Essequibo

Note: I’m taking next week off for the new year and to work on my next book—this month’s More Things bonus episodes has thus been moved to this upcoming Thursday, and you’ll see the next LKT episode on January 2! This week we talk about Venezuelan, Guyana, and the British. We also discuss oil deposits, gold, and the Geneva Agreement. Recommended Book: Your Brain on Art: How the Arts Transform Us by Susan Magsamen and Ivy Ross Transcript In 1581, Dutch colonists arrived in South America, setting up a colony along the northern coast—but that embryonic settlement, called Pomeroon, was wiped out about a decade and a half later by the British; and survivors from Pomeroon then founded a new settlement on the back of an existing but abondoned Portuguese fort, located on an island in the middle of a river, that was an offshoot of the major regional waterway, the Essequibo River—they took over this fort, and then eventually retook Pomeroon from the British, with the help of their allies, the French. The specifics of all this conquering and reconquering aren't terribly important, though: what's important to know is that this settlement was located in a strategic area, globally, because it allowed Europeans to grow incredibly valuable crops, like sugarcane, in an region that was accessible to ocean-traversing vessels, and in a location that was an established crossroads for local trade, which made acquiring local resources a lot easier, and getting workers for these plantations at lot simpler, as well. All of which has meant this region—like many other scattered throughout the world, but especially those with natural ports and located somewhere near the equator—was a somewhat tumultuous, violent place for a long while, in large part because all these Europeans kept popping in to kill and take and build and destroy existing buildings and to fight with each other, while also leaving a lot of dead locals and destroyed local infrastructure and ecosystems in their wake. Following that initial period of back and forth, though, things calmed down a bit, and the Dutch fleshed out their holdings, vastly expanding the scope of their plantations, even to the point—and this was fairly controversial at the time—that they allowed English planters to join them from 1740, onward, which increased the scope of the plantations thereabouts still-further. In February of 1781, some British privateers showed up, captured the main settlements, and then left, and in March of that same year two Royal Navy sloops arrived and did the same, conquering the area for the British Crown until the French showed up, beat the local British forces, and occupied the colony; though a peace deal back in Europe resulted in this colony being handed back to the Dutch in 1783. In 1796 it was reoccupied by the British, the Dutch retook it, holding it from 1802 until 1803, then the British took it again during the Napoleonic Wars, and it became an official British territory in mid-1814. That was the end of that second period of conflicts, as the big, violent rush to claim as much area as possible during the Age of Discovery was beginning to wane, there was a sort of peace, in some aspects of the word, at least, emerging between European powers, and many of these entities were finding they made more money by trading than by fighting with each other all the time. That said, a more fundamental conflict remained in this area, as the Spanish held a neighboring territory, the border between that territory and this one held by the British typically delineated by the Essequibo river. So the Spanish were busy with a series of colonial independence movements when the British rolled up this collection of plantations and habitations on the east side of the Essequibo river, and thus the Spanish didn't really have anything to say on the matter, despite at times having claimed portions of the territory the British were now claiming as their own. And maybe partially because of that distraction on the part of Spain, Britain's new, official maps that were drawn in 1835 showed British Guiana, the name of its new, official territory thereabouts, beginning at the Orinoco River, not the Essequibo, while neighboring Venezuela's maps showed the latter river as the border. When the government of the relatively newfound state of Venezuela, which is what that neighboring Spanish territory became, realized that their neighbor was claiming territory they thought of as their own on their maps, they complained, threatened, and negotiations began, but no compromise was reached and in 1850 the two governments agreed to not occupy the disputed area along their shared border. Less than a decade later, though, gold was discovered in that disputed area, and British settlers almost immediately moved in and started setting up formal mining infrastructure, alongside a company through which they could profit from it. The Venezuelan government continued to complain and attempted to solve the disagreement through arbitration, but the British weren't keen to do so. This led to Venezuela breaking diplomatic relations with the British in 1887, and it asked the US for help, and when the US suggested that the UK enter arbitration, they were told no, even when then-President, Grover Cleveland, said that the US might have to intervene if the British didn't do something, based on the Monroe Doctrine, which basically says European powers shouldn't meddle in the Western Hemisphere, or else. The British eventually said okay to arbitration in 1897, and a decision handed down in 1899 gave 94% of the disputed area to British Guiana—and the Venezuelan government was perhaps predictably fairly upset about this outcome, but both sides formally accepted this new boundary in 1905. What I'd like to talk about today is a new rift resulting from a fresh batch of resources discovered in this long-contested area, and how that rift could spark still-further conflict. — In 1958, British Guiana was divided into official administrative regions, and that led to the dissolution of an historical region called Essequibo, after the river that bisected it. In 1962, as the European powers were undergoing a phase of decolonization in the wake of WWII, Venezuela re-stated its position that the claim it made to the territory back in the 19th century was legit and should never have been questioned or legalized away, and part of its argument was that the British had a deal with the Russians back when that arbitration effort was completed, the folks on the arbitration board—who were supposed to be objective—allegedly were swayed by that alliance to rule in favor of the Brits. The British said this is nonsense, as did the government of British Guiana, but this remained in dispute—and still is to this day in dispute, in some corners of policy and diplomacy—until British Guiana gained independence from the British, as a dominion, in 1966, becoming the nation of Guyana, with those arbitration-established borders still in place, and they remained in place when it became a republic in 1970, as well. Shortly after that independence was attained, though, Venezuela started taking action of diplomatic, economic, and military varieties to retake the territory it considered to be its own, and to have been unfairly stolen from it, arguing—and this is just one of the many arguments it has made toward this intended end—that the Geneva Agreement that it, then-British Guiana, and the British signed in 1966 nullified the original arbitration agreement the parties signed earlier that established the still-in-place, British Guiana-favoring border. That new agreement also said that the signatory nations would solve all disputes through dialogue, though, which is part of why recent saber-rattling by Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro has been so shocking to many, as even though this has been an, again, tumultuous and violent area for a long time, in recent memory it's been tumultuous, but mostly peaceful, despite those long-simmering resentments from Venezuela about this perceived violation of trust and wholesale theft of a region it considers its own. On December 3, 2023, Venezuela held a referendum that asked voters if they reject the 1899 arbitration agreement, if they support the 1966 agreement, if they agree with the government's stance that the International Court of Justice has no say in this matter, if they agree that the Venezuelan government should be able to oppose Guyana's claims about the region, and if they think the government should turn the disputed region into a new Venezuelan state called Guayana Esequiba, granting all locals Venezuelan citizenship as a consequence. Low turnout was reported at polling stations for this referendum, but the official results indicated that more than 95% of voters responded "yes" to each of those five questions, and despite that low turnout and claims that the government may have falsified these results, they've been using those "yes" numbers as part of their justification for seemingly moving forward with an annexation of the region—though as of the day I'm recording this at least, and this could change before this episode goes live, that annexation is only on paper, not a practical, real-life reality. Now, part of why that vote and the results and the government's response to the results are so shocking is that this region has been governed by Guyana in its many governmental guises for generations; this isn't an area that's gone back and forth between the two countries in recent memory—it's been well and truly Guyanan for a long time, and the people living in the region, all 125,000-or-so of them, out of Guyana's total 800,000-ish population, would tell you the same if you asked them. It also makes up something like 2/3 of Guyana's total landmass. In 2015, though, oil was discovered just off the coast of this disputed territory, and that led to calls by then, as today, Venezuelan President Maduro, to take this territory back; Venezuela has a lot of oil already, but these new reserves were looking to be sizable, and this new discovery had the potential to further enrich already rapidly enriching, from the sale of oil in other reserves, Guyana—so through some lenses, it made sense to to try grab the land attached to these reserves if possible, both to get that money, and to prevent a neighbor with whom they've long had all sorts of conflicts from getting that money, as well. That call eventually died down a bit; it remained, but wasn't at the forefront of conversation the way it was in 2015, when Venezuela was in the midst of a Presidential crisis that Maduro was likely keen to conceal a bit, moving the spotlight to something else, and ideally something nationalistic in nature. So while getting that money was probably a big part of that renewed push, there's a good chance that political expediency and trying to get both the public and the media to look at something else, something potentially titilating in the sense that the possibility of military action tends to be titilating, and something that might rile up the nationalistic base in support of their president, rather than encouraging them to continue questioning that president's legitimacy, which was otherwise a major topic of conversation. In October of 2023, a consortium of fossil fuel interests, led by Exxon Mobile, announced the discovery of a significant new reserve of oil and gas, marking the fourth such discovery in 2023, alone. That announcement ran parallel to increasingly bad news for Venezuelan president Maduro, who is incredibly unpopular with Venezuelans, for all sorts of alleged corruption and driving the economy into the ground, and who is up for election in January of 2024, that election almost certain to be rigged, though the US has offered him incentives to not rig the election, allowing it to be free and open and fair, in exchange for lessening some of the oil export sanctions the country has been operating under for a long while. So the state of play is that Maduro would almost certainly like to rig this upcoming election the way he has previous elections, keeping his hold on power as a consequence, and he kind of has to rig it if he wants to win, based on his popularity numbers, but he could potentially better those numbers by allowing something closer to a free election, getting sanctions lifted, the economy improving a bit, and he could possibly goose his numbers further by raising the Essequibo issue once more, riling up the nationalistic base and thus, possibly benefitting from those lifted sections while also winning the election with the minimum of corruption required on the back of pro-Venezuela fervor. That's one theory of what he's up to, at least, as there's a chance he's ramping up to just move into the contested region, start setting up shop, guarding roads and claiming the area for Venezuela based on those historical claims. But that option is considered to be quite risky by many analysts, as military action of that kind, annexing a neighbor's internationally recognized territory, in the western hemisphere, could be a step too far, bringing neighboring militaries, including Brazil's, which already has troops on the border because of this dispute, into the conflict, alongside forces or other types of support from the US. What might be better, instead, for his seeming purposes, at least, is to just keep on rattling that saber, raise the possibility of annexing the area, maybe make some deals with the Guyanan government, threatening the whole time, and consequently grabbing some small piece of the territory, or maybe just economic, monetary rights to some of the assets—deals instead of land—and that would still be more than he started with, alongside those aforementioned election-related benefits that could help him stay in power, without having to do much in the way of election fraud. This is all speculation at this point, though, as the public face of this burgeoning crisis is the threat of a much larger, wealthier, more powerful nation and military telling their smaller, weaker neighbor that a significant portion of their land is not theirs, and will therefore be incorporated into that larger neighbor. That's not unheard of—it's similar to the claim made by the Russian government about Ukraine, recently, pre-invasion—but it's also not super common in the modern world, as the taking of territory in this way has been disincentivized by international structures and alliances that generally make the consequences of doing so a lot weightier than the benefits of acquiring that bit of land. We're entering a new, post-Ukraine-invasion age, though, in which a lot of those prior norms and expectations are being challenged or upended, neighbors invading neighbors, maybe gesturing at a new norm, but some of these governments maybe just hoping to get in while the getting is good, righting perceived wrongs and grabbing what they can before the international order gets wise and implements some new system of carrots and sticks, assuming—not without reason—that it will make more sense for everyone, in the aftermath, to just leave things where they are at that point, rather than trying to put the pieces of the former setup back together in some way. The governments of Venezuela and Guyana had a meeting in the nearby island of St. Vincent recently, in which they agreed to an 11-point declaration, which included a mutual promise not to use force against each other, no matter what, and to avoid escalating the conflict in any way—but their disagreement over who should have jurisdiction here, with Guyana pointing at the International Court of Justice, and Venezuela saying that Court should have no say in the matter, could complicate these discussions before they really start, making any progress a slogging, pit-trap laden effort. Show Notes https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-67635646 https://time.com/6343549/guyana-essequibo-region-venezuela-dispute/?utm_placement=newsletter https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-67645018 https://apnews.com/article/venezuela-opposition-referendum-machado-guaido-0f615a5aa835a4cae7d83403321c6c6d https://www.semafor.com/article/12/07/2023/guyana-venezuela-tensions-drive-us-military-exercises https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Flag_of_Venezuela#2006_changes https://apnews.com/article/guyana-venezuela-essequibo-oil-united-nations-maduro-fd9e3a3275de8d88dc0a0982f8e7cda4 https://archive.ph/VMWiR https://www.france24.com/en/americas/20231214-venezuela-guyana-presidents-meet-to-de-escalate-tensions-over-disputed-oil-rich-region https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/12/15/venezuela-and-guyana-agree-not-to-use-force-in-essequibo-dispute https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/venezuela-tells-world-court-referendum-go-ahead-despite-guyana-resistance-2023-11-15/ https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2023/dec/14/guyana-venezuela-essequibo-maduro-kenneth-mohammed https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/British_Guiana https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Essequibo_(colony) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fort_Kyk-Over-Al https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Guyana%E2%80%93Venezuela_territorial_dispute https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Guyana

This is a public episode. If you’d like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit letsknowthings.substack.com/subscribe