third party’s confession was ruled inadmissible under Military Rule of Evidence 807. The duo dissects the detailed facts to show how and why the CAAF reached the decision it did. During their discussion, they talk about two Supreme Court cases: Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973), and Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319 (2006). The second case they discuss is United States v. Miller, No. 25-0025, 2025 CAAF LEXIS 803 (C.A.A.F. Sep. 24, 2025). In this 4-1 decision, the CAAF held that Military Rule of Evidence 412 hearings must be closed and that military judges need not hold an open hearing to decide whether, on the facts of the case, the hearing ought to be closed. Sam and Trevor also highlight the dissent and draw parallels between Miller and the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Pitts v. Mississippi, 223 L.Ed.2d 151 (U.S. 2025). 

As always, feel free to reach out with questions or comments at [email protected].

Send us Fan Mail

In their last episode of 2025, Sam and Trevor discuss all things waiver. 

There are four cases on the agenda, so buckle-up! First, United States v. Arroyo, 2025 CAAF LEXIS 688 (C.A.A.F. Aug. 19, 2025), which deals with how and why an appellate court can consider that an appellant got the “benefit of the bargain” from a plea agreement during its sentence appropriateness analysis. Second, United States v. Cook, 2025 CAAF LEXIS 726 (C.A.A.F. Aug. 28, 2025), which covers how an accused can waive the maximum punishment calculation. Third, United States v. Suarez, 2025 CAAF LEXIS 651 (C.A.A.F Aug. 5, 2025), which holds that unlawful command influence can be waived. And, finally, United States v. Batres, 2025 CAAF LEXIS 755 (C.A.A.F. Sep. 9, 2025), which grapples with the meaning of “transaction” under Rule for Courts-Martial 1002(d)(2)(B)(i). 

A few other cases that come up during their discussion are United States v. Brown, 2025 CAAF LEXIS 691 (C.A.A.F. Aug. 20, 2025) (granting review), United States v. Cole, 84 M.J. 398 (C.A.A.F. 2024), and United States v. Baker, 14 M.J. 361 (C.M.A. 1983), abrogated on other grounds by United States v. Teters, 37 M.J. 370 (C.A.A.F. 1993). The briefs for Brown are available here: https://www.armfor.uscourts.gov/GrantedCasesBriefs.htm

After covering all these cases, the duo are taking a quick break and will see everyone again after the New Year! Happy Holidays! In the meantime, you can always email us with questions or comments at [email protected].

Send us Fan Mail

Happy Thanksgiving! This week, Sam and Trevor tackle United States v. Gonzalez, 2025 CAAF LEXIS 761 (C.A.A.F. 2025), and United States v. Ruiz, 2025 CAAF LEXIS 656 (C.A.A.F. 2025). While both cases have some interesting facts, they also have big takeaways for trial practitioners. 

In Gonzalez, we see the first effects of United States v. George, 85 M.J. 133 (C.A.A.F. 2024), where the parties’ interpretations of the specification at trial trump arguments on appeal. For Ruiz, prior consistent statements under MRE 801(d)(1)(B)(ii) seem to be expanded outside the narrow path articulated in United States v. Finch, 79 M.J. 389 (C.A.A.F. 2020). Now part of a circuit split, Ruiz is petitioning SCOTUS on this issue, so keep an eye out for any developments dealing with whether SCOTUS will extend Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150 (1995), to this category of prior consistent statements. The full Petition for Writ of Certiorari is available at: https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/25/25-561/383633/20251105123311855_Ruiz%20v.%20United%20States%20Petition%20for%20Writ%20of%20Certiorari.pdf.

If you have any questions or listener comments, please email us at [email protected].