Lindke v. Freed

Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Oct 31, 2023.

Petitioner: Kevin Lindke.
Respondent: James R. Freed.

Advocates:

• Allon Kedem (for the Petitioner)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

James Freed created a private Facebook profile that was originally intended to connect with family and friends. Eventually, he grew too popular for Facebook's 5,000-friend limit on profiles. So Freed converted his profile to a "page," which has unlimited "followers" instead of friends and is public so that anyone may "follow" it. Freed designated the page category as "public figure."

In 2014, Freed was appointed city manager for Port Huron, Michigan, so he updated his Facebook page to reflect that new title. On his page, he shared both personal updates about himself and his family and professional updates, including directives and policies he initiated in his official capacity.

Kevin Lindke came across Freed’s page and did not approve of how Freed was handling the pandemic. He posted criticism of Freed in response to Freed’s Facebook page, and Freed deleted the comments and ultimately “blocked” Lindke.

Lindke sued Freed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violating his First Amendment rights by deleting his comments and blocking him. The district court granted summary judgment to Freed, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed.

Question

When does a public official’s social media activity constitute state action subject to the First Amendment?

Culley v. Marshall

Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Oct 30, 2023.

Petitioner: Halima Tariffa Culley, et al.
Respondent: Steven T. Marshall, Attorney General of Alabama, et al.

Advocates:

• Shay Dvoretzky (for the Petitioners)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

On February 17, 2019, Halima Tariffa Culley’s son was pulled over by police while driving a car registered to his mother. Police arrested him, charged him with possession of marijuana and drug paraphernalia, and seized the vehicle. Culley unsuccessfully tried to retrieve the vehicle, and on February 27, 2019, the State of Alabama filed a civil asset forfeiture action in state court. After 20 months, the state court granted Culley summary judgment, finding that she was entitled to the return of her vehicle under Alabama’s innocent-owner defense.

Culley filed a class-action lawsuit in federal court claiming under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that the failure of the state and local officials to provide a prompt post-deprivation hearing violated their rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The district court ruled for the defendants, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed as to those claims that were not moot.

Question

What test must a district court apply when determining whether and when a post-deprivation hearing is required under the Due Process Clause?

Alexander v. South Carolina State Conference of the NAACP

Justia · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Oct 11, 2023.

Appellant: Thomas C. Alexander, in His Official Capacity as President of the South Carolina Senate, et al..
Appellee: The South Carolina State Conference of the NAACP, et al..

Advocates:

• John M. Gore (for the Appellants)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

After the 2020 Census, South Carolina’s Republican-controlled legislature adopted a new congressional map that moved tens of thousands of Black voters to a different district, effectively making the district a safe seat for Republicans.

The South Carolina State Conference of the NAACP sued, and a three-judge panel concluded that the district was an unconstitutional racial gerrymander. The legislators appealed directly to the Supreme Court, arguing that the map was actually a political gerrymander (which is permissible) that merely had a racial effect.

Question

Does the South Carolina legislature’s redistricting map, which has the effect of moving tens of thousands of Black voters to a different district, constitute an impermissible racial gerrymander, even if the legislators’ purported intent was merely a political gerrymander?

Great Lakes Insurance SE v. Raiders Retreat Realty Co., LLC

Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Oct 10, 2023.

Petitioner: Great Lakes Insurance SE.
Respondent: Raiders Retreat Realty Co., LLC.

Advocates:

• Jeffrey B. Wall (for the Petitioner)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Raiders Retreat Realty Co., a Pennsylvania company, insured a yacht for up to $550,000 with Great Lakes Insurance (GLI), a company headquartered in the United Kingdom. In June 2019, the yacht ran aground, incurring at least $300,000 in damage. Raiders submitted a claim to GLI for loss of the vessel, but GLI rejected it, claiming that, although none of the damage was due to fire, the entire policy was void because Raider had failed to timely recertify or inspect the yacht's fire-extinguishing equipment.

GLI asked the district court for a declaratory judgment that Raiders’ omission voided the policy, and Raiders raised five counterclaims based on Pennsylvania law. The district court dismissed those counterclaims, finding that ​​the policy’s choice-of-law provision required the application of New York law. The court also rejected Raiders’ argument that the choice-of-law provision was unenforceable under the Supreme Court’s decision in The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972), which held that under federal admiralty law, a forum-selection provision is unenforceable “if enforcement would contravene a strong public policy of the forum in which suit is brought.” The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit vacated, finding The Bremen controlled the outcome in this case.

Question

Is a choice-of-law clause in a maritime contract unenforceable if enforcement would conflict with the “strong public policy” of the state whose law is displaced?

Murray v. UBS Securities, LLC

Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Oct 10, 2023.

Petitioner: Trevor Murray.
Respondent: UBS Securities, LLC, et al..

Advocates:

• Easha Anand (for the Petitioner)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

In 2011, UBS hired Trevor Murray as a strategist in its commercial mortgage-backed securities business. Under Securities and Exchange Commission regulations, Murray was required to certify that his reports were produced independently and that they accurately reflected his own views. According to Murray, two leaders at UBS improperly pressured him to skew his research. Murray repeatedly reported this conduct to his supervisor, who declined to take action. UBS terminated Murray in 2012.

Murray sued UBS in 2014 alleging that his former employer terminated him in response to his complaints about fraud on shareholders in violation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act's antiretaliation provision, 18 U.S.C. § 1514A. The district court ruled for Murray, and UBS appealed, arguing that the district court erred by failing to instruct the jury that Murray had to prove UBS's retaliatory intent to prevail on his section 1514A claim. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit agreed with UBS and vacated the judgment of the district court. 

Question

Under 18 U.S.C. § 1514A, must a whistleblower prove his employer acted with “retaliatory intent” as part of his case in chief?

Acheson Hotels, LLC v. Laufer

Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Oct 4, 2023.

Petitioner: Acheson Hotels, LLC.
Respondent: Deborah Laufer.

Advocates:

• Adam G. Unikowsky (for the Petitioner)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Deborah Laufer, a prolific litigant with physical disabilities and vision impairments, sued Acheson Hotels for failing to publish information about their accessibility on their website, which is required under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).

The district court dismissed the lawsuit, finding that Laufer lacked standing to sue because had no plans to visit the hotel and thus suffered no injury as a result of the lack of information on the website. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed, concluding that Laufer’s lack of intent to book a room at the hotel operated by Acheson does not negate the fact of injury.

Question

Does an ADA “tester” have Article III standing to challenge a hotel’s failure to provide disability accessibility information on its website, even if she has no plans to visit the hotel?

Consumer Financial Protection Bureau v. Community Financial Services Association of America

Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Oct 3, 2023.

Petitioner: Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, et al..
Respondent: Community Financial Services Association of America, Limited, et al..

Advocates:

• Elizabeth B. Prelogar (for the Petitioners)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

In response to the financial crisis around 2007, Congress passed the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, which, among other things, authorized the creation of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) as an independent agency within the Federal Reserve. The CFPB was tasked with writing and enforcing rules for financial institutions, examining financial institutions, monitoring and reporting on markets, and tracking consumer complaints.

In 2017, the CFPB adopted a rule that prohibited lenders from further attempting to withdraw funds from borrowers’ bank accounts after two consecutive attempts failed for lack of funds.

A group of lenders sued the CFPB over that rule, arguing that the agency’s funding scheme was unconstitutional. Instead of receiving money allocated to it each year by Congress, as most agencies do, the CFPB receives funding directly from the Federal Reserve, which collects fees from member banks. The district court concluded the funding scheme was not unconstitutional, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed.

Question

Does the funding scheme for the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, which receives funding directly from the Federal Reserve, violate the Appropriations Clause of the Constitution?

Pulsifer v. United States

Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Oct 2, 2023.

Petitioner: Mark E. Pulsifer.
Respondent: United States.

Advocates:

• Shay Dvoretzky (for the Petitioner)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Mark Pulsifer pleaded guilty to distributing at least fifty grams of methamphetamine. Relying on 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f), Pulsifer asked the district court for a sentence lower than the otherwise applicable statutory minimum term of imprisonment. That provision, permits a district court to impose a sentence lower than the statutory minimum upon finding that the defendant does not have: “(A) more than 4 criminal history points, excluding any criminal history points resulting from a 1-point offense, as determined under the sentencing guidelines; (B) a prior 3-point offense, as determined under the sentencing guidelines; and (C) a prior 2-point violent offense, as determined under the sentencing guidelines.”

It was undisputed that Pulsifer had a criminal history that meets the criteria in subsections (A) and (B), due to having more than four criminal history points and a prior three-point offense. The district court concluded that this history alone made him ineligible for sentencing under § 3553(f), notwithstanding that he did not also have a prior two-point violent offense that would meet the condition in subsection (C). It therefore denied his request under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f).

Pulsifer appealed, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed, concluding the statutory word “and” means a defendant must not have any of the criteria, not that he must not have all of them.

Question

Must a defendant show he does not meet any of the criteria listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f) to qualify for a sentence lower than the statutory minimum?

Tyler v. Hennepin County, Minnesota

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Apr 26, 2023.
Decided on May 25, 2023.

Petitioner: Geraldine Tyler.
Respondent: Hennepin County, Minnesota, et al..

Advocates:

• Christina M. Martin (for the Petitioner)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Geraldine Tyler owned a condominium in Minneapolis. She stopped paying her property taxes and accrued a tax debt of $15,000. To satisfy the debt, Hennepin County foreclosed on Tyler’s property and sold it for $40,000, retaining the net proceeds from the sale.

Tyler sued the County, arguing that its actions violated her constitutional rights. The district court dismissed Tyler’s case for failure to state a claim, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed.

Question

1. Does taking and selling a home to satisfy a debt to the government, and keeping the surplus value as a windfall, violate the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause?

2. Is the forfeiture of property worth far more than needed to satisfy a debt a fine within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment?

Conclusion

Taking and selling a home to satisfy a debt to the government, and keeping the surplus value as a windfall, violates the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause. Chief Justice John Roberts authored the unanimous opinion of the Court holding that Tyler plausibly alleged that Hennepin County’s actions violated the Takings Clause and thus that her claim can go forward.

The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, prohibits the government from taking private property without “just compensation.” This does not prevent the government from collecting taxes, or from taking action to enforce the collection of taxes. However, the government may not, as Minnesota purported to do by statute in 1935, extinguish a property owner’s interest in property when she falls behind on her property taxes. English law, from which the U.S. Constitution derives much meaning, has long proscribed the taking of more from a taxpayer than she owes. Moreover, Supreme Court precedents and Minnesota law itself, in other contexts, recognize the principle that a taxpayer is entitled to the surplus in excess of the debt owed.

Justice Neil Gorsuch authored a concurring opinion, in which Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson joined, addressing the second question presented, which the majority declined to address. In Justice Gorsuch’s view, Hennepin County’s actions likely also violate the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause.

Yegiazaryan v. Smagin

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Apr 25, 2023.
Decided on Jun 22, 2023.

Petitioner: Ashot Yegiazaryan.
Respondent: Vitaly I. Smagin, et al. .

Advocates:

• Vincent Levy (for the Petitioners)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Vitaly Smagin, a Russian citizen who resides in Russia, sued Ashot Yegiazaryan, a Russian citizen who resides in California, and eleven other defendants, under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act. Smagin alleged that Yegiazaryan and the other defendants illegally attempted to avoid paying a judgment Smagin won against them in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California for engaging in a series of fraudulent transactions between 2003 and 2009 in to steal Smagin’s shares in a joint real estate investment in Moscow, Russia.

The district court dismissed Smagin’s RICO claim, finding he did not suffer a domestic injury, which is a requirement for a RICO claim. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded, concluding that Smagin did allege a domestic injury.

Question

Does a foreign plaintiff with no alleged connection to the United States state a cognizable claim under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act when it suffers an injury to an intangible property?

Conclusion

A plaintiff alleges a “domestic injury” for purposes of filing a private civil suit under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c), when the circumstances surrounding the injury indicate it arose in the United States. Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored the 6-3 majority opinion of the Court.

The “domestic injury” requirement for private civil RICO suits comes from the Court’s decision in RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Community. However, the RJR Nabisco Court did not explicitly define a “domestic injury,” so the Court adopted a context-specific approach that considers the injury's circumstances—an approach consistent with that case. Applying this approach to Smagin’s case, the Court found his injury to be domestic. The majority of the alleged racketeering activities that prevented Smagin from collecting his judgment occurred in the U.S., targeting a California judgment. 

Justice Samuel Alito authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Clarence Thomas, and Neil Gorsuch joined, arguing that the writ of certiorari should have been dismissed as improvidently granted.