The topic of this episode is, “What has become of the United States Senate and can it be revived?”

The Senate did not have a good year in 2024. The chamber did not pass a budget resolution, nor did the Senate enact any of the dozen annual spending bills. Its year-end calendar of business listed dozens of pages of bills on matters large and small awaiting votes. Lots of floor time was spent on presidential nominations rather than on debating policy or amending legislation and voting on it.

To help us get a better sense of what’s not going well in the Senate and what might be done to improve its functioning I have with me Professor Anthony J. Madonna. Tony is a professor at the University of Georgia. He is the author of many scholarly articles on Congress, and most recently published a piece for Political Research Quarterly titled, “Interbranch Warfare: Senate Amending Process and Restrictive House Rules.”

The topic of this episode is a new book on Senator Mitch McConnell, a Republican who served as his party’s chamber leader for the better part of two decades.

The book was written by Associated Press reporter Michael Tackett, and its title is The Price of Power: How Mitch McConnell Mastered the Senate, Changed America, and Lost His Party. It was published by Simon & Schuster in November of 2024.

It is a fine book, and I certainly enjoyed reading it. I learned a lot about Senator McConnell. For example, who knew that he dated a lot when he was a single guy? Who knew that he had a role in transforming Kentucky from a Democrat-controlled state to one with a vibrant Republican party? And who knew that Senator McConnell recruited a Rep. Tom Cotton of Arkansas to run for the Senate?

Capacious as this book is, I could have read one twice its size. Mitch McConnell is fascinating figure, and a historic one.

So let’s get to it—the story of Mitch McConnell.

Read the full transcript here.

As listeners know, every two years the House of Representatives is reborn. After the November election each party convenes in Washington, DC. They discuss and debate how they will run their parties, and what their legislative priorities will be. And if they are members of the majority party, they will discuss and decide what the rules of the House should be. Then when they open the new Congress in January one of the first things they will do is to vote along party lines on a new rules package.

A group of scholars and former House members recently released Revitalizing the House (Hoover Institution/Sunwater Institute), a report calling for the House to revise its rules. You can find that report on UnderstandingCongress.org.

To discuss why the House should change its rules I have with me one of the authors, Dr. Philip Wallach. He is a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute. He is a colleague and a friend. At AEI he studies America’s separation of powers, with a focus on regulatory policy issues and the relationship between Congress and the administrative state. His latest book is Why Congress (Oxford University Press).

Click here for the full transcript of the episode.

The topic of this episode is, “What does the House Ways and Means Committee do? And how does it do it?”

The House Ways and Means Committee is the oldest committee of the United States Congress, first established in 1789 and became a standing committee in 1805. It has jurisdiction over raising revenue for the government to spend---taxes, tariffs, and the like. The term “Ways and Means” comes from English Parliamentary practice, wherein there was a committee with authority for finding the ways and means to pay for government actions and policies.

My guest is Tom Reed, a former member of the House of Representatives. He was in Congress from 2010 to 2022 and represented New York’s 29th and 23rd districts. Importantly for this podcast, Mr. Reed served on the House Ways and Means Committee and was deeply involved with its tax reform work.

Click here for the full transcript of the episode.

The topic of this episode is, “How can the House of Representatives better prepare new members?”

My guest is Rep. Stephanie Bice, a Republican who has represented Oklahoma’s fifth congressional district for the past four years. She previously served in the Oklahoma state legislature from from 2014 to 2020. Prior to that, she worked in business for her family’s technology company and her own marketing firm.

I first met Rep. Bice perhaps eight years ago. I was studying alcohol policy reform and she was deep in the process of helping rewrite some of Oklahoma’s outdated alcoholic beverage laws.

Rep. Bice, I should add, sits on the House Appropriations Committee and the House Committee on Science, Space and Technology. And most relevant for this podcast, she also is on the Committee on House Administration, which has jurisdiction over many matters including the onboarding of new members of Congress.

The topic of this episode is, “How does media affect our perceptions of Congress?’

As listeners no doubt know, Americans are down on Congress. Public approval of Congress has averaged about 20 percent over the past 20 years, according to Gallup. Certainly, the people on Capitol Hill are partly to blame. We have legislators who behave as if they are on a reality television show and who spend a lot of time starting fights on social media. Congress also has hurt its reputation by failing to address major public policy issues, like immigration and the soaring national debt. And then there are the occasional scandals that disgust the average American.

Yet, Americans’ dour opinion of Congress also is fueled by media coverage.

To talk more about this I have with me Rob Oldham, who is a Ph.D. candidate in politics at Princeton University. This year he will be an American Political Science Association Congressional Fellow, and will be spending a lot of time on Capitol Hill. His published papers investigate the relationship between supermajority rules and bipartisan policymaking. His dissertation considers congressional policymaking in response to crises during the era of polarization.

And importantly and especially relevant for this podcast is that Rob is the coauthor (along with James M. Curry and Frances Lee) of a fascinating, recent article titled, “On the Congress Beat: How the Structure of News Shapes Coverage of Congressional Action.” This article was recently published by Political Science Quarterly.

The topic of this special episode of the Understanding Congress podcast is a recent book by Michael Johnson and Jerome Climer. The book is titled, Fixing Congress: Restoring Power to the People (Morgan James Publishing, 2024). Mr. Johnson and Mr. Climer each have spent more than four decades in Washington, DC and have had stints working inside Congress.

Today, I have with me one of the authors, Michael Johnson, who, I should add, is not to be confused with current House Speaker Mike Johnson.

He has a long resume—he has spent about a half century in or around government, with stints in the White House, Congress, and private sector. Mike also coauthored a book with Mark Strand, Surviving Inside Congress (Congressional Institute, Inc., 2017), which we previously discussed on this podcast.

The topic of this episode is, “Does Congress still suffer from Demosclerosis?"

My guest is Jonathan Rauch, the author of the classic book, Demosclerosis: The Silent Killer of American Government (Times Books, 1994). Jonathan is a fellow at the Brookings Institution, and the author of numerous books, including The Constitution of Knowledge (Brookings Institution Press, 2021), and Kindly Inquisitors: The New Attacks on Free Thought (University of Chicago Press, 2014).

I first read Demosclerosis nearly 30 years ago, when I was a graduate school student. I was rifling offerings outside the Strand Bookstore in Manhattan, and the book’s title grabbed me. Once I cracked it, the writing got me hook, line, and sinker. Rauch had taken social scientific insights to explain the mounting federal government dysfunctionality. Whereas pundits and politicos blamed Washington’s foibles and corruptions on bad people, Rauch showed that the trouble was caused by people within the Beltway rationally pursuing their own interests.

I recently re-read this book and think it is absolutely on to something important about Congress, and I am delighted to have Jonathan here to discuss it.

Show Notes:

- Demosclerosis (National Journal, 1992)

- Mancur Olson

- Government's End: Why Washington Stopped Working (Public Affairs, 1999)

The topic of this episode is, "what is Congress' role in a contingent presidential election?"

Two centuries ago, America had a contingent presidential election. No candidate got a majority of votes, and thus it fell to Congress to decide who got to be president. Might the United States have another contingent election? Certainly it is possible. Four of the past six presidential elections have been very close. In 2020, had 44,000 voters in Georgia, Arizona and Wisconsin picked Trump instead of Biden we would have had a tied election, with each candidate receiving 269 electoral votes.

So what is Congress’s role in a contingent election? How does that work? To answer these questions I have with me my colleague, Dr. John Fortier. He is a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, where he studies Congress and elections, election administration, election demographics, voting, and more. John is the coauthor of the books After the People Vote: A Guide to the Electoral College (AEI Press, 2020) and Absentee and Early Voting: Trends, Promises, and Perils (AEI Press, 2006). John also hosts The Voting Booth podcast.

Kevin Kosar:

Welcome to Understanding Congress, a podcast about the first branch of government. Congress is a notoriously complex institution, and few Americans think well of it. But Congress is essential to our republic. It is a place where our pluralistic society is supposed to work out its differences and come to agreement about what our laws should be.

And that is why we are here: to discuss our national legislature and to think about ways to upgrade it so it can better serve our nation. I am your host, Kevin Kosar, and I’m a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, a think tank in Washington DC.

John, welcome to the podcast.

John Fortier:

Thank you, Kevin. Pleasure to be here.

Kevin Kosar:

Let's start with a simple question. Why must a presidential candidate get 270 electoral votes in order to become the president?

John Fortier:

There's a short answer and a long answer. The short answer is that 270 is a majority of the electors that are possible to be cast.

The longer answer is that there was a debate in the Constitutional Convention about how to elect the president, but it came sort of late in the process. And I would say the first thing that they needed to decide is what did Congress look like? And there were all sorts of debates and back and forth before a compromise was reached where essentially the House of Representatives was one that represented the people more broadly. The states would have a number of House representatives based on their population and the Senate would be equal in the states.

Now when coming to the Electoral College—figuring out how to elect the president—there were two big principles. One, they had decided at this point that they wanted the president to be elected separately from the Congress. Not like a parliamentary system, not something coming out of the Congress. And secondly, that they were going to reflect that compromise in Congress.

And so, the real number of 270, or the larger number of electors that are available, are basically all of the states have two electors for the senators that they have. And then they have a certain number of electors in the House of Representatives based on their, their House delegation and also D.C. votes. That's what gets you the total, but it is something of a compromise coming out of a compromise, and this is a majority of the votes that you need.

Kevin Kosar:

So it's a constitutional thing, it's not a statutory thing.

Let’s imagine a scenario for the sake of illustrating the process: pretend it is mid-November of 2024, and we have Mr. Biden and Mr. Trump tied at 269 electoral votes each, or, that they each got fewer than 270 votes thanks to a third-party candidate garnering a handful of electoral votes. What happens next?

John Fortier:

You're right to point to two scenarios. One would be that there's a tie in the Electoral College, and in today's numbers that would be 269 to 269. Therefore, no one has a majority or perhaps there's a third party candidate who takes enough electors so that neither of the of the candidates gets to 270. Those are the types of situations which, down the road, are going to get you to a contingent election: one that doesn't go the regular way of counting the electors.

Now, in the meantime, there are steps. The first, of course, is the casting of candidates. The votes by the electors themselves. We the people vote in November, but we are ultimately electing these electors. They are going to their state capitals in each of the 50 states in the District of Columbia, and they are casting ballots in mid-December. Those ballots are ultimately then sent on to Congress and are then going to be counted on January 6. This is typically a very simple process where votes are counted and in almost every case other than two in our history someone has had a majority of the electoral votes. If that is the case on January 6, we have an official president-elect. That person is going to take office on January 20. We similarly do the same thing with the vice presidential votes from the electors for the vice president.

But if no one person gets 270 electoral votes, then we go into what is sometimes labeled a contingent election. And if all is clear, the House of Representatives will immediately convene to vote for a president, but they'll do so in an untraditional way. They'll essentially be voting by state delegation. Each state has one vote and then each state delegation, which could be made up of a bunch of people are somehow going to have to cast that ballot.

Another interesting thing to note—I think that's important—is you do need to get a majority of states, not just a plurality. You need 26 of the 50 state delegations in the contingent election to elect a president. And there are a number of ways in which you might not get that. One possibility is if there are three candidates, another way is that we might have some delegations that are split and that wouldn't count to the total—assuming both those people voted according to party. And you might have a case where somebody has 25 delegations, somebody has 23, and two delegations are split. That's not enough to elect the president, so there's a potential for a deadlock here, and you don't necessarily easily get to the 26.

One more thing lurking in the background, of course, is if for some reason that election is deadlocked or doesn't get to a conclusion, the vice president might be facing the same issue, where the vice president does not have a majority of the electoral votes. In that case, the Senate convenes and votes, but you need to get a majority of the senators to ultimately elect a vice president. Perhaps that might not happen either, but it is more likely that it will not divide in the same way.

You could either have a vice president who's elected, no president, and get to January 20th and have that vice president take over. It is possible that both of the contingent elections are held up, in which case we'd go all the way to January 20th, and then we'd have to go down the line of succession, meaning the Speaker of the House in today's line would become president.

So it's a complicated process, but there is a role for Congress, the House voting very differently than it typically does, and the Senate voting for the vice presidential candidate if there's no majority for either of these in the case of electing the vice president.

Kevin Kosar:

As a follow up, we have the House having to vote for the president, the Senate having to vote for the vice president. Imagine in the House, we have a state that has 10 representatives—six of them prefer Mr. Trump, four of them prefer Mr. Biden. Does their state then get counted towards the presidential total, or do they have to be unanimous? Do we know?

John Fortier:

This would be likely only the case where there are three presidential candidates who are being considered. With the 12th Amendment, the House can only consider the top three candidates. They can't consider anybody else. That was important in 1824 when there was fourth major political candidate who couldn't be considered.

So, if there were a state that had nine reps and it was four to three to two, the House is at times believed that maybe the four would prevail, but we're not absolutely sure about that. So the House might have a role. I'll leave it at that.

Kevin Kosar:

You've already indicated that we could end up in a peculiar situation where if the House can't come to agreement, the Senate could—in theory—come to an agreement about who gets to be the vice president. Would that vice president succeed? Would he become the president come January 20th?

John Fortier:

Yes, a couple things. First, we could go back to the 1800 election, one of two elections (1800 and 1824) where we did have this contingent election.

In 1800, the Electoral College looked a little different. We hadn't passed the 12th Amendment, and it was a bit of a quirk that it was a tie between two people of the same party—Thomas Jefferson and Aaron Burr. They were running like a ticket. The Federalists didn't do as well, but they controlled a number of congressional delegations, so this tie really could only be resolved with some of the help of the Federalists. Ultimately, especially with the urging of Alexander Hamilton (who preferred Jefferson to Burr), the Federalists voted for Jefferson. So, I think there is bargaining that's likely to happen.

If there is a deadlock, and you don't actually elect the president, most constitutional scholars believe that the president is still sitting there, kind of in waiting. The vice president is going to become the president, but ultimately if the presidential election were later decided—the House came up later in the Congress and decided the election—that president could sort of later come back into play.

Kevin Kosar:

So, when a new Congress first convenes it has no Speaker. One must be chosen before the legislators get sworn in and then move onto the business of the chamber. We had a long drawn out Speaker fight at the start of the 118th Congress in early 2023. What happens to the contingent election if the House deadlocks on choosing a Speaker?

John Fortier:

Of course, what happened in January 2023 doesn't happen very often. I think many people—while we wouldn't like to see this—could think of a way of which the House might not proceed with the Speaker. We—in a sense—had an interim Speaker, Patrick McHenry.

There are people who will argue that maybe the House might proceed without a Speaker by some agreement of the people who were elected. I don't think anybody would prefer that, but I don't think that by itself it would absolutely prevent the House from going forward.

If you mean that there's a determined majority in the House to stop the counting on January 6th and not to go to that joint session, it is in the Constitution we're going to have the joint session.

But I don't think there's anything that really stops the court or others would stop and say the house must join this joint session Similarly the Senate it's the right thing to do. It's what they're supposed to do constitutionally But if you really had a determined number of people of majority of people I think you can do a lot of things to muck up the process So I don't think that's gonna happen and I don't recommend it but you know at the end of the day Determined majorities in Congress can do a lot.

Kevin Kosar:

That's true. Determined majorities can do an awful lot, especially in the House—which is a majoritarian entity—but certainly also true in the Senate. Earlier you've referenced the line of succession. For the help of listeners who are not familiar with it, could you talk a little bit about what this is? This is a constitutional thing. Is it a statutory thing? And who's in this line?

John Fortier:

Yes, it is both a constitutional and a statutory thing. The 12th and 20th Amendments have a process by which the vice president is going to take over for the president if the president dies, resigns, gets impeached and removed, or incapacitated.

That's a little trickier, but also clarified by the 25th Amendment. There are ways in which the president might not be able to be president and the vice president steps in. That's clear. Then it says is that Congress may provide a line of statutory line of succession. It says some more specific things like which officer shall be next in line.

Over the years, we've had three big different ideas, different laws of presidential succession. The first one had just the president pro tem (in the Senate) and the Speaker. The second one, starting in the 1880s, had a Cabinet succession—just the members of the President's Cabinet, no members of Congress.

The current line of succession we've had since Harry Truman put it in place in the late 1940s is a mix. Today, the Speaker of the House and the President pro tem are the top two people, and then there are all the Cabinet members in the order that the Cabinet's departments were created.

There has been some constitutional debate over the years of whether or not it is appropriate to have members of Congress in the line of succession. That's actually something James Madison protested against—saying officer means somebody in the executive branch—even though we did that in the first law.

We at AEI—with Brookings at times—have had a Continuity of Government Commission, and part of the recommendations of that Commission has been to say there might be more sense in having members of the Cabinet be in the line of succession. There are a lot of difficulties of thinking about bringing a Speaker over and being the president either temporarily or for a long time, especially with issues of change of party and the separation of powers issues.

So our current line has the Speaker of the House as next in the statutory line of succession after the vice president. And if for some reason there was no president elected, no vice president elected, and we have to January 20th, the Speaker would be the one who would step in and become president.

Kevin Kosar:

Yes, I could see the concerns about having a legislator step into the chief executive role. You mentioned the Speaker and the Senate pro tempore, the longest serving Senator, correct?

John Fortier:

By custom. Of course, we didn't always pick it that way. It's one of the criticisms of the line that it's often a very senior elderly senator from the majority party.

One other thing that's something of a conflict of interest is the case of impeachment.

Let's say you were to try to remove the president and the vice president, or one of them weren't there. There's a bit of a self-interested matter that perhaps the party in the House that's in the majority might put its own person in place. In fact, there was some rumblings back in the days when Vice President Spiro Agnew had resigned, and some saw President Richard Nixon as on the ropes. There were some people saying, "Don't confirm Gerald Ford because now we can appoint a new vice president with the 25th Amendment." And if you didn't appoint Vice President Ford and then impeached Nixon, the president would have been Carl Albert, the Speaker of the House. And there were even some efforts with a faction of the Democratic Party getting significant memos written about what would the Carl Albert presidency look like.

Kevin Kosar:

We can never forget about incentives, can we? And we can never forget Madison's point that you can't expect people in politics to be angels.

As a closing question, since amongst your many areas of scholarship are a scholar of continuity of government, when you look at the current process for Congress having to deal with a contingent election, do you think it's a pretty strong, robust, and steady process, and that we can relax and not be anxious about it? Or is this something that maybe some sort of reforms really should be put in place to just ensure that things go smoothly?

John Fortier:

We are coming up on the 200th anniversary of the last time we've had a presidential contingent election in the house—1824 was when we had the last one. It's a good thing we haven't had a lot of them. I think with our two party system—which is pretty strong—we're less likely to have it because we're not likely to have a case of multiple candidates. It really has to be a 269-269 tie scenario.

That being said, the Electoral College itself is not popular in most public opinion polls. There are people who don't like the idea of the popular vote being able to go one way and the Electoral College vote the other way. A contingent election is a very obscure procedure, and one that suddenly transforms the House of Representatives into something like the Senate, where the House is voting by states. This is much more unequal than the Electoral College itself, where it could elect a president of the, who didn't win the popular vote. I'm not sure the American people are going to love seeing this process.

There are some little things around the edges that Congress can do to clarify the rules about how it works, but getting rid of it requires a constitutional amendment. There is an effort out there where a bunch of states band together and agree to cast their electors for the winner of the popular vote, indirectly bypassing the Electoral College. That still is hard to do. You have to get a bunch of states to do it and they're not at a majority

This topic of this special episode of the Understanding Congress podcast is a recent book by a former Hill staffer. It is titled Fire Alarm: The Investigation of the U.S. House Select Committee on Benghazi (Lexington Books, 2023)

The author is Bradley F. Podliska is an Assistant Professor of Military and Security Studies at the U.S. Air Force Air Command and Staff College in Montgomery, Alabama.

Brad is a retired U.S. Air Force Reserve intelligence officer with the rank of lieutenant colonel. He was deployed to Iraq in 2008 and also worked as an intelligence analyst for the Department of Defense.

Dr. Podliska is a former investigator for the U.S. House of Representatives Select Committee on Benghazi. He is the author of two books, and that latter experience working on the Hill formed the basis for his book, Fire Alarm: The Investigation of the U.S. House Select Committee on Benghazi.

Kevin Kosar:

Welcome to Understanding Congress, a podcast about the first branch of government. Congress is a notoriously complex institution, and few Americans think well of it. But Congress is essential to our republic. It is a place where our pluralistic society is supposed to work out its differences and come to agreement about what our laws should be.

And that is why we are here: to discuss our national legislature and to think about ways to upgrade it so it can better serve our nation. I am your host, Kevin Kosar, and I’m a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, a think tank in Washington DC.

Professor Podliska, welcome to the podcast.

Bradley Podliska:

Thank you, Kevin, for having me. I appreciate being here.

Kevin Kosar:

You were an investigator for the House of Representatives. I introduced you as a professor, but you had on-the-ground experience inside Congress as an investigator for the House of Representatives. For audience members who have never heard of that position, what do House investigators do? And how did you get to that position?

Bradley Podliska:

Investigators are another term for subject matter experts, usually based on their executive branch experience. The role of an investigator is to interview witnesses, request documents, analyze those documents and then provide new information back to the members for the committee so they can conduct their investigation. Now with that said, the titles when it comes to the Benghazi Committee were completely and totally arbitrary. Attorneys had “counsel” in their title and if you were a non-attorney, you either had the title of investigator, professional staff member, or advisor, but we all did the same work. So we were all analyzing documents, we were all interviewing witnesses, and then we were reporting the results to the committee members.

In my particular case, I spent 17 years in the intelligence community and the Defense Department, and I knew someone that had known the Republican staff director of the Benghazi committee for over two decades. So I submitted a resume and I was hired soon thereafter, and this is a point I actually make in my book Fire Alarm, which is that you're basically hired on perceived party loyalty. I refer to this as a non-compensatory dimension. In other words, merit is a secondary condition. You might be the best person for a job, but if you are not perceived as a partisan, you are not going to be hired in the first place. This is done is through those personal connections that I talked about. I am not aware of any staff member that was hired on the Benghazi committee that either did not have prior Capitol Hill experience or did not know somebody on the committee itself.

Kevin Kosar:

And that should—for listeners who have heard some of the other podcasts I have done on the Congressional Research Service, Congressional Budget Office, Government Accountability Office—that is a very different thing from what happens at those legislative branch support agencies. Over there, it is a nonpartisan hiring process, based on merit, and once they are hired, they are tenured for life once they get through their one-year trial period to make sure that they are a right fit for the job. It is a very sharp contrast.

This committee that employed you—we will call it the Benghazi Committee, since the title is rather long—was not the same thing as the typical standing committees, the ones that have lasted forever (e.g., the Agricultural Committee or the Armed Services Committee). Where did this thing come from? How was it created and how was it different from the usual Congressional Committee?

Bradley Podliska:

That is certainly correct. This was a Select Committee and it was established through a resolution for the purpose of investigating a particular issue. The resolution is going to detail the power and authority that a Select Committee has, and—unlike a Standing Committee—it is not limited to a particular subject area.

Now when it comes to the Benghazi attack, the government had actually conducted 11 prior investigations prior to the setup of the Benghazi Select Committee. The FBI had conducted an investigation. The State Department and County Review Board had conducted an investigation. There were five House committees and four Senate committees that had conducted investigations.

The Benghazi Select Committee in particular was forced into being by an outside group referred to as Judicial Watch. On April 29, 2014, they obtained an email from Obama advisor Ben Rhodes via a FOIA request. And in that email, Rhodes is going to tell Ambassador Susan Rice that she should emphasize that the attacks were, “rooted in an internet video and not a broader failure of policy.” This email forced then-Speaker Boehner—who at the time did not want to set up a Select Committee—to hold a vote on May 8, 2014 to establish the Select Committee on Benghazi. It's going to be given a mandate: nine investigatory tasks that it's going to look to when it comes to the 2012 Benghazi attacks, which boil down to why did the attack happen, how the Obama administration respond to the attack, and did the Obama administration stonewall Congress in its prior investigations.

Kevin Kosar:

What did this special committee look like? Was it a lot of staff working for it? Was it a sprawling operation or was this a tight-knit group of people?

Bradley Podliska:

It was a small staff—24 staff members in total: two press secretaries, two executive assistants, security manager, and the interns. Arguably, there was a 25th member, who was actually a reporter. The committee would link information to this reporter and she would publish the results of this. So, you know, de facto 25. However, of this 25, there was only 15 staff members who could be identified as actually being actively involved in the investigative work of the committee. This included the staff director, the deputy staff director, the chief counsel, and 12 investigators, counselors, and advisors.

Kevin Kosar:

I think it is easy for people—when they hear committees—to think about what they see on TV, which is a bunch of legislators sitting at a dais with maybe a staffer or two lurking in the back, and a clerk tapping out notes of what is going on. But that is not all the people power involved.

How often were legislators working with the staff, poring through documents? What percentage of that time were they there doing that hard work?

Bradley Podliska:

In general, very, very little. Now this did vary from member to member. I actually looked at this in Fire Alarm, so I can say that Representatives Jim Jordan, Lynn Westmoreland and Trey Gowdy were actively involved in investigation. They were attending those witness interviews, and getting briefed on a regular basis. But then we have Rep. Peter Roskam on the opposite side. He only attended four high profile interviews in total. I think I saw him for a total of maybe one staff meeting, so simply not involved.

The day-to-day activities of the committee are actually done by the staff. You are going to tee up that information for the committee members and it is up to them on what they are going to do with it. We can get into details on Rep. Roskam’s Clinton hearing, what it looked like in terms of not being prepared. But generally speaking, it varied greatly between the members.

Kevin Kosar:

It is a good reminder of the old quip by Woodrow Wilson, 120 some years ago, that Congress at work is Congress in committee—staff in Committee; that is Congress at work.

Early in your book, you ask—and this is a driving question for Fire Alarm—how did a committee devoted to researching a terrorist attack on a US compound in Libya turned into a conflictual partisan operation. How did that happen?

Bradley Podliska:

My central claim in Fire Alarm is that both Republicans and Democrats actually use these taxpayer-funded congressional investigations as an arena to mount political attacks for electoral advantage. This actually stems from institutional changes under Speaker Newt Gingrich in 1995. He made committee chair selection subject to a secret party vote and subjected committee chairs term limits, replacing the seniority factor that had been in prior. He set task forces that allow an alternative legislative path to committees. He cut the committee staffs by a third, effectively limiting the expertise available. He also removed the minority party from deliberations.

In terms of the Benghazi committee itself, as I said, Speaker Boehner did not want to set up the committee. His hand was forced by the conservatives, and so when the hiring process was initially completed, it was going to do a check the box investigation. That is up until March 2, 2015, when The New York Times published an article that then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton used private email. After that, and up to her hearing on October 22, 2015, the investigation is going to kick into high gear going after Hillary Clinton to the exclusion of investigating the White House, intelligence community, or Defense Department.

One example of that is the committee issued 26 press releases about Clinton, three about the State Department, but absolutely none about the White House, Defense Department, or our intelligence community. The committee is going to direct 15 of its 27 document requests towards the State Department, including five for Clinton herself.

Here are a few other examples. The committee is going to produce 74,306 pages of documents; 72,343 of those pages came from the State Department. It interviewed 107 witnesses; only three of those were from the White House. It conducted 24 Defense Department interviews; 19 of those interviews are going to occur in the last four months of the actual investigation itself.

Kevin Kosar:

Not only was Hillary Clinton the Secretary of State, but she considered as the leading candidate for the Democratic Party’s nomination for president in 2016. And what happened in Benghazi became a vehicle of embarrassment and referendum on her confidence. Her use of private email was also remarkable and problematic because a) you are not supposed to do that and b) there are classified information policies that the executive branch and as the leader of an executive agency you are responsible for ensuring that those are obeyed.

What other background factors that should listeners know about?

Bradley Podliska:

Certainly, that is going to change completely the course of the investigation because this now becomes about Clinton's emails. Did she cause a problem and bring the attention onto herself? Arguably, yes. And, as it turned out, she had the private server set up in her basement of her house which added fuel to the fire.

With that said, the investigation goes into high gear and goes after her. Nobody is taking responsibility and now it appears that Clinton is hiding things. This is going to add, as I said, fuel to the fire.

Kevin Kosar:

You noted that, when Newt Gingrich was the Speaker in the 1990s, there were alterations made to the way the House operated. This was the first time that the Republicans had gained control of the House in four decades, and they were putting things under new management: changing how the House works and they were making it a little more parliamentary in nature. It was much more kind of becoming a team sport exercise. When you are the majority, you stick it to the minority. You vote with the team. Do not cross the aisle unless you absolutely have to. And so you describe these kind of forces that have been building up over the years.

But was it inevitable? The Benghazi hearings that were just so polarizing and got so ugly, it did not have to end up that way, did it?

Bradley Podliska:

No, absolutely not. And so, going back to my earlier claim, you are hiring party loyalists to conduct this investigation, and these are not necessarily going to be the subject matter experts. They are getting their direction from Speaker Boehner's office on how to conduct this investigation. And so, one of the points I make in Fire Alarm is it is evident to me that nobody actually read the witness interview transcripts after they were completed. They put together this report kind of anecdotally, and in doing so they missed key factors that actually were more incriminating on Clinton than they actually found.

Kevin Kosar:

So in the rush to bloody up a member of the opposite party and the person who would become the next candidate to run for the presidency, essentially the truth got lost along the way.

Bradley Podliska:

Absolutely. In my book, I talk about a key interagency meeting at 7:30 PM on the night of the attacks. Clinton—as the senior official—is going to lead this meeting, and this groupthink mentality takes place that Ambassador Stevens has been taken hostage. This is going to lead the military to making a whole bunch of other mistakes and delay in their response for Ambassador Stevens.

Instead of looking for all information that was available to her, including contradictory information, Secretary Clinton read a note at the meeting, saying Ambassador Stevens has been taken hostage. Now, we know this is completely and totally untrue. This was a very well planned, well-organized terrorist assault, which later goes on to the CIA annex. But the military is going to follow her lead and basically execute a plan for hostage rescue and assume they had more time than they did, and the CIA annex does not even come into their equation when it comes to the rescue. Also at this meeting, a narrative is going to take hold—also based on absolutely no evidence—that this attack was due to an anti-Islamic video. Jake Sullivan is going to write talking points from this meeting that are going to show up on the Sunday talk shows five days later where Susan Rice is going to make the infamous comments that this all being due to a video that had gone awry.

Kevin Kosar:

It is a popular amongst voters to imagine that there are great and complex conspiracies that are being carried out by nefarious people in high places and that they are very intricate and coordinated, and they can last for decades. That is not what happened here.

What we end up with is clusters of people playing a rough partisan game, crafting narratives on the fly to some degree to suit their priors and purposes, adjusting them along the way, sometimes just making up stuff outright. All the while, the media is running around and having some sort of interplay with it. It is a messy scene.

Bradley Podliska:

That is exactly right. You cannot have a conspiracy when incompetence is the answer. Officials are doing their best, but not entirely. Other officials such as Ben Rhodes and Jake Sullivan are getting involved and putting a partisan spin on this. And the Republican investigation is all in on Clinton but not looking at the White House, Defense Department, or intelligence community.

We just have incompetence built on top of incompetence. There is no conspiracy theory to be had here. It simply comes down to people failed and people failed to take responsibility.

Kevin Kosar:

This is why books like yours are so important, because there was so much noise being made around this whole phenomenon of what occurred in Benghazi. It was a blur of confusion to anybody trying to follow it from the outside. So much information coming out and so much stuff you did not know if it was true or not true. For somebody to go back, write a history, put everything together, and try to explain how it played out, where the facts were, and where the fantasy was is a huge service. We can all learn something instead of being caught in the myths that were spun at the time.

You ended up leaving the committee before the whole hullabaloo was done. Why? What happened?

Bradley Podliska:

This is actually quite interesting. I talked about Newt Gingrich and how he had fundamentally changed Congress in 1995. He is actually going to pass the Congressional Accountability Act. And included in that is employment law—what is referred to as USERRA—meant to protect reservists that go on military service. So right as The New York Times story is breaking, literally that day, I notified the committee I had to go on military leave on two periods, once in March and then again in May.

I came back and staff leadership is not talking to me, they were not giving me an investigative work. It turned out they were very upset that I had gone on leave and that I had not shifted to this hyper-focus on Clinton when I returned. About a month later, they called me in the office, they told me to resign or be fired. I, in turn, filed a USERRA complaint. The whole thing blew up in the media.

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