Two mishnayot! First - a description of how the Sanhedrin sat -- in a semi-circle, so the judges could see each other. Scribes transcribed the arguments. Plus, the hierarchy of the seating, and how the judges would rise through the ranks. Plus, the way the Jewish people would not broach the borders of sin, even when that border is relatively passable, such as hedge of roses. Which is understood as sufficient barrier to sin for a husband and wife, when the laws of taharat hamishpachah (niddah) require them to separate. With a note for Jews as people who are not too likely sin. Second - the court intimidates the witnesses to make sure they are sufficiently serious about the weight of what they have to say, in several different scary ways. And then the mishnah takes a side-step to interpret the verse of Kayin killing Hevel (Cain and Abel), and how serious that was. Plus, how man (Adam) was created alone - which attests to the value of one person, who is, indeed, an entire world. Which is, of course, another indication of how serious one's testimony is. Plus, an argument for both peace among people, and also, monotheism, as it turns out. And exactly why people should bother themselves to come forward to testify, even in light of the intimidation of witnesses in a capital case.

A comparison of Moshe Rabbenu to Rabbi Yehudah HaNasi, and then eventually Rav Ashi. The question is what's going on. The court begins deliberations with the lowest in the hierarchy, though elsewhere, the opposite was done. The Gemara posits that temporal leadership and Torah leadership was not found in the same person between Moshe and Rabbi Yehudah HaNasi, but the Gemara also pushes back with concrete examples, with biblical and talmudic examples. Plus, Rav Ashi, and his role as editor of the Talmud. Which gives us a timeline of Torah leadership through the generations. Also, the judgement from the lowliest of judges - weighing in first - in actual capital cases. The mishnah addresses the source for this order of opinions, with biblical sources, and philosophy about humanity's role in the world.

There are days when a court won't hear a capital case, because the capital verdict is not allowed to be issued on the same day as the case is heard, deliberated, etc. So, for example, Erev Shabbat (Fridays) and Erev Chag (the day before the night a holiday begins). This is further complicated by the need to carry out a death sentence on the same day as the verdict, rather than leave the convicted person with the death sentence hanging over his head overnight. Also, the overriding dominance of Shabbat, except when it comes to a "met mitzvah" - an unidentified dead body that needs immediate burial from whomever can do it - including kohanim, including a nazir. Plus, other extreme cases that might entail conflict or competing mitzvah needs - like keeping shabbat and circumcision, for example, when they need to be done simultaneously, but both can't be kept in that same moment.

In capital cases, one arguing for conviction can change and argue for acquittal, but not the reverse - if it's before the time of handing down the verdict. But how does this presentation line up with other comparable sources? It seems that judges cannot reverse a decision to acquit. Also, judging a case in day and at night - where monetary cases are begun in the day time. How far is that taken? What can be done at night? Plus, parallels between the assessment of possible tzara'at and court cases. Including the rule against blind judges. So how could there be a blind judge?

Returning to distinctions between monetary cases being tried and capital cases being tried -- what is the procedure for handling new evidence? The mishnah here is contradicted by a mishnah in Bekhorot -- where, here, in Sanhedrin, the case is retried, fundamentally, while in the other mishnah, the judge is responsible for the error. Why so? Also, reversing capital cases -- in the event of conviction, but not acquittal (that judgement stands). With exploration of various potential reversals, using various verses to illustrate the viability or impossibility of following through on a reversed decision to convict. Plus, the Sadducees and when the need to overturn a case was obvious even to to this sect.

Chapter 4! Beginning with a cluster of mishnayot -- comparing monetary cases with capital cases. For example - the number of judges, opening arguments, the extent to which are witnesses grilled, the majority for "conviction," the handling of new witnesses, evidence and reversals, and more. Also, delving into the need for investigation and interrogation of witnesses, which leads into the treatment of justice in biblical verses, including several interpretation of "tzedek, tzedek tirdof." Plus, the examples of boats that need to pass each other, or camels -- and the nature of compromise.

A new mishnah! With the dispute over when and how a verdict in the property court can be overturned, with new evidence -- or testimony. Also, forming a court for the sake of establishing the litigation - shouldn't it be done where the litigants are? Don't the costs of travel mitigate against the value of traveling to the specific court? Some flexibility is necessary. Plus, the parties sometimes need to bring their litigation to certain courts - depending on the circumstances and the dispute.

When one who borrowed money admitted that he did so - in less formal circumstances than a court, for example, where the claim is that he has set the money aside because he owes it to so-and-so -- that isn't a legal admission. The Gemara provides a general principle when such an admission would count. Also, we follow Rabbi Yehoshua ben Karcha or an admission with regard to land, but not for movable property. [Who's Who? Rabbi Yehoshua ben Karcha] His opinion is also applied for first-born animals which have been blemished and therefore incur a monetary loss. And signs of physical maturity. That is, testimony from 2 witnesses can be combined. But what is the question here, and how was it implemented?

A new mishnah! How the courtroom works - welcoming the witnesses with some scare tactics to make sure that they testify honestly. Note that witnesses are supposed to be designated as such. The judges weigh in, and the proceeding details exactly what needs to happen to rule innocent or guilty -- though each judge is anonymous with regard to the public of the case itself. Plus, the role of an "instigator" -- one who brings another party to do wrong. In the case of an instigator, the court doesn't need to seek out his innocence (as compared to other cases), as derived from the snake in the Garden of Eden. Also, in the event that a debtor admits to his debt before witnesses - that plus a formal act of acquisition means they can write an accord of his debt and that's so much stronger than testimony. And before 3 witnesses - the question is whether they become a court, with or without the formal act of acquisition and whether they can write that account.

Relationship and relationship charts are the essence of most of this daf. What relationships disqualify relatives from testifying against or about a relative? Note that these are all men - as witnesses, though some of the relationships include in-law status via women. And note that these are not the same relationships as the prohibited marriage/yevamot relationships. Also, a "lid on a barrel" - the mechutanim (fathers of bride and groom) can testify against each other. But can a man testify against or about his betrothed? Is that too close of a relationship? But he wouldn't be in deep mourning for her if she died (nor she for him).