Dr. Michael Huemer joins me to discuss moral realism vs. antirealism, ethical intuitionism, phenomenal conservatism, moral disagreement, and much else in moral philosophy. 

Ethical Intuitionism 

Knowledge, Reality, and Value: A Mostly Common Sense Guide to Philosophy 

William Lane Craig vs. Erik Wielenberg 

Linktree

/ The Five Metaethical Positions / 

Noncognitivism/expressivism: Moral statements are neither true nor false. Evaluative predicates do not even

purportedly refer to any sort of property, nor do evaluative statements assert propositions.

Error theory/nihilism: Moral statements (that imply that something has an evaluative property) are all false.

Subjectivism: Some moral statements are true, but not objectively. For a thing to be good is for some individual or group to (be disposed to) take some attitude towards it.

Moral Naturalism: There are objective moral properties, but they are reducible. Evaluative truths are reducible to descriptive truths. Additionally, moral statements can be justified empirically.

Moral Non-Naturalism/Intuitionism: There are objective moral properties, and they are irreducible. Evaluative truths are not reducible to descriptive truths. Additionally, at least some moral truths are known intuitively.

/ Timestamps /

00:00 Introduction

01:05 Objective vs. Subjective

06:45 Five Metaethical Views

36:45 Fictionalism

50:40 Phenomenal Conservatism, Scientism, Skepticism

1:15:00 Moral Disagreement

1:25:00 Theism and Moral Realism

1:41:00 Companions in Innocence

1:46:30 Evolutionary Debunking Arguments

2:00:00 Huemer’s soul is not in Colorado nor is it in Michigan