Talking Talmud

Are people responsible for doing the wrong thing when they thought it was permitted at the time that they did it, or to what extent is a person responsible for making sure he or she has knowledge of those permitted/prohibited actions? The example is a ger toshav - and the question of when punishing consequences kick in. That is, when does it seem close to deliberate, in contrast to the consequences all being left to God. With examples from the Torah where people were held responsible for transgressions they hadn't known they were committing (for example, Avimelech when he thought Sarah and Avraham were siblings, leaving her permitted for Avimelech to take as a wife - though she wasn't really). Also: 2 mishnayot - on the cities of refuge, and who can and cannot take refuge there. For example, a blind person cannot. An enemy of an "unintentional" killing cannot usually go to exile (and might be put to death for murder instead). Plus, the location of the 6 cities of refuge. Plus, initially, the killer ran to a city of refuge before the court judgement.

A new mishnah! But first - the written form of the Torah's verses, as compared to the read/pronounced form. Now, when one throws a stone into a public gathering - that person would go to exile in the city of refuge (among other cases, and with exclusions). Plus, cases between father and son, teacher and student, etc., where there might well be a mitzvah for the perpetrator to have a mitzvah for the action, including deliberate hitting (as compared to throwing a stone). With the Gemara doing the heavy duty lifting to interpret the mishnah. Plus, a jump to shemitah - and a comparison to voluntary action. Also, another mishnah: A father's accidental of a son, and a son's accidental killing of a father - the killer goes to the city of refuge. This right seems reserved to a Jew who kills a Jew (unless it's a ger toshav who kills a ger toshav). Note that the father who strikes his son for is own education is in a different category, because that might be a mitzvah, in context.

Last mishnah of the chapter: After the witnesses have testified, and the court has issued its verdict (a death sentence), and the defendant runs away... and he comes back, but is not judged again. Rather, witnesses testify to the previous judgement. Plus, the concern about a court being a "bloody court" for sentencing however many to death - and the concern that no death sentences (so the court would never be a bloody court, but, at the same time, murderers would be getting away, as it were). Also: Chapter 2! With a new mishnah - and unintentional killing which may allow the killer to take refuge in a city of refuge, protected from an avenging relative. But not every unintentional killing has that protection. Also, another mishnah! What happens if a person is chopping with an axe and the axe-head - or the wood - flies through the air and kills another... would that woodchopper be able to be exiled to the city of refuge?

A new mishnah - a long one, including discussion of verses that provide the key details about witness testimony (not conspiring witnesses, though). For example, how many witnesses may offer testimony to establish the case. Plus, the significance of warning, especially in capital cases. Also, another mishnah: where different groups of witnesses see the same event from different angles. Plus, what happens if the potential victim of conspiring witnesses truly did wrong things?

3 mishnayot! 1 - Conspiring witnesses who plot to impose monetary penalties on their victim. The witnesses can divide the payment that they are then required to pay, but each gets the full total of lashes (with a linguistic connection on the verses of the Torah - according to Abaye, vs. Rava's claim of imposing lashs on another). 2 - Conspiring witnesses are only deemed such when other witnesses come forward to establish that they couldn't have witnessed what they claim to have witnessed - with testimony about the witnesses themselves, and not about the event they are speaking about. And then witnesses can come forward who knock down the witnesses who claimed the witnesses were conspiring - and reestablish the original testimony. And so on for 100 sets of witnesses. Also, Rava introduces a number of cases where the witnesses are faulty and problematic, but not conspiring. Which is difficult, but not as bad as the conspiracy of conspiring witnesses. 3 - The penalty to the conspiring witnesses - and when they would experience "as they conspired to do to another." That is, their execution would only kick in if another's life was taken because of them. But the halakhah also seems to balk at imposing the death sentence on them, after their victim has been put to death - to the distinction to the "final judgement" with regard to the victim, not actually putting him to death.

If a barrel of well water falls into the Mediterranean and a person comes to immerse where that water fell into the sea, that dunking is not effective - on the assumption that the water doesn't blend/disperse quickly. With some attention to other mixtures - such as wine in the Mediterranean, and more. Also, a new mishnah - back to the conspiring witnesses, and the monetary cases where the witnesses get lashes for false testimony and also are dunned for paying the amount they were attempting to force their victim to pay. Plus, the contrast between conspiring witnesses and the fines levied against someone who slanders (motzi shem ra).

How to assess the damage that the conspiring witnesses would have caused if they hadn't been determined to be conspiring: especially with monetary cases, such as the value of a ketubah, for example. But if he were to have died, he'd only have lost the value of the ketubah, without having to pay it out. So the risk of her having been widowed becomes part of the equation - including whether someone might have been willing to buy out the ketubah. Likewise, a case where the person they're testifying against has done the thing they're testifying about - and in that case, how much damage have they caused him? Also, a caveat about whether a loan is made with a promissory note - and how the default 30 days before asking for your money back kicks in only with a formal IOU. Plus, a concern about opening a collar on a shirt - and how that would be a violation of Shabbat, in contrast to removing the stopper from a wine barrel.

An introduction to the tractate Makkot, and to chapter 1: lashes as punishment for middle-level transgressions. Also, conspiring witnesses who cannot be given the judgment they sought to enact against the person they testified again, so that lashes take that place. So the Gemara explains that the mishnah's expectation for the result of the testimony is upended - though in some cases, the witnesses would be selected via the proper channels, as applied.

More on the idolatrous city - specifically, how to handle the sacred scrolls that cannot be burned (namely, bury them). How little prevents an ir ha-nidachat from being judged as such? Also, recognizing that the place of the destroyed city cannot be rebuilt as a city, can it be converted to gardens or orchards? A clear machloket! Plus, a detour into the question of Jericho, and also Achav. Also, who are the wicked referred to in the last mishnah? Thievery. Wickedness leading to anger - and God's anger. With a strong finish with an eye to redemption, when righteous people come to the world, which leads to joy in the world too.

More on the city of idolaters... Including how to determine how at least half of the city was involved, and the process by which each was put to death in an expeditious way. Also, what does it mean to destroy everything in a city when some of those things are not supposed to be destroyed ever?! Namely, consecrated property, and more. Of course, there's a machloket.