General Sanders was evidently as blunt as he felt he could be in his valedictory communication when standing down as Chief of the General Staff (CGS). From day 1 of his appointment he was publicly candid about the size of the Army, which did not sit well with the Secretary of State for Defence; it is well known that even exceptional politicians find it difficult to cope with inconvenient truths. Nevertheless, Wallace was considered one of our better politicians. I still wonder why the shining star that was Wallace faded so quickly. I do hope there is not an unedifying explanation.

Sanders' assessment of British Army decline was as explicit as he dared to be but full of implicit warnings that will be lost on most people. He was absolutely right to make the case to re-arm as fast as we can (a huge challenge given our sclerotic acquisition processes). What was left largely unsaid is the inability of the Army to prepare, deploy and sustain itself in the field.

During the Cold War, when we used to spend around 6% of GDP on Defence, the Army had four deployable Divisions, that exercised as a Corps within NATO. In the same era, 'Stables' parades were a feature of unit life whereby vehicles were taken out of their garages and cleaned, repaired and maintained. Detachment, vehicle or Crew Commanders and their associated personnel became very knowledgeable about the state of their vehicles; knew their strengths, weaknesses and idiosyncrasies. Understandably, a bond was formed with the vehicle platform that was to bear these personnel into and/or in battle. Being so in touch with key equipment heightened the chance of success in combat; the like of which has been torpedoed by something called Whole Fleet Management (WFM), arguably one of the most destructive policies ever implemented.

The bulk of vehicles and equipment are no longer in unit lines, but held centrally (and certainly not enough to equip a comprehensive mobilisation) and 'maintained'. With the bonds of ownership broken, prior to an exercise (or Operation), vehicles and equipment are delivered from a central pool, quite often not on time or in a good state, and preparation/repair/familiarisation eats into valuable training time. Worse still, a paucity of military vehicles is often offset by civilian rental vehicles, which detracts from training and credibility still further, and some exercises would in all likelihood fail completely if personal mobile phones were not used; which tells you more about the Army's communications systems than it does about poor signals security behaviour. Whilst WFM may make sense to accountants, it has destroyed the crucial link of familiarity between operator and vehicle platform and signals equipment, that is likely to make a difference in the crucible of combat.

Even if there were sufficient numbers of vehicles, there is a NATO-wide critical lack of strategic and operational lift capacity, whether that be air, maritime, rail or by road, to get them to the right place on time.

Back in the 80s the British Army had over 1,000 Main Battle Tanks (MBT). On the books today there are 200 or so. I would risk a lot of money in betting that only about 100 are actually fully serviceable.

As Sanders asked when he became CGS: why would he want to reduce the size of the Army in these turbulent times? Re-arming is one thing. Increasing the size of the Army is quite another. The rot set in with the demise of the Junior Army back in the 90s, compounded, amongst other things, by a disastrous privatisation of the recruiting function. Units are much reduced in size in terms of personnel. The persistent reduction of "our most important asset"1 necessitates the Army policy direction for new capability programmes to aim for personnel levels of less than the current level or at worst: no more. The reality is that many new capabilities will require greater personnel levels than currently, particularly if the Army is to double and then triple its capability. Even if t...