Talking Talmud

A Torah scholar must learn 3 skills: writing, kosher slaughtering, and circumcision. And 3 additional things are subject to dispute - whether they are skills that are required or commonplace: tying the knot of tefillin, the blessing for the wedding, and tying tzitzit. Also, standards of presumption regarding an animal: while it's alive, the presumption is that it's not going to be kosher. Once it's slaughtered correctly, then the presumption is that the animal IS kosher, unless a blemish is discovered. Also, what if a wolf bite is clear on the innards of an animal - but perhaps it's a puncture after the shechitah? Or might the bite have obscured a hole that would have made the animal a treyfa? What about a snake's poison? But the wolf/intestine is a concern of a prohibition! And the snake concern is about danger, which requires greater stringency!

If you heat a knife to white-hot, the shechitah done with that knife is kosher, because it was already sharp enough before it was hot. The concern is whether the slaughtering was done with the knife's blade or if it was done via the heat and a burn. The Gemara contrasts the issues that pertain here to the details of tzara'at, which has a long-standing tradition "halakhah le-Moshe mi-Sinai" regarding the measure of impurity. Plus the details of shechitah as applied to a case of tzara'at. Also, the 3 knives that the butcher needs to cut the meat and the forbidden fats, and to keep the forbidden from contaminating the permitted. Plus, distinctive indications regarding which knife was which.

Does produce from Beit She'an need tithing? How is this even a question - Beit She'an is clearly part of the land of Israel. Note the Gemara's initial focus on how a sage isn't going to change his mind -- with various interpretations of the Hebrew term used here to note that he won't be dissuaded. Back to Beit She'an - it all goes to the human consecration (and re-consecration) of the land as essential to the holiness that results in land-based mitzvot, and the decisions made for the sake of the local poor. [Who's Who: Rabbi Pinchas ben Yair] Also, a story of the animals of the righteous. With a story of R. Pinchas ben Yair being able to split the river (for easier passage) - and with allusions to the splitting of the Red Sea -because of his own stance that it should - and God granted the miracle. Which rolls into a story about a stubborn donkey who wouldn't eat non-tithed barley. Plus, the concerns about preventing the suffering of animals and the righteous who take up their cause. Plus, Rabbi Hanina's statement that any injury or suffering in this world was decreed on high - with all the accompanying theological conundrum.

A story involving R. Asi and R. Zeira about eggs that were cooked on wine - did that combination carry a risk of "demai" (possibly untithed produce)? Where even R. Asi wasn't thinking about this concern - and how God prevents error by those who are righteous. Which leads us into the ongoing discussion of mixtures or combinations. Also, what about the concern of the population of those unschooled (am ha-aretz) in the halakhic arena of tithing? What if the person who is ignorant switches out that food, perhaps out of concern that it goes bad, or one's personal status of being impure/pure to be protective. That is, one's intent could be entirely on target, but the action is still problematic for a potentially demai mixture.

On the way Yehoshafat stuck by Achav, even when it came to the reliability of his shechitah, despite Achav being guilty of worshipping idols. Note the relationship between the king of Yehudah and the king of Yisrael, despite the divine among the tribes. Plus, the ravens who brought Eliyahu (Elijah) the Prophet his daily bread and meat... ostensibly from Achav's slaughterhouse (so how can Eliyahu have eaten that shechitah if it weren't acceptable? But he's really in a different reality). Plus, what if these ravens were people, not ravens? Also, a return to the Kutim/Samaritans - how it was determined to reject their shechitah after all. Plus, God protects righteous people from inadvertent sinning - or, in this case, not eating meat that wasn't slaughtered properly.

If one finds a string of birds in the possession of a Kuti, there are various ways of increasing rigor to test whether the Kuti had done the slaughtering properly, each of which concludes with determining whether the Kuti himself would eat from his shechitah. That is, where they accepted the halakhic requirements, they were incredibly careful -- and if they didn't accept the requirement to begin with, then they weren't trustworthy. Also, investigating Rava's view on one who intentionally eats non-kosher food - and yet that person can be relied upon for his assessment of kashrut, and even if that person does idolatry. Plus, the human enticement of food and drink just won't work for the Divine.

More on the contradiction in the first mishnah of the tractate, with attempts to determine what caveat works for the distinction between the ideal circumstances for kosher slaughtering as compared to after the fact. With a spotlight on the case of the "Kutim" (Samaritans) whose shechitah was accepted if overseen by an observant Jew. [Who's Who: Kutim/Samaritans] The question is what degree of supervision is required. And the test for kashrut is whether the Samaritan himself would eat his own shechitah. Plus, rounding up all 6 opinions regarding careful reading of the mishnah to draw that ideal/after the fact (lekhathilah/ bedi'avad) distinction.

An introduction to Hullin, including the meaning of the term and the likely original title of the tractate. Also, details of how to manage ritual slaughter (for any kind of slaughter, including non-consecrated meat). And the first mishnah! Everyone is eligible to do this slaughtering -- except for the usual 3 (deaf-mute, cognitively impaired, or a minor). Though, if they did it, and under supervision, and the slaughtering is done correctly, then it would be kosher too, at least after the fact. But does "everybody" always mean this distinction between the ideal situation and after the fact? With parallels to elsewhere in the halakhah that disprove that idea.

The Gemara picks up on yesterday's mention of King Hizkiyahu, one of the few truly righteous kings of Israel, and how he not only was a good example among Israel, but also for the neighboring nations. Plus, the Mediterranean region from Tyre to Carthage (likely) were said to have known God, though the rest of the world may not have. Also, the recognition of Torah study as of supreme value, especially once the Jewish people were in exile, beginning in Babylonia. Also, a final mishnah! With a profound understanding that one's pure intent is what determines the value of the offering, and whether its "aroma is pleasing to God," and not how large or expensive it is. Plus, the hunt for the source of this idea.

A new mishnah! One who makes a vow to bring an offering must do so in the Temple in Jerusalem (as compared to local personal offerings)... and also as compared to the replica of the Temple in Egypt: Beit Honio (or the Temple of Onias). And Honio was the descendent of Simon HaTzadik. [Who's Who: Simon HaTzadik] [What's What: The Temple of Onias] The historical context is essential here, in the era on the path to the downfall of the Second Temple... Note that the phrasing of one's vow will make the difference as to whether one could bring the offering in Beit Honio at all, though it obviously ought to be offered in Jerusalem. Plus, a baraita that delves into the question of where the Temple of Onias went wrong - namely, was it really a seat of idol worship? And who was "Honio"? Why did he agree to dress like a woman? And what was the state of the Jewish people in this era?