Lock and Code

When Lock and Code host David Ruiz talks to hackers—especially good-faith hackers who want to dutifully report any vulnerabilities they uncover in their day-to-day work—he often hears about one specific law in hushed tones of fear: the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act.

The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, or CFAA, is a decades-old hacking law in the United States whose reputation in the hacker community is dim. To hear hackers tell it, the CFAA is responsible not only for equipping law enforcement to imprison good-faith hackers, but it also for many of the legal threats that hackers face from big companies that want to squash their research.

The fears are not entirely unfounded.

In 2017, a security researcher named Kevin Finisterre discovered that he could access sensitive information about the Chinese drone manufacturer DJI by utilizing data that the company had inadvertently left public on GitHub. Conducting research within rules set forth by DJI's recently announced bug bounty program, Finisterre took his findings directly to the drone maker. But, after informing DJI about the issues he found, he was faced not with a bug bounty reward, but with a lawsuit threat alleging that he violated the CFAA.

Though DJI dropped its interest, as Harley Geiger, senior director for public policy at Rapid7, explained on today's episode of Lock and Code, even the threat itself can destabilize a security researcher.

"[It] is really indicative of how questions of authorization can be unclear and how CFAA threats can be thrown about when researchers don’t play ball, and the pressure that a large company like that can bring to bear on an independent researcher," Geiger said.

Today, on the Lock and Code podcast, we speak with Geiger about other hacking laws can be violated when conducting security researcher, how hackers can document their good-faith intentions, and the Department of Justice's recent decision to not prosecute hackers who are only hacking for the benefits of security.

You can also find us on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, and Google Podcasts, plus whatever preferred podcast platform you use.

Show notes and credits:

Intro Music: “Spellbound” by Kevin MacLeod (incompetech.com)

At the start of the global coronavirus pandemic, nearly everyone was forced to learn about the "supply chain." Immediate stockpiling by an alarmed (and from a smaller share, opportunistic) public led to an almost overnight disappearance of hand sanitizer, bottled water, toilet paper, and face masks.

In time, those items returned to stores. But then a big ship got stuck in the Suez, and once again, we learned even more about the vulnerability of supply chains. They can handle little stress. They can be derailed with one major accident. They spread farther than we know.

While the calamity in the canal involved many lessons, there was another story in late 2020 that required careful study in cyberspace—an attack on the digital supply chain.

That year, attackers breached a network management tool called Orion, which is developed by the Texas-based company SolarWinds. Months before the attack was caught, the attackers swapped malicious code into a legitimately produced security update from SolarWinds. This malicious code gave the attackers a backdoor into every Orion customer who both downloaded and deployed the update and who had their servers connected online. Though the initial number of customers who downloaded the update was about 18,000 companies, the number of customers infected with the attackers’ malware was far lower, somewhere around 100 companies and about a dozen government agencies.

This attack, which did involve a breach of a company, had a broader focus—the many, many clients of that one company. This was an attack on the software supply chain, and since that major event, similar attacks have happened again and again.

Today, on the Lock and Code podcast with host David Ruiz, we speak with Kim Lewandowski, founder and head of product at Chainguard, about the software supply chain, its vulnerabilities, and how we can fix it.

Kubernetes diagram:

https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/622577/170547400-ef9e2ef8-e35b-46df-adee-057cbce847d1.svg

Intro Music: “Spellbound” by Kevin MacLeod (incompetech.com)

Tor, which stands for "The Onion Router," has a storied reputation in the world of online privacy, but on today's episode of Lock and Code with host David Ruiz, we speak with security researcher Alec Muffett about the often-undiscussed security benefits of so-called "onion networking." 

The value proposition to organizations interested in using Tor goes beyond just anonymity, Muffett explains, and its a value prop that has at least persuaded the engineers at Facebook, Twitter, The New York Times, Buzzfeed, The Intercept, and The Guardian to build onion versions of their sites. 

Tune in to hear about the security benefits of onion networking, why an organization would want to launch an onion site for its service, and whether every site in the future should utilize Tor.

Show notes and credits:

Why and How you should start using Onion Networking: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pebRZyg_bh8

How WhatsApp uses metadata analysis for spam and abuse fighting: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LBTOKlrhKXk

Alec Muffett's blog and about page: https://alecmuffett.com/about

Intro Music: “Spellbound” by Kevin MacLeod (incompetech.com)

Last year, Whitney Merrill wanted to know just how much information the company Clubhouse had on her, even though she wasn't a user. After many weeks of, at first, non-responses, she learned that her phone number had been shared with Clubhouse more than 80 times—the byproduct of her friends joining the platform. 

Show notes and credits:

Intro Music: "Spellbound” by Kevin MacLeod (incompetech.com)

Earlier this year, a flashy documentary premiered on Netflix that shed light onto on often-ignored cybercrime—a romance scam. In this documentary, called The Tinder Swindler, the central scam artist relied on modern technologies, like Tinder, and he employed an entire team, which included actors posing as his bodyguard and potentially even his separated wife. After months of getting close to several women, the scam artist pounced, asking for money because he was supposedly in danger. 

The public response to the documentary was muddy. Some viewers felt for the victims featured by the filmmakers, but others blamed them. This tendency to blame the victims is nothing new, but according to our guest Cindy Liebes, Chief Cybersecurity Evangelist for Cybercrime Support Network, it's all wrong. That's because, as we discuss in today's episode on Lock and Code with host David Ruiz, these scam artists are professional criminals. 

Show notes and credits:

Intro Music: "Spellbound” by Kevin MacLeod (incompetech.com)

Licensed under Creative Commons: By Attribution 4.0 License

http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

Outro Music: “God God” by Wowa (unminus.com)

Every few months, a basic but damaging flaw is revealed in a common piece of software, or a common tool used in many types of programs, and the public will be left asking: What is going on with how our applications are developed?

Today on the Lock and Code podcast with host David Ruiz, we speak to returning guest Tanya Janca to understand the many stages of software development and how security trainers can better work with developers to build safe, secure products.

Data protection, believe it or not, is not synonymous with privacy, or even data privacy. But around the world, countless members of the public often innocently misconstrue these three topics with one another, swapping the terms and the concepts behind them. 

Typically, that wouldn't be a problem—not every person needs to know the minute details of every data-related concept, law, and practice. But when the public is unaware of its rights under data protection, it might be unaware of how to assert those rights. 

In 2017, a former NSA contractor was arrested for allegedly leaking an internal report to the online news outlet The Intercept. To verify the report itself, a journalist for The Intercept sent an image of the report to the NSA, but upon further inspection, it was revealed that the image was actually a scan of a physical document. 

This difference—between an entirely digital, perhaps only-emailed document, and a physical piece of paper—spurred several suspicions that the news outlet had played an unintended role in identifying the NSA contractor to her employer, because the NSA did not have to find people who merely accessed the report, but only people who had printed it. 

This is what journalism can look like in the modern age. There are countless digital traces left behind that can puncture the safety and security of both journalists and their sources. 

Three years ago, a journalist for Gizmodo removed five of the biggest tech companies from her life—restricting her from using services and hardware developed or owned by Google, Apple, Amazon, Facebook, and Microsoft. The experiment, according to the reporter, was "hell." 

But in 2022, cybersecurity evangelist Carey Parker, who also hosts the podcast Firewalls Don't Stop Dragons, wanted to do something similar, just on a smaller scale, and with a focus on privacy.

How would you feel if the words you wrote to someone while in a crisis—maybe you were suicidal, maybe you were newly homeless, maybe you were suffering from emotional abuse at home—were later used to train a customer support tool? 

Those emotions you might behaving right now were directed last month at Crisis Text Line, after the news outlet Politico reported that the nonprofit organization had been sharing anonymized conversational data with a for-profit venture that Crisis Text Line had itself spun off at an earlier date, in an attempt to one day boost the nonprofit's own funding. 

Today, on Lock and Code with host David Ruiz, we’re speaking with Courtney Brown, the former director of a suicide hotline network that was part of the broader National Suicide Prevention Lifeline, to help us understand data privacy principles for crisis support services and whether sharing this type of data is ever okay.