Iran's Gambit

The Supreme National Security Council, Iran's central national security decision-making body, remains one of the most secretive organizations in the Islamic Republic. Its proceedings are not public, and insights into its operations are mostly limited to references in the journals of former President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani and scattered accounts from Iranian officials. Therefore, former Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif's book "The Audacity of Resilience," published in Tehran in March, is a revelation. The book illuminates the SNSC process, documents interagency rivalry among Iran's government bureaucracies, and highlights the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps' dominance in national security decision making.

In yesterday's edition of reformist Ham-Mihan newspaper, there ws an excellent article by Ms. Mansoureh Mohammadi, on appointment of governor generals under President Masoud Pezeshkian. In the past, I used to do a social background analysis of the governor generals, in order to develop a better understanding of the composition of the executive branch of government in Iran, and more broadly, about the ruling elites of the Islamic Republic. Under President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, I was particularly interested in how many governor generals were veterans of the Revolutionary Guard, and found out most of the governors appointed by Mr. Ahmadinejad were indeed former Guardsmen. For some time, I have neglected this work, and I was happily surprised by Ms. Mohammadi's article in today's newspaper, which shows Dr. Pezeshkian has invited everyone into the tent: Ethnic and religious minorities, representatives of his political rivals, and some of his own backers.

Today's program is based on a single article in Ham-Mihan newspaper, which discusses the Iranian opposition abroad, and delves into the principle of whether the end justifies the means, especially when this entails the unprecedented situation of opposition-minded individuals or factions supporting foreign adversaries attacking Iran, their homeland. Obviously, Ham-Mihan argues that the end does not justify the means, and depicts the exiled opposition as traitors and mercenaries of foreign powers, primarily Israel. Ham-Mihan has also some unrealistic policy recommendations, such as "dialogue, permitting dissent, and encouraging a multiplicity of voices" in Iran, which I will comment on in the final part of the program. After all, the Islamic Republic had such proclivity, there would be no exiled opposition in the first place!

Reviewing the Persian language media, you sense that an unsettling atmosphere pervades the political landscape, as though destiny is inescapably closing in. There is also a palpable sense of fatalism, a resigned recognition that the path forward may not be altered and catastrophe awaits Iran. n this charged atmosphere, the regime's desperation to construct a semblance of national unity becomes palpable, so much so that it has begun conjuring the ghost of Shah Mohammad-Reza Pahlavi—a monarch whom it has long vilified as both a traitor to his people and a puppet of foreign interests. This ironic resurrection speaks to the regime's faltering grasp, as it calls upon the very figure it once condemned in its quest for survival.

Dear listeners, I'm recording this program on Sunday October 20th. As you may recall, yesterday's program focused on the ongoing island dispute between Iran and the United Arab Emirates. This issue resurfaced after the European Union and Gulf Cooperation Council issued a Joint Statement, calling on Iran to "end its occupation of the three UAE islands—Greater Tunb, Lesser Tunb, and Abu Musa—which constitutes a violation of UAE sovereignty and the principles of the U.N. Charter."

Yesterday, I predicted that the Islamic Republic would use this affair to frame a new threat to Iran's territorial integrity, aiming to mobilize Iranian nationalism against regional rivals. This prediction came true today, as Iranian politicians are now competing to hurl insults at the European Union, Britain, and, to a lesser extent, Arab states. While I'll cover the most significant reactions in today's program, those patient enough to listen through will also hear a fascinating story about how Israel uses jinns, witchcraft, and supernatural elements to fight Lebanese Hezbollah!

Iran and United Arab Emirates both claim sovereignty over the Greater Tunb, Lesser Tunb, and Abu Musa islands. This conflict predates the Islamic Republic, with Shah Mohammad-Reza Pahlavi ordering the Imperial Navy in 1971 to assert Iranian sovereignty over the islands. The dispute has simmered since then and resurfaces regularly.

A fresh episode occurred a few days ago when the European Union (EU) and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) held their first summit, themed "Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity." The October 16 summit produced a Joint Statement that devoted an entire section to Iran. The statement emphasizes "the importance of diplomatic engagement with Iran to pursue regional de-escalation" and stresses "the importance of ensuring the peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear program, ending the proliferation of ballistic missiles, unmanned aerial vehicles, and any technologies that threaten regional security." This refers primarily to Iran's arms exports to Russia, though it may also encompass Iran's arming of proxies. However, the section that sparked reactions in Iran was Section 46, which calls on Iran to "end its occupation of the three islands of the UAE—Greater Tunb, Lesser Tunb, and Abu Musa—which constitutes a violation of the UAE's sovereignty and the principles of the U.N. Charter."

This is not the first time outside powers have sided with the UAE in the island dispute. Even China, sometimes considered a tactical ally of Iran, has supported the UAE's claims, as has Russia. In today's program, explore Iran's reaction to the joint statement and how the issue is likely to influence Iranian politics.

How is Hamas leader Mr. Yahya Sinwar depicted in the Islamic Republic's propaganda? Is his violent death likely to impact Iran? How come the "Morality Police" has almost stopped enforcing Iran's hijab law, and how can it be related to the war in Gaza and Lebanon?

With Lebanese Hezbollah—a key element of Iran's defense strategy and its main deterrent against Israel and, indirectly, the U.S.—struggling, Iran's state-controlled media are openly discussing nuclear breakout as a way to restore the balance of terror. Remarkably, Iranian lawmakers are participating in this debate. On October 9, 39 members of parliament sent a letter to the Supreme National Security Council calling for a "revision of Iran's nuclear doctrine." Ahmad Bakhsheyesh Ardestani, a member of the parliamentary National Security and Foreign Affairs Committee, echoed this sentiment in a recent interview with the reformist newspaper Shargh, emphasizing Iran's need to develop a nuclear weapon. He also delivered a few comments concerning the necessity for Ayatollah Ali Khamenei to revise his so-called nuclear fatwa, or religious edict, which undermine the Iranian leader's religious authority. Everyone has now an opinion on fatwas!

In response to Iran's missile and drone transfers to Russia, the European Union sanctioned three Iranian airliners on October 14: Saha Airlines, which operates domestic flights within Iran; Mahan Air; and Iran Air. Following the sanctions, Iran Air suspended its services to EU member states. This leaves the significant demand for flights from Iran to Europe to be fulfilled by foreign airlines through connecting flights via intermediate countries such as Turkey, the UAE, and Qatar. While most Iranian media merely reported the new sanctions, Kayhan newspaper, a mouthpiece for Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, reacted strongly to the sanctions in its October 16 edition.

Today's Persian-language media are dominated by two major stories: the resurrection of Quds Force Chief Brigadier General Ismail Qaani, and the stalled nuclear negotiations between Iran and the United States, which seem to remain in the grave for the foreseeable future.