Talking Talmud

A new mishnah! On how a healthy person can transfer property to others -- to go into effect after that person's death: the phrasing of "from now until after death." But what happens to that property during the lifetime? Neither father nor son can sell those properties during the father's lifetime. And if the son did sell, the buyer does not have the right until father's death. But does the father need to say, " from now" to begin with? The Gemara suggests that the date alone should be enough. Also, the case of all of the above, but where the son dies in his father's lifetime -- what happens if the son has sold the property before he died? Does the sale take effect (say, after the father's death? Or not at all? It's a dispute between R. Yochanan and Resh Lakish.

When a man is dying, they ask him in a roundabout way whether his wife will be subject to yibum. When he says she could marry a kohen gadol means she doesn't have any need for yibum. But what about when a man comes to divorce his wife, he is considered reliable with regard to his wife's status - sometimes! Sometimes, he is explicitly "not believed" with regard to his wife's status. Which leads to a serious discussion about protecting the women, and also held in a respectful manner that allowed for different opinions. Also, if a will is written on one's deathbed and not yet given to anyone, and then the person dies -- that will is not considered valid. Likewise, a deed of transfer that is to be written on one's deathbed is not valid, because that kind of contract is only effective if the original owner is still alive.

A practical example, of one who found his children to be lacking and gave all of his property to Yonatan ben Uziel instead of to his official heirs. The sage gave a portion of that gift back to the children, which opened a tussle with Shammai, over the standing of the benefactor's wishes. Also, the 80 students of Hillel the Elder, and their greatness, including the least of them being R. Yochanan ben Zakkai, and how accomplished and steadfast he was in learning Torah. Also, a new mishnah! When man who specifies his heirs, he's largely believed - and then his wife would be proven exempt from yibum. Which is more of a "yibum" issue than an "inheritance" issue, but it applies to both.

More on Rabbi Yehudah ben Berkoka's position, with the property being established as an inheritance vs. as a gift. But what is the real difference? Why would it be preferable to inherit, as compared to receive a gift? For starters, the heirs need to support the widow of the benefactor, which is not the case for the recipients of gifts. Also, a new mishnah! What happens when a person really does give his property away and his rightful heirs get nothing? The majority view frowns upon such a decision, though it would take effect. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel explains that there are circumstances, say, with an heir who is not behaving well, where circumventing the inheritance laws would be considered the right move. The Gemara provides a story that illustrates what the rabbis of the majority view think of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel's caveat.

A case where a husband gives his wife the entirety of his property as a gift, not an inheritance, where her ketubah is fundamentally folded into the sum total of his property, as it were. Then a creditor comes along to collect from her. What is she to do? [Who's Who: Rabbi Yehudah Nachtom (the Baker)] Rabbi Yehudah Nachtom has a story that illustrates exactly the question of whether the wife should keep the sum total of the gift. Also, the case of a woman who forfeits the right to her ketubah when her husband gave her land. But why does this (potentially small) piece of land mean she's forfeited her ketubah? The Gemara has a complicated answer.

What happens when a healthy person wants to allocate his property as gifts? In contrast to the cases we've seen to this point, which have been deathbed utterances. Also, what happens when there's an administrator (apotropa) appointed over the estate. Note that the case doesn't spell out the relationship between all parties. Plus, how does the appointment of an administrator function in the context of gift-giving vs. the default inheritance?

More on stipulations of inheritance vs. those of gift-giving. What if the stipulation is about someone who is suitable to be inheriting in any case? Also, a deep dive into the ways of determining what the given halakhah is. Plus, a few words of appreciation in memory of Rabbi Raymond Harari z"l.

How to handle inheritance - with oral designation as a gift, and not as "inheritance." Including the question of when one must stipulate that a gift is indeed a gift in the statement of establishing a gift (beginning, middle, or end of the giving). Also, a dispute among 3 Amoraim -- when or whether giving a gift in place of "inheritance" would be effective. Plus, how that kind of gift can be reapportioned to others. Also, when one rethinks a statement with legal consequences, one can recant -- if one does so in a very speedy manner: fundamentally, "within the initial statement."

This daf presents 7 queries about some quirky cases that were sent by Rabbi Abba to Rav Yosef Bar Chama [Who's Who: Rav Yosef bar Chama and also Rabbi Abba, in which the halakhah is decided in accord with Rabbi Abba, in the end of it all. Cases include both details about inheritance as well as other legal issues pertaining to one's standing.

How the laws pertaining to a "Tumtum" affect his ability to inherit the double portion. This status has all kinds of implications to other areas of halakhah that pertain to males -- including the timing of brit milah, including the impurity that attaches to a mother after giving birth. Also, a question was sent to Shmuel: When a person has knowledge that he is the first-born, and his father says that someone else is the first-born -- does the father's statement hold sway or not? (it's a machloket)