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Although the Austro-Serb War was now a reality, Britain did not know this until the evening of 28 July. In the meantime, Sir Edward Grey was determined to do all he could to make the mediation scheme work. But not everyone Grey dealt with could be described as sincere, and this included members of his own Cabinet.
Churchill had acted provocatively and pre-emptively in mobilising the fleet and moving it to its battle stations. The Cabinet remained divided over whether to choose a side, but the dilemma was clear. If she declared herself for Russia and France, those powers would be emboldened, and might take greater risks. If, conversely, she declared neutrality, the same effect could be felt in Berlin and Vienna. The solution was thus - still - to keep her options open, but this did not mean British diplomacy slept on 28 July, far from it.
Although the goal was the same, the landscape was rapidly changing under her feet. It was difficult to reconcile Austro-German goals of a limited Serb war with the need Russians felt to defend their Slav brethren. It was at least clear that if the war could be contained, Britain could remain neutral. Yet the space for neutrality was shrinking in line with the escalation in Austro-Serb tensions. By the end of the day, the two foes were at war, and the peaceful hopes of so many had been shattered. The prognosis looked grim, but as had been the case for the last few weeks, Sir Edward Grey had to try.
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Although the Austro-Serb War was now a reality, Britain did not know this until the evening of 28 July. In the meantime, Sir Edward Grey was determined to do all he could to make the mediation scheme work. But not everyone Grey dealt with could be described as sincere, and this included members of his own Cabinet.
Churchill had acted provocatively and pre-emptively in mobilising the fleet and moving it to its battle stations. The Cabinet remained divided over whether to choose a side, but the dilemma was clear. If she declared herself for Russia and France, those powers would be emboldened, and might take greater risks. If, conversely, she declared neutrality, the same effect could be felt in Berlin and Vienna. The solution was thus - still - to keep her options open, but this did not mean British diplomacy slept on 28 July, far from it.
Although the goal was the same, the landscape was rapidly changing under her feet. It was difficult to reconcile Austro-German goals of a limited Serb war with the need Russians felt to defend their Slav brethren. It was at least clear that if the war could be contained, Britain could remain neutral. Yet the space for neutrality was shrinking in line with the escalation in Austro-Serb tensions. By the end of the day, the two foes were at war, and the peaceful hopes of so many had been shattered. The prognosis looked grim, but as had been the case for the last few weeks, Sir Edward Grey had to try.
Support the July Crisis series, join the conversation, and find out more through these links:
Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.
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