In the discussion of kidnapping, the source is connected to the "don't steal" of the Ten Commandments (at least, according to a prominent opinion), which seems to revise the translation of that mitzvah! Also, the concern of conspiring witnesses in the context of the gluttonous and rebellious child (among others). Plus, a new mishnah! On a "zaken mamre" - the rebellious elder, and his death sentence, plus what it takes to deserve that execution.

Since a son cannot hit his parents, can that son sit on a court that would decide the case of his father being subject to lashes, for example? Rav Sheshet says yes, and the Gemara jumps to defend his approach, though then his view is countered in a sharp why. Also: 2 new mishnayot: First, one who hits his father or mother is only subject to execution if he actually injures the parent (but only if the hitting takes place while the parent is alive). Second, when it comes to kidnapping, the kidnapper is only liable for execution when he brings the captive into his own domain -- and possibly only after the kidnapper has exploited his captive.

First, finishing chapter 9: If a non-kohen served in the Temple, that would be punishable by death "in the hands of heaven." But that opinion seems to be contradicted by the very sages who said it to begin with. Why so? The Gemara resolves the question. Next, beginning chapter 10, starting with a new mishnah: Those who are sentenced to death by strangulation. Note, again, the special status of the daughter of the kohen. Plus, the sources for these violations leading to this particular execution. Including the death sentence for hitting a person -- specifically in the event of a wound. Plus, a new kind of linguistic comparison of applying details to a new case.

In the context of death that is meted out in the hands of heaven, the Gemara presents a list of those in this category - specifically, pertaining to the Temple, the required practices of the kohanim, and so on. Plus, other violations by kohanim while performing the Temple service who aren't punished with death, but simply with violating a negative commandment. Also, if a non-kohen eats terumah, reserved for the kohanim to be eaten with purity - seems a violation for lashes, and not worse. With careful inference with regard to the biblical text. Plus, the special status of Rav and his extra authority.

Rav Dimi traveled from the land of Israel to Babylonia: The Hasmonean court isn't decrees against a man sleeping with a non-Jewish woman that puts him in violation of 4 injunctions: a woman who is impure from menstruation (even if she's not Jewish, when that wouldn't usually apply), a non-Jewish maidservant, a non-Jewish woman, and a married woman. That last one was subject to debate, and "zonah," prostitute, was suggested in place of adultery. But a Jewish man who saw this kind of event and brings it to the attention of the court is NOT told by the court to take it forward. That is, the court does not approve of these matters being taken into the hands of individuals, by those individuals. Also, a read of Pinchas, the archetypal zealot. 6 miracles were done for Pinchas when he acted against Zimri and Cozbi. With graphic, fascinating interpretations with regard to each of these three (and their sin).

Mishnayot! 1 - Someone who has incurred two different kinds of death penalties (but can only be killed once) - he is killed with the worse of them. Someone who has incurred two death penalties with one action, likewise to the more severe punishment. Which is tricky because there are such disputes over the hierarchy of the severity of the ways of execution. Also, 2 - someone who has been punished with lashes twice is then given the judgement of "machnisin oto la-kipah," even though he can't be executed at this time. (How many times does he have to have been judged for lashes?) 3 - Someone who kills another, but with no witnesses - another case of being consigned to that little hut, where basically the person starves. But why does this judgement usually include barley? Possibly it's the same across the board, and with each part of the meal in the different mishnayot. 4. Violations that are beyond the scope of the judgement of the courts - open the way for zealots, which is its own discussion (stay tuned!).

Ongoing discussion of a guilty party intermingled with innocent people (for example). Beginning with a case of two people standing together - and an arrow being shot from there those two people are, which kills someone. But since there's no way to identify which of those two shot the arrow, both are off the hook. Even if one of them is so righteous (like Abba Halafta) that the perpetrator seems obvious. Also, a group of those who all are waiting for their respective death sentences, but the executions are different, so how do you establish which should be put to death how? Look to the majority of the death sentences for the group and also the ranking of the severity of the different executions, to determine which should be applied to all.

Two new mishnayot! First, one with the case of one who intends to kill an animal, but kills a person, or a non-Jew and then Jew, etc. Disturbing cases, but in the effort of determining the parameters of the case - when the perpetrator would be culpable, and when not. Plus, many cases of intending one action (including killing), but where the result is the death of someone else - where the perpetrator is deemed not liable. Such that intent and the degree of his blow, for example, will bring about a death - he may well be culpable after all. But if the intent included the person who is killed - then the culpability is more likely, depending on the logic of the given case. Also, the exempt cases - when you're not sure who of the group killed someone outside of the group -- applying to and assessing the perpetrator... which leads to the decision for "machnisin oto la-kipah," where the court can't establish a death sentence judgement, but they also can't let these perpetrators go free.

With partial or shared causation, who is culpable? Which leads to a discussion of someone who is already mortally wounded or ill or injured, and then someone kills that person, when is that considered murder (and the perpetrator would be held accountable) - as compared to being exempt because there was no new "death" to perpetrate (because he was already dying)? And what if one's strike is not forceful enough, but someone else follows up? Or one's strike IS forceful enough, but happens not to kill? Plus, the position of Rabbi Nechemiah, and the assessment that the victim will live after all.

When one person ties up another, and the tied-up person died of starvation, or of the elements (on delay), then the person who tied him up is exempt - unless he tied him up, for example, in such a way that the elements begin their affect on the person who dies immediately. Or a person ties another person up in front of a lion - where the lion might not eat the guy... or mosquitos, which would definitely bite him until he dies... that's the distinction between whether the perpetrator is held accountable or not. Plus, a discussion over who takes the approach of exempting the perpetrator, or holding him culpable. Also, a person in a pit where another party pushes a ladder in (so he can't escape), or when someone shoots an arrow at another, and another party takes the victim's shield... if that shield would have protected its holder, then the arrow-shooter wouldn't be held liable. Likewise, if one has medicine to heal himself at the time of the shooting, even if he later loses them, then the shooter is not liable. Including games that need to include a warning to be able to hold someone who uses the games as a means of the attack liable.