<div>
In parts of eastern Congo, the organisation that collects your taxes, settles your disputes and holds the monopoly on cigarettes is not the state.Raúl Sánchez de la Sierra (LSE) has spent years investigating how Congo's armed militias work. He tells Tim Phillips how he won the trust of its commanders without building the bomb they requested. He was allowed to see administrative records, and what they reveal about how the group raises and spends its money. He also interviewed recruits and their neighbours to find out who chooses to fight and why. It's a fascinating insight into a system of government that many economists never see.The research behind this episode:Sanchez de la Sierra, Raul, Louis Dunia, and Hilary Yu. 2025. <a href="https://raulsanchezdelasierra.com/research/">"Moral Violence: At the Heart of One of Congo's Major Armed Groups."</a> Working paper.Henn, Soeren J., Christian Mastaki Mugaruka, Miguel Ortiz, Raul Sanchez de la Sierra, and David Qihang Wu. 2025. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdae036">"Monopoly of Taxation without a Monopoly of Violence: The Weak State's Trade-Offs from Taxation."</a> Review of Economic Studies 92 (2): 1126-56.Sanchez de la Sierra, Raul, Kristof Titeca, Haoyang (Stan) Xie, Albert Malukisa Nkuku, and Aimable Amani Lameke. 2024. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20220908">"The Real State: Inside the Congo's Traffic Police Agency."</a> American Economic Review 114 (12): 3976-4014.Sanchez de la Sierra, Raul. 2020. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1086/703989">"On the Origins of the State: Stationary Bandits and Taxation in Eastern Congo."</a> Journal of Political Economy 128 (1): 32-74.Humphreys, Macartan, Raul Sanchez de la Sierra, and Peter van der Windt. 2019. <a href="https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/214632/1/Full-text-article-Humphreys-et-al-Exporting-democratic-practices.pdf">"Exporting Democratic Practices: Evidence from a Village Governance Intervention in Eastern Congo."</a> Journal of Development Economics 140: 279-301.To cite this episode:Phillips, Tim, and Raul Sanchez de la Sierra. 2026. "Armed groups as states: Taxation, security, and civilian support." VoxDev Talks (podcast). About the guest <a href="https://www.lse.ac.uk/people/raul-sanchez-de-la-sierra">Raul Sanchez de la Sierra</a> is Associate Professor of Management at the London School of Economics and Political Science. His research spanning political economy and development economics draws on sociology, anthropology and psychology to study the origins of the state, the internal organisation of armed groups, the hidden workings of state agencies and the psychology of the choice to use violence. He was one of the founders of Marakuja Kivu Research, a Congolese research organisation based in Goma.Research cited in this episode Community-driven development in eastern Congo. Raul's first work in the region was as a research assistant on the impact evaluation of a large village governance programme funded by the UK's Department for International Development. It aimed to bring elected committees to villages run by chiefs. Villagers objected when chiefs were barred from standing, and objected again when a chief stood and lost. Humphreys, Sanchez de la Sierra and van der Windt (2019) report the <a href="https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/214632/1/Full-text-article-Humphreys-et-al-Exporting-democratic-practices.pdf">results</a>.Stationary bandits. Mancur Olson's idea: a roving bandit takes everything and moves on, but a bandit who stays has an interest in next year's harvest, so he taxes rather than plunders and keeps rivals out (Olson, Mancur. 1993. <a href="https://ideas.repec.org/a/cup/apsrev/v87y1993i03p567-576_10.html">"Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development."</a> American Political Science Review 87 (3): 567-76). Sanchez de la Sierra (2020) tested it in eastern Congo; his VoxEU column <a href="https://cepr.org/voxeu/columns/origins-state-stationary-bandits-and-taxation-eastern-congo">On the origins of the state: Stationary bandits and taxation in eastern Congo</a> summarises the evidence.When the state takes back territory. Henn et al. (2025) study a Congolese army operation that stopped armed groups taxing villages they had controlled for years. Unable to tax, the same groups turned to pillage. Raul uses it to show how policy that looks only at the legal map can backfire.Who joins an armed group. Most studies of combatants interview veterans, who are survivors and have been changed by fighting. Sanchez de la Sierra, Dunia and Yu (2025) set up a phone alert with the armed group's 55 human resources commanders, so survey teams could interview recruits as they enlisted and, at the same time, a random sample of civilians in their home villages. Raul says the team spoke in person to about 300 new joiners.Measuring what people will not say. To limit misreporting, answers were given in private; the team also measured skin conductance, a physiological signal strongly associated with emotional arousal, collected supervisor and peer ratings seven months after enlistment, and asked second-order questions such as why respondents think others joined.Parochial altruism. A willingness to make sacrifices for your own group combined with hostility to outsiders. Choi and Bowles modelled how the two traits can evolve together through war (Choi, Jung-Kyoo, and Samuel Bowles. 2007. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1144237">"The Coevolution of Parochial Altruism and War."</a> Science 318 (5850): 636-40). Raul argues his setting goes further, because the act of being prosocial towards the group depends on fighting the enemy.Moral disengagement. Albert Bandura's term for the psychological steps, including dehumanisation, that let people harm others without feeling they have broken their own moral code (Bandura, Albert. 1999. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1207/s15327957pspr0303_3">"Moral Disengagement in the Perpetration of Inhumanities."</a> Personality and Social Psychology Review 3 (3): 193-209).The economics of corruption. Shleifer and Vishny separate the question of whether bribery is wrong from the question of when it is less efficient than taxation (Shleifer, Andrei, and Robert W. Vishny. 1993. <a href="https://shleifer.scholars.harvard.edu/publications/corruption">"Corruption."</a> Quarterly Journal of Economics 108 (3): 599-617). Raul uses that approach in his study of Kinshasa's traffic police.Kinshasa's traffic police. Sanchez de la Sierra et al. (2024) follow bribes up the chain of command in Kinshasa's traffic police agency. Station commanders set officers quotas of cars to bring in, and most of the agency's revenue comes from payments made behind closed doors at the station, not from bribes on the street. The team randomly reduced the quotas and measured what happened to traffic jams, accidents and enforcement.Pitfalls of policy advice. Acemoglu and Robinson argue that advice which ignores the political equilibrium can backfire, because it changes who holds power (Acemoglu, Daron, and James A. Robinson. 2013. <a href="https://www.nber.org/papers/w18921">"Economics versus Politics: Pitfalls of Policy Advice."</a> Journal of Economic Perspectives 27 (2): 173-92).More VoxDev Talks episodes <a href="https://voxdev.org/topic/public-economics/no-taxation-without-administration-what-makes-tax-authorities-work">No taxation without administration: What makes tax authorities work</a>. Anders Jensen and Jonathan Weigel on how tax authorities in developing countries are organised and staffed, from the formal side of the state Raul's militias imitate.<a href="https://voxdev.org/topic/public-economics/corruption-public-procurement-how-politicians-co-opt-bureaucrats">Corruption in public procurement: How politicians co-opt bureaucrats</a>. Sarah Brierley on why merit-based hiring alone does not stop corruption, a companion to Raul's work on the hidden structure of Kinshasa's traffic police.Related reading on VoxDev <a href="https://voxdev.org/topic/public-economics/can-low-capacity-governments-work-local-leaders-increase-tax-revenues">Can low-capacity governments work with local leaders to increase tax revenues? Evidence from the Democratic Republic of Congo</a>. Pablo Balan, Augustin Bergeron, Gabriel Tourek and Jonathan Weigel find that city chiefs in Kananga raised more property tax than state collectors.<a href="https://voxdev.org/topic/public-economics/does-low-state-capacity-set-ceiling-tax-rates-evidence-drc">Does low state capacity set a ceiling on tax rates? Evidence from the DRC</a>. Augustin Bergeron, Gabriel Tourek and Jonathan Weigel find that, in a property tax experiment, lower tax rates raised compliance and revenue, and stronger enforcement raised the rate at which revenue peaks.</div>

In parts of eastern Congo, the organisation that collects your taxes, settles your disputes and holds the monopoly on cigarettes is not the state. Raúl Sánchez de la Sierra (LSE) has spent years investigating how Congo's armed militias work. He tells Tim Phillips how he won the trust of its commanders without building the bomb they requested. He was allowed to see administrative records, and what they reveal about how the group raises and spends its money. He also interviewed recruits and their neighbours to find out who chooses to fight and why. It's a fascinating insight into a system of government that many economists never see. The research behind this episode: Sanchez de la Sierra, Raul, Louis Dunia, and Hilary Yu. 2025. "Moral Violence: At the Heart of One of Congo's Major Armed Groups." Working paper. Henn, Soeren J., Christian Mastaki Mugaruka, Miguel Ortiz, Raul Sanchez de la Sierra, and David Qihang Wu. 2025. "Monopoly of Taxation without a Monopoly of Violence: The Weak State's Trade-Offs from Taxation." Review of Economic Studies 92 (2): 1126-56. Sanchez de la Sierra, Raul, Kristof Titeca, Haoyang (Stan) Xie, Albert Malukisa Nkuku, and Aimable Amani Lameke. 2024. "The Real State: Inside the Congo's Traffic Police Agency." American Economic Review 114 (12): 3976-4014. Sanchez de la Sierra, Raul. 2020. "On the Origins of the State: Stationary Bandits and Taxation in Eastern Congo." Journal of Political Economy 128 (1): 32-74. Humphreys, Macartan, Raul Sanchez de la Sierra, and Peter van der Windt. 2019. "Exporting Democratic Practices: Evidence from a Village Governance Intervention in Eastern Congo." Journal of Development Economics 140: 279-301. To cite this episode: Phillips, Tim, and Raul Sanchez de la Sierra. 2026. "Armed groups as states: Taxation, security, and civilian support." VoxDev Talks (podcast). About the guest Raul Sanchez de la Sierra is Associate Professor of Management at the London School of Economics and Political Science. His research spanning political economy and development economics draws on sociology, anthropology and psychology to study the origins of the state, the internal organisation of armed groups, the hidden workings of state agencies and the psychology of the choice to use violence. He was one of the founders of Marakuja Kivu Research, a Congolese research organisation based in Goma. Research cited in this episode Community-driven development in eastern Congo. Raul's first work in the region was as a research assistant on the impact evaluation of a large village governance programme funded by the UK's Department for International Development. It aimed to bring elected committees to villages run by chiefs. Villagers objected when chiefs were barred from standing, and objected again when a chief stood and lost. Humphreys, Sanchez de la Sierra and van der Windt (2019) report the results. Stationary bandits. Mancur Olson's idea: a roving bandit takes everything and moves on, but a bandit who stays has an interest in next year's harvest, so he taxes rather than plunders and keeps rivals out (Olson, Mancur. 1993. "Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development." American Political Science Review 87 (3): 567-76). Sanchez de la Sierra (2020) tested it in eastern Congo; his VoxEU column On the origins of the state: Stationary bandits and taxation in eastern Congo summarises the evidence. When the state takes back territory. Henn et al. (2025) study a Congolese army operation that stopped armed groups taxing villages they had controlled for years. Unable to tax, the same groups turned to pillage. Raul uses it to show how policy that looks only at the legal map can backfire. Who joins an armed group. Most studies of combatants interview veterans, who are survivors and have been changed by fighting. Sanchez de la Sierra, Dunia and Yu (2025) set up a phone alert with the armed group's 55 human resources commanders, so survey teams could interview recruits as they enlisted and, at the same time, a random sample of civilians in their home villages. Raul says the team spoke in person to about 300 new joiners. Measuring what people will not say. To limit misreporting, answers were given in private; the team also measured skin conductance, a physiological signal strongly associated with emotional arousal, collected supervisor and peer ratings seven months after enlistment, and asked second-order questions such as why respondents think others joined. Parochial altruism. A willingness to make sacrifices for your own group combined with hostility to outsiders. Choi and Bowles modelled how the two traits can evolve together through war (Choi, Jung-Kyoo, and Samuel Bowles. 2007. "The Coevolution of Parochial Altruism and War." Science 318 (5850): 636-40). Raul argues his setting goes further, because the act of being prosocial towards the group depends on fighting the enemy. Moral disengagement. Albert Bandura's term for the psychological steps, including dehumanisation, that let people harm others without feeling they have broken their own moral code (Bandura, Albert. 1999. "Moral Disengagement in the Perpetration of Inhumanities." Personality and Social Psychology Review 3 (3): 193-209). The economics of corruption. Shleifer and Vishny separate the question of whether bribery is wrong from the question of when it is less efficient than taxation (Shleifer, Andrei, and Robert W. Vishny. 1993. "Corruption." Quarterly Journal of Economics 108 (3): 599-617). Raul uses that approach in his study of Kinshasa's traffic police. Kinshasa's traffic police. Sanchez de la Sierra et al. (2024) follow bribes up the chain of command in Kinshasa's traffic police agency. Station commanders set officers quotas of cars to bring in, and most of the agency's revenue comes from payments made behind closed doors at the station, not from bribes on the street. The team randomly reduced the quotas and measured what happened to traffic jams, accidents and enforcement. Pitfalls of policy advice. Acemoglu and Robinson argue that advice which ignores the political equilibrium can backfire, because it changes who holds power (Acemoglu, Daron, and James A. Robinson. 2013. "Economics versus Politics: Pitfalls of Policy Advice." Journal of Economic Perspectives 27 (2): 173-92). More VoxDev Talks episodes No taxation without administration: What makes tax authorities work. Anders Jensen and Jonathan Weigel on how tax authorities in developing countries are organised and staffed, from the formal side of the state Raul's militias imitate. Corruption in public procurement: How politicians co-opt bureaucrats. Sarah Brierley on why merit-based hiring alone does not stop corruption, a companion to Raul's work on the hidden structure of Kinshasa's traffic police. Related reading on VoxDev Can low-capacity governments work with local leaders to increase tax revenues? Evidence from the Democratic Republic of Congo. Pablo Balan, Augustin Bergeron, Gabriel Tourek and Jonathan Weigel find that city chiefs in Kananga raised more property tax than state collectors. Does low state capacity set a ceiling on tax rates? Evidence from the DRC. Augustin Bergeron, Gabriel Tourek and Jonathan Weigel find that, in a property tax experiment, lower tax rates raised compliance and revenue, and stronger enforcement raised the rate at which revenue peaks.

In parts of eastern Congo, the organisation that collects your taxes, settles your disputes and holds the monopoly on cigarettes is not the state.Raúl Sánchez de la Sierra (LSE) has spent years investigating how Congo's armed militias work. He tells Tim Phillips how he won the trust of its commanders without building the bomb they requested. He was allowed to see administrative records, and what they reveal about how the group raises and spends its money. He also interviewed recruits and their neighbours to find out who chooses to fight and why. It's a fascinating insight into a system of government that many economists never see.The research behind this episode:Sanchez de la Sierra, Raul, Louis Dunia, and Hilary Yu. 2025. <a href="https://raulsanchezdelasierra.com/research/" rel="noopener noreferrer">"Moral Violence: At the Heart of One of Congo's Major Armed Groups."</a> Working paper.Henn, Soeren J., Christian Mastaki Mugaruka, Miguel Ortiz, Raul Sanchez de la Sierra, and David Qihang Wu. 2025. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdae036" rel="noopener noreferrer">"Monopoly of Taxation without a Monopoly of Violence: The Weak State's Trade-Offs from Taxation."</a> Review of Economic Studies 92 (2): 1126-56.Sanchez de la Sierra, Raul, Kristof Titeca, Haoyang (Stan) Xie, Albert Malukisa Nkuku, and Aimable Amani Lameke. 2024. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20220908" rel="noopener noreferrer">"The Real State: Inside the Congo's Traffic Police Agency."</a> American Economic Review 114 (12): 3976-4014.Sanchez de la Sierra, Raul. 2020. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1086/703989" rel="noopener noreferrer">"On the Origins of the State: Stationary Bandits and Taxation in Eastern Congo."</a> Journal of Political Economy 128 (1): 32-74.Humphreys, Macartan, Raul Sanchez de la Sierra, and Peter van der Windt. 2019. <a href="https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/214632/1/Full-text-article-Humphreys-et-al-Exporting-democratic-practices.pdf" rel="noopener noreferrer">"Exporting Democratic Practices: Evidence from a Village Governance Intervention in Eastern Congo."</a> Journal of Development Economics 140: 279-301.To cite this episode:Phillips, Tim, and Raul Sanchez de la Sierra. 2026. "Armed groups as states: Taxation, security, and civilian support." VoxDev Talks (podcast). About the guest <a href="https://www.lse.ac.uk/people/raul-sanchez-de-la-sierra" rel="noopener noreferrer">Raul Sanchez de la Sierra</a> is Associate Professor of Management at the London School of Economics and Political Science. His research spanning political economy and development economics draws on sociology, anthropology and psychology to study the origins of the state, the internal organisation of armed groups, the hidden workings of state agencies and the psychology of the choice to use violence. He was one of the founders of Marakuja Kivu Research, a Congolese research organisation based in Goma.Research cited in this episode Community-driven development in eastern Congo. Raul's first work in the region was as a research assistant on the impact evaluation of a large village governance programme funded by the UK's Department for International Development. It aimed to bring elected committees to villages run by chiefs. Villagers objected when chiefs were barred from standing, and objected again when a chief stood and lost. Humphreys, Sanchez de la Sierra and van der Windt (2019) report the <a href="https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/214632/1/Full-text-article-Humphreys-et-al-Exporting-democratic-practices.pdf" rel="noopener noreferrer">results</a>.Stationary bandits. Mancur Olson's idea: a roving bandit takes everything and moves on, but a bandit who stays has an interest in next year's harvest, so he taxes rather than plunders and keeps rivals out (Olson, Mancur. 1993. <a href="https://ideas.repec.org/a/cup/apsrev/v87y1993i03p567-576_10.html" rel="noopener noreferrer">"Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development."</a> American Political Science Review 87 (3): 567-76). Sanchez de la Sierra (2020) tested it in eastern Congo; his VoxEU column <a href="https://cepr.org/voxeu/columns/origins-state-stationary-bandits-and-taxation-eastern-congo" rel="noopener noreferrer">On the origins of the state: Stationary bandits and taxation in eastern Congo</a> summarises the evidence.When the state takes back territory. Henn et al. (2025) study a Congolese army operation that stopped armed groups taxing villages they had controlled for years. Unable to tax, the same groups turned to pillage. Raul uses it to show how policy that looks only at the legal map can backfire.Who joins an armed group. Most studies of combatants interview veterans, who are survivors and have been changed by fighting. Sanchez de la Sierra, Dunia and Yu (2025) set up a phone alert with the armed group's 55 human resources commanders, so survey teams could interview recruits as they enlisted and, at the same time, a random sample of civilians in their home villages. Raul says the team spoke in person to about 300 new joiners.Measuring what people will not say. To limit misreporting, answers were given in private; the team also measured skin conductance, a physiological signal strongly associated with emotional arousal, collected supervisor and peer ratings seven months after enlistment, and asked second-order questions such as why respondents think others joined.Parochial altruism. A willingness to make sacrifices for your own group combined with hostility to outsiders. Choi and Bowles modelled how the two traits can evolve together through war (Choi, Jung-Kyoo, and Samuel Bowles. 2007. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1144237" rel="noopener noreferrer">"The Coevolution of Parochial Altruism and War."</a> Science 318 (5850): 636-40). Raul argues his setting goes further, because the act of being prosocial towards the group depends on fighting the enemy.Moral disengagement. Albert Bandura's term for the psychological steps, including dehumanisation, that let people harm others without feeling they have broken their own moral code (Bandura, Albert. 1999. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1207/s15327957pspr0303_3" rel="noopener noreferrer">"Moral Disengagement in the Perpetration of Inhumanities."</a> Personality and Social Psychology Review 3 (3): 193-209).The economics of corruption. Shleifer and Vishny separate the question of whether bribery is wrong from the question of when it is less efficient than taxation (Shleifer, Andrei, and Robert W. Vishny. 1993. <a href="https://shleifer.scholars.harvard.edu/publications/corruption" rel="noopener noreferrer">"Corruption."</a> Quarterly Journal of Economics 108 (3): 599-617). Raul uses that approach in his study of Kinshasa's traffic police.Kinshasa's traffic police. Sanchez de la Sierra et al. (2024) follow bribes up the chain of command in Kinshasa's traffic police agency. Station commanders set officers quotas of cars to bring in, and most of the agency's revenue comes from payments made behind closed doors at the station, not from bribes on the street. The team randomly reduced the quotas and measured what happened to traffic jams, accidents and enforcement.Pitfalls of policy advice. Acemoglu and Robinson argue that advice which ignores the political equilibrium can backfire, because it changes who holds power (Acemoglu, Daron, and James A. Robinson. 2013. <a href="https://www.nber.org/papers/w18921" rel="noopener noreferrer">"Economics versus Politics: Pitfalls of Policy Advice."</a> Journal of Economic Perspectives 27 (2): 173-92).More VoxDev Talks episodes <a href="https://voxdev.org/topic/public-economics/no-taxation-without-administration-what-makes-tax-authorities-work" rel="noopener noreferrer">No taxation without administration: What makes tax authorities work</a>. Anders Jensen and Jonathan Weigel on how tax authorities in developing countries are organised and staffed, from the formal side of the state Raul's militias imitate.<a href="https://voxdev.org/topic/public-economics/corruption-public-procurement-how-politicians-co-opt-bureaucrats" rel="noopener noreferrer">Corruption in public procurement: How politicians co-opt bureaucrats</a>. Sarah Brierley on why merit-based hiring alone does not stop corruption, a companion to Raul's work on the hidden structure of Kinshasa's traffic police.Related reading on VoxDev <a href="https://voxdev.org/topic/public-economics/can-low-capacity-governments-work-local-leaders-increase-tax-revenues" rel="noopener noreferrer">Can low-capacity governments work with local leaders to increase tax revenues? Evidence from the Democratic Republic of Congo</a>. Pablo Balan, Augustin Bergeron, Gabriel Tourek and Jonathan Weigel find that city chiefs in Kananga raised more property tax than state collectors.<a href="https://voxdev.org/topic/public-economics/does-low-state-capacity-set-ceiling-tax-rates-evidence-drc" rel="noopener noreferrer">Does low state capacity set a ceiling on tax rates? Evidence from the DRC</a>. Augustin Bergeron, Gabriel Tourek and Jonathan Weigel find that, in a property tax experiment, lower tax rates raised compliance and revenue, and stronger enforcement raised the rate at which revenue peaks.

S7 Ep55: Armed groups as states: Taxation, security, and civilian support

<div>
How can we cut corruption in government, procurement that generates kickbacks for local politicians? We could hire officials on merit. Across the developing world, many governments now do exactly that. So why do public contracts still go to political friends?In this week's VoxDev Talk, Sarah Brierley (LSE) tells Tim Phillips why merit-based hiring is not enough. If politicians cannot choose who gets the job, they can often control what happens next: where officials work, and whether they are promoted. This power may be sufficient to co-opt them. In Ghana, where she did much of her research, nearly half of senior local officials say contracts in their district go to firms that fund the ruling party. The research behind this episode:Brierley, Sarah. 2026. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009757270">The Co-opted State: How Politicians' Control Over Bureaucrats' Careers Threatens Governance</a>. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Open access.To cite this episode:Phillips, Tim, and Sarah Brierley. 2026. "How politicians co-opt bureaucrats.” VoxDev Talks (podcast). About the guest <a href="https://www.lse.ac.uk/people/sarah-brierley">Sarah Brierley</a> is Associate Professor of Comparative Politics in the Department of Government at the London School of Economics and Political Science. Her research spans the state, corruption, bureaucracy, and election campaigns, with a focus on sub-Saharan Africa. She holds a UKRI Future Leaders Fellowship for a project on political finance in Africa.Research cited in this episode Clientelism. Politicians hand out public resources, such as schools, jobs or contracts, in return for votes. Most research assumes that officials simply do what politicians ask. Sarah argues that officials have real control over who gets what, so politicians must first win them over.Hiring on merit. Sarah checks whether senior local officials in Ghana are hired on merit in three ways: expert surveys, a survey of the officials themselves, and staff records. Of those hired between 2010 and 2016, 67% sat an exam. When the governing party changed after the 2008 election, the kind of people hired into professional jobs did not change. The kind of people hired into low-skilled jobs did.Randomised response technique. A way to ask survey questions that people would rather not answer. Each person rolls a die where the interviewer cannot see it. On one number they must say "yes", on another "no", and otherwise they tell the truth. Nobody knows what any one person meant, but the odds of each roll are known, so the true share of "yes" answers can be calculated across the whole survey. Using this method, Sarah found that 46% of 864 senior officials in 80 local governments say contracts go to firms that fund the ruling party.Career control tools. Sarah's name for the ways politicians can shape an official's career after hiring: promotions, the work they are given, and where they are posted. Transfers are the main tool in Ghana. Officials who think their mayor can easily move them are more likely to report corruption. In a second survey question, 58% of officials said that exposing misconduct would likely get them transferred.Whistleblower protection. Ghana's Whistleblower Act, 2006 (Act 720) protects people who report wrongdoing from punishment, including unwanted transfers, and can pay them a reward. But in a small local office it is almost impossible to stay anonymous, so the protection counts for little in practice.Local electoral competition. Competition between parties at national level is usually good for reform. Sarah finds that close contests at local level have the opposite effect. When seats are won and lost on small margins, campaigns cost more, and politicians have more reason to get money out of public contracts.India and Indonesia. Both countries hire senior officials through competitive exams. In India, members of the Indian Administrative Service change jobs on average every 16 months, and transfers become more likely when state leadership changes (Iyer and Mani 2012). Proposals to set a minimum time in post have not been adopted. In Indonesia, politicians also interfere in promotions.Promotion panels. In Ghana's local government service, promotions are decided by panels that include professional officials, so politicians rarely use them as a threat. Sarah suggests using similar panels to approve transfers, so no single politician can move an official at will.Campaign spending caps. Limits on how much candidates can spend. Many countries in sub-Saharan Africa have none. India has them, but candidates routinely spend far more (Chauchard 2018). Sarah points to the UK's Corrupt and Illegal Practices Act of 1883, which set strict limits that were enforced in court. Total campaign spending fell by 40% between the 1880 and 1885 elections (Rix 2008).More VoxDev Talks episodes <a href="https://voxdev.org/topic/institutions-political-economy/why-civil-service-reform-fails-and-what-actually-works">Why civil service reform fails (and what actually works)</a>. Martin Williams looks at 131 attempts to reform the civil service in six African countries, and why none fully succeeded.Related reading on VoxDev <a href="https://voxdev.org/voxdevlit/bureaucracy">Bureaucracy</a>, the VoxDevLit review of the evidence on how officials are selected, paid and managed.<a href="https://voxdev.org/topic/public-economics/autonomy-incentives-and-effectiveness-bureaucrats">Autonomy, incentives, and the effectiveness of bureaucrats</a>, on evidence from Nigeria and Ghana that civil servants with more freedom complete more of their projects.<a href="https://voxdev.org/topic/public-economics/should-civil-servants-be-allowed-serve-their-home-areas-evidence-india">Should civil servants be allowed to serve in their home areas? Evidence from India</a>, on what happens when officials are posted close to home.</div>

How can we cut corruption in government, procurement that generates kickbacks for local politicians? We could hire officials on merit. Across the developing world, many governments now do exactly that. So why do public contracts still go to political friends? In this week's VoxDev Talk, Sarah Brierley (LSE) tells Tim Phillips why merit-based hiring is not enough. If politicians cannot choose who gets the job, they can often control what happens next: where officials work, and whether they are promoted. This power may be sufficient to co-opt them. In Ghana, where she did much of her research, nearly half of senior local officials say contracts in their district go to firms that fund the ruling party. The research behind this episode: Brierley, Sarah. 2026. The Co-opted State: How Politicians' Control Over Bureaucrats' Careers Threatens Governance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Open access. To cite this episode: Phillips, Tim, and Sarah Brierley. 2026. "How politicians co-opt bureaucrats.” VoxDev Talks (podcast). About the guest Sarah Brierley is Associate Professor of Comparative Politics in the Department of Government at the London School of Economics and Political Science. Her research spans the state, corruption, bureaucracy, and election campaigns, with a focus on sub-Saharan Africa. She holds a UKRI Future Leaders Fellowship for a project on political finance in Africa. Research cited in this episode Clientelism. Politicians hand out public resources, such as schools, jobs or contracts, in return for votes. Most research assumes that officials simply do what politicians ask. Sarah argues that officials have real control over who gets what, so politicians must first win them over. Hiring on merit. Sarah checks whether senior local officials in Ghana are hired on merit in three ways: expert surveys, a survey of the officials themselves, and staff records. Of those hired between 2010 and 2016, 67% sat an exam. When the governing party changed after the 2008 election, the kind of people hired into professional jobs did not change. The kind of people hired into low-skilled jobs did. Randomised response technique. A way to ask survey questions that people would rather not answer. Each person rolls a die where the interviewer cannot see it. On one number they must say "yes", on another "no", and otherwise they tell the truth. Nobody knows what any one person meant, but the odds of each roll are known, so the true share of "yes" answers can be calculated across the whole survey. Using this method, Sarah found that 46% of 864 senior officials in 80 local governments say contracts go to firms that fund the ruling party. Career control tools. Sarah's name for the ways politicians can shape an official's career after hiring: promotions, the work they are given, and where they are posted. Transfers are the main tool in Ghana. Officials who think their mayor can easily move them are more likely to report corruption. In a second survey question, 58% of officials said that exposing misconduct would likely get them transferred. Whistleblower protection. Ghana's Whistleblower Act, 2006 (Act 720) protects people who report wrongdoing from punishment, including unwanted transfers, and can pay them a reward. But in a small local office it is almost impossible to stay anonymous, so the protection counts for little in practice. Local electoral competition. Competition between parties at national level is usually good for reform. Sarah finds that close contests at local level have the opposite effect. When seats are won and lost on small margins, campaigns cost more, and politicians have more reason to get money out of public contracts. India and Indonesia. Both countries hire senior officials through competitive exams. In India, members of the Indian Administrative Service change jobs on average every 16 months, and transfers become more likely when state leadership changes (Iyer and Mani 2012). Proposals to set a minimum time in post have not been adopted. In Indonesia, politicians also interfere in promotions. Promotion panels. In Ghana's local government service, promotions are decided by panels that include professional officials, so politicians rarely use them as a threat. Sarah suggests using similar panels to approve transfers, so no single politician can move an official at will. Campaign spending caps. Limits on how much candidates can spend. Many countries in sub-Saharan Africa have none. India has them, but candidates routinely spend far more (Chauchard 2018). Sarah points to the UK's Corrupt and Illegal Practices Act of 1883, which set strict limits that were enforced in court. Total campaign spending fell by 40% between the 1880 and 1885 elections (Rix 2008). More VoxDev Talks episodes Why civil service reform fails (and what actually works). Martin Williams looks at 131 attempts to reform the civil service in six African countries, and why none fully succeeded. Related reading on VoxDev Bureaucracy, the VoxDevLit review of the evidence on how officials are selected, paid and managed. Autonomy, incentives, and the effectiveness of bureaucrats, on evidence from Nigeria and Ghana that civil servants with more freedom complete more of their projects. Should civil servants be allowed to serve in their home areas? Evidence from India, on what happens when officials are posted close to home.

How can we cut corruption in government, procurement that generates kickbacks for local politicians? We could hire officials on merit. Across the developing world, many governments now do exactly that. So why do public contracts still go to political friends?In this week's VoxDev Talk, Sarah Brierley (LSE) tells Tim Phillips why merit-based hiring is not enough. If politicians cannot choose who gets the job, they can often control what happens next: where officials work, and whether they are promoted. This power may be sufficient to co-opt them. In Ghana, where she did much of her research, nearly half of senior local officials say contracts in their district go to firms that fund the ruling party.&nbsp;The research behind this episode:Brierley, Sarah. 2026. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009757270" rel="noopener noreferrer">The Co-opted State: How Politicians' Control Over Bureaucrats' Careers Threatens Governance</a>. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Open access.To cite this episode:Phillips, Tim, and Sarah Brierley. 2026. "How politicians co-opt bureaucrats.” VoxDev Talks (podcast). About the guest <a href="https://www.lse.ac.uk/people/sarah-brierley" rel="noopener noreferrer">Sarah Brierley</a> is Associate Professor of Comparative Politics in the Department of Government at the London School of Economics and Political Science. Her research spans the state, corruption, bureaucracy, and election campaigns, with a focus on sub-Saharan Africa. She holds a UKRI Future Leaders Fellowship for a project on political finance in Africa.Research cited in this episode Clientelism. Politicians hand out public resources, such as schools, jobs or contracts, in return for votes. Most research assumes that officials simply do what politicians ask. Sarah argues that officials have real control over who gets what, so politicians must first win them over.Hiring on merit. Sarah checks whether senior local officials in Ghana are hired on merit in three ways: expert surveys, a survey of the officials themselves, and staff records. Of those hired between 2010 and 2016, 67% sat an exam. When the governing party changed after the 2008 election, the kind of people hired into professional jobs did not change. The kind of people hired into low-skilled jobs did.Randomised response technique. A way to ask survey questions that people would rather not answer. Each person rolls a die where the interviewer cannot see it. On one number they must say "yes", on another "no", and otherwise they tell the truth. Nobody knows what any one person meant, but the odds of each roll are known, so the true share of "yes" answers can be calculated across the whole survey. Using this method, Sarah found that 46% of 864 senior officials in 80 local governments say contracts go to firms that fund the ruling party.Career control tools. Sarah's name for the ways politicians can shape an official's career after hiring: promotions, the work they are given, and where they are posted. Transfers are the main tool in Ghana. Officials who think their mayor can easily move them are more likely to report corruption. In a second survey question, 58% of officials said that exposing misconduct would likely get them transferred.Whistleblower protection. Ghana's Whistleblower Act, 2006 (Act 720) protects people who report wrongdoing from punishment, including unwanted transfers, and can pay them a reward. But in a small local office it is almost impossible to stay anonymous, so the protection counts for little in practice.Local electoral competition. Competition between parties at national level is usually good for reform. Sarah finds that close contests at local level have the opposite effect. When seats are won and lost on small margins, campaigns cost more, and politicians have more reason to get money out of public contracts.India and Indonesia. Both countries hire senior officials through competitive exams. In India, members of the Indian Administrative Service change jobs on average every 16 months, and transfers become more likely when state leadership changes (Iyer and Mani 2012). Proposals to set a minimum time in post have not been adopted. In Indonesia, politicians also interfere in promotions.Promotion panels. In Ghana's local government service, promotions are decided by panels that include professional officials, so politicians rarely use them as a threat. Sarah suggests using similar panels to approve transfers, so no single politician can move an official at will.Campaign spending caps. Limits on how much candidates can spend. Many countries in sub-Saharan Africa have none. India has them, but candidates routinely spend far more (Chauchard 2018). Sarah points to the UK's Corrupt and Illegal Practices Act of 1883, which set strict limits that were enforced in court. Total campaign spending fell by 40% between the 1880 and 1885 elections (Rix 2008).More VoxDev Talks episodes <a href="https://voxdev.org/topic/institutions-political-economy/why-civil-service-reform-fails-and-what-actually-works" rel="noopener noreferrer">Why civil service reform fails (and what actually works)</a>. Martin Williams looks at 131 attempts to reform the civil service in six African countries, and why none fully succeeded.Related reading on VoxDev <a href="https://voxdev.org/voxdevlit/bureaucracy" rel="noopener noreferrer">Bureaucracy</a>, the VoxDevLit review of the evidence on how officials are selected, paid and managed.<a href="https://voxdev.org/topic/public-economics/autonomy-incentives-and-effectiveness-bureaucrats" rel="noopener noreferrer">Autonomy, incentives, and the effectiveness of bureaucrats</a>, on evidence from Nigeria and Ghana that civil servants with more freedom complete more of their projects.<a href="https://voxdev.org/topic/public-economics/should-civil-servants-be-allowed-serve-their-home-areas-evidence-india" rel="noopener noreferrer">Should civil servants be allowed to serve in their home areas? Evidence from India</a>, on what happens when officials are posted close to home.

S7 Ep48: How politicians co-opt bureaucrats

Tavneet Suri tells Tim Phillips about the rise of digital credit in Kenya. Who receives digital loans? What the loans are used for? How do they affects the lives of Kenyan people?<a href="https://voxdev.org/topic/finance/measuring-equilibrium-impacts-credit-evidence-indian-microfinance-crisis">Read more about digital credit on VoxDev</a>.

Tavneet Suri tells Tim Phillips about the rise of digital credit in Kenya. Who receives digital loans? What the loans are used for? How do they affects the lives of Kenyan people? Read more about digital credit on VoxDev.

Tavneet Suri tells Tim Phillips about the rise of digital credit in Kenya. Who receives digital loans? What the loans are used for? How do they affects the lives of Kenyan people?<a href="https://voxdev.org/topic/finance/measuring-equilibrium-impacts-credit-evidence-indian-microfinance-crisis" rel="noopener noreferrer">Read more about digital credit on VoxDev</a>.

S1 Ep1: Paving a path to financial well-being

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