We continue our discussion of theories of judicial review that say it should enforce--and reinforce--democracy: footnote 4 theories and John Hart Ely. We argue that these theories run up against contradictions when they try to specify particular forms of democracy that they're trying to reinforce. As many have argued these theories can be quite narrow, leaving untouched forms of democratic failure that ought to be remedied, or quite broad, giving courts the power to displace ordinary legislation across extremely wide swathes of public policy. We also discuss Bruce Ackerman's effort to distinguish between constitutional politics, whose outcomes the courts should enforce, and ordinary politics, interest group politics whose outcomes judges should accept. And we renew our disagreement about whether or how we should respect decisions made years ago by people quite different from us.

We now begin to explore alternatives to originalism as a theory of constitutional interpretation. This episode and the next deal with approaches that say that courts can promote democracy through constitutional review. This time we take up an old and mostly abandoned approach advocated by James Bardley Thayer in 1892, that courts should invalidate statutes only if they are obviously unreasonable. Thayer said that was the right approach because legislators should and did take their responsibility to adhere to the Constitution seriously. Most of discussion challenges that assumption.

We continue our discussion of originalism, developing two

themes: defenses and criticisms of the original constitution articulated by prominent African American thinkers--Barbara Jordan, Thurgood Marshall, and Frederick Douglass--that bring out the distinction between the Constitution as enforceable law and as symbol of aspirations; and historians' critiques of originalism as developed most prominently recently by Jonathan Gienapp. The two of us disagree about some important details, but end up agreeing that at the very least originalism doesn't accurately describe the way even purported originalists among the justices actually seek to justify their decisions.

This is the first of two episodes on the constitutional theory of originalism. This time we look at originalism from the inside; next time we offer broader criticisms. We spend a fair amount of time defining originalism's various versions and distinguish between academic originalism and originalism as practiced by the courts. In the end, we argue, academic originalism is difficult though not impossible to defend, but judicial originalism fails miserably at doing what its proponents claim orignalism does--keep judges from imposing their personal policy preferences in the guise of interpreting the Constitution.

Our lens broadens to deal with three issues of public policy where the Supreme Court has interfered with ordinary policy making: affirmative action, gun safety, and partisan gerrymandering. We discuss more briefly than in prior episodes the possible justifications for that interference and argue that those justifications aren't strong enough to overcome the presumption that ordinary policies should be determined by ordinary politics.

We discuss the Supreme Court's interference with the 2024 election by slow walking its consideration of Donald Trump's claim that he was immune from prosecution for his actions in connection with the January 6 insurrection. And we criticize the Court's ultimate decision for its incoherence, failure to provide guidance for the future, and inconsistency with basic ideas about our Constitution and the rule of law.

Progressives like us have vigorously criticized the Dobbs decision. Why? Doesn't it return a public policy question to the people for democratic decision-making? You'll hear our criticisms of the Dobbs decision, mostly for its internal logic, and our disagreements about the underlying issue--but our ultimate agreement that there's a fair amount to be said by people on our side of the political spectrum in favor of keeping the Court from constitutionalizing the abortion issue.

This episode explores the reasons why the modern Supreme Court is out of control and why the mechanisms that have historically kept it (more or less) in control no longer work