On Edmund Husserl's Ideas, Vol. 2 (1928), Section 3, "The Constitution of the Spiritual World," Ch. 1, "Opposition Between the Naturalistic and Personalistic Worlds."

Given Husserl's method of "reduction" whereby he sets aside the metaphysical status of objects in the natural world (are they mind-independent or merely ideas?), we wanted to see how he accounts for our ability to directly perceive other people's minds. We don't just perceive their bodies and our own bodies and deduce that others must be like us mentally, but we perceive both our minds and those of others as strata (aspects) of physical bodies.

Read along with us, starting on p. 183 (PDF p. 101).

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