This week we talk about floods, wildfires, and reinsurance companies.

We also discuss the COP meetings, government capture, and air pollution.

Recommended Book: If Anyone Builds It, Everyone Dies by Eliezer Yudkowsky and Nate Soares

Transcript

The urban area that contains India’s capital city, New Delhi, called the National Capital Territory of Delhi, has a population of around 34.7 million people. That makes it the most populous city in the country, and one of the most populous cities in the world.

Despite the many leaps India has made over the past few decades, in terms of economic growth and overall quality of life for residents, New Delhi continues to have absolutely abysmal air quality—experts at India’s top research hospital have called New Delhi’s air “severe and life-threatening,” and the level of toxic pollutants in the air, from cars and factories and from the crop-waste burning conducted by nearby farmers, can reach 20-times the recommended level for safe breathing.

In mid-November 2025, the problem became so bad that the government told half its workers to work from home, because of the dangers represented by the air, and in the hope that doing so would remove some of the cars on the road and, thus, some of the pollution being generated in the area.

Trucks spraying mist, using what are called anti-smog guns, along busy roads and pedestrian centers help—the mist keeping some of the pollution from cars from billowing into the air and becoming part of the regional problem, rather than an ultra-localized one, and pushing the pollutants that would otherwise get into people’s lungs down to the ground—though the use of these mist-sprayers has been controversial, as there are accusations that they’re primarily deployed near air-quality monitoring stations, and that those in charge put them there to make it seem like the overall air-quality is lower than it is, manipulating the stats so that their failure to improve practical air-quality isn’t as evident.

And in other regional news, just southeast across the Bay of Bengal, the Indonesian government, as of the day I’m recording this, is searching for the hundreds of people who are still missing following a period of unusually heavy rains. These rains have sparked floods and triggered mudslides that have blocked roads, damaged bridges, and forced the evacuation of entire villages. More than 300,000 people have been evacuated as of last weekend, and more rain is forecast for the coming days.

The death toll of this round of heavy rainfall—the heaviest in the region in years—has already surpassed 440 people in Indonesia, with another 160 and 90 in Thailand and Vietnam, respectively, being reported by those countries’ governments, from the same weather system.

In Thailand, more than two million people were displaced by flooding, and the government had to deploy military assets, including helicopters launched from an aircraft carrier, to help rescue people from the roofs of buildings across nine provinces.

In neighboring Malaysia, tens of thousands of people were forced into shelters as the same storm system barreled through, and Sri Lanka was hit with a cyclone that left at least 193 dead and more than 200 missing, marking one of the country’s worst weather disasters in recent years.

What I’d like to talk about today is the climatic moment we’re at, as weather patterns change and in many cases, amplify, and how these sorts of extreme disasters are also causing untold, less reported upon but perhaps even more vital, for future policy shifts, at least, economic impacts.

—

The UN Conference of the Parties, or COP meetings, are high-level climate change conferences that have typically been attended by representatives from most governments each year, and where these representatives angle for various climate-related rules and policies, while also bragging about individual nations’ climate-related accomplishments.

In recent years, such policies have been less ambitious than in previous ones, in part because the initial surge of interest in preventing a 1.5 degrees C increase in average global temperatures is almost certainly no longer an option; climate models were somewhat accurate, but as with many things climate-related, seem to have actually been a little too optimistic—things got worse faster than anticipated, and now the general consensus is that we’ll continue to shoot past 1.5 degrees C over the baseline level semi-regularly, and within a few years or a decade, that’ll become our new normal.

The ambition of the 2015 Paris Agreement is thus no longer an option. We don’t yet have a new, generally acceptable—by all those governments and their respective interests—rallying cry, and one of the world’s biggest emitters, the United States, is more or less absent at new climate-related meetings, except to periodically show up and lobby for lower renewables goals and an increase in subsidies for and policies that favor the fossil fuel industry.

The increase in both number and potency of climate-influenced natural disasters is partly the result of this failure to act, and act forcefully and rapidly enough, by governments and by all the emitting industries they’re meant to regulate.

The cost of such disasters is skyrocketing—there are expected to be around $145 billion in insured losses, alone, in 2025, which is 6% higher than in 2024—and their human impact is booming as well, including deaths and injuries, but also the number of people being displaced, in some cases permanently, by these disasters.

But none of that seems to move the needle much in some areas, in the face of entrenched interests, like the aforementioned fossil fuel industry, and the seeming inability of politicians in some nations to think and act beyond the needs of their next election cycle.

That said, progress is still being made on many of these issues; it’s just slower than it needs to be to reach previously set goals, like that now-defunct 1.5 degrees C ceiling.

Most nations, beyond petro-states like Russia and those with fossil fuel industry-captured governments like the current US administration, have been deploying renewables, especially solar panels, at extraordinary rates. This is primarily the result of China’s breakneck deployment of solar, which has offset a lot of energy growth that would have otherwise come from dirty sources like coal in the country, and which has led to a booming overproduction of panels that’s allowed them to sell said panels cheap, overseas.

Consequently, many nations, like Pakistan and a growing number of countries across Sub-Saharan African, have been buying as many cheap panels as they can afford and bypassing otherwise dirty and unreliable energy grids, creating arrays of microgrids, instead.

Despite those notable absences, then, solar energy infrastructure installations have been increasing at staggering rates, and the first half of 2025 has seen the highest rate of capacity additions, yet—though China is still installing twice as much solar as the rest of the world, combined, at this point. Which is still valuable, as they still have a lot of dirty energy generation to offset as their energy needs increase, but more widely disseminated growth is generally seen to be better in the long-term—so the expansion into other parts of the world is arguably the bigger win, here.

The economics of renewables may, at some point, convince even the skeptics and those who are politically opposed to the concept of renewables, rather than practically opposed to them, that it’s time to change teams. Already, conservative parts of the US, like Texas, are becoming renewables boom-towns, quietly deploying wind and solar because they’re often the best, cheapest, most resilient options, even as their politicians rail against them in public and vote for more fossil fuel subsidies.

And it may be economics that eventually serve as the next nudge, or forceful shove on this movement toward renewables, as we’re reaching a point at which real estate and the global construction industry, not to mention the larger financial system that underpins them and pretty much all other large-scale economic activities, are being not just impacted, but rattled at their roots, by climate change.

In early November 2025, real estate listing company Zillow, the biggest such company in the US, stopped showing extreme weather risks for more than a million home sale listings on its site.

It started showing these risk ratings in 2024, using data from a risk-modeling company called First Street, and the idea was to give potential buyers a sense of how at-risk a property they were considering buying might be when it comes to wildfires, floods, poor air quality, and other climate and pollution-related issues.

Real estate agents hated these ratings, though, in part because there was no way to protest and change them, but also because, well, they might have an expensive coastal property listed that now showed potential buyers it was flood prone, if not today, in a couple of years. It might also show a beautiful mountain property that’s uninsurable because of the risk of wildfire damage.

A good heuristic for understanding the impact of global climate change is not to think in terms of warming, though that’s often part of it, but rather thinking in terms of more radical temperature and weather swings.

That means areas that were previously at little or no risk of flooding might suddenly be very at risk of absolutely devastating floods. And the same is true of storms, wildfires, and heat so intense people die just from being outside for an hour, and in which components of one’s house might fry or melt.

This move by Zillow, the appearance and removal of these risk scores, happened at the same time global insurers are warning that they may have to pull out of more areas, because it’s simply no longer possible for them to do business in places where these sorts devastating weather events are happening so regularly, but often unpredictably, and with such intensity—and where the landscapes, ecologies, and homes are not made to withstand such things; all that stuff came of age or was built in another climate reality, so many such assets are simply not made for what’s happening now, and what’s coming.

This is of course an issue for those who already own such assets—homes in newly flood-prone areas, for instance—because it means if there’s a flood and a home owner loses their home, they may not be able to rebuild or get a payout that allows them to buy another home elsewhere. That leaves some of these assets stranded, and it leaves a lot of people with a huge chunk of their total resources permanently at risk, unable to move them, or unable to recoup most of their investment, shifting that money elsewhere. It also means entires industries could be at risk, especially banks and other financial institutions that provide loans for those who have purchased homes and other assets in such regions.

An inability to get private insurance also means governments will be increasingly on the hook for issuing insurance of last resort to customers, which often costs more, but also, as we’ve seen with flood insurance in the US, means the government tends to lose a lot of money when increasingly common, major disasters occur on their soil.

This isn’t just a US thing, though; far from it. Global reinsurers, companies that provide insurance for insurance companies, and whose presence and participation in the market allow the insurance world to function, Swiss Re and Munich Re, recently said that uninsurable areas are growing around the world right now, and lacking some kind of fundamental change to address the climate paradigm shift, we could see a period of devastation in which rebuilding is unlikely or impossible, and a resultant period in which there’s little or no new construction because no one wants to own a home or factory or other asset that cannot be insured—it’s just not a smart investment.

This isn’t just a threat to individual home owners, then, it’s potentially a threat to the whole of the global financial system, and every person and business attached to it, which in turn is a threat to global governance and the way property and economics work.

There’s a chance the worst-possible outcomes here can still be avoided, but with each new increase in global average temperature, the impacts become worse and less predictable, and the economics of simply making, protecting, and owning things become less and less favorable.

Show Notes

https://www.nytimes.com/2025/11/30/climate/zillow-climate-risk-scores-homes.html

https://www.nytimes.com/2025/11/30/climate/climate-change-disinformation.html

https://www.nytimes.com/2025/11/30/world/asia/india-delhi-pollution.html

https://www.nytimes.com/2025/11/30/world/asia/flooding-indonesia-thailand-southeast-asia.html

https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c5y9ejley9do

https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2025/nov/22/cop30-deal-inches-closer-to-end-of-fossil-fuel-era-after-bitter-standoff

https://theconversation.com/the-world-lost-the-climate-gamble-now-it-faces-a-dangerous-new-reality-270392

https://theconversation.com/earth-is-already-shooting-through-the-1-5-c-global-warming-limit-two-major-studies-show-249133

https://www.404media.co/americas-polarization-has-become-the-worlds-side-hustle/

https://www.cnbc.com/2025/08/08/climate-insurers-are-worried-the-world-could-soon-become-uninsurable-.html

https://www.imd.org/ibyimd/sustainability/climate-change-the-emergence-of-uninsurable-areas-businesses-must-act-now-or-pay-later/

https://www.jec.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/democrats/2024/12/climate-risks-present-a-significant-threat-to-the-u-s-insurance-and-housing-markets

https://www.weforum.org/stories/2025/04/financial-system-warning-climate-nature-stories-this-week/

https://www.weforum.org/stories/2025/05/costs-climate-disasters-145-billion-nature-climate-news/

https://arstechnica.com/science/2025/11/solars-growth-in-us-almost-enough-to-offset-rising-energy-use/

https://ember-energy.org/latest-updates/global-solar-installations-surge-64-in-first-half-of-2025/

This week we talk about radioactive waste, neutrons, and burn while breeding cycles.

We also discuss dry casks, radioactive decay, and uranium.

Recommended Book: Breakneck by Dan Wang

Transcript

Radioactive waste, often called nuclear waste, typically falls into one of three categories: low-level waste that contains a small amount of radioactivity that will last a very short time—this is stuff like clothes or tools or rags that have been contaminated—intermediate-level waste, which has been contaminated enough that it requires shielding, and high-level waste, which is very radioactive material that creates a bunch of heat because of all the radioactive decay, so it requires both shield and cooling.

Some types of radioactive waste, particularly spent fuel of the kind used in nuclear power plants, can be reprocessed, which means separating it into other types of useful products, including another type of mixed nuclear fuel that can be used in lieu of uranium, though generally not economically unless uranium supplies are low. About a third of all spent nuclear fuel has already been reprocessed in some way.

About 4% of even the recyclable stuff, though, doesn’t have that kind of second-life purpose, and that, combined with the medium- and long-lived waste that is quite dangerous to have just sitting around, has to be stored somehow, shielded and maybe cooled, and in some cases for a very long time: some especially long-lived fission products have half-lives that stretch into the hundreds of thousands or millions of years, which means they will be radioactive deep into the future, many times longer than humans have existed as a species.

According to the International Atomic Energy Agency, something like 490,000 metric tons of radioactive spent fuel is currently being stored, on a temporary basis, at hundreds of specialized sites around the world. The majority of this radioactive waste is stored in pools of spent fuel water, cooled in that water somewhere near the nuclear reactors where the waste originated. Other waste has been relocated into what’re called dry casks, which are big, barrel-like containers made of several layers of steel, concrete, and other materials, which surround a canister that holds the waste, and the canister is itself surrounded by inert gas. These casks hold and cool waste using natural air convection, so they don’t require any kind of external power or water sources, while other solutions, including storage in water, sometimes does—and often the fuel is initially stored in pools, and is then moved to casks for longer-term storage.

Most of the radioactive waste produced today comes in the form of spend fuel from nuclear reactors, which are typically small ceramic pellets made of low-enriched uranium oxide. These pellets are stacked on top of each other and encased in metal, and that creates what’s called a fuel rod.

In the US, alone, about 2,000 metric tons of spent nuclear fuel is created each year, which is just shy of half an olympic sized swimming pool in terms of volume, and in many countries, the non-reuseable stuff is eventually buried, near the surface for the low- to intermediate-level waste, and deeper for high-level waste—deeper, in this context, meaning something like 200-1000 m, which is about 650-3300 feet, beneath the surface.

The goal of such burying is to prevent potential leakage that might impact life on the surface, while also taking advantage of the inherent stability and cooler nature of underground spaces which are chosen for their isolation, natural barriers, and water impermeability, and which are also often reinforced with human-made supports and security, blocking everything off and protecting the surrounding area so nothing will access these spaces far into the future, and so that they won’t be broken open by future glaciation or other large-scale impacts, either.

What I’d like to talk about today is another potential use and way of dealing with this type of waste, and why a recent, related development in China is being heralded as such a big deal.

—

An experimental nuclear reactor was built in the Gobi Desert by the Chinese Academy of Sciences Shanghai Institute of Applied Physics, and back in 2023 the group achieved its first criticality, got started up, basically, and it has been generating heat through nuclear fission ever since.

What that means is that the nuclear reactor did what a nuclear reactor is supposed to do. Most such reactors exist to generate heat, which then creates steam and spins turbines, which generates electricity.

What’s special about this reactor, though, is that it is a thorium molten salt reactor, which means it uses thorium instead of uranium as a fuel source, and the thorium is processed into uranium as part of the energy-making process, because thorium only contains trace amounts of fissile material, which isn’t enough to get a power-generating, nuclear chain reaction going.

This reactor was able to successfully perform what’s called in-core thorium-to-uranium conversion, which allows the operators to use thorium as fuel, and have that thorium converted into uranium, which is sufficiently fissile to produce nuclear power, inside the core of the reactor. This is an incredibly fiddly process, and requires that the thorium-232 used as fuel absorb a neutron, which turns it into thorium-233. Thorium-233 then decays into protactinium-233, and that, in turn, decays into uranium-233—the fuel that powers the reactor.

One innovation here is that this entire process happens inside the reactor, rather than occurring externally, which would require a bunch of supplementary infrastructure to handle fuel fabrication, increasing the amount of space and cost associated with the reactor.

Those neutrons required to start the thorium conversion process are provided by small amounts of more fissile material, like enriched uranium-235 or plutonium-239, and the thorium is dissolved in a fluoride salt and becomes a molten mixture that allows it to absorb that necessary neutron, and go through that multi-step decay process, turning into uranium-233. That end-point uranium then releases energy through nuclear fission, and this initiates what’s called a burn while breeding cycle, which means it goes on to produce its own neutrons moving forward, which obviates the need for those other, far more fissile materials that were used to start the chain reaction. All of which makes this process a lot more fuel efficient than other options, dramatically reduces the amount of radioactive waste produced, and allows reactors that use it to operate a lot longer without needing to refuel, which also extends a reactor’s functional life.

On that last point, many typical nuclear power plants built over the past handful of decades use pressurized water reactors which have to be periodically shut down so operators can replace spent fuel rods. This new method instead allows the fissile materials to continuously circulate, enabling on-the-fly refueling—so no shut-down, no interruption of operations necessary.

This method also requires zero water, which could allow these reactors to be built in more and different locations, as conventional nuclear power plants have typically been built near large water sources, like oceans, because of their cooling needs.

China initiated the program that led to the development of this experimental reactor back in 2011, in part because it has vast thorium reserves it wanted to tap in its pursuit of energy independence, and in part because this approach to nuclear energy should, in theory at least, allow plant operators to use existing, spent fuel rods as part of its process, which could be very economically interesting, as they could use the waste from their existing plants to help fuel these new plants, but also take such waste off other governments’ hands, maybe even be paid for it, because those other governments would then no longer need to store the stuff, and China could use it as cheap fuel; win win.

Thinking further along, though, maybe the real killer application of this technology is that it allows for the dispersion of nuclear energy without the risk of nuclear weapons proliferation. The plants are smaller, they have a passive safety system that disallows the sorts of disasters that we saw in Chernobyl and Three-Mile Island—that sort of thing just can’t happen with this setup—and the fissile materials, aside from those starter materials used to get the initial cycle going, can’t be used to make nuclear weapons.

Right now, there’s a fair amount of uranium on the market, but just like oil, that availability is cyclical and controlled by relatively few governments. In the future, that resource could become more scarce, and this reactor setup may become even more valuable as a result, because thorium is a lot cheaper and more abundant, and it’s less tightly controlled because it’s useless from a nuclear weapons standpoint.

This is only the very first step on the way toward a potentially thorium-reactor dominated nuclear power industry, and the conversion rate on this experimental model was meager.

That said, it is a big step in the right direction, and a solid proof-of-concept, showing that this type of reactor has promise and would probably work scaled-up, as well, and that means the 100MW demonstration reactor China is also building in the Gobi, hoping to prove the concept’s full value by 2035, stands a pretty decent chance of having a good showing.

Show Notes

https://www.deepisolation.com/about-nuclear-waste/where-is-nuclear-waste-now

https://www.energy.gov/ne/articles/5-fast-facts-about-spent-nuclear-fuel

https://www.energy.gov/ne/articles/3-advanced-reactor-systems-watch-2030

https://world-nuclear.org/information-library/nuclear-fuel-cycle/nuclear-waste/radioactive-wastes-myths-and-realities

https://www.visualcapitalist.com/visualizing-all-the-nuclear-waste-in-the-world/

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/High-level_radioactive_waste_management

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Radioactive_waste

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_reprocessing

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dry_cask_storage

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deep_geological_repository

https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1002/er.3854

https://archive.is/DQpXM

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thorium-based_nuclear_power

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thorium_fuel_cycle

This week we talk about Venezuela, casus belli, and drug smuggling.

We also discuss oil reserves, Maduro, and Machado.

Recommended Book: Dungeon Crawler Carl by Matt Dinniman

Transcript

Venezuela, which suffered all sorts of political and economic crises under former president Hugo Chávez, has suffered even more of the same, and on a more dramatic scale, under Chávez’s successor, Nicolás Maduro.

Both Chávez and Maduro have ruled over autocratic regimes, turning ostensibly democratic Venezuelan governments into governments ruled by a single person, and those they like and empower and reward, over time removing anyone from power who might challenge them, and collapsing all checks and balances within the structure of their government.

They still hold elections, then, but like in Russia, the voting is just for show, the outcome predetermined, and anyone who gets too popular and who isn’t favored by the existing regime is jailed or killed or otherwise neutralized; the votes are then adjusted when necessary to make it look like the regime is still popular, and anyone who challenges that seeming popularity is likewise taken care of.

As a result of that state of affairs, an unpopular regime with absolute power running things into the ground over the course of two autocrats’ administrations, Venezuela has suffered immense hyperinflation, high levels of crime and widespread disease, ever-increasing mortality rates, and even starvation, as fundamentals like food periodically become scarce. This has led to a swell of emigration out of the country, which has, during the past decade, become the largest ever recorded refugee crisis in the Americas, those who leave mostly flooding into neighboring countries like Colombia, Peru, and Ecuador.

As of 2025, it’s estimated that nearly 8 million people, more than 20% of Venezuela’s entire population as of 2017, has fled the country to get away from the government, its policies, its collapsed economy, and the cultural homogeny that has led to so much crime, conflict, and oppression of those not favored by the people in charge.

This has also led to some Venezuelans trying to get into the US, which was part of the justification for a proposed invasion of the country, by the US government, under the first Trump administration in 2017.

The idea was that this is a corrupt, weak government that also happens to possess the largest proven oil reserves in the world. Its production of oil has collapsed along with everything else, in part because the government is so ineffectual, and in part because of outside forces, like longstanding sanctions by the US, which makes selling and profiting from said oil on the global market difficult.

Apparently, though, Trump also just liked the idea of invading Venezuela through US ally Colombia, saying—according to Trump’s National Security advisor at the time, John Bolton—that Venezuela is really part of the US, so it would be “cool” for the US to take it. Trump also later said, in 2023, that when he left office Venezuela was about to collapse, and that he would have taken it over if he had been reelected instead of losing to Joe Biden, and the US would have then kept all the country’s oil.

So there’s long been a seeming desire by Trump to invade Venezuela, partly on vibe grounds, the state being weak and why shouldn’t we own it, that kind of thing? But underlying that is the notion of the US being a country that can stomp into weaker countries, take their oil, and then nation-build, similar to what the government seemed to be trying to do when it invaded Iraq in the early 2000s, using 9/11 as a casus belli, an excuse to go to war, with an uninvolved nation that happened to own a bunch of oil resources the US government wanted for itself.

What I’d like to talk about today is the seeming resurgence of that narrative, but this time with an, actual tangible reason to believe an invasion of Venezuela might occur sometime soon.

—

As I mentioned, though previously kind of a success story in South America, bringing people in from all over the continent and the world, Venezuela has substantially weakened under its two recent autocratic leaders, who have rebuilt everything in their image, and made corruption and self-serving the main driver behind their decisions for the direction of the country.

A very popular candidate, María Corina Machado, was barred from participating in the country’s 2024 election, the country’s Supreme Court ruling that a 15-year ban on her holding public office because of her involvement with an alleged plot against Maduro with a previous candidate for office, Juan Guaido; Guiado is now in exile, run out of the country for winning an election against Maduro, which Maduro’s government has claimed wasn’t legit, but which dozens of governments recognize as having been legitimate, despite Maduro’s clinging to power after losing.

So Machado is accused of being corrupt by Maduro’s corrupt government, and thus isn’t allowed to run for office. Another candidate that she wanted to have run in her place was also declared ineligible by Maduro’s people, so another sub was found, Edmundo González, and basically every outside election watchdog group says that he won in 2024, and handedly, over Maduro. But the government’s official results say that’s not the case, that Maduro won, and that has created even more conflict and chaos in the country as it’s become clearer and clearer that there’s no way to oust the autocrat in control of the government—not through the voting box, at least.

This is part of what makes Venezuela an even more appealing target, for the Trump administration, right now, because not only is Maduro incredibly unpopular and running the country into the ground, there’s also a very popular alternative, in the shape of María Corina Machado, who could conceivably take control of things should Maduro be toppled. So there’s a nonzero chance that if someone, like the US military, were to step in and either kill Maduro or run him out of town, they could make a very sweet deal with the incoming Machado government, including a deal that grants access to all that currently underutilized oil wealth.

This is theoretical right now, but recent moves by the US government and military suggest it might not remain theoretical for much longer.

In mid-November, 2025, the US Navy moved the USS Gerald R. Ford Carrier Strike Group to the Caribbean—the USS Gerald R Ford being an aircraft carrier, and the strike group being the array of ships and aircraft that accompany it—it was moved there from the Eastern Mediterranean, where it was moved following the attack on Israel that led to Israel’s invasion of the Gaza Strip.

This, by itself, doesn’t necessarily mean anything; the shifting of aircraft carrier groups is often more symbolic than practical. But the US government has suggested it might us these vessels and aircraft to strike drug manufacturers across South and Central America, and specifically in Venezuela.

This is being seen as an escalation of an already fraught moment in the region, because the US has launched a series of strikes against small boats in the area, beginning back in September of 2025.

These boats, according to the US government, are drug smuggling vessels, bringing fentanyl, among other drugs, to US shores. So the idea is that the people aboard these boats are criminals who are killing folks in the US by bringing this drug, which is highly addictive and super potent, and thus more likely to kill its users than other opioids, into the country for illegal sale and distribution. So, the claim goes, this is a justified use of force.

These strikes have thus far, over the past two months, killed at least 79 people, all alleged by the US government to be drug smugglers, despite some evidence to the contrary, in some cases. The US’s allies have not been happy about these strikes, including allies the government usually relies on to help with drug-related detection and interdiction efforts, including regional governments that take action to keep drugs from shuffling around the region and eventually ending up in the US.

Many US allies have also called the strikes illegal. The French foreign minister recently said they violate international law, and the EU’s foreign policy chief said something similar, indicating that such use of force is only valid in cases of self-defense, and when there’s a UN Security council resolution on the matter.

Canadian and Dutch governments have been doing what they can to distance themselves from the strikes, without outright criticizing the at times vindictive US government, and some regional allies, like Colombia, have been signaling that they’ll be less cooperative with the US when it comes to drug-related issues, saying that they would no longer share intelligence with the US until they stop the strikes, which they’ve called “extrajudicial executions.”

An extrajudicial killing is one that is not lawful; it doesn’t have the backing of a judicial proceeding, and thus lacks the authority typically granted by the proper facets of a government. Lacking such authority, killing is illegal. Given said authority, though, a killing can be made legal, at least according to the laws of the government doing the killing.

The argument here is that while governments can usually get away with killing people, only authoritarian regimes typically and regularly to use that power to kill folks without going through the proper channels and thus getting the legal authority to do so.

In this case, the facts seem to support the accusations of those who are saying these killings aren’t legally legitimate: the Trump administration has launched these attacks on these vessels without going through the usual channels, and without declaring Congressionally approved war on anyone in particular. They’ve instead claimed that drug cartels are terrorists, and have said that anyone they suspect of smuggling drugs, or who they suspect in any way might be involved with the illegal drug making and smuggling industry, can be considered enemy, non-state combatants that they’re allowed to kill at will.

And as part of that declaration that the US government has the right to kill anyone they like who’s involved in drug smuggling, in late-October 2025 it was reported that the US has identified targets on land, as well, some of these targets located within ports and airstrips across Venezuela, including those used by the Venezuelan government, which the Maduro regime allegedly also uses for drug smuggling purposes.

This loops us back around to that original possibility that the Trump administration, looking for a casus belli, an excuse to go to war with Venezuela, may be using these strikes and the drug smuggling industry to get social and maybe legal backing for strikes that reach closer and closer to Maduro and the Venezuelan military.

If the US were to strike some vital Venezuelan military ports, using drug smuggling as justification, but taking out Venezuelan military infrastructure and/or people in the process, would that be an act of war? Would that trigger a response from Maduro? Could that response then allow the US military to claim self-defense?

These questions are up in the air right now, and that confusion could provide the opportunity to move fast and not have to suffer legal consequences until all is said and done, but it could also help shape the outcome of those decisions: ask for forgiveness, not permission, basically, but maybe not even forgiveness, if other aspects of the government come to support the Trump administration’s decisions and rule in their favor, after the fact.

Some analysts have said they suspect this drumbeat toward war with Venezuela is meant to solve several problems for the Trump administration. It could help them deal with plummeting approval numbers leading into a midterm election in 2026, and it could also give Trump himself cover from the escalating issue of the Epstein files, which, among other things, seem to connect Trump with someone who’s become the world’s most famous human trafficker and pedophile even more tightly than before.

This sort of process may also serve to slowly bolster the perception that the presidency has more powers than it has traditionally wielded, like the ability to unilaterally declare war, even though such powers are supposed to rest with Congress; an extension of other efforts by this administration to reinforce the presidency at the expense of the checks and balances that are meant to keep the US government from becoming an autocracy, like the one in Venezuela.

Show Notes

https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2024/01/27/venezuela-s-supreme-court-disqualifies-opposition-leader-from-running-for-president_6469941_4.html

https://www.theguardian.com/world/article/2024/aug/06/venezuela-election-maduro-analysis

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2024_Venezuelan_presidential_election

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Carrier_Strike_Group_12

https://www.cnn.com/2025/11/15/politics/venezuela-trump-military-what-we-know

https://www.cnn.com/2025/11/12/americas/venezuela-us-aircraft-carrier-reaction-latam-intl

https://www.nytimes.com/2025/11/14/us/politics/trump-pressure-venezuela.html

https://www.npr.org/2025/11/15/nx-s1-5609888/aircraft-carrier-caribbean-venezuela-military-action

https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2025/nov/16/us-rogue-state-extrajudicial-killings-venezuela

https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2025/11/15/trump-maduro-venezuela-column-00652369

https://www.wsj.com/politics/national-security/justice-department-drug-boat-strike-memo-83711582

https://www.nytimes.com/2025/11/13/world/americas/trump-drug-boat-strikes-colombian-fisherman.html

https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c7810w37vwdo

https://www.militarytimes.com/news/your-military/2025/11/13/colombia-to-suspend-intelligence-sharing-with-us-over-boat-strikes/

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2025_United_States_military_strikes_on_alleged_drug_traffickers

https://www.theatlantic.com/newsletters/2025/11/trump-boat-strikes-killings-venezuela/684921/

https://www.wsj.com/world/americas/trump-boat-strikes-drug-9bbbeb90?mod=hp_lead_pos11

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Extrajudicial_killing

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Crisis_in_Venezuela

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Venezuelan_refugee_crisis

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proposed_United_States_invasion_of_Venezuela

This week we talk about OxyContin, opium, and the British East India Company.

We also discuss isotonitazene, fentanyl, and Perdue.

Recommended Book: The Thinking Machine by Stephen Witt

Transcript

Opioids have been used as painkillers by humans since at least the Neolithic period; there’s evidence that people living in the Iberian and Italian Peninsulas kept opium poppy seeds with them, and there’s even more evidence that the Ancient Greeks were big fans of opium, using it to treat pain and as a sleep aid.

Opium was the only available opioid for most of human history, and it was almost always considered to be a net-positive, despite its downsides. It was incorporated into a mixture called laudanum, which was a blend of opium and alcohol, in the 17th century, and that helped it spread globally as Europeans spread globally, though it was also in use locally, elsewhere, especially in regions where the opium poppy grew naturally.

In India, for instance, opium was grown and often used for its painkilling properties, but when the British East India Company took over, they decided to double-down on the substance as a product they could monopolize and grow into a globe-spanning enterprise.

They went to great lengths to expand production and prevent the rise of potential competitors, in India and elsewhere, and they created new markets for opium in China by forcing the product onto Chinese markets, initially via smuggling, and then eventually, after fighting a series of wars focused on whether or not the British should be allowed to sell opium on the Chinese market, the British defeated the Chinese. And among other severely unbalanced new treaties, including the ceding of the Kowloon peninsula to the British as part of Hong Kong, which they controlled as a trading port, and the legalization of Christians coming into the country, proselytizing, and owning property, the Chinese were forced to accept the opium trade. This led to generations of addicts, even more so than before, when opium was available only illicitly, and it became a major bone of contention between the two countries, and informed China’s relationship with the world in general, especially other Europeans and the US, moving forward.

A little bit later, in the early 1800s, a German pharmacist was able to isolate a substance called morphine from opium. He published a paper on this process in 1817, and in addition to this being the first alkaloid, the first organic compound of this kind to be isolated from a medicinal plant, which was a milestone in the development of modern drug discovery, it also marked the arrival of a new seeming wonder drug, that could ease pain, but also help control cold-related symptoms like coughing and gut issues, like diarrhea. Like many such substances back in the day, it was also often used to treat women who were demonstrating ‘nervous character,’ which was code for ‘behaving in ways men didn’t like or understand.’

Initially, it was thought that, unlike with opium, morphine wasn’t addictive. And this thinking was premised on the novel application method often used for morphine, the hypermedia needle, which arrived a half-century after that early 1800s isolation of morphine from opium, but which became a major driver of the new drug’s success and utility. Such drugs, derived scientifically rather than just processing a plant, could be administered at specific, controllable doses. So surely, it was thought, this would alleviate those pesky addictive symptoms that many people experienced when using opioids in a more natural, less science-y way.

That, of course, turned out not to be the case. But it didn’t stop the progression of this drug type, and the further development of more derivations of it, including powerful synthetic opioids, which first hit the scene in the mid-20th century.

What I’d like to talk about today is the recent wave of opioid addictions, especially but not exclusively in the US, and the newest concern in this space, which is massively more powerful than anything that’s come before.

—

As I mentioned, there have been surges in opioid use, latent and externally forced, throughout modern human history.

The Chinese saw an intense wave of opioid addiction after the British forced opium onto their markets, to the point that there was a commonly held belief that the British were trying to overthrow and enslave the Chinese by weighing them down with so many addicts who were incapable of doing much of anything; which, while not backed by the documentation we have from the era—it seems like they were just chasing profits—is not impossible, given what the Brits were up to around the world at that point in history.

That said, there was a huge influx in opioid use in the late-1980s, when a US-based company called Purdue Pharma began producing and pushing a time-released opioid medication, which really hit the big-time in 1995, when they released a version of the drug called OxyContin.

OxyContin flooded the market, in part because it promised to help prevent addiction and accidental overdose, and in part because Purdue was just really, really good at marketing it; among other questionable and outright illegal things it did as part of that marketing push, it gave kickbacks to doctors who prescribed it, and some doctors did so, a lot, even when patients didn’t need it, or were clearly becoming addicted.

By the early 2000s, Purdue, and the Sackler family that owned the company, was spending hundreds of millions of dollars a year to push this drug, and they were making billions a year in sales.

Eventually the nature of Purdue’s efforts came to light, there were a bunch of trials and other legal hearings, some investigative journalists exposed Purdue’s foreknowledge of their drug’s flaws, and there was a big government investigation and some major lawsuits that caused the collapse of the company in 2019—though they rebranded in 2021, becoming Knoa Pharma.

All of which is interesting because much like the forced legalization of opium on Chinese markets led to their opioid crisis a long time ago, the arrival of this incredibly, artificially popular drug on the US market led to the US’s opioid crisis.

The current bogeyman in the world of opioids—and I say current because this is a fast-moving space, with new, increasingly powerful or in some cases just a lot cheaper drugs arriving on the scene all the time—is fentanyl, which is a synthetic opioid that’s about 30-50 times more potent than heroin, and about 100 times as potent as morphine. It has been traditionally used in the treatment of cancer patients and as a sedative, and because of how powerful it is, a very small amount serves to achieve the desired, painkilling effect.

But just like other opioids, its administration can lead to addiction, people who use it can become dependent and need more and more of it to get the same effects, and people who have too much of it can experience adverse effects, including, eventually, death.

This drug has been in use since the 1960s, but illicit use of fentanyl began back in the mid-1970s, initially as its own thing, but eventually to be mixed in with other drugs, like heroin, especially low-quality versions of those drugs, because a very small amount of fentanyl can have an incredibly large and potent effect, making those other drugs seem higher quality than they are.

That utility is also this drug’s major issue, though: it’s so potent that a small amount of it can kill, and even people with high opioid tolerances can see those tolerances pushed up and up and up until they eventually take a too-large, killing dose.

There have been numerous efforts to control the flow of fentanyl into the US, and beginning in the mid-20-teens, there were high-profile seizures of the illicitly produced stuff around the country. As of mid-2025, China seems to be the primary source of most illicit fentanyl around the world, the drug precursor produced in China, shipped to Mexico where it’s finalized and made ready for market, and then smuggled into the US.

There have been efforts to shut down this supply chain, including recent tariffs put on Chinese goods, ostensibly, in part at least, to get China to handle those precursor suppliers.

Even if that effort eventually bears fruit, though, India seems to have recently become an alternative source of those precursors for Mexican drug cartels, and for several years they’ve been creating new markets for their output in other countries, like Nigeria, Indonesia, and the Netherlands, as well.

Amidst all that, a new synthetic drug, which is 40-times as potent as fentanyl, is starting to arrive in the US, Europe, and Australia, and has already been blamed for thousands of deaths—and it’s thought that that number might be a significant undercount, because of how difficult it can be to attribute cause with these sorts of drugs.

Nitazenes were originally synthesized back in the 1950s in Austria, and they were never sold as painkillers because they were known, from the get-go, to be too addictive, and to have a bad tradeoff ratio: a little bit of benefit, but a high likelihood of respiratory depression, which is a common cause of death for opioid addicts, or those who accidentally overdose on an opioid.

One nitazene, called isotonitazene, first showed up on US drug enforcement agency radars back in 2019, when a shipment was intercepted in the Midwest. Other agencies noted the same across the US and Europe in subsequent years, and this class of drugs has now become widespread in these areas, and in Australia.

It’s thought that nitazenes might be seeing a surge in popularity with illicit drugmakers because their potency can be amped up so far, way, way higher than even fentanyl, and because their effects are similar in many ways to heroin.

They can also use them they way they use fentanyl, a tiny bit blended into lower-quality versions of other drugs, like cocaine, which can save money while also getting their customers, who may not know what they’re buying, hooked, faster. For context, a fifth of a grain of nitazene salt can be enough to kill a person, so it doesn’t take much, less than that, if they want to keep their customers alive, to achieve the high they’re looking for. A little bit goes a long, long way.

This class of drugs is also difficult to detect, which might be part of the appeal for drug makers, right now. Tests that detect morphine, heroin, and fentanyl do not detect natazines, and the precursors for this type of drug, and the drugs themselves, are less likely to be closely watched, or even legally controlled at the levels of more popular opioids, which is also likely appealing to groups looking to get around existing clampdown efforts.

Right now, drug agencies are in the process of updating their enforcement and detection infrastructure, and word is slowly getting out about nitazenes and the risk they potentially pose. But it took years for sluggish government agencies to start working on the issue of fentanyl, which still hasn’t been handled, so it’s anyone’s guess as to when and if the influx of nitazenes will be addressed on scale.

Show Notes

https://www.wired.com/story/a-new-type-of-opioid-is-killing-people-in-the-us-europe-and-australia/

https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/BF02161116

https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lanpub/article/PIIS2468-2667(24)00024-0/fulltext

https://www.theguardian.com/society/2025/nov/03/nitazenes-synthetic-opioid-drug-500-times-stronger-than-heroin-fatal

https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-025-03280-5

https://theconversation.com/10-times-stronger-than-fentanyl-nitazenes-are-the-latest-deadly-development-in-the-synthetic-opioid-crisis-265882

https://www.cato.org/blog/fentanyl-nitazenes-why-drug-war-keeps-making-danger-worse

https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/fentanyl-and-us-opioid-epidemic

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Purdue_Pharma

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oxycodone

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fentanyl

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nitazenes

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Opioid

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Timeline_of_the_opioid_epidemic

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Opioid_epidemic

This week we talk about Mach 1, the Bell X-1, and the Concorde.

We also discuss the X-59, the Tu-144, and Boom Supersonic.

Recommended Book: Red Team Blues by Cory Doctorow

Transcript

The term “supersonic,” when applied to speed, refers to something moving faster than the speed of sound—a speed that is shorthanded as Mach 1.

The precise Mach 1 speed of sound will be different depending on the nature of the medium through which an object is traveling. So if you’re moving at sea level versus up high in the air, in the stratosphere, the speed of sound will be different. Likewise if you’re moving through moist air versus dry air, or moving through water versus moving through syrup, different speed of sound, different Mach 1.

In general, though, to give a basic sense of how fast we’re talking here, if an object is moving at sea level through dry air at a temperature of 20 degrees celsius, which is 68 degrees fahrenheit, Mach 1 is about 768 miles per hour, which is about 1,126 feet per second, and 343.2 meters per second.

It’s fast! It’s very fast. Again, this is the speed at which sound moves. So if you surpass the speed of sound, if you go supersonic, you will arrive faster than the sound you make while moving.

Back in 1947, an experimental American plane called the Bell X-1 broke the sound barrier, surpassed Mach 1, reaching a speed of almost 1,000 miles per hour using a 6,000 pound thrust rocket propulsion system. A later version of the same rocket-powered plane, the Bell X-1A, which was basically the same vehicle, it just had more fuel capacity, allowing the rocket to burn longer, achieved 1,600 miles per hour in 1956.

Prior to that, in 1943, British began working on a secret experimental aircraft called the Miles M.52, intending to build a plane capable of traveling 1,000 mph. Interestingly, this project was apparently the result of the British wanting to keep up with a supposed already existing German aircraft capable of achieving that speed, though it’s now believed the intelligence that led the British to believe the Germans had a supersonic-capable plane was the result of a mistranslation—the Germans hit 1,000 km per hour, which is about 621 mph, and still subsonic.

Though apparently a success in terms of research and innovation, the Miles M.52 project was cancelled in 1946, due partly to budgetary concerns, and partly because the new government didn’t believe supersonic aircraft were practical, or maybe even feasible.

After the existence of this project was revealed to the public, however, criticism for the cancellation mounted, and the design was translated into new, unmanned scale-model experimental versions of the plane which achieved controlled Mach 1.38 supersonic speeds, and both the design and research from this program was shared with the American company, Bell, and all that knowledge informed the development of the aforementioned Bell X-1 supersonic plane.

Again, that successful Bell mission was flown in 1947, and in 1961, a Douglas jetliner, a commercial jet, broke the sound barrier during a controlled test dive, and that fed the development of an intended supersonic airliner in the US, though similar research being conducted elsewhere would bear more direct and immediate fruit.

In the Soviet Union, a supersonic jetliner called the Tupolev Tu-144 entered service in 1968, and a jetliner co-developed by the British and French, the Concorde, began construction in 1965, and tallied its first flight in March of 1969.

The Tu-144 was thus the world’s first commercial supersonic airliner, by a few months, and it also became the first commercial transport to exceed Mach 2, twice the speed of sound, in 1970.

The Tu-144 was plagued by reliability issues from the get-go, however, and while performing maneuvers at an air show in Paris in 1973, it disintegrated in midair, which—combined with its high operating costs reduced its long-term market viability, especially internationally. By the mid-1970s, it was primarily operating within the Soviet Union, and after a new variant of the jet crashed in 1978, the Tu-144 program was cancelled in 1983. Existing models continued to be use for niche purposes, like training space program pilots, and for a supersonic research program undertaken by NASA in the late-1990s, but the final Tu-144 flight was in mid-1999, and all surviving aircraft are now on display or in storage.

The Concorde has a similar history. Original forecasts for the supersonic airliner market were optimistic, and while the craft seemed to be generally more reliable and less issue-prone than the Tu-144, and it enjoyed a period of fanfare and promotion, as a sort of luxury experience for folks crossing the Atlantic in particular, cutting travel times in half, a major crash in mid-2000, which killed all 109 occupants and four people on the ground, led to the suspension of service until late-2001, and all remaining Concorde aircraft were retired in 2003—about 20 of them are on display throughout North American and Europe, as of the mid-2020s.

The costs associated with operating Concorde aircraft, as with the Tu-144, were also quite high, and those costs and other complications led to the cancellation of a would-be supersonic jetliner competitor from Boeing, the 2707, in 1971, before it built any prototypes.

What I’d like to talk about today is a renewed enthusiasm for supersonic passenger aircraft, and what’s changed that might make supersonic transport a viable market, today.

—

In the United States, commercial aircraft are not allowed to fly at supersonic speeds. This is because the sonic booms generated by supersonic flight, which are shockwaves that work a bit like the crack of a bullwhip or the firing of a bullet, but much, much larger, can set off alarms, rattle or shatter windows, and generally create all sorts of chaos on the ground, even in areas not directly under the aircraft that’s breaking the sound barrier.

This was true even during the heyday of the Concorde: the craft was only allowed to travel at supersonic speeds over the ocean, because doing so over populated areas was such a pain, and in some cases, a danger.

Sonic booms aren’t the only reason supersonic aircraft like the Concorde failed to establish a long-term presence in the airline industry, but they’re a big part of it. It’s just really difficult to work around that kind of persistent issue.

This is why a new experimental project by NASA, the X-59 Quesst, with two-s’s, Quesst standing for Quiet SuperSonic Technology, is garnering so much attention. Built by Lockheed Martin, the X-59 is said to dramatically reduce the scale of sonic booms, instead producing what’s been described as a sonic thump, its long, slender nose breaking up the pressure waves that otherwise build up and create that much larger, more impactful shock wave boom, and its engine is on top of the plane rather than underneath it, a design choice that sends the majority of remaining shock wave impacts upward toward the sky, rather than down toward the ground.

The X-59 is still just an experimental jet. It’s a single-seater, it’s about twice as long as an F-16 fighter jet, and it can cruise at around 925 miles per hours, which is Mach 1.4.

It’s hoped that this new design will allow for the creation of future supersonic jetliners, though, as being able to traverse oceans twice as fast would bring massive economic benefits, in terms of shipping people, but also all kinds of goods. Being able to use these aircraft fully, at their full speed, over land and to and from any airport, would likewise make them more versatile and introduce new benefits and, hopefully, favorable economics.

Worth noting here is that this jet is a descendent of that first Bell X-1 plane that broke the sound barrier in 1947; NASA’s X-planes are innovative models meant to push the boundaries of what’s currently possible, and the X-59 is just a more modern version of that initial X-1 conception in many ways.

That said, the X-59 has only been successfully flown at low speeds and altitudes at this point. It got a lot of press at the end of October 2025 for successfully completing its first flight, which shows it can fly and land, which is good. But its inaugural flight stuck with a low altitude and just 240 miles per hour; really slow for a jet, and too low for a commercial airliner.

The folks behind this project have also said that while they have every reason to believe this design will both work and create a far less impactful sonic boom, they don’t yet know if that boom will actually be tolerable for people on the ground. Simulating such things is different from the experience of them, and they won’t know until they power the thing all the way up and have it break the sound barrier whether the sonic thump will be barely noticeable and tolerable for folks near airports and flight paths, or if it will be better, but still not good enough to make this a viable alternative to existing jets.

There are other entities working on similar things right now, including a company called Boom Supersonic that has already flown a piloted demonstration aircraft, the XB-1, at supersonic speeds—Mac 1.122, which is about 750 mph—at an altitude of over 35,000 feet; the first time a non-government-affiliated aircraft has done so.

That was back in March of 2024, and the company plans to build a commercial supersonic aircraft that will carry between 64 and 80 passengers at Mach 1.7, on hundreds of global routes; they say they already have a large number of orders for this passenger aircraft they intend to build, and they say to begin with, they’ll be able to produce 66 of them per year from their factory in North Carolina. They say that they’ll have the first full-scale prototype of that passenger aircraft, called the Overture, in 2027, and they’re aiming to put that craft into service beginning in 2029 or 2030.

They’re not the only private company aiming to produce supersonic aircraft for various purposes, either. The promise of moving people and things around the world, faster than most of today’s options can manage, and in many cases far faster, is still tantalizing for many industries, so long as regulatory, safety, and technological hurdles can be traversed. For most of these private companies, their innovation seems to be mostly in price and scale, not reducing the boom, but some have also claimed that their sonic booms are more moderated; there’s also a good chance findings from the NASA X project will translate over to the commercial world in due time, if these companies survive, blending those innovations.

It’s an interesting moment in this space, then, in part because it seems like supersonic flight is appealing again, to some, at least, after a long period of dashed hopes—that dashing partly the consequence of flaws in earlier models, and headline-grabbing crashes that ruined a lot of appetites for the option.

But also because we could see modern technologies, from sensors to propulsion systems to manufacturing capacities applied to this vehicle type, which could ease a lot of the issues that made the Concordes and Tu-144s non-workable the first time around, and could make this type of transport and travel cheaper, too, though probably not until mid-century at the earliest, according to current timelines.

Show Notes

https://arstechnica.com/space/2025/10/nasa-test-flight-seeks-to-help-bring-commercial-supersonic-travel-back/

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sonic_boom

https://www.wired.com/story/nasas-quiet-supersonic-jet-takes-flight/

https://www.sofeminine.co.uk/back-in-4-years-your-london-new-york-time-slashed-by-3-hours-as-60-80-seat-supersonic-jet-nears/

https://abcnews.go.com/US/wireStory/nasa-takes-step-closer-launching-quiet-supersonic-jets-127036299

https://boomsupersonic.com/

https://www.grc.nasa.gov/www/k-12/airplane/lowsup.html

https://www.nasa.gov/aeronautics/supersonic-flight/

https://www.spikeaerospace.com/

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Miles_M.52

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bell_X-1

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Supersonic_aircraft

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tupolev_Tu-144

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Concorde

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Supersonic_transport

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Supersonic_speed

This week we talk about robots, call center workers, and convenience stores.

We also discuss investors, chatbots, and job markets.

Recommended Book: The Fourth Consort by Edward Ashton

Transcript

Though LLM-based generative AI software, like ChatGPT, Gemini, and Claude, are becoming more and more powerful by the month, and offering newfangled functionality seemingly every day, it’s still anything but certain these tools, and the chatbots they power, will take gobs of jobs from human beings.

The tale that’s being told by upper-management at a lot of companies makes it seem like this is inevitable, though there would seem to be market incentives for them to both talk and act like this is the case.

Companies that make new, splashy investments in AI tech, or which make deals with big AI companies, purporting to further empower their offerings and to “rightsize” their staff as a consequence, tend to see small to moderate bumps in their stock price, and that’s good for the execs and other management in those companies, many of whom own a lot of stock, or have performance incentives related to the price of their stock built into their larger pay package.

But often, not always, but quite a lot of the time, the increased effectiveness and efficiencies claimed by these higher-ups after they go on a firing spree and introduce new AI tools, seem to be at least partly, and in some cases mostly attributable to basically just threatening their staff with being fired in a difficult labor market.

When Google executives lay off 5 or 10% of their staff on a given team, for instance, and then gently urge those who survived the cull to come to the office more frequently rather than working from home, and tell them that 60 hours a week is the sweet spot for achieving their productivity goals, that will tend to lead to greater outputs—at least for a while. Same as any other industry where blood has been drawn and a threat is made if people don’t live up to a casually stated standard presented by the person drawing that blood.

Also worth mentioning here is that many of the people introducing these tools, both into their own companies and into the market as a whole, seem to think most jobs can be done by AI systems, but not theirs. Many executives have outright said that future businesses will have a small number of people managing a bunch of AI bots, and at least a few investors have said that they believe most jobs can be automated, but investing is too specialized and sophisticated, and will likely remain the domain of clever human beings like themselves.

All of which gestures at what we’re seeing in labor markets around the globe right now, where demands for new hires are becoming more intense and a whole lot of low-level jobs in particular are disappearing entirely—though in most cases this is not because of AI, or not just, but instead because of automation more broadly; something that AI is contributing to, but something that is also a lot bigger than AI.

And that’s what I’d like to talk about today. The rapid-speed deployment, in some industries and countries, at least, of automated systems, of robots, basically, and how this is likely to impact the already ailing labor markets in the places that are seeing the spearpoint of this deployment.

—

Chatbots are AI tools that are capable of taking input from users and responding with often quite human-sounding text, and increasingly, audio as well.

These bots are the bane of some customers who are looking to speak to a human about some unique need or problem, but who are instead forced to run a gauntlet of AI-powered bots. The interaction often happens in the same little chat window through which they’ll eventually, if they say the right magic words, reach a human being capable of actually helping them. And like so many of the AI innovations that have been broadly deployed at this point, this is a solution that’s generally hated by customers, but lauded by the folks who run these companies, because it saves them a lot of money if they can hire fewer human beings to handle support tickets, even if those savings are the result of most people giving up before successfully navigating the AI maze and reaching a human customer support worker.

In India right now, the thriving call center industry is seeing early signs of disruption from the same. IT training centers, in particular, are experimenting with using audio-capable AI chatbots instead of human employees, in part because demand is so high, but also, increasingly, because doing so is cheaper than hiring actual human beings to do the same work.

One such company, LimeChat, recently said that it plans to cut its employee base by 80% in the near-future, and if that experiment is successful, this could ripple through India’s $283 billion IT sector, which accounts for 7.5% of India’s GDP. Hiring growth in this sector already collapsed in 2024 and 2025, and again, while this shift seems to be pretty good for the balance books of the companies doing less hiring and more firing as they deploy more AI systems, it’s very not good for the often younger people who take these jobs, specializing in call center IT work, only to find that the market no longer demands their skill sets.

Along the same lines, but in a perhaps more surprising industry, some convenience stores in Japan are deploying robots to manage their back rooms, where the products that end up available out front are unloaded, tallied, and shelved.

These robots, which are basically just arms on poles, sometimes attached to wheeled bases, for moving around, sometimes not, are operated by AI, but are also continuously monitored by human employees in the Philippines. Each worker, who can be paid a lot less than an entry-level, young Japanese person would expect to be paid, monitors about 50 machines at a time, and steps in, using virtual reality gear to control the robots, if one of them gets stuck or drops something; which apparently happens about 4% of the time.

This is akin to offshoring of the kind we’ve seen since the early 2000s, when the dawn of technological globalization made China the factory of the world and everything shifted from a model of local production and the stockpiling of components, to a last-minute, supply-chain oriented model that allowed companies to move all their manufacturing and some of their services to wherever it could be done the cheapest.

Many people and companies benefitted from this arbitrage to some degree, though many regions have dried up as a result of this shift, because, for instance, former company towns where cars were produced no longer have the resources to keep infrastructure from degrading, and no longer have enough jobs to keep young people from moving away; brain drain can become pretty intense when there’s no economic reason to stay.

This reality is expected to become more widespread, even beyond former manufacturing hubs, because of the deployment of both AI systems, which can be subbed-in for many remote jobs, like call center work, programming, and the like, but also because of increasingly sophisticated and capable robots, which can do more automated work, which in turn allows them to be monitored, sometimes remotely, like those Japanese convenience store robots, for a fraction of the price of hiring a human being.

This shift is expected to be especially harrowing for teens hoping to enter the labor market in entry-level jobs, as responsibilities like shelf-stocking and product scanning and the loading and unloading of materials are increasingly automatable, as robots capable of doing this work are developed and deployed, and perhaps even more importantly, as systems that augment that automatability are developed and deployed.

In practice, that means coming up with shipping processes and other non-tangible systems that lean into the strengths of today’s automated systems, while reducing the impact of their weaknesses.

Amazon is in prime position to do exactly this, as they’ve already done so much to rewire global shipping channels so that they can deliver products as rapidly as possible, to as many places as possible. As a result, they control many of the variables within these channels, which in turn means they can tweak them further, so that they’re optimized to work with Amazon’s specialized automated systems, rather than just human ones.

The company has stated, in internal documents, that it plans to automate 75% of its total operations, and it currently has nearly 1.2 million employees. That’s triple what it employed in 2018, and it’s expected that the automated systems it has already and will soon deploy will allow it to hire 160,000 fewer people than planned by 2027.

Even though the company expects to sell twice as many products by 2033, then, it expects to hire 600,000 fewer people by that same year. And it’s so confident in its ability to make this happen that it’s already making plans to rebuild its image in the aftermath of what’s expected to be a really difficult period of people hating it. It’s planning significant branding efforts, meant to help it seem like a good corporate citizens, including sponsored community events and big donations to children’s programs.

It’s also intending to frame this shift as an evolution in which robots are amplifying the efforts of human employees. Rather than calling their automated systems robots, they might call them ‘cobots,’ for instance.

Amazon has contended that the internal documents in which these plans were outlined, those documents acquired and reported upon by the New York Times, are incomplete and not an accurate representation of what Amazon plans, and they said those branding efforts are not a response to hate related to their automation efforts, they just like spending money on nice things for communities.

The net-impact of existing efforts of this kind, though, is to deplete local job markets where these big companies dominate, and to make the jobs that survive a lot higher-end, requiring more technical sophistication, often, like being able to manage and maintain these sorts of robots, which are skills few people currently have.

Amazon’s backend is already very automated, powered by bots originally developed by robotics maker Kiva, which was purchased by the company for 3/4 of a billion dollars back in 2012. Amazon warehouse workers now work alongside all sorts of robots—though as seems to be the case with employees who survive AI-related firings, those humans who remain are often subjected to strenuous conditions and a lot of pressure to work long hours.

In the company’s Shreveport, Louisiana location, there are more than a thousand robots working around the clock, and that’s allowed Amazon to hire 25% fewer human workers at that facility, while processing 10% more items. The plan is to further refine that model while also spreading it to other Amazon warehouse locations, 40 more of them by 2027, which is part of how they expect to reach that aforementioned 75% employee reduction goal.

Amazon’s obviously at the forefront of this shift because of the nature of their business and business model, but other big employers, such as Walmart, are also pushing in this direction. Walmart officials have said they will have cut costs by more than 30% at facilities where they’ve been experimenting with more automation by the end of 2025, and they’ve already cut those costs by 20% at these facilities, in part because fewer human employees are necessary.

All of which is interesting in part because these are clearly real innovations that are leading to more efficiency and effectiveness at lower costs, and ultimately these may translate into cheaper goods and services for customers if the companies deploying automated technologies decide to pass on those savings.

But simultaneously, this represents a fundamental shift in the job market and overall economy, and if new jobs don’t arrive at the same scale and pace as they’re disappearing, or some other money-distribution solution, like a minimum basic income, doesn’t arrive in time, we could find ourselves in a situation, globally, but especially and most immediately in markets like China, which has far more automation than everyone else right now, and the US—we could have a situation where there’s just a whole lot of stuff being made, but not enough people who can afford it, because they can’t find jobs that will pay them enough to participate in the economy, which in turn could splashback on these automated measures in a negative way, as these companies’ addressable markets shrink.

Show Notes

https://collectivefutures.blog/the-infrastructure-of-meaninglessness/

https://www.cnbc.com/2025/02/20/meta-approves-plan-for-bigger-executives-bonuses-following-5percent-layoffs.html

https://www.nytimes.com/2025/02/27/technology/google-sergey-brin-return-to-office.html

https://www.reuters.com/world/india/meet-ai-chatbots-replacing-indias-call-center-workers-2025-10-15/

https://restofworld.org/2025/philippines-offshoring-automation-tech-jobs/

https://www.theverge.com/report/806728/tech-left-teens-fighting-over-scraps-robots-taking-jobs

https://www.theverge.com/transportation/805471/waymo-robotaxi-winter-snow-weather-testing

https://www.wired.com/story/elon-musk-wants-strong-influence-over-the-robot-army-hes-building/

https://www.supplychaindive.com/news/walmart-automation-supply-chain-cost-savings/747377/

https://www.nytimes.com/2025/04/23/business/china-tariffs-robots-automation.html

This week we talk about entanglements, monopolies, and illusory money.

We also discuss electrification, LLMs, and data centers.

Recommended Book: The Extinction of Experience by Christine Rosen

Transcript

One of the big claims about artificial intelligence technologies, including but not limited to LLM-based generative AI tech, like ChatGPT, Claude, and Gemini, is that they will serve as universal amplifiers.

Electricity is another universal amplifier, in that electrifying systems allows you to get a lot more from pretty much every single thing you do, while also allowing for the creation of entirely new systems.

Cooking things in the kitchen? Much easier with electricity. Producing things on an assembly line? The introduction of electricity allows you to introduce all sorts of robotics, measuring tools, and safety measures that would not have otherwise been available, and all of these things make the entire process safer, cheaper, and a heck of a lot more effective and efficient.

The prime argument behind many sky-high AI company valuations, then, is that if these things evolve in the way they could evolve, becoming increasingly capable and versatile and cheap, cooking could become even easier, manufacturing could become still faster, cheaper, and safer, and every other aspect of society and the economy would see similar gains.

If you’re the people making AI, if you own these tools, or a share of the income derived from them, that’s a potentially huge pot of money: a big return on your investment. People make fortunes off far more focused, less-impactful companies and technologies all the time, and being able to create the next big thing in not just one space, but every space? Every aspect of everything, potentially? That’s like owning a share of electricity, and making money every time anyone uses electricity for anything.

Through that lens, the big boom in both use of and investment in AI technologies maybe shouldn’t be so surprising. This represents a potentially generational sea-change in how everything works, what the economy looks like, maybe even how governments are run, militaries fight, and so on. If you can throw money into the mix, why wouldn’t you? And if that’s the case, the billions upon billions of dollars sloshing around in this corner of the tech world make a lot of sense; it may be curious that there’s not even more money being invested.

Belief in that promise is not universal, however.

A lot of people see these technologies not as the next electricity, but maybe the next smartphone, or perhaps the next SUV.

Smartphones changed a whole lot about society too, but they’re hardly the same groundbreaking, omni-powerful upgrade that electricity represents.

SUVs, too, flogged sales for flailing car companies, boosting their revenues at a moment in which they desperately needed to sell more vehicles to survive. But they were just another, more popular model of what already came before. There’s a chance AI will be similar to that: better software than came before, for some people’s use-cases—but not revolutionary, not groundbreaking even on the scale of pocketable phone-computers.

What I’d like to talk about today are the peculiar economics that seem to be playing a role in the AI boom, and why many analysts and financial experts are eyeballing these economics warily, worrying about what they maybe represent, and possibly portend.

—

The term ‘exuberance,’ in the context of markets, refers to an excitement among investors—sometimes professional investors, sometimes casual investors, sometimes both—about a particular company, technology, or financial product type.

The surge in interest and investment in cryptoassets during the height of the COVID-19 pandemic, for instance, including offshoot products like NFTs, was seemingly caused by a period of exuberance, sparked by the novelty of the product, the riches a few lucky insiders made off these products, and the desire by many people—pros and consumer-grade investors—to get in on that action, at a moment in which there wasn’t as much to do in the world as usual.

Likewise, the gobs of money plowed into early internet companies, and the money thrown at companies laying fiberoptic cable for the presumed boom in internet customers, were, in retrospect, at least partly the consequence of irrational exuberance.

In some cases these investors were just too early, as was the case with those cable-laying companies—the majority of them going out of business after blowing through a spectacular amount of money in a short period of time, and not finding enough paying customers to fund all that expansion—in others it was the result of sky-high valuations that were based on little beyond the exuberance of investors who probably should have known better, but who couldn’t get past their fear of missing out on the next big thing.

In that latter case, that flow of money into early dotcom startups did fund a few winners that survived the eventual bursting of that bubble, but the majority of companies tagged with those massive valuations went out of business in part because their valuations were based in part on optimism, hot air, and illusory financials.

Which is to say, their financials were based on a lot of money being added to their account sheets and tallied in the places investors would see those numbers, but the numbers didn’t mean what most people thought they meant.

A company could receive tens of millions of dollars in orders, for instance, but that money and those orders might never be received and fulfilled, or that money might be mostly illusory: maybe it was borrowed from another company to spend on advertising, and that money would then go right back out the door, to the company from which it was borrowed, to pay for their ad services.

That kind of arrangement could be beneficial, as the company doing the borrowing might give up a relatively small number of shares in exchange for money, which looks good on its balance sheet, especially if the money is given at a high valuation, even if that money was mostly just a loan from a company providing ad services, with the full knowledge that money would then be spent on their own ad services. And the ad company giving the money could usually afford to buy in at a high valuation, because it knows it will get that money right back, and when it does, it will get to record that money as income on its own balance sheets.

So Company A gets millions of dollars from Company B, that money is then paid to Company B for some type of service, and both companies get to record favorable figures on their accounting sheets, as if real sales took place and real outside money changed hands, despite it being a circular move, with very little or no actual value being created.

These sorts of relationships are also often good for investors in companies that do this sort of thing, because it makes their investments, the companies they’ve bought into, look even more valuable.

Check it out, Company A, which I own shares in, is worth more than it was last month because of all the business it’s conducting, and because this other company bought into it at a higher price per share than I paid! Even though that increase in valuation is predicated on circular financing, the numbers still go up, and they go up for everyone involved, so there’s little reason to crack down on this not illegal, but shady behavior, and even less reason to want anyone else to know about it, because then they might not add their own money to the circular money-cycling, number-increasing machine.

The major concern amongst some analysts right now is that the AI boom, especially in the United States, might be essentially this kind of circular cycle, but much larger than previous versions of the same.

In the US right now, investment in AI infrastructure like data centers accounts for a huge portion of overall growth—the numbers vary, depending on who you ask and what numbers they look at, but some say that about 90% of total US economic growth, and around 80% of US stock market growth, are predicated on these sorts of investments this past year. Without these investments, the US economy would be basically flat, or worse, and the US stock market would be flailing as well.

This situation isn’t ideal whatever the specifics, as too much reliance on just one industry, or one small collection of industries dominated by just a handful of companies and their investors, makes for a precarious financial foundation.

If anything goes wrong with just one company, the whole house of cards could collapse. And if anything goes wrong with the industry, things could get even worse, and fast. All that investment, all that construction, all those employees and all that money sloshing around could disappear, could stop being spent, could make all those numbers fall and fall and fall more or less overnight.

If this industry is in fact in a bubble, and if it’s being propped up by this kind of circular financing, where companies are fluffing up their own and each other’s accounting books by rotating the same bundle of money and on-paper money from company to company to company, that would portend pretty bad things for the US economy and market, if anyone involved stumbles, even just a little.

This is why recent deals between the biggest players in this space are raising so many eyebrows, and causing so much sweat to bead on so many foreheads.

In September of 2025, ChatGPT-maker OpenAI announced it had formalized a $100 billion investment deal with AI chipmaker Nvidia, the latter expanding on its existing investment in the former. In October, OpenAI announced it was purchasing billions of dollars worth of AI hardware from Nvidia-rival AMD, and that it’s taking a 10% stake in the company.

Microsoft is already heavily invested in OpenAI, to the tune of $13 billion; it takes 49% of OpenAI’s profits, and gets more than that until its original investment is paid back. Microsoft also accounted for nearly 20% of Nvidia’s annualized revenue, as of the fourth quarter of 2025.

Oracle, another computing company which has become hugely influential in this space due to its investment in cloud-based AI datacenters, has a $300 billion deal with OpenAI for future infrastructure buildouts and access, and OpenAI’s Stargate datacenter project was co-funded by Oracle and SoftBank. Nvidia also owns part of CoreWeave, which is an AI infrastructure supplier for OpenAI, and which has Microsoft as a massively important customer.

All of which is very…tangly. It’s an interconnected mess, and OpenAI and Nvidia are at the center of it, but there are a lot of weak spots, threads that, if pulled, would cause the whole thing to unravel. Which is why this feels like such a dangerous setup to many analysts right now.

Consider that in 2025 alone, OpenAI has made around $1 trillion-worth of AI deals. A lot of these deals are plans to invest: commitments to buy data center construction or the use of data center bandwidth, or they’re financial ties with competitors, clients, and providers—companies that would otherwise be competing with, selling to, and buying from each other, rather than linking arms and creating financial and infrastructural interdependencies.

Many of these deals are predicated on debt and what are generally considered to be over-inflated IPO valuations, too: money that isn’t money in the traditional, accounting-book sense, in other words. Numbers that make activity, use, and income for these companies look a lot bigger than they concretely are, on balance sheets, which in turn helps their investment numbers go up up up.

This dynamic has become overt enough that many of the biggest investors in AI companies, and the heads of said companies, like Sam Altman of OpenAI, have said, outright, that it’s probably a bubble, and that a lot of companies will probably go under in the relatively near future. No one knows when, but it’s a good thing, they’re fond of saying, because that shakeout will kill off the deadweight, allow the survivors to scoop up their former competitors’ assets at fire sale prices, and the whole industry will be further centralized around just a handful of the best and the most impactful, just like in the post-dotcom years. Monopolies and mini-monopolies, which, for the people creating and profiting from those monopolies, at least, seems like a good thing.

That optimism glosses over what those in-between years look like, though, especially for smaller investors, employees who are laid off, en masse, and the folks who aren’t profiting directly from the surviving business entities, and who see their stock portfolios collapse and overall growth in their country decrease.

Most of the stories in the tech world right now in some way tie back to the promise and concerns surrounding AI. It’s become such a big story because there’s a chance it will be the next electricity, but there’s also a chance the warning signs we’re seeing are real, and things will get a lot worse before they maybe, possibly, for some people, at some point, get better.

Show Notes

https://finance.yahoo.com/news/a-20-billion-clock-is-ticking-for-openai-as-microsoft-talks-turn-fractious-130006071.html

https://www.sfgate.com/tech/article/circular-deals-bay-area-tech-21089538.php

https://www.theguardian.com/business/2025/oct/08/openai-multibillion-dollar-deals-exuberance-circular-nvidia-amd

https://www.ft.com/content/950e3a36-7141-4426-b7c5-08fad5d83919

https://finance.yahoo.com/news/very-troubling-ais-self-investment-spree-sets-off-bubble-alarms-on-wall-street-160524518.html

https://www.cnbc.com/2025/10/15/a-guide-to-1-trillion-worth-of-ai-deals-between-openai-nvidia.html

https://insights.som.yale.edu/insights/this-is-how-the-ai-bubble-bursts

https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cz69qy760weo

https://www.nbcnews.com/business/economy/openai-nvidia-amd-deals-risks-rcna234806

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-10-08/the-circular-openai-nvidia-and-amd-deals-raising-fears-of-a-new-tech-bubble

https://flowingdata.com/2025/10/13/circular-deals-among-ai-companies/

https://www.nytimes.com/2025/10/07/business/dealbook/openai-nvidia-amd-investments-circular.html

https://sherwood.news/markets/analyst-a-lot-more-disclosure-needed-on-these-circular-ai-deals/

https://www.barrons.com/articles/nvidia-microsoft-openai-circular-financing-ai-bubble-5d9a4e7c

https://www.investopedia.com/wall-street-analysts-ai-bubble-stock-market-11826943

https://www.goldmansachs.com/insights/articles/ai-may-start-to-boost-us-gdp-in-2027

https://finance.yahoo.com/news/most-us-growth-now-rides-213011552.html

This week we talk about trade wars, TACO theory, and Chinese imports.

We also discuss negotiation, protectionism, and threat spirals.

Recommended Book: More Than Words by John Warner

Transcript

In January of 2018, then first-term US President Trump announced a slew of tariffs and trade barriers against several countries, including Canada, Mexico, and those in the European Union.

The most significant of these new barriers and tariffs were enacted against China, though, as Trump had long claimed that China, the US’s most important trade partner by many measures, was taking advantage of the US market; a claim that economists tepidly backed, as while some of the specifics, like those related to intellectual property theft on the part of China, were pretty overt, the Chinese government fairly brazenly gobbling up IP and technology from US companies that do business in the country before hobbling those US interests in China and handing that IP and technology off to their own, China-born copies, claims about a trade deficit were less clear-cut—most of those sorts of claims seemed to be the result of a misunderstanding about how international trade works.

That said, Trump had made a protectionist stance part of his platform, so he kicked off his administration by imposing a package of targeted tariffs against specific product categories from China, including things like solar panels and washing machines. Those were followed by more tariffs on steel and aluminum—from a lot of countries, not just China—and this implementation of trade barriers between the US and long-time trade partners, which had mostly enjoyed barrier-free trade up till that point, kicked off a trade war, with the Trump administration announcing, out of nowhere, new tariffs or limitations, and the country on the pointy end of that new declaration announcing their own counter, usually something the US sells to their country, while in the background, both countries tried to negotiate new trade terms on the down-low.

There was a lot of tit-for-tatting in those first couple years of the first Trump administration, and they led to a lot of negotiations between the US government and these foreign governments, which in turn led to the lifting of many such barriers, though the weaponization of barriers continued, with the administration, for instance, announcing a tariff on all imports from Mexico until the Mexican government was able to halt all illegal immigration coming into the US; negotiation ended that threat, too, but this early salvo upset a lot of the US’s long-time allies, while also making it clear that Trump intended to open negotiations with these sorts of threats, whenever possible—which had the knock-on effect of everyone taking the threats pretty seriously, as they were often incredibly dangerous to specific industries, while also taking them less seriously because it was obvious they were intended to be a negotiating tactic.

When Trump left office, a bunch of international relationships had been scarred by this approach to trade deals, and when Biden replaced him, he dropped most of the new tariffs against long-time allies, but kept most of the China tariffs in place, especially those related to green technologies like electric vehicles and semiconductors, the local-made versions of which were becoming a big focus for the Biden administration. The administration then went on to expand upon those tariffs, against China, in some cases.

What I’d like to talk about today is how this approach to trade protectionism and negotiation has ballooned under the second Trump administration, and what a new threat against China by Trump might mean for how the relationship between these two countries evolves, moving forward.

—

Trump’s second administration opened with an executive order that declared a national emergency, claiming that the Chinese were trafficking drugs, especially synthetic opioids like fentanyl, into the US, and that this allowed criminals to profit from destroying the lives of US citizens.

This declaration allowed him to unleash a flurry of tariffs against China, first imposing 10% on all Chinese imports, then increasing that to 20% in March of 2025.

China retaliated, imposing tariffs of 15% on mostly US energy products, like coal and natural gas, and on some types of agricultural machines, while also engaging in some legal pressure against US companies, like Google. They followed this up with tariffs against meat and dairy products, and suspended US lumber import rights, and disallowed three US firms from selling soybeans to China.

The US reciprocated, and China reciprocated back. There was a period of spiraling broad tariffs and import bans in the mid-2025 between the US and China, which led to an aggregate baseline tariff on Chinese imports of 104%, which was followed with an aggregate Chinese baseline tariff against US goods of 84%. The US then upped theirs to 145%, and China raised theirs to 125%.

Again, vital to understanding this spiral is that the Trump administration made pretty clear that they were doing this mostly as a negotiating tactic. There were claims that they could solve the US deficit by raising tariffs so high that the funds from those tariffs would pay off the country’s debt, but that’s generally not considered to be realistic. Instead, the consensus view is that Trump likes to play negotiating hardball, likes to step into negotiations with the upper-hand, being able to say, give me what I want and I’ll reduce the pain you’re experiencing, basically, and this play against China was another attempt to make that kind of advantage stick.

China, for its part, seemed like it was done with the posturing at that point, though: it announced, after its retaliatory tariffs reached 125%, that it would simply ignore all further increases on the US government’s side, because the whole thing is just kind of a joke and it’s beneath them to keep playing this game.

Not long after that, Trump announced that the tariffs against China would come down substantially, but not to zero; Trump said this was decided after discussions with China, and Chinese officials said they hadn’t been in contact with the Trump administration about any of this—which is something that seems to happen quite a bit with the Trump administration.

During this period of spiraling trade barriers, China was able to establish better and more open trade agreements with other nations in Southeast Asia, including South Korea and Japan. China also reduced it US Treasury holdings, reducing its exposure to the US economy at a moment in which the US government was betting big on policy that many economists considered to be ham-handed at best, completely nonsensical, delusional, and harmful at worst.

During that spiral, before things cooled off, China also began applying protections on locally sourced and refined rare earths, which are a category of mineral that are vital for modern electronics and things like solar panels, batteries, semiconductors, and electric vehicles.

China makes and owns the rights to the vast majority of the current global supply of these materials, mining about 70% of them and controlling about 90% of global processing. And cutting them off, or even truncating their flow, is considered to be a huge strategic threat. The US has been slowly investing in alternative supplies for such things, but many of them are difficult or expensive to produce in the proper volume, and it’ll likely be a decade or more before those alternative sources can be properly exploited, replacing the volume currently imported from China.

Back in June, China granted permits to US businesses that would be allowed to import rare earths, but that supply remained tenuous—a bit of a counter to Trump’s ongoing tariff threats that could seemingly arise out of nowhere, messing up everyone’s plans. The Chinese seemed to want to leverage this supply in the same way, and keeping things limited while issuing a few permits meant the flow could kind of continue, but could also be slowed or cut off, again, at a moment’s notice.

In early October, the Chinese government announced new curbs on the export of rare earths and related technologies, just three weeks before a scheduled meeting between Trump and Chinese leader Xi Jinping. These new curbs further limited what could be imported to the US, even if there were intermediary nations involved, and also tightened their grip on anything related to mining, smelting, recycling, and producing products, like powerful magnets, from such materials.

It’s worth mentioning here, too, that these sorts of materials are increasingly vital for the production of high-tech military goods. If the US were to lose access to sufficient volumes of them, the US military would have a very hard time making missiles, replacing satellite components, building tanks and drones—it would give China a significant advantage, probably for years, in terms of upgrading and maintaining their military hardware.

Despite that, and despite the US government’s claims that it intended to replace Chinese sources of these materials, theoretically limiting Chinese leverage in these upcoming talks, progress in that department has been minimal, so far; about a billion dollars worth of investment in rare earths supply chains were announced over the past year or so, but further investment is considered to be unlikely in the near-future, and it’ll be a while before these investments will pay off, if they ever do.

Shortly after that announcement by the Chinese, President Trump threatened to enforce a new 100% tariff on Chinese imports, beginning on November 1, or potentially even sooner, raising tariff levels to just shy of what they were back in April of 2025, at the peak of the US-China trade protectionism threat-spiral.

He also said he didn’t see any reason to meet with Xi if they were going to limit rare earths in this way, but later clarified that the meeting hadn’t been cancelled, and said that he set the implementation date for that new threatened tariff rate to Nov 1 because that would give the Chinese the opportunity to back down on their new trade barriers before they chatted.

Global markets, which are sometimes a good barometer for how informed folks think these sorts of negotiations will play out, have been relatively calm about all this, though there have been some significant tumbles in the US market, including a recent drop of about 2.7% for the S&P 500, marking the worst day for the US market since April, back when the tariff threats last reached this kind of peak.

One stance that’s become popular in trading circles over the past year is the so-called TACO theory, which stands for Trump Always Chickens Out; the idea being that Trump is never really serious about any of these threats, he just likes to talk a big game and then hopes the other side will feel threatened enough to give him what he wants during negotiations—but if they don’t, he steps back from all his big talk and quietly gives in to the other side, especially if they have leverage.

Some analysts are assuming that’s what’s happening now, as evidenced by Trump’s own statements about giving China the chance to deescalate—giving them specific instructions for how to let things calm down, rather than making these threats and suggesting they’re permanent, or not giving the other side any rationale for why it’s happening.

There’s a chance, though, that there’s some truth to the opposing theory that this is part of a larger plan by the Trump administration to create a new trade war that’s meant to dominate headlines and concerns for a while, maybe as far into the future as next year’s elections, all of which is meant to conceal other efforts by the administration, like the military occupancy of American cities and the administration’s vehement objection to releasing the so-called Epstein files, which allegedly contain many references to Trump and other powerful people within his administration, which in turn would further connect him to a renowned pedophile.

The Republican-controlled congress has made a massive effort to keep those files from being released, and Trump has become well-known for saying and doing headline-grabbing things whenever something inconvenient for him starts bubbling up in the news.

So while there’s a chance this back-and-forth will end just before those upcoming trade talks, both sides taking their fingers off the trigger, as it were, in order to make a deal, there’s also a chance elements of this will be spun into a larger narrative, a war of sorts meant to dominate headlines and conceal other things that the administration would prefer to keep off the front page.

Show Notes

https://apnews.com/article/rare-earths-china-united-states-trade-supply-chain-de92222cda02dc85064c697911c6dea7

https://apnews.com/article/tariffs-timeline-trade-war-trump-canada-mexico-china-a9d714eea677488ef9397547d838dbd0

https://www.scmp.com/economy/china-economy/article/3318694/china-cuts-us-treasury-holdings-third-month-amid-trade-war-debt-ceiling-fears

https://apnews.com/article/china-us-trump-tariff-threat-trade-talks-cc4bd30c3b1bcf2eb2676bc0e66efba0

https://apnews.com/article/trump-inflation-federal-reserve-powell-88358f4955fd86ef3c86f5e8e089e775

https://apnews.com/article/trump-xi-tariffs-china-ai-642b042b1ebe1d1930eb93bf51943e3f

https://apnews.com/article/trump-xi-china-cc47e258cfc6336dfddcc20fa67a3642

https://apnews.com/article/china-earths-exports-trump-dad99d532f858f04d750d0b8c50e5ed6

https://time.com/7292207/us-china-trade-war-trump-tariffs-timeline/

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/China%E2%80%93United_States_trade_war

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tariffs_in_the_first_Trump_administration

https://www.piie.com/research/piie-charts/2019/us-china-trade-war-tariffs-date-chart

https://www.wsj.com/economy/trade/trumps-fresh-tariff-assault-threatens-chinas-fragile-economy-d0b3a00d

https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cn828kg8rmzo

This week we talk about Electronic Arts, 3DO, and the Saudi Arabian Public Investment Fund.

We also discuss Jared Kushner, leveraged buyouts, and loot boxes.

Recommended Book: Bandwidth by Dan Caruso

Transcript

Electronic Arts, often shorthanded as EA, was founded in 1982 in California by a former Apple employee named Trip Hawkins, who also went on to found the ill-fated 3DO company, which made video game hardware, and the somewhat more prolific, but also ultimately ill-fated casual game developer Digital Chocolate.

EA, though, has been an absolutely astounding success. It’s business model was predicated on the premise of selling video games directly to retailers, rather than going through intermediaries. This allowed them to gain more market share than their competitors right off the bat, and it helped them glean higher margins than their competitors from each direct sale, too.

EA also established an early reputation for treating its developers really well. They were the first gaming company to feature their developers in advertising and to give them platforms, promoting them as video game artists, basically, and it shared the profits netted from those direct sales with these develops—which in turn meant all the best developers really wanted to work for EA, which led to a beneficial cycle where they created better and better, and more and more financially successful games.

In the late-80s, they started deviating from this model somewhat, scooping up a collection of successful independent game development studios and deviating, at times, from the creative lead’s vision when releasing their games. They also refocused a fair bit of their resources on franchises, like the immensely successful, as it turned out, Madden NFL series, and they branched out into producing games for the console market, including the still-new Nintendo Entertainment System, in 1990.

That same year, EA went public on the NASDAQ, the company got new leadership when Hawkins decided to refocus on his far less successful 3DO hardware startup, and in an interesting twist, the arrival of the Sony Playstation in North America caused EA to drop support for 3DO hardware in the mid-90s so it could refocus on Playstation games, which were a lot more lucrative.

By the mid-90s, EA had an astonishingly large and successful software library, including franchises like the aforementioned Madden games and the FIFA soccer games, but also celebrity-tied games like Shaq Fu, and military shooters like Jungle and Urban Strike.

By the early-2000s, EA was making exclusive licensing deals with the NFL and ESPN, in order to stave off newfound sports game competitors, and it was the only video game company to consistently make a profit, most others experiencing feast and famine cycles, with periodic wins, but a whole lot of losses they had to cover with the profits from those wins. EA, in contrast, had a reliable stable of profit-sources, and it thus had a whole lot of leverage in terms of attracting and retaining talent, but also getting big names and brands on board, for collaborative projects.

What I’d like to talk about today is what happened to EA during and following the 2008 economic crisis, and how and why it recently became an acquisition target for Saudi Arabia.

—

In 2008, when the global economy was collapsing, EA suffered a bad holiday sales season and fired 1,100 employees and closed 12 of their facilities early the following year. Later in 2009, the company announced the firing of another 1,500 employees, which was about 17% of their total workforce at the time, and in 2010 they acquired a gaming company that focused on mobile games, which were becoming increasingly popular, now that many people had touch-capable smartphones, which brought hot new franchises like Angry Birds under their brand umbrella.

On the strength of that acquisition and all those downsizings, in early 2011, EA announced that it hit $3.8 billion in revenue in the financial year for the first time, and in early 2012, it announced it surpassed $1 billion in digital revenue during the previous year, which was a huge figure that early in the digital media landscape. It used some of those profits to scoop up another mobile-first gaming company, adding properties like Plants vs Zombies and Peggle to their library.

EA completed another mass-firing in 2013, dismissing 10% of their employees under what they called a reorganization, around the same time they announced an exclusive license with Disney that would allow them to develop Star Wars games.

Their stock value boomed in the following years, as a result of those cost-savings measures, and those new relationships, and emboldened by record-high stock valuations, in the mid-20-teens, the company started releasing big-name games, like Star Wars Battlefront 2, with random-content loot boxes and other sorts of microtransactions.

This did not go over well with players, who decried these in-game purchasing options as ‘pay to win’ mechanics, as players could pay more money to get better characters and equipment, and a lot of the content, even after paying for the expensive games, was still locked behind paywalls, requiring more payments to unlock that content. A bunch of gaming journalists cried foul on this shift as the game careened toward its full release, as did a whole lot of early players, and Disney complained, too, so by the time it hit shelves, the game’s loot system was substantially changed, but that whole controversy spooked investors, and led to an 8.5% stock value drop in just a single month, knocking $3.1 billion from the company’s valuation. As a result of that controversy, EA also became the face for a larger legal and legislative debate about in-game purchases and how it’s kinda sorta like gambling, from that point forward.

Soon after, EA experienced a series of bad quarters, including a huge drop of 13.3% to its valuation when a major entry in one of their larger franchises, Battlefield V, was released late, and received very mixed reviews when it was released, which led to a million fewer sold copies than anticipated. The game was also lagging in terms of gameplay behind smaller, nimbler competitors, including then-burgeoning Fortnite.

The company saw an overall boost with the surprise success of Apex Legends, and the COVID-19 pandemic boosted sales dramatically for a while, since everyone was staying home, which allowed EA to gobble up a few more competing companies with successful franchises, and they knocked out a few more successful Star Wars games, as well.

In early 2021, Saudi Arabia’s public investment funds bought 7.4 million shares of EA for about $1.1 billion, which flew under the radar for most gamers, but that’ll be important in a moment.

Later that year, the company experienced a massive hack, a lot of its data, including the source code for games, stolen and sold on the dark web. EA bought some more competitors, but word on the street in 2022 was the the higher ups at EA were quietly shopping the company around, themselves looking to be acquired by a larger entity, on the scale of Apple or Disney.

In early 2023, the company announced more mass-layoffs and launched another internal reorganization. It gutted several of its most popular gaming sub-brands, including BioWare, it cancelled an upcoming Star Wars game, and it announced that it would be shifting away from licensing agreements and refocusing on EA-owned IP.

The pattern of layoffs leading to better financial fortunes didn’t pay off this time, though. In early 2025, EA divulged that it expected to underperform in the coming year, several of its big-name titles not doing as well as expected; the company cast blame on the market, but players and journalists pointed at the company’s gutting of its big-name studios, and the firing of many of its veteran developers to explain the reduced sales.

EA had another mass-firing in April of this year, and followed by another in May, which paralleled an announcement that they would no longer be moving forward with a big, planned Black Panther game.

In late September of 2025, EA announced that it had reached a deal, worth $55 billion, to go private, no longer selling shares on the stock market, with the financial assistance of a group of investors, which included Affinity Partners, which is led by Jared Kushner, US President Trump’s son-in-law, Silver Lake, which is a US-based private equity firm that helps make these sorts of big sales happen, and the aforementioned Saudi Arabian Public Investment Fund.

This deal isn’t done yet, it still needs to get regulatory approval and a successful vote by stockholders, but it seems likely to go through, since the US regulatory environment is pretty lax at the moment, and because Kushner is involved, it’s unlikely President Trump will take a personal disliking to it.

But the big story here seems to be that Saudi Arabia is buying up not just a video game company, but one of the biggest and most successful video gaming companies in the world, which, although it’s lost a lot of fan-credibility over the years, still owns some massively influential intellectual property and has just a stunning number of relationships and connections throughout the media world, alongside its huge valuation.

If the sale does go through, and we should know for sure by sometime around June 2026, it would be the largest-ever leveraged buyout, which means the purchase was completed by using borrowed money that was borrowed against the asset being purchased; so those investors have taken out debt against EA itself, which is an increasingly common means of buying a large asset on the cheap, but it also typically burdens that asset with a simply astounding amount of debt which must then be recouped, often by selling off undervalued assets.

When this happens to a newspaper, for instance, the buyer will often sell off the paper’s real estate and fire all their employees, to make money and pay off that debt, and in this case, there’s a chance that debt will be paid by throwing up a bunch of new paywalls and really leaning into those in-game transactions that nobody really liked, including politicians, back in the day, but which in this current regulatory environment would probably be allowed, and they would probably make some serious bank off of it initially, before players started getting wise and moving on to other games released by less predatory companies.

The really interesting facet of this story, though, is the question of why Saudi Arabia wants a video game company.

And to understand that, it’s important to understand that, first, the country’s Public Investment Fund is meant to help its economy shift away from purely extractive resources, like oil, and it has thus invested in all sorts of things, including luxury beach resorts, minority stakes in financial service companies like Citigroup, stakes in companies like Disney and Boeing and Meta, and increasingly, investments in companies run by allies of President Trump, like the aforementioned Affinity Partners, which was formed by Jared Kushner.

So this is an economic play, but also a political play, almost certainly, by the Saudis, to get in good with the people who are in good with the US government.

It’s also been alleged that this might be an attempt by the Saudis to engage in what’s being called game-washing, which is similar to greenwashing, but instead of trying to make a company seem green and sustainable by doing kinda sorta green things, but only as a veneer to cover up the opposite, in this case it means using sports and video games and the like to increase a nation’s reputation with humanistic seeming things, despite, well, the truth being much more complicated.

Just as when the Fund participated in buying a Premier League football, a soccer team, back in 2021, then, alongside their concomitant establishment of LIV Gold, a golf league meant to compete with the PGA, this investment in EA, and other investments it’s made in video game companies like Capcom and Nexon, might be part of a larger effort to diversify the nation’s brand, not just its economics. It’s human rights record is abysmal, and it’s possible they’re trying to cover that up, make people forget about it, by creating more connections between Saudi Arabia and more positive things, like sports and games and the like.

There are additional concerns about this purchase of EA, too, by the way, because Saudi Arabia’s cultural values are very anti-woman, anti-LGBTQ, and anti-liberal, democratic values. So there are fears that we might see less representation and fewer what we might call western values portrayed in the games released by these studios, as a result of this ownership.

The folks running EA have said their core values will remain unchanged by the buyout, but it’s expected, bare-minimum, that this will lead to another several restructurings and mass-layoffs throughout the company in the coming years, to help recoup all that debt, at the end of which even the people making those promises might be long gone.

Show Notes

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Public_Investment_Fund

https://www.nytimes.com/2025/09/29/business/dealbook/electronic-arts-buyout-jared-kushner.html

https://www.wsj.com/business/deals/ea-private-deal-buyout-video-game-maker-808aefec

https://www.ft.com/content/61cef75e-ceba-43ee-80e3-040756c6154f?accessToken=zwAGQAMTiJKIkc9hzvdezrpD7tOA4wQHVsYVTw.MEUCIHND3WOT4rS4frIMIOoeXHQeil_Ma1yGrwOqUD2m306DAiEAtA_QLvpyObai9zoo_9GZSljJuJyTKxJgFHpQDcCcVsE&sharetype=gift&token=03dd6ca5-c34f-4925-8a3d-a89f4058ee80

https://www.wsj.com/business/deals/ea-silver-lake-deal-jared-kushner-c145cd55?st=eZghQH

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Electronic_Arts

This week we talk about Article 4, big sticks, and spheres of influence.

We also discuss Moldova, super powers, and new fronts.

Recommended Book: More Everything Forever by Adam Becker

Transcript

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, or NATO, was originally formed in 1949 in the wake of World War 2 and at the beginning of the Cold War.

At that moment, the world was beginning to orient toward what we might think of as the modern global order, which at the time was predicated on having two superpowers—the US and the Soviet Union—and the world being carved up into their respective spheres of influence.

NATO was formed as the military component of that protection effort, as the Soviets (and other powers who had occupied that land in the past) had a history of turning their neighbors into client states, because their territory provides little in the way of natural borders. Their inclination, then, was to either invade or overthrow neighboring governments so they could function as buffers between the Soviet Union and its potential enemies.

The theory behind NATO is collective security: if anyone attacks one of the member nations, the others will come to their aid. Article 5 of the NATO treaty says that an attack against one member is considered an attack against all members, and while this theoretically would be applied against any would-be attacker, it was 100% created so that the Soviets and their Warsaw Pact allies knew that if they attacked, for instance, Norway, the other NATO nations—including, importantly, the United States, which again, was one of just two superpowers in the world at that point, all the other powers, like the UK and France having been devastated by WWII—would join in their defense.

NATO, today, is quite a bit bigger than it was originally: it started out with just 12 countries in Europe and North America, and as of 2025, there are 32, alongside a handful of nations that are hoping to join, and are at various points along the way to possibly someday becoming member states.

What I’d like to talk about today are recent provocations by the Soviet Union’s successor state, Russia, against NATO, and what these provocations might portend for the future of the region.

—

In early 2014, Russia invaded—in a somewhat deniable way, initially funding local rabble-rousers and using unmarked soldiers and weapons—the eastern portion of Ukraine, and then annexed an important Black Sea region called Crimea. Then in early 2022, Russia launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine, massing hundreds of thousands of military assets on their shared border before plunging toward Ukraine’s capitol and other vital strategic areas.

Against the odds, as Ukraine is small and poor compared to Russia, and has a far smaller military, as well, Ukrainians managed to hold off the Russian assault, and today, about 3.5 years later, Ukraine continues to hold Russia off, though Russian forces have been making incremental gains in the eastern portion of the country over the past year, and Russian President Putin seems convinced he can hold the Donbas region, in particular, even if peace is eventually declared.

At the moment, though, peace seems unlikely, as Russian forces continue to grind against increasingly sophisticated and automated Ukrainian defenses, the invading force, in turn, bolstered by North Korean ammunition and troops. Ukraine’s exhausted soldiery is periodically and irregularly bulwarked by resources from regional and far-flung allies, helping them stay in the game, and they’re fleshing out their locally grown defense industry, which has specialized in asymmetric weaponry like drones and rockets, but Russia still has the advantage by pretty much any metric we might use to gauge such things.

Over the past three weeks, concerns that this conflict might spill over into the rest of Europe have been heightened by Russian provocations along the eastern edge of the NATO alliance.

Russia flew drones into Poland and Romania, fighter jets into Estonia, and aggressively flew fighters over a Germany Navy frigate in the Baltic Sea. Article 4 of the NATO treaty was invoked, which is the lead-up invocation to an eventual invocation of Article 5, which would be a full-fledged defense, by the bloc, against someone who attacked a NATO member.

And that’s on top of Russia’s persistent and ongoing efforts to influence politics in Moldova, which held an election over the weekend that could serve as a foot in the door for Russian influence campaigns and Russia-stoked coups within the EU, or could become one more hardened border against such aggressions, depending on how the election pans out. The final results aren’t in as of the day I’m recording this episode, but there are fears that if the pro-Russian parties win, they’ll turn the country—which is located on Ukraine’s borders, opposite Russia—into another Russian puppet state, similar to Belarus, but if the pro-Russian parties don’t do well, they’ll try to launch a coup, because Russian disinformation in the country has been so thorough, and has indicated, in essence, if they lose, the process was rigged.

All of which is occurring at a moment in which NATO’s most powerful and spendy member, by far, the US, is near-universally pulling out of international activities, the second Trump administration proving even more antagonistic toward allies than the first one, and even more overt in its disdain for alliances like NATO, as well. It’s probably worth noting here, too, that part of why things are so hectic in Moldova is that the US government has stopped pressuring social networks to tamp down on overt misinformation and propaganda from Russia-aligned groups, and that’s led to significant fog of war for this most recent election.

Considering the US’s recent unreliability, and in some cases complete absence regarding NATO and similar alliances and pacts, it’s perhaps prudent that NATO member states have recently agreed to up their individual spending on defense, all of these states meeting or exceeding their pre-2025-summit goal of 2% of GDP, that target increasing to 5% by 2035.

This is notable in part because it’s something Trump demanded, and that demand seems to have worked and probably been a good idea, but this is also notable because of what it represents: a cessation of leadership by the US in this alliance.

The US has long been the big stick wielded by its European allies, and this administration basically said, hey, you need to make your own big sticks, you may not have access to our weapons and support anymore. And while it will still take a while to both get their funding up to snuff and to spend those funds appropriately, outfitting their defenses and shoring up their numbers, this would seem to be a step in that direction—though there’s simmering concern that it might be too little, too late.

That concern is mostly held by Russia-watchers who have noted a big pivot by Russia’s leadership, and in the Russian economy.

Over the past 3.5 years since it invaded Ukraine, that invasion taking a lot longer than they thought it would, Russia has shifted into a total war stance, its entire economy becoming reliant on its continued invasion of Ukraine.

Should that invasion end or ebb, or should it continue to fail to give the Russian government enough successes, so it can brag about how well it’s doing to its citizenry and oligarchs, it would probably need another target—another front in the war that it can open to justify the continued churning-out of weapons and soldiers, and the continued spending of a huge chunk of its GDP toward the military. Lacking that churn, it’s economy would be in even worse straits than it’s in, today, and lacking that cause, it’s possible support for the government could collapse.

It’s also been posited that it could be a disaster Putin’s regime if too many Russian veterans, wounded and traumatized from their time on the front lines in Ukraine, were to arrive back in Russia all at once. That’s the sort of situation that could lead to an uprising against the government, or bare minimum a lot of turmoil that they don’t want to deal with. Having another front, another battle to send them to, would solve that problem; it would be an excuse to keep them fighting external enemies, rather than looking for internal ones.

Russia’s Foreign Minister, Sergey Lavrov, recently said that NATO and the EU have declared a “real war” against Russia by participating in the conflict; by providing arms and financial support for Ukraine.

This is, of course, a silly thing to say, though it is the kind of statement an aggressor makes when they want to make themselves sound like the victim, and want to justify moving on to victimize someone else. You attacked us for no reason! We are thus completely within our rights to defend ourselves by attacking you; we are in the right here, you’re the bad guys.

This could be just saber-rattling, and it usually is. Lavrov says things like this all the time, and it’s almost always state-sanctioned bluster. The drone and jet flyovers, likewise, could be meant to send a signal to the EU and NATO: back off, this is not your fight, but if you continue supporting Ukraine, we’ll make it your fight, and we think we can beat you.

It’s also possible, though, that these actions are meant to test NATO defenses at a moment in which the US is largely absent from the region, China and Russia have never been tighter, including in supporting each other’s regional goals and militaries, and in which Russia seemingly has many reasons, mostly internal, to expand the scope of the conflict.

Show Notes

https://www.yahoo.com/news/articles/pistorius-russian-jet-flew-over-142629311.html?guccounter=1

https://www.nytimes.com/2025/09/19/world/europe/russian-fighter-jets-estonia-nato.html

https://www.nytimes.com/2025/09/07/business/russia-disinformation-trump.html

https://www.nytimes.com/2025/09/20/world/europe/poland-drones-russia-nato.html

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prelude_to_the_Russian_invasion_of_Ukraine

https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c5ygjv0r2myo

https://thehill.com/policy/international/5522862-lavrov-nato-eu-russia/

https://www.cnn.com/2025/09/27/europe/putin-hybrid-war-europe-risks-intl

https://www.nytimes.com/2025/09/27/world/europe/russia-europe-poland-drones-moldova-election.html

https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-poland-drones-sanctions-rafale-429ff46431a916feff629f26a5d0c0da

https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/denmark-has-no-plans-invoke-natos-article-4-foreign-minister-says-2025-09-26/

https://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2025/09/27/More-drones-spotted-Denmark/4031758983759/

https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-war-poland-drones-defense-kyiv-ec284922b946737b98a28f179ac0c5a0

https://apnews.com/article/poland-airspace-drones-russia-airport-closed-cf7236040d8c7858104a29122aa1bd57

https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-war-poland-drones-fa2d5d8981454499fa611a1468a5de8b

https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-war-poland-drones-1232774279039f9e5c5b78bd58686cb9

https://apnews.com/article/british-intelligence-mi6-russia-war-443df0c37ff2254fcc33d5425e3beaa6

https://apnews.com/article/nato-article-4-explainer-russia-poland-estonia-26415920dfb8458725bda517337adb12

https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/nato-article-4-russia/

https://www.nytimes.com/2025/09/28/world/europe/moldova-election-russia-eu.html

https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49187.htm

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NATO

https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_52044.htm