Did you know that George Washington could have become an American Caesar, but instead chose to walk away from power? Unlike Napoleon or Cromwell, he rejected dictatorship and dynasty, setting the precedent for civilian control of the military, limited executive authority, and the peaceful transfer of power.

In this episode of This Constitution, host Matthew Brogdon sits down with eminent historian Jeremy Black to trace Washington’s extraordinary balancing act. From the battlefields of the Revolution to the presidency, Washington navigated fragile institutions, fractious states, and the lure of personal power and, in doing so, set precedents that continue to define American politics.

The conversation explores Washington’s role as a “meritocratic monarch,” how he differed from figures like George III, Napoleon, and Oliver Cromwell, and why his restraint proved essential to building a constitutional republic. They discuss the challenges of commanding a multi-state army, the dangers of potential coups, his deliberate retirement, and the legacy of leadership “for country, not party.”

They also tackle a deeper question: what does Washington’s example teach us about the relationship between military power and constitutional government? His decision to submit force to law, ambition to restraint, and leadership to the service of the people remains one of the defining features of American constitutionalism.

In This Episode

• (00:03) Opening and introduction
• (00:56) Washington as a "meritocratic monarch"
• (02:34) Contrasts with George III and Napoleon
• (04:09) Washington’s challenges with Congress and state governments
• (05:31) Comparison to the French Revolution and use of force
• (07:01) Civilian control of the military: Historical continuity
• (08:20) Presidential power and restraint
• (09:37) Washington’s post-war precedent
• (10:54) Use of force in domestic rebellions
• (12:23) Continuity from military to executive leadership
• (13:04) Constitutional practices in the Continental Army
• (14:48) Managing rivalries and federalism in the army
• (16:12) Geographic shifts in the Revolutionary War
• (17:25) Washington’s political skills and resource allocation
• (19:41) National identity and the crucible of war
• (22:29) Army vs. Navy in American political culture
• (23:48) Washington’s non-autocratic leadership
• (24:32) Washington as American Cincinnatus
• (25:56) Washington’s farewell address and peaceful transfer of power
• (27:44) Conclusion and legacy
• (28:08) Podcast outro and next episode teaser

Notable Quotes

• (01:00) "I see George Washington as a formative figure in America and an example of the best type of what I call a meritocratic monarch." — Jeremy Black
  
  
• (04:13) "Washington does this with enormous skill, not in easy circumstances." — Jeremy Black
  
  
• (08:21) "One of the patterns that derives directly from Washington is that of the subordination of the military to civil authority." — Jeremy Black
  
  
• (08:37) "Washington was not an American Caesar. He did not create himself as a dictator either." — Jeremy Black
  
  
• (19:44) "America is born in the crucible of war, because that defines the boundaries of America." — Jeremy Black
  
  
• (23:06) "The expression of liberty becomes that of serving on land in military forces." — Jeremy Black
  
  
• (27:35) "I think one could say his politics were for the people, for his country, rather than for himself or his party." — Jeremy Black

How did a political system founded by leaders who warned against factions end up making political parties an indispensable part of democracy? And why has the United States remained a two-party nation for nearly two centuries?

In this episode of This Constitution, host Matthew Brogdon sits down with political scientist Daniel DiSalvo to trace the fascinating constitutional and political journey of America’s party system. From Jefferson’s “party to end all parties” to Martin Van Buren’s invention of the enduring two-party model, they unpack the forces that created, shaped, and sustained the parties we know today.

The conversation explores how early mechanisms like the “King Caucus” gave way to national conventions, how parties managed (and sometimes suppressed) divisive issues like slavery, and why the two-party system has proven so resilient thanks to first-past-the-post elections, the Electoral College, and state ballot laws.

They also tackle a deeper question: how political parties and the Constitution are in constant tension. The Constitution disperses power through the separation of powers; parties try to assemble it to win and govern. That push-and-pull has defined American politics from the 1790s to the present.

In This Episode

• (00:13) Introduction to Daniel DiSalvo and the study of political parties
• (01:16) Founders’ skepticism toward parties and their early emergence
• (04:30) State governments’ role in shaping elections
• (06:03) The “King Caucus” and constitutional concerns
• (09:44) Jefferson’s “party to end all parties”
• (10:58) Van Buren’s case for permanent parties to avoid sectionalism
• (12:16) National conventions as a political safety valve
• (15:19) Tariffs, internal improvements, and keeping slavery off the agenda
• (18:18) How parties suppressed abolitionist voices
• (20:38) The Republican Party’s rise as the only successful third party
• (24:22) Why the U.S. has a two-party system
• (26:19) First-past-the-post elections and the Electoral College
• (31:13) The appeal (and limits) of the two-party model
• (36:00) Consensus politics in a separated-powers system
• (39:32) Why parties remain essential to democratic accountability

Notable Quotes

• (01:23) "Jefferson's opposition didn't last very long. You could say that maybe his statement shows that many statements in politics are in bad faith, since he still hopes to go to heaven, even though he was one of the founders of the first political party." — Dan DISalvo

• (02:10) "The Constitution, which sets up all these institutions, doesn't specify a way that these offices are gonna get filled up. So how are you gonna get people to be elected to these offices?" — Dan DISalvo

• (03:15) "Parties become the ligaments and the muscles that tie it together, tying citizens to the institutions set up by the Constitution." — Dan DiSalvo

• (06:30) "The process for electing presidents became what was then called the King Caucus, which was what these nascent parties in Congress were." — Dan DiSalvo

• (13:00) "Van Buren's idea is we're going to take away, get rid of this King caucus, and we're going to have this idea of national conventions." — Dan DiSalvo

• (29:00) "The Electoral College system makes it very hard for third parties to get in." — Dan DiSalvo

• (32:30) "In our system, you campaign inside your own party to win a primary election, then you campaign on what you think is good." — Dan DiSalvo

How should a democracy balance the need for independent investigations of government wrongdoing with the president’s constitutional authority over prosecutions? Where do we draw the line?

In this episode of This Constitution, hosts Savannah Eccles Johnston and Matthew Brogdon dig into the fascinating and often murky world of special counsels. From their origins in President Grant’s efforts to distance himself from scandals, to the dramatic moments of the Watergate era and the "Saturday Night Massacre," the history of special counsels is anything but straightforward.

They break down the creation of independent counsels under the Ethics in Government Act of 1978, a powerful legal framework that was later undone by high-profile investigations like Iran-Contra and the Clinton impeachment. Fast forward to today, and the special counsel role has become a battleground for constitutional debate, raising tough questions about who holds the power to fire them and when.

Matthew makes a compelling argument for why prosecutorial power must remain politically accountable, warning against a future where legal battles spiral beyond the courts’ control. They wrap up the episode with a powerful reminder to rethink our reliance on legally ambiguous mechanisms and consider the Constitution’s built-in safeguards, like impeachment, as a much-needed check on power.

Tune in for an eye-opening dive into the constitutional tension between justice and executive authority.

In This Episode

• (00:15) Topic Introduction and definition of special counsels
• (01:16) Historical origins: Grant and Roosevelt
• (01:57) Watergate and Nixon: The rise of controversy
• (03:37) The Saturday night massacre
• (06:03) Aftermath of Watergate: Impeachment and resignation
• (07:14) Constitutional issues: Executive power and accountability
• (09:53) The Ethics in Government Act of 1978
• (11:31) Independent counsel vs. special counsel: Key differences
• (12:44) Scope and jurisdiction of independent counsel
• (14:35) Controversies: Iran-Contra and Whitewater
• (15:05) Supreme Court and Morrison v. Olson
• (17:20) Problems with removal and accountability
• (20:48) Expiration of the independent counsel statute
• (25:38) Return to special counsels: DOJ regulations
• (26:52) The Mueller investigation and modern special counsels
• (29:12) Removal and oversight of special counsels
• (31:51) Unresolved constitutional questions
• (33:23) Political vs. legal controls: Impeachment and accountability
• (37:38) Checks and balances: Political structure vs. legal process

Notable Quotes

• (09:07) "The prosecutorial power is a very dangerous power. Even if you can't get a conviction, to bring an indictment and to pursue a prosecution against someone can ruin their life." — Matthew Brogdon

• (12:26) "The independent counsel has, quote, full power and independent authority to exercise all investigative and prosecutorial functions and powers of The Department of Justice, the Attorney General, and any other officer or employee of the Department of Justice." — Matthew Brogdon

• (34:09) "I think the founding generation expected the impeachment power to be a far more widely utilized power. That's been extremely rare. And I think we've actually underutilized it." — Matthew Brogdon

• (37:43) "Checks and balances work best when you lean into their political structure. They're inherently political structure, and they get really murky, and we get lots of problems or potential problems when we ignore that structure in favor of a more legal structure and rely more on the courts." — Savannah Eccles Johnston

When we hear “impeachment,” most of us immediately think: the President. But what if that’s only part of the story? In this episode of This Constitution, Savannah Eccles Johnston and Matthew Brogdon explore the lesser-known history of impeaching cabinet secretaries and other executive officials, revealing how the process has always been more political than legal.

They revisit the case of Secretary of War William Belknap, who resigned in tears in 1876, hoping to dodge impeachment—only to face it anyway. Fast-forward to 2024, and Secretary Alejandro Mayorkas is at the center of a modern-day controversy that reopens the same unresolved questions. Can officials be impeached after they’ve left office? What actually qualifies as a “high crime or misdemeanor”? And who decides?

Through historical case studies, sharp legal insight, and a few surprising turns (including George Washington daring Congress to impeach him), this episode digs into how impeachment functions as a tool of accountability—and a reflection of the political moment.

If you think impeachment is just about criminal wrongdoing, think again. This conversation will shift how you view one of the Constitution’s most powerful and misunderstood mechanisms.

In This Episode

• (00:13) Introduction and overview
• (00:59) Impeachment process and constitutional ambiguity
• (02:52) Impeaching former officials: The Belknap case
• (05:32) Impeachment after resignation: Nixon and precedents
• (07:50) Trump’s second impeachment and unresolved legal questions
• (08:21) Senate jurisdiction and the Blount case
• (11:30) Defining high crimes and misdemeanors: Johnson’s impeachment
• (13:07) Political vs. legal grounds for impeachment
• (15:23) Impeachment standards for judges vs. executives
• (16:12) Early impeachment threats: Washington and the Jay Treaty
• (17:39) Modern debates: Mayorkas's impeachment and political disputes
• (19:19) Impeachment responsibility: Cabinet secretaries vs. presidents
• (22:32) Impeachment as a congressional tool
• (23:16) Impeachment’s political nature and checks and balances
• (24:36) Impeachment vs. criminal prosecution
• (27:05) Conclusion: Impeachment’s role in American government

Notable Quotes

• (00:43) "When it comes to executive impeachments, we have a history of failed impeachments." — Savannah
• (03:01) "Can you impeach former government officials? The Constitution does not tell us... This is something that had to be figured out in the moment that it became an issue." — Savannah 
• (05:10) "I just hope at some point in my life I can find an occasion to look at an office holder and say, you have prostituted your high office out of a lust for private gain." — Matthew
• (06:43) "Impeachment is not just about removing people from office. It's also about the possibility of excluding them or disqualifying them from future office holding." — Matthew 
• (17:05) "Washington was saying, impeach me if you think I can't be trusted and I violated the public interest in negotiating this treaty." — Matthew 
• (26:29) "One use for impeachment is to remove a president so that he can be successfully criminally charged." — Savannah 
• (27:07) "Impeachment is a tool in the checks and balances toolbox when it comes to working out disputes between the branches." — Matthew 

In This Episode

In this episode of This Constitution, Savannah Eccles Johnston and Matthew Brogdon explore one of the least understood and most powerful tools in the U.S. Constitution: impeachment. But forget presidents for now, this episode dives deep into judicial impeachments: how they work, why they're rare, and why judges have historically been the ones who get removed.

Savannah and Matthew unpack what it means for Congress to wield this political sword, why it's not a criminal process, and how colorful cases like Samuel Chase and Alcee Hastings shaped our understanding of judicial accountability. Along the way, they raise big questions about what "high crimes and misdemeanors" really means—and whether just being bad at your job is enough to get you booted off the bench.

• (00:00:13) Introduction to judicial impeachment and constitutional process
• (00:01:00) The House indicts, the Senate convicts
• (00:02:23) Impeachment is a political, not criminal process
• (00:03:42) The Senate as jury and the role of the Chief Justice
• (00:05:13) Historical focus: judges, not presidents
• (00:05:58) Corruption, perjury, and Florida judges
• (00:06:29) Why cabinet members get fired but judges get impeached
• (00:07:00) Life tenure vs. good behavior
• (00:08:00) Samuel Chase and the partisan bench
• (00:10:00) The Jeffersonian purge of the courts
• (00:12:00) Why Chase avoided conviction
• (00:13:30) Fast forward to Alcee Hastings (and yes, Florida again)
• (00:14:30) No conviction? No problem—still impeached
• (00:15:20) Hastings’s comeback as a Congressman
• (00:17:00) Can you impeach just for bad rulings?
• (00:18:13) Defining “high crimes and misdemeanors”
• (00:20:00) Bad judgment vs. misconduct
• (00:21:26) The Senate is the ultimate check
• (00:24:01) The case of Judge Pickering and judicial incompetence
• (00:26:05) Balancing judicial independence with accountability
• (00:28:00) Why judicial impeachments are so rare and so hard

Notable Quotes

(00:03:00) "Though this is set up like a criminal trial, it’s important to note this is a political process. This is not a criminal process." — Savannah Eccles Johnston

(00:07:05) "You only get to hold this office as long as you behave yourself. And there’s a way to get rid of you if not." — Matthew Brogdon

(00:12:25) "Had they impeached Chase, it would’ve telegraphed to the court: if you act like a partisan hack on the bench, we will kick you off." — Matthew Brogdon

(00:15:00) "He’s no longer a judge, but Florida elects him to Congress. So I guess… he wins?" — Savannah Eccles Johnston

(00:18:57) "High crimes and misdemeanors are not defined in the Constitution. But 'misdemeanor' back then just meant to misbehave." — Matthew Brogdon

(00:26:05) "There is a fine balance between judicial independence and oversight by Congress. And impeachment is the only tool Congress has." — Savannah Eccles Johnston

Resources and Links

This Constitution  

• https://bit.ly/4fYWnVi

Savannah Eccles Johnston

• https://www.linkedin.com/in/savannah-eccles-johnston-515a72198/
• https://www.instagram.com/savypolitics/

Matthew Brogdon

• https://www.linkedin.com/in/matthew-brogdon-8a21bb89
• https://www.uvu.edu/ccs/people/matthew_brogdon.html

In this Independence Day episode of This Constitution, Matthew Brogdon is joined by Dr. Jane Calvert, Director of the John Dickinson Writings Project and author of Penman of the Revolution. Together, they explore the legacy of John Dickinson, one of America’s most influential yet often overlooked founders.

Best known for Letters from a Farmer in Pennsylvania, Dickinson was a leading advocate for colonial rights but notably opposed the rush toward independence. Jane explains how Dickinson’s belief in natural rights, his cautious approach to revolution, and his commitment to unity positioned him as both a voice of reason and a strategic architect of America’s founding.

Matthew and Jane dive into Dickinson's critical contributions to the Articles of Confederation, his overlooked role in shaping early American foreign policy, and how he continued to influence the nation, leading troops, freeing enslaved people, and playing a vital part in the Constitutional Convention.

If you think the American Revolution was driven only by firebrands and radicals, this episode will challenge that view and reveal how one of the most cautious founders helped lay the foundation for American independence and unity.

In This Episode

• (00:00:37) Introduction 
• (00:00:27) Dickinson’s Letters from a Farmer in Pennsylvania
• (00:01:22) Sources of rights: British law vs. natural rights
• (00:03:45) Dickinson’s ambivalence toward independence
• (00:06:20) Colonial status and constitutional debates
• (00:07:21) Dickinson’s views on Parliament, trade, and executive power
• (00:11:08) The onset of war and Dickinson’s role in Congress
• (00:12:23) The Olive Branch Petition and the Declaration of Taking Up Arms
• (00:17:10) Dickinson’s strategic use of time and preparation for war
• (00:19:29) Dickinson’s leadership in the Pennsylvania militia and committees
• (00:20:36) Congressional debates: diplomacy, union, and independence
• (00:21:58) Dickinson’s position on independence and committee work
• (00:24:01) Drafting the Articles of Confederation and the Model Treaty
• (00:29:10) Dickinson’s post-Declaration statesmanship
• (00:31:51) Dickinson’s role in the Federal Convention and later life
• (00:35:36) Conclusion and legacy

Notable Quotes

• (02:32) "Dickinson was one of the earliest people who said, actually, that is not right. Our rights are not bestowed upon us by any kind of paper or parchment. They come to us from God" — Jane Calvert
• (05:51) "Understand that  from the vantage point of the 1760s and early 1770s, the safest course for securing rights was within the confines of the British Constitution." — Jane Calvert
• (06:28) “The British considered themselves to have a constitution. They had certain institutional relationships, just like we argue over the relationship between the President and Congress and the relationship between the federal government and the states.”— Matthew Brogdon
• (16:14) "Dickinson’s goal with the Declaration was to produce such apprehensions in the British that they would think twice about coming over here." — Jane Calvert
• (24:08) "If Dickinson had supported independence, he would have written the Declaration." — Jane Calvert
• (26:37) "The model treaty Dickinson helped draft became the blueprint for American foreign policy until World War II." — Jane Calvert
•  (26:45) "So it is a shame in a way that when we think about the Continental Congress, we often think about the Declaration of Independence and the conduct of the war. But forget some of these other crucial things that are happening and don't really happen,." — Matthew Brogdon

What happens when nine unelected judges have the final say on the most divisive questions in American life? In this episode of This Constitution, Savannah Eccles Johnston and Matthew Brogdon break down the Supreme Court’s most consequential and contentious tool: judicial review.

They explore how this authority allows nine unelected justices to strike down laws, reshape policy, and act as a final check on Congress and the presidency. But where does this power actually come from? Is it rooted in the Constitution or in political tradition? And does it strengthen or weaken democracy?

Savannah and Matthew examine the origins of judicial review, from the Supremacy Clause to Marbury v. Madison, and how the courts have used this power to decide the nation’s most polarizing issues—from marriage equality to abortion rights. They also unpack the tension between constitutional stability and democratic self-rule, and why judicial review has become both a cornerstone of American government and a lightning rod for controversy.

In This Episode

• (00:00:15) Judicial Review: Introduction and definition
• (00:01:26) Scope and constitutional basis
• (00:03:13) Judicial review in Article III and historical assumptions
• (00:04:01) Marbury v. Madison and early judicial review
• (00:05:25) Hamilton, Federalist 78, and popular sovereignty
• (00:07:05) Jefferson vs. Hamilton: The dead hand of the past
• (00:08:31) Jefferson’s revolutionary perspective
• (00:12:06) Judicial review as upholding the original bargain
• (00:12:47) Amendments and overturning Supreme Court decisions
• (00:15:09) Marbury v. Madison and precedents
• (00:19:01) Frequency and notification of judicial review
• (00:20:22) Political impact of Marbury v. Madison
• (00:23:01) Judicial review and modern controversies
• (00:25:33) Congressional response to Supreme Court decisions
• (00:28:28) The Supreme Court’s aristocratic nature and democratic tension
• (00:29:32) Judicial review as a tool of national majorities
• (00:31:36) Deliberation and the Court’s effect on democracy
• (00:34:20) When should the Court intervene?
• (00:35:31) Origins and alternatives to judicial review
• (00:39:09) Judicial review: Supreme but not final

Notable Quotes

• (00:51) “When judges declare a law unconstitutional, they're saying that the law is in effect, unenforceable.”— Matthew Brogdon
• (01:53) “There's one provision in article six and what's called the Supremacy Clause that tells state judges they're supposed to declare state laws and constitutional provisions unconstitutional, or declare them void if they conflict with a federal law or the federal constitution.”— Matthew Brogdon
• (05:25) “This is something Alexander Hamilton will talk about in Federalist 78, where he will defend judicial review as a necessary check on legislative power, basically, legislative overreach, violation of rights. And this is very interesting.”— Savannah Eccles Johnston
• (00:09:06) “The hardest thing about revolution is ending it.It's creating a stable government. And the way you do that is stability and veneration in the laws” — Savannah Eccles Johnston
• (15:58) “Marbury is the first time the Supreme Court openly exercises the power of judicial review and declares a federal law unconstitutional.”— Matthew Brogdon
• (00:23:10) “Judicial review is the basis for the court being a co-equal branch of government. It’s what makes them powerful—and potentially problematic in a democratic system.” — Savannah Eccles Johnston
• (00:30:06) “Judicial review is a kind of tool of national majorities to discipline states that want to stay out of the prevailing direction in the country.” — Matthew Brogdon
• (00:39:09) “Judicial review is a supreme power—but not a final power.” — Mat

Abraham Lincoln claimed he only wanted to save the Union. So how did he end up freeing millions of enslaved Americans?

In this special Juneteenth episode, host Savannah Eccles Johnston is joined by Diana Schaub, professor emerita of political science at Loyola University Maryland and nonresident senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute. A leading Lincoln scholar, Schaub brings deep insight into the political, legal, and moral complexity of emancipation.

Together, they explore how Lincoln’s views on slavery evolved, how he balanced his constitutional oath with his personal convictions, and why his famous executive order—though limited in scope—became the most consequential in American history. The episode also traces the military strategy, legal ambiguities, and political finesse that led to the 13th Amendment and the legacy of Juneteenth.

In This Episode

• (00:00:00) Opening and introduction
• (00:01:16) Lincoln’s stance on slavery and the Constitution
• (00:01:44) Slavery as a state vs. federal issue
• (00:02:18) The battle over territories and the spread of slavery
• (00:03:28) Lincoln’s strategy: Quarantine and gradual extinction
• (00:05:44) Changing Southern attitudes: Slavery as a positive good
• (00:07:14) Lincoln’s efforts with border states and gradual emancipation
• (00:08:41) Decision for executive action: Emancipation Proclamation
• (00:10:51) Scope and strategy of the Emancipation Proclamation
• (00:11:46) Reassuring border states and shaping public opinion
• (00:13:55) Effectiveness of the Emancipation Proclamation
• (00:15:26) African American troops and military impact
• (00:17:19) Legal status of the Emancipation Proclamation post-war
• (00:18:32) The need for the 13th Amendment
• (00:20:16) Lincoln’s political strategy for the 13th Amendment
• (00:22:29) Lincoln’s signature and ratification process
• (00:23:05) Failure of the first House vote
• (00:24:17) Lincoln’s sense of timing and political skill
• (00:25:28) Black troops and the right to vote
• (00:26:31) Civil War: Union vs. abolition motives
• (00:27:32) Gettysburg Address and the moral meaning of the Union
• (00:29:06) Gettysburg Address vs. Second Inaugural Address
• (00:30:31) National responsibility and postwar reconciliation
• (00:33:22) Final reflections and closing

Notable Quotes

• [00:01:45] “Slavery was regarded as a domestic institution... governed at the state level, it was considered a state matter.” — Diana Schaub
• [00:04:36] “Lincoln thought that the Founders put slavery in a position of moral and physical quarantine.” — Diana Schaub
• [00:05:07] “The Southerners took that as the death knell of slavery and were prepared to secede over it.” — Diana Schaub
• [00:14:11] “The Emancipation Proclamation assumes that slaves will take action on their own. It in fact invites them to take action on their own.” — Diana Schaub
• [00:15:45] “By the end of the Civil War, one-fifth of the Union troops were African American.” — Diana Schaub
• [00:26:46] “The Union is everything because the Union has moral worth. It has moral content.” — Diana Schaub
• [00:27:16] “Lincoln believed that if slavery were to have spread into the territories, then it would actually become perpetual.” — Diana Schaub
• [00:32:49] “The point of the theological interpretation is to try to get Americans to transcend those bad passions and move in the direction of charity.” — Diana Schaub

Can Congress say no after it already said yes? For more than 50 years, the legislative veto let Congress give power to the president, then yank it back when it didn’t like the results. It was a political safety net, a constitutional gray area, and a ticking time bomb.

In this episode, hosts Savannah Eccles Johnston and Matthew Brogdon unpack how this backdoor power worked, why it exploded in the landmark case INS v. Chadha, and what that means for modern government.

They trace its roots from tariff tweaks and emergency powers to immigration enforcement and massive presidential discretion. The Supreme Court said the legislative veto was unconstitutional. But here’s the twist: Congress’s sweeping delegations of power to the president stayed in place. So now we’re stuck with a powerful executive and no real legislative check.

In This Episode

• (00:00:02) Introduction and overview
• (00:00:16) Executive veto vs. legislative veto explained
• (00:02:25) Historical background of legislative veto
• (00:03:26) Types of legislative vetoes
• (00:04:24) INS v. Chadha case introduction
• (00:04:50) Details of the Chadha case
• (00:06:46) Judicial and due process concerns
• (00:09:09) Constitutional issues with legislative veto
• (00:11:36) Supreme Court ruling in INS v. Chadha
• (00:12:11) Impact on existing laws
• (00:13:52) Tariffs and legislative-veto example
• (00:15:01) Expansion of presidential power post-Chadha
• (00:17:04) Political and constitutional implications
• (00:19:20) Three options for addressing legislative veto
• (00:20:28) Supreme Court’s dilemma, possible solutions
• (00:27:18) Alternative legislative solutions

Notable Quotes

• [00:01:10] “Imagine Congress authorizes the President to tear down some of the hideous brutalist architecture in Washington, D.C., and put beautiful buildings, big, beautiful buildings in its place. Right. Which I'm in favor of.” — Matthew Brogdon

• [00:08:23] “If you had to pick any deliberative body to decide a question about your fate... no one would look at a congressional committee and go, that's the group I want deciding.” — Matthew Brogdon

• [00:12:38] "We live in a post-Chadha period now where presidents still have this delegated authority, but there is no congressional check."— "Savannah Eccles Johnston 

• [13:57] “So the Congress passed back in the early 1900s, something called the TWEA. And you know a good chunk about this. It's gives the President the capacity to have some discretion over certain tariffs and how Congress can respond to that then."— "Savannah Eccles Johnston 

• [00:17:38] “The legislative veto was actually a sort of incentive for Congress to delegate away absolutely way too much of its authority.” — Matthew Brogdon

• [00:19:25] “You can either say the legislative veto is necessary in modern government, we're going to overlook constitutional issues. Two, you can say the legislative veto is unconstitutional and deny it, but be okay with delegations of authority to the president continuing anyway."— Savannah Eccles Johnston 

• [00:16:37] "Did Congress intend to grant the President that level of unchecked tariff power where it's unquestionably a power of Congress to control tariffs in the Constitution? They've delegated some of this authority without the capacity to say, except we don't like it in this circumstance.— "Savannah Eccles Johnston 

• [00:21:03] “The legislative veto is pretty clearly unconstitutional. I mean, as a matter of constitutional structure, it's very hard to square it with Article 1, Section 7.” — Matthew Brogdon

In this episode, hosts Savannah Eccles Johnston and Matthew Brogdon examine the presidential veto — what it is, what it isn’t, and why it remains one of the most potent constitutional powers in modern governance.

They dissect the mechanics of Article I, Section 7, and explain the differences between the qualified veto (which Congress can override) and the pocket veto (which Congress cannot). Along the way, they revisit presidential losers like Andrew Johnson, discover why Reagan and Clinton both wanted a line-item veto and explore why even the threat of a veto is often more powerful than the veto itself.

Plus, a special focus on the institutional tug-of-war that defines the separation of powers and how the veto isn’t just a tool for lawmaking, but a key part of constitutional interpretation.

In This Episode

• (00:00:00) Reading the Constitution’s veto clause
• (00:01:42) Why the word “veto” never appears in the Constitution
• (00:02:17) Qualified vs. absolute veto power
• (00:03:58) How pocket vetoes work and why they’re sneaky
• (00:04:56) Override math: why two-thirds matters
• (00:06:46) Less than 10 percent of vetoes are overridden
• (00:07:54) Veto failures: Andrew Johnson, Franklin Pierce, George W. Bush
• (00:10:49) The veto as a political threat
• (00:13:00) Institutional vs. partisan power struggles
• (00:14:00) Madison's veto dreams and regrets
• (00:18:28) Reagan, Clinton, and the failed line-item veto
• (00:20:00) Clinton v. City of New York (1998)
• (00:24:23) Congress’s habit of abdication
• (00:25:26) Can the line-item veto return? Maybe.
• (00:26:00) Why do presidents explain their vetoes
• (00:28:00) Veto messages as constitutional arguments
• (00:29:14) Nixon’s War Powers Resolution veto lives on
• (00:30:00) Who interprets the Constitution? Everyone.
• (00:32:00) Checks, balances, and constitutional fights that matter

Notable Quotes

[00:02:06] “The president can veto a bill, subject to two-thirds override, but the word ‘veto’ doesn’t even appear in the Constitution.” — Savannah Eccles Johnston

[00:04:29] “The pocket veto isn’t in your face. It’s like, ‘Oops, I forgot to act and now all your legislative effort is dead.’” — Savannah Eccles Johnston

[00:11:24] “This almost feels like an absolute veto because you could never muster the political will to override it.” — Savannah Eccles Johnston

[00:24:30] “Congress can’t get its house in order, so they ask the president to run it for them.” 

— Savannah Eccles Johnston

[00:29:14] “Sometimes a veto message gets overridden, but the constitutional argument inside it eventually wins.” — Matthew Brogdon

[00:31:00] “The constitutional system is structured so that each branch has to interpret the Constitution for itself.” — Matthew Brogdon

Resources and Links

This Constitution  

• Website

Savannah Eccles Johnston

• https://www.linkedin.com/in/savannah-eccles-johnston-515a72198/
• https://www.instagram.com/savypolitics/

Matthew Brogdon

• https://www.linkedin.com/in/matthew-brogdon-8a21bb89
• https://www.uvu.edu/ccs/people/matthew_brogdon.html