Philosopher's Zone

This week, we look at the convergence – or perhaps not – of two philosophies: Buddhism and modern science.  Buddhism has attempted to redefine itself in relation to neuroscience . A case in point is the ‘dialogue’ between Buddhism and neuroscience promoted by the Dalai Lama and his Western followers.   But before talking of a possible convergence between neuroscience and Buddhism, do we need to acknowledge the divergences?

You might think that, if anybody owns your genes, it’s you, but if you know anything about your genes it will be because of professional gene testing. And in cases of a genetically transmitted disorder, should genetic counsellors breach patient confidentiality to disclose the results of genetic tests to relatives who are likely to be affected by the same disorder?  Is genetic information personal information, which belongs to the patient being tested, or does it belong to all the patient’s genetic relations?

What was Shakespeare’s religion and what did he think about personal identity?  Did he believe that the personal identity we have is had because we are this living body rather than that?  How does commitment to religious faith or to marriage affect your identity?  And should we think of Shakespeare not just as an inventor of characters but as a thinker?

Ethnic groups across the planet are beginning to act like corporations that own a 'natural' copyright in their 'culture' and 'cultural products' which they protect, often by recourse to the law, and on which they capitalise in much the same way as do incorporated businesses in the private sector.

The Norwegian mass killer Anders Behring Breivik argues that he killed to do good for his country. Adolf Eichmann, one of the major organisers of the Holocaust, displayed neither guilt nor hatred, claiming he bore no responsibility because he was simply 'doing his job'. It was for him that the phrase ‘the banality of evil’ was coined. Ivan Milat, however, had a life-long history of behavioural disturbance and a propensity for sadistic violence. So how do we understand the problem? Is it just a lack of empathy or is there more than this to the problem of evil?

Philosophy is all about arguing, but some arguments are worse than others. In fact, some are so awful that only really intelligent people can believe them: The Chinese room argument, Pascal's wager and the ontological argument for the existence of God are among the nominees. This week we examine some implausible ideas with the help of two connoisseurs of bad arguments.

This week on the Philosopher’s Zone, we’re looking at a couple of people you might not think of as philosophers at all. One of them aspired to be a scientist of the mind.  The other, though, was something of a philosopher, something of a mystic and something of a shaman.  His name was Carl Gustav Jung and his relationship with an older man, Sigmund Freud, is the subject of A Dangerous Method, a new film directed by David Cronenberg, written by Christopher Hampton  and starring Michael Fassbender as Freud, Viggo Mortensen as Jung and Keira Knightley as the woman who presence proves to be something of a catalyst in their relationship.

Human consciousness is intentional – it’s about something – but what is the relationship between my consciousness and the objects of which I’m conscious?  And, in particular, how does this work when the objects don’t even exist, like Santa Claus and Pegasus?  This week, we investigate an old philosophical issue.

Over four decades, the Gavin David Young Lectures in Philosophy at the University of Adelaide have become a very significant series with many distinguished contributors from across the globe..  This year, the speaker was Frank Jackson, Professor of Philosophy at ANU. His subject was ‘Philosophy for Representationalists’: perceptual experiences represent the way things are. For example, visual perceptual experiences typically represent how things are in front of us. We can pass this information on in many ways, but we humans most often pass it on using words and sentences. What do these commonplaces about experiences and language tell us about the contents of our experiences and the contents of our words and sentences?

Where does the mind stop and the rest of the world begin? Some philosophers are now arguing that thoughts are not all in the head. The environment has an active role in driving cognition; cognition is sometimes made up of neural, bodily, and environmental processes. Their argument has excited a vigorous debate among philosophers and this week we discover what the fuss is about. We hear from two proponents of the extended mind thesis from one of its critics, Robert Rupert, associate professor of philosophy at the University of Colorado, Boulder.