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We return to our narrative on an eventful day in world history. By the end of 24 July, Russia had established its policy towards Austria's ultimatum. But what was this policy, and why did Russia act so differently to crises in the past?
We find Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Sazonov to be central to the events that transpired next. But what did Sazonov want? He authorised the period preparatory to war, and signalled his intention to support Serbia via war, if it came to that. This did not mean Sazonov was a warmonger, but he had not been entirely honest with the Central Powers either. Moderate advice was given to Serbia, and the Austrian and German ambassadors were informed that Russia would not look lightly upon an Austrian attack. Seeing German tentacles curling around any Austrian initiative, Sazonov felt he could not back down if Russia wished to retain her prestige, but what did this mean in practice?
Further afield, Britain was perhaps the sole power capable of offering a neutral space where mediation could take place. But how attractive were Grey's proposals, and were they likely to appeal to Germany? Did British distractions with the Irish Home Rule crisis impact its effectiveness in this regard? It seemed unlikely that London could rely on France. This time around, the French, represented in St Petersburg by Paleologue, maintained that Russia would find its ally loyally by its side for whatever came next. Such assurances were not designed to pull Russia back, because the prevailing belief in Entente circles was that only a policy of firmness could deter the Central Powers from going further.
However, if all the powers clung to a policy of deterrence, and if none considered backing down, what we are left with is a dangerous game of chicken with no off ramps. Since Sazonov believed that it meant war this time, was this proof of his conspiratorial policy, or simply of his realism? Could the Central Powers have done anything to defuse the crisis, or had the assumption of Russia's retreat blinded them to the disaster they now hurtled towards? All these questions and many more will be addressed in the episodes to come, so I hope you enjoy it!
Support the July Crisis series, join the conversation, and find out more through these links:
Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.
By Zack Twamley4.7
652652 ratings
We return to our narrative on an eventful day in world history. By the end of 24 July, Russia had established its policy towards Austria's ultimatum. But what was this policy, and why did Russia act so differently to crises in the past?
We find Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Sazonov to be central to the events that transpired next. But what did Sazonov want? He authorised the period preparatory to war, and signalled his intention to support Serbia via war, if it came to that. This did not mean Sazonov was a warmonger, but he had not been entirely honest with the Central Powers either. Moderate advice was given to Serbia, and the Austrian and German ambassadors were informed that Russia would not look lightly upon an Austrian attack. Seeing German tentacles curling around any Austrian initiative, Sazonov felt he could not back down if Russia wished to retain her prestige, but what did this mean in practice?
Further afield, Britain was perhaps the sole power capable of offering a neutral space where mediation could take place. But how attractive were Grey's proposals, and were they likely to appeal to Germany? Did British distractions with the Irish Home Rule crisis impact its effectiveness in this regard? It seemed unlikely that London could rely on France. This time around, the French, represented in St Petersburg by Paleologue, maintained that Russia would find its ally loyally by its side for whatever came next. Such assurances were not designed to pull Russia back, because the prevailing belief in Entente circles was that only a policy of firmness could deter the Central Powers from going further.
However, if all the powers clung to a policy of deterrence, and if none considered backing down, what we are left with is a dangerous game of chicken with no off ramps. Since Sazonov believed that it meant war this time, was this proof of his conspiratorial policy, or simply of his realism? Could the Central Powers have done anything to defuse the crisis, or had the assumption of Russia's retreat blinded them to the disaster they now hurtled towards? All these questions and many more will be addressed in the episodes to come, so I hope you enjoy it!
Support the July Crisis series, join the conversation, and find out more through these links:
Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

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