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- 183: Megan O’Keefe-Schlesinger on Information Operations Part I
Welcome to the ONE CA Podcast. I’m LTC Brian Hancock, and I will be your host for this session. Today, we have Major Megan O’Keefe-Schlesinger with us to discuss Civil Affairs, Information Operations, and the U.S. Army School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS). MAJ Schlesinger, welcome to the show!
Megan O'Keefe-Schlesinger is an Information Advantage practitioner. She has served in the Nevada National Guard medical detachment, the Pacific, Europe and the Middle East in various capacities from the Army Medical Department to civil affairs planner and leader with special operations. In her downtime she volunteered with Team Rubicon assisting with disaster relief in the Mid West and COVID vaccine events. As a student at the command and general staff officer college she studied Defense Support to Civil Authorities and Homeland Security at the University of Kansas School of Law. She went on to study the impacts of automation on the Army and applying emerging concepts in multi-domain operations to large scale military exercises.
Disclaimer: A quick reminder for the audience that all remarks are solely those of the presenters.
One CA is a product of the civil affairs association
and brings in people who are current or former military, diplomats, development officers, and field agents to discuss their experiences on the ground with a partner nation's people and leadership.
We aim to inspire anyone interested in working in the "last three feet" of U.S. foreign relations.
To contact the show, email us at CApodcasting@gmail dot com
or look us up on the Civil Affairs Association website at www civilaffairsassoc.org
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Special thanks to BluntedBeatz for the sample “Summer Breeze.” Retrieved from https://youtu.be/3P8Xz71BLes?si=r4-xvwcG21cLMWrO
----Credits----
Host: Brian Hancock
Production: Jack Gaines
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00:00:03 BRAIN HANCOCK
Welcome to One Civil Affairs Podcast. I'm Lieutenant Colonel Brian Hancock, and I will be your host for this session. Today, we have with us Jedi Knight, Major Megan O’Keefe-Schlesinger, an information advantage practitioner. She has served in the Nevada National Guard, the Pacific, Europe, and the Middle East in various capacities, from the Army Medical Department to civil affairs planner and leader with special operations. In her downtime, she volunteered with Team Rubicon, assisting with disaster relief in the Midwest. As a student, she studied defense support to civil authorities, or DISCA, and Homeland Security at the University of Kansas School of Law. She went on to study the impacts of automation on the Army and applying emerging concepts in multi -domain operations to large -scale military exercises. Quick disclaimer before we get into it, all the remarks made by the participants are solely ours. Now, I first met you when you were out here in Europe on a School of Advanced Military Studies Utilization Tour.00:01:13 BRAIN HANCOCKAnd you were here at United States Army Europe in Africa in the G35. I certainly do.00:01:18 MEGAN O’KEEFE-SCHLESINGERcertainly do. And boy, does it feel like time has absolutely flung. But being a student and a practitioner from the Advanced Military Studies Program at Fort Leavenworth really allowed me to appreciate and understand the value that that education brings to the joint force and certainly in a complex environment like Europe, where NATO multinational operations truly are at the forefront of everything that we do.00:01:49 BRAIN HANCOCKI love what you said about the complexity of the environment with all these different partners. Many of us spend much of our time in the tactical arena where we really don't have to think about sovereign first world governments allowing us to do this type of training or not do this type of training or capabilities that we don't have in our army that they bring and suddenly you're working with. It's super exciting, very different than what we're normally used to. I think we'll probably talk a little bit more about that as we go through some of our questions and some of the experience that you've had out here. Let's start with your current tradecraft. You have many diverse interests and are well -versed in many different topics, but we only have about 40 minutes here, so we'll stick to just a few. Let's start with information operations. Tell the audience, why did you settle on I .O. or have you?00:02:42 MEGAN O’KEEFE-SCHLESINGEROh, I don't think as a voracious learner and a curious leader, you ever really settle in the Army. I think our best leaders remain generalists. And so that is some of the appeal of the role of information operations, which we have transitioned to this phrase called maintaining an information advantage. From my early days in the National Guard onto my volunteer time, with various organizations, like you mentioned, Team Rubicon, you start to appreciate the role that crisis communication has, the role of informing and protecting an audience. But I really got interested in this field as a captain when I got to see the interplay between civil affairs, the interplay of psychological operations, electronic warfare, cyber and space. And it's amazing when you as a military planner have the ability to nest these things together, just how rewarding the art of planning becomes. And so to be interested in a field like any functional area in the Army particularly, you can't just go into it as a lieutenant. You have to come from another assessed branch. As a lieutenant, you might assess into infantry or signal or intel, certainly. And then you get the opportunity later on to say, you know, maybe I want to apply that to a new field and try to become a specialist in a unique way. And that's really the field of the FA30s. We all come from a different background. And that complexity or maybe the dynamic backgrounds of the individuals help to spark creativity, help to approach problem solving differently. And so I don't think any two IO officers are alike in that sense, because like I said before, you become more of a generalist and learning how to apply a vast array of combined arms into orders and plans. And so I came into this field almost about five years ago. I wanted to be able to mature into a field where I could take not just CA, but the combined information forces in a way where as a leader and as a manager, I got a little more toys to play with, if you will.00:05:11 BRAIN HANCOCKI could see from personal job satisfaction, you're a pretty bright light. I used to be a pretty bright light. I'm going to get a little older, but One of the things that I love about some of these aspects of information operations is how they rotate us every few years in the military to keep our education going. It's part of that broadening that we do. But within FA30, you have all of those things that you've mentioned. Are you interested in space? Great. You can do it. Are you interested in cyber? Great. You can do it. Are you interested in psyop? Great. You can do it. All of those things, they're all available to you. They're all open to you. All those schools, all those. training opportunities, all those career opportunities. With one functional area, you can play in any of those, which I think would keep my interest for a long time.00:06:01 MEGAN O’KEEFE-SCHLESINGERWell, and what's unique to functional areas, and I did not know this until later on in my career, it is unique to active duty. And there's a great value in what the reserves in the National Guard are able to apply in the realm of information operations because you may not be a branded FA -30. But that's not to say that in our theater information operations groups, we don't have quite a complex and diverse background of leaders who may come from the fields of intel or civil affairs or psychological operations. and have the chance to go through the information operations qualification course at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. So there may be a lack of awareness of these things that we call functional areas because they are slightly more unique to active duty officers who kind of track. In a way that I think the reserves have a little more flexibility to explore career fields and continue to grow and expand their knowledge base without necessarily being bound to one specific area of concentration.00:07:05 BRAIN HANCOCKThat's true. Many of us have like three MOSs. That's not uncommon in the reserve as you move units. They'll let you go to whatever bill at MOS you are sitting in at the time. And they're happy to do that because many of these fields that you mentioned are non -accession fields. So they have to take folks from other base branches and move them over. They are used to doing that and are happy to do that. Now, I believe one of the National Guards on the East Coast has an IO qualification course that COMPO2 National Guard and COMPO III Army Reserve can go to. A friend of mine went to that. And I assume they award the FA -30 a functional area upon successful completion. But that sounds like that that is not a normal career pathing for many of our I .O. folks. So most of the folks that I know I've worked with in FA -30s are, as you said, from COMPO I, from the active duty component. And that's been wonderful. I think being a generalist also probably gives you some job security if you think about it. Now, when I was growing up, there was something called the S -curve, which would measure the acceptance of technology when a new critical tech comes out and is released in business. How long does it take for that to be adopted, to become ubiquitous, and to change the way business is done? And that used to be about a five -year period of time where some disruptive technology would come out, like the microcomputer, and it would just change the way business was done forever after. But that's now down to less than two years, where highly disruptive technologies, which at times eliminate entire job fields. So if you're a specialist and you've got a lot of education in a narrow niche, there's a lot of risk there that that field could go away when a disruptive technology is released. But as a generalist, we may not know as much about a specialist in their given field. But if one thing just isn't viable anymore, we just switch to something else. So I think there's some other auxiliary value to your generalist approach.00:09:14 MEGAN O’KEEFE-SCHLESINGERSure, sure. disruptive technologies. The Army is always attempting to forecast future challenges across the world, future problems it might face. And part of the approach to preparing for those challenges is through modernization and experimentation. And the field of information operations has been around for decades. And we think about the application in the Gulf Wars was quite successful. And as we come around now to moving into the nearly the 2030s, we're still applying some of those fundamentals. The common phrase that folks are arguably relearning is called multi -domain operations. We're really layering that space and that cyber maritime air and land across dimensions, right? Whether that's human information or physical. And so how do we collectively as planners As operators, think about how we have to fight across warfighting functions, whether it's the offense, whether it's the defense, or whether it's in response to disaster. Applying information, as it were, to the spectrum of operations that we tend to get involved in, from the small conflict battles to the larger campaigns. We are not in the Civil War era where we can think without the internet. And as a result, the information operations realm really looks to maximize our ability to continue the fight, protecting the command and control,00:10:52 MEGAN O’KEEFE-SCHLESINGERcommand and control, protecting data, and really trying to maintain an advantage.00:11:01 BRAIN HANCOCKWould you say that's a decision advantage? Because when we look at the information advantage doctrine, I don't think it's clear what the terminal outcome is supposed to be that is battlefield significant. I think it's decision advantage. We can run our OODA loop faster than the enemy. We make better, faster decisions, which allow us to gain and maintain the initiative and put the enemy progressively into a situation which they can't cope, which hopefully leads to their... early culmination. Is that how you see information advantage?00:11:33 MEGAN O’KEEFE-SCHLESINGEROh, I think this is a topic of great debate right now. Yeah. And, you know, I'll say that the November 2023 publication of the Army Doctrine Primer 313 tells us that information advantage is offensively oriented, which is somewhat the American way of war in some debate. It is combined arms, not a new topic. perhaps with layered capabilities that are emerging and modernizing today. It is commander -driven and remains soldier -enabled. So what does that mean? That is certainly not for one random FA -30 to think about. It is a complex series of decisions, thought processes, planning frameworks that have to be applied to improve our decision -making ability. So what is information advantage? I think it is many a things. And we continue to evolve and debate what it means because at the end of the day, acronyms and terms of reference, they do matter, but that doesn't mean that they can't change.00:12:40 BRAIN HANCOCKWell said. You mentioned earlier warfighting functions. I think we traditionally think that way. I'm not convinced that all combat power is defined by what we call warfighting function. So one example that's close to home for both of us, information is not a warfighting function in the Army. But of course, much of our topic today is about that and why it's important. It is a joint function. And for the Marine Corps, it is a warfighting function. Do you think the Army is going to follow in that path? Or how do you think we in our branch are going to ultimately treat information?00:13:23 MEGAN O’KEEFE-SCHLESINGERSo a warfighting function, for those that may not be familiar with these terms, we talk about intelligence, we talk about fires, we talk about these rather general terms that help bucket the way that we break down our staffs and prioritize who focuses on what. Whether as sustainment, you know, we might think of a logistics officer. Fires, we might think of a field artilleryman. But debatably, the realm of information truly does span the full warfighting functions gamut. And so to separate it out into its own might be dismissive of the integrated nature that it has across every single warfighting function. So I21 min - 182: Natacha Ciezki, from Zaire to America
Today we welcome Natasha Zieski and discuss her journey from growing up in Zaire to becoming a US citizen and joining Civil Affairs and the State Department's Office of Conflict Stabilization. This episode is a little different, but there is a lot of good stuff in it.
Enjoy.
One CA is a product of the civil affairs association
and brings in people who are current or former military, diplomats, development officers, and field agents to discuss their experiences on the ground with a partner nation's people and leadership.
We aim to inspire anyone interested in working in the "last three feet" of U.S. foreign relations.
To contact the show, email us at CApodcasting@gmail dot com
or look us up on the Civil Affairs Association website at www civilaffairsassoc.org
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Special Thanks to the Cafe Music BGM channel for sampling Hip Hop Jazz & Chill Jazz Summer Beach Mix - Instrumental Cafe Music. Retrieved from: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YROyrBBf9WQ
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Credits
Sponsor: Civil Affairs Association
Host: Jack Gaines
31 min - 181: Proxy Wars, by Pawel Bernat, Juneyt Gurer, and Cyprian Kozera
Today Assad Raza hosts Pawel Bernat, Juneyt Gurer, and Cyprian Kozera, authors of Proxy Wars From a Global Perspective: Non-State Actors and Armed Conflicts: https://www.bloomsbury.com/uk/proxy-wars-from-a-global-perspective-9781350369283/
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One CA is a product of the civil affairs association
and brings in people who are current or former military, diplomats, development officers, and field agents to discuss their experiences on the ground with a partner nation's people and leadership.
We aim to inspire anyone interested in working in the "last three feet" of U.S. foreign relations.
To contact the show, email us at CApodcasting@gmail dot com
or look us up on the Civil Affairs Association website at www civilaffairsassoc.org
----
Special thanks to Rajhesh Vaidhya and Bengaluru Ganesh Utsava for the audio sample. Retrieved from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=B_iVM-6z2j4
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Credits
Sponsor: Civil Affairs Association
Host: Assad Raza
Showrunner / editor: Jack Gaines
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00:00:00 Introduction
A quick note, the guests on today's show represent themselves and their book and no other organization. Enjoy the show. Welcome to the 1CA podcast. This is your host, Jack Gaines. 1CA is a product of the Civil Affairs Association and brings in people who are current or former military, diplomats, development officers, and field agents to discuss their experiences on ground with the partner nation's people and leadership. Our goal is to inspire anyone interested in working the last three feet of foreign relations. To contact the show, email us at capodcasting at gmail .com or look us up on the Civil Affairs Association website at www .civilaffairsassos .org. I'll have those in the show notes.00:00:45 ASSAD RAZAWelcome to the 1CA Podcast. I'm your host, Assad Raza, and our guests today are Pavel Bernat, Junaid Guerrero, and Saiprin Cozada, authors of The Proxy Wars from a Global Perspective. First, congratulations, and thank you for taking the time to talk about your book with our audience today. Thank you, Asad. Thank you, Asad. So, what motivated you to write a book on proxy wars and non -state actors in armed conflicts? Who'd like to start? Cyprian? Yeah.00:01:10 CYPRIAN KOZERAIt pays back to some gloomy January. Syvasa Center organized a great meeting. Cyprian said, hey, let's do something about that. Because this obviously merits deeper attention. And we started working. We got so inspired. We issued an academic special issue devoted to proxy forces. And then it was yet not enough. We still had more ideas. There were more people interested in the topic. After this academic general special issue, we decided, okay, we have to go on. And then we started to work on a book, starting with theory and history, and then goes into case studies in the last decade.00:01:50 ASSAD RAZAThank you, Cyprian. Before we started recording this, we had talked about... You guys noticed that there was a gap within the literature and focused on some of the contemporary proxy wars versus some of the historical ones that had been written about years ago. Pawel, I know you wanted to talk about the evolution of proxy warfare. So there are so many people interested in proxy warfare,00:02:09 PAWEL BERNATare so many people interested in proxy warfare, trying to understand and define what it actually means. We find ourselves in this very special time. On the one hand, we've got this interesting and needed concept of proxy warfare, but we have observed this gap of understanding what it is. And on the margin, we have to remember that it is very important not only to understand from this academic point of view, but this is crucial for policymakers. A theoretical material does not really provide proper answers to the current proxy warfare. Those traditional old definitions, they were coined during the Cold War era. Basically, you've got armed conflict, two superpowers. So, you know, NATO and Warsaw Pact. And they fight against each other indirectly. So using the territory of the third state, like Korea, Afghanistan. And then in 1991, things changed. The Soviet Union collapsed. And this very significant... geopolitical alteration started. So traditional old Cold War definitions did not provide enough exemplary power. So this is the theoretical background behind the book. What we wanted to do, we have invited specialists on different areas on the globe to provide the field data. So we, with the book, provide enough end -of -row material for future researchers and policymakers understanding proxy warfare.00:03:52 ASSAD RAZAFunny that you say that because I think the average person wouldn't put in consideration these shifts within the geopolitical aspect and the way it impacts the operational environment. So on that point to Juneyt, how is proxy warfare in the context of international relations?00:04:08 JUNEYT GURERThe key thing for us today is to understand the changes in the strategic element. International relations perspective is the state objectives basically are critical, but other non -state actors matter, which means the proxy group may have something to say in that interaction. So let's look at this issue from a different perspective to give us some more explanation.00:04:35 ASSAD RAZAThank you, Jeanette. Having the different perspectives contributes to the conversation and the academic rigor to understand these complex problems. specifically in proxy wars. Let's shift now to talking about the current situations. How do contemporary proxy wars and the participation of non -state actors contribute to global strategic competition? So I'll shift to Powell.00:04:59 PAWEL BERNATSo what I'm going to talk about is the Russo -Granian war from the proxy perspective, or how the proxies were created and used by the both sides. The first thing we should do here is actually to divide the time of the conflict. So you have this first stage between 2014 and February of 2022, and then the full -scale invasion of Ukraine by Russia. So in 2014, the Russian Federation annexed Crimea and started the occupation. There was some betrayal involved and the action was actually really well prepared. Russian troops in the skies were present there. This is a great example of efficient use of hybrid warfare because the level of disinformation was just enormous. This traditional fog of war, we had basically no idea what was going on. When we look to the Donbass region in 2014, this is actually very interesting because the Russian Federation created their own proxies. So obviously, before 2014, there had been many people living in Lugansk that were pro -Russian. So what Russians did, they created units from those regions and paid them to organize and to fight. So the proxies there, that actually were created by the sponsor state, the Russian Federation. The indigenous people were not the only ones involved. There were many Cossacks from Russia, there were some other ethnic groups from Ural, but there were also straightforward criminals invited and organized to conduct the basic fighting against the Ukrainian forces. But when we look at this from this global strategic perspective, obviously proxies are used by the sponsored state when the state doesn't want to take full responsibility. This direct involvement in the conflict, you use proxies to fight this fight indirectly. So with the use of intermediaries. And you can either use the existing forces or you can create them.00:07:24 ASSAD RAZAPavel, thank you. One question when you were talking about Crimea and Russia's support to the proxy for the occupation or annexation, you were saying at the strategic level, state sponsors usually don't want to take full responsibility. So some of that responsibility shift to the proxy forces and how is that looked upon within the area that they're operating in?00:07:45 PAWEL BERNATSure. From the strategic perspective, that's very important to explain to the Russian society why this war is being fought. So the main argument that is actually being repeated by the Russian state propaganda over and over again has been these are our Russian -speaking people and we will engage. in order to protect them because the Ukrainian regime treats them badly. And to support this argument, you create the indigenous units who fight beside you for their freedom. So having proxies in the Donbass region, that strengthened this explanation and Russia behind this strategic move of actually going to war.00:08:34 ASSAD RAZAThank you. So we'll shift now to talk about Russia's proxies in Africa. So type in.00:09:03 CYPRIAN KOZERAYou don't need to involve a lot of resources to win with actors. And here I mean dislocating the Western powers, France, the US, from the Sahel and Central African Republic. So Russia not being able to counter the influence, use proxy forces to the point that the West still doesn't know what to do with that, how to respond. And is it warfare? That's a question I would like to raise here, because as Pablo started in this discussion, he introduced this issue of odd theories. The classic proxy warfare theories not really sit here nowadays, because in the classic theory, armed conflict, and then proxies. What happens now if you have hybrid warfare? Is it the fifth generation of warfare? It's so hard to define. Is it a complex or not? Are we waging war with Russia? Some sabotage is happening. And then with some assassination ordered by Russia in the Western countries, the West supporting Ukraine providing weapons. It's very hard to say. So even if we don't use the term proxy warfare, it's happening. Proxy forces are being used in Africa by Russia and strategic gains. So definitely proxy warfare. It's very efficient. in Central African Republic since 2008. In Mali, 2022. Burkina Faso, 2023. Niger, last month, when the Russian mercenaries arrived to Myanmar. And it was two days ago when we learned that the Russians moved into the very same base in Myanmar and standing outside the U .S. soldiers. The U .S. troops are not any more welcome in Niger. They're moving out. moved out from Burkina Faso, French from Mali, with a hundred, a couple hundred, three hundred mercenaries, they entirely dislodged the Western forces. And with that, the influence. And now we are facing a U .S. troop leaving Chad, and we don't know where Chad will go in the next elections, which is on the 6th of May in two days. What about Senegal? the new president speaking of emancipation deals with anyone willing to enter the deal. So, looking from this perspective of the Sahel and the Sub -Saharan Africa, we see that there's plenty of proxy hybrid warfare, which brings enormous gains for a very little expense. Russia is the winner there, and we still don't know how to react.00:11:50 ASSAD RAZAThank you so much. That was a really good description of how proxy war is used in global competition. Before we move on, I wanted to ask Junet if he has any thoughts on the role of proxy forces in global strategic competition.00:12:04 JUNEYT GURERThe other thing about the strategic competition is this is a competition between US and China, and now China and Russia international order. But what happens, interestingly, after the conflicts? I think we will see a lot of organized criminal groups in this new era of strategic competition.00:12:26 ASSAD RAZABut I want to ask you, what are your thoughts about the intersection with such terms like insurgency or counterterrorism or terrorism? I am not an expert in that field,00:12:36 JUNEYT GURERthat field, but I have some experience actually working with my colleagues here at the Marshall Center. Interesting topic. What I would basically say, if we consider the new... international security domain that will shape around the strategic competition. We have to look at those definitions of groups or tactics from that perspective. It is a critical time right now, and we all agree after Russia attacked Ukraine in 2022, now we are in a new international security era. So that era requires us to focus on the outcomes. I think those should be the real questions.00:13:18 ASSAD RAZASo earlier in the conversation, we talked a little bit about ethical considerations. So what are some of the ethical considerations surrounding the use of proxy forces in armed conflicts? There is a plethora of issues that could be addressed here.00:13:29 PAWEL BERNATis a plethora of issues that could be addressed here. But very briefly and generally speaking, we have observed certain negativity linked to proxy warfare. So there is this pejorative undertone to it. And I think it actually stems from this Cold War era understanding. So basically you had two superpowers fighting against one another on the territory of another country, using this country for their struggle in order to avoid mutual assured destruction. You used the country, but also the people living in it. So this is my hypothesis. That's why this pejorative undertone linked to proxy warfare comes from. If you want to be academically honest, proxy war, it is not the case where the sponsor state uses some proxies to do their dirty work and the state does not want to break international law. So they use some forces to do that for them in order to achieve those strategic goals. But proxy warfare in itself is not. a negative thing so this is neutral okay but it also could be positive so this is something that i'd like the circle of the people working on it but also the republic to understand and remember we've seen not only the states but also a whole number of ngos but also private companies and informal groups participating by providing data by hacking the russian infrastructure so this is obviously manifestation of proxy warfare that proxies don't have to be military organizations. Very often they are, but they don't have to. That could be a very informal group of hackers that enters the stage of this armed conflict by, for example, hacking or providing some information. So in this sense, proxy warfare is not something ethically neutral.00:15:33 ASSAD RAZAYou hit a lot of good things. I like the way you framed it. Is it being neutrally ethical, depending on the reasons behind the supports of some of these proxies, and the complexity behind it with the different actors that are supporting a proxy force? I like the example of the hackers. That was really good. I wanted to ask anyb25 min - 180: Sandor Fabian: Europe is Learning the wrong lessons from the conflict in Ukraine
Today, Jack Gaines hosts Doctor Sandor Fabian, who published
"The Illusion of Conventional War: Europe is Learning the wrong lessons from the conflict in Ukraine."This ten-point contrarian op-ed is focused on helping smaller nations build better national defense programs.
Article link: https://mwi.westpoint.edu/the-illusion-of-conventional-war-europe-is-learning-the-wrong-lessons-from-the-conflict-in-ukraine/
Sandor Fabian's Bio: https://www.linkedin.com/in/sandor-fabian-ph-d-3422b639/
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One CA is a product of the civil affairs association
and brings in people who are current or former military, diplomats, development officers, and field agents to discuss their experiences on the ground with a partner nation's people and leadership.
We aim to inspire anyone interested in working in the "last three feet" of U.S. foreign relations.
To contact the show, email us at CApodcasting@gmail dot com
or look us up on the Civil Affairs Association website at www civilaffairsassoc.org
---
Special thanks to Jazz Bois for the sample of Mellow Hive Live @ Root Budapest. Retrieved from https://youtu.be/EhGCsaiVm0I?si=zG3B1_1zaHjC_K2j
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Credits
Sponsor: Civil Affairs Association
Host: Jack Gaines
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00:00:04 Introduction
Welcome to the 1CA Podcast. This is your host, Jack Gaines. 1CA is a product of the Civil Affairs Association and brings in people who are current or former military, diplomats, development officers, and field agents to discuss their experiences on ground with the partner nation's people and leadership. Our goal is to inspire anyone interested in working the last three feet of foreign relations. To contact the show, email us at capodcasting at gmail .com or look us up on the Civil Affairs Association website, at www .civilaffairsassos .org. I'll have those in the show notes. Today we welcome Dr.00:00:41 JACK GAINESShander Fabian, who published The Illusion of Conventional War, Europe is Learning the Wrong Lessons from the Conflict in Ukraine. This 10 -point contrarian op -ed is focused on helping smaller nations build better national defense programs. I have a link to his bio and the paper in the show notes. So let's get started. One thing that caught my eye thinking about your paper are the points where you say that most observers are ignoring or misinterpreting things that they don't agree with. In other words, they have confirmation bias or they have a blind spot to things that they don't understand or refuse to include in their ideal.00:01:24 SANDOR FABIANYes. And the base of my argument is... I traveled all over Europe and look at European capabilities. So throughout my personal experience and also studies in Europe, that these small countries, especially former Warsaw Pact countries, are trying to get integrated into the NATO system, which is driven mostly by the U .S. and the U .S. frame of reference of warfighting.00:01:48 JACK GAINESSure. Division on division.00:01:50 SANDOR FABIANDivision on division. But the issue is these countries could not. purchase, maintain, sustain big ticket items. Right. And small countries have very small training areas. You cannot train officers to conduct division on division war fighting. So you are missing major opportunities in the education and training of the professional military officers and NCOs as well. Tanks are very expensive.00:02:19 JACK GAINESRight.00:02:19 SANDOR FABIANThese countries can buy maybe 10 tanks. When you buy 10 tanks, then you cannot really train with them because it's very difficult and expensive to actually get them to the field. You need the train system. You need the training areas. You need the ammunition for them. You train as you fight. These countries cannot afford to train as you fight. So by that definition, you actually going into any kind of war. in a suboptimal setting because you did not prepare your soldiers as they are going to fight. So there's a huge disconnect compared to France or the UK or the US.00:02:56 JACK GAINESRight. Because they can field larger armories and have more of a supply system to support them.00:03:01 SANDOR FABIANYou have the supply system. You have a large training and education infrastructure behind it that actually prepares your military leaders to understand and to fight such kind of wars. And you have the infrastructure behind it and all that that is completely locking in smaller former Warsaw Pact countries. Right.00:03:17 JACK GAINESRight. Switzerland was able to stay neutral during World War II. And the strategic calculus that Nazi Germany had for not invading Switzerland was that their form of warfare didn't work well in Switzerland with all the mountains. So they would have had to change all their tactics. And they knew that the Swiss didn't have battle tanks. They had an air force. They had a lot of snipers. They had a lot of riflemen in the mountains that knew those mountains well. just realized that by going through those mountains trying to take Switzerland would have been such a cost that it wasn't worth it. So as you're saying, they created warfare in a way that was successful for them instead of trying to emulate what would have been the popular military style of that time.00:04:04 SANDOR FABIANAbsolutely. And it's not just the Swiss. Ivan Ergun Toft, he wrote a book about how the weak actually defeats the strong. And he looked at all the wars of the last 150 years. And the primary determinant of who is actually succeeding in war is exactly what you just described. And the Ukrainian war actually shows that too. When you are not presenting a war to your enemy that he is understanding, he is organized, trained, educated for, he's active for, that enemy is immediately in trouble because you refuse to fight on his terms. So when you have a lot of main battle tanks and your enemy don't have main battle tanks... those battle tanks are not going to be useful because who are they going to fight with? What type of targets are they going to hit? And if that enemy has a million high -tech IEDs against your main battle tank, but zero battle tanks, that creates a huge dilemma for you. And also the Western frame of reference of the warfighting is when we win conventionally, we won the war. And the Iraq invasion showed that it's completely wrong. We run through a country, we occupy the country, we won all the engagements, and now we won the war. That actually has been shown throughout history. It's not the case anymore.00:05:21 JACK GAINESRight. You know, and that reminds me, H .R. McMaster in his book was talking about how when he went into Iraq with his tank division. I can't remember the size of the unit. I apologize. It was his famous battle where he went over the hill. And he knew that the Iraqi tank commander had trained in the U .S. because as they saw the formation, It was laid out exactly the way they had taught them how to do it. He was proud of them for doing that, but also he knew how to unscrew that type of defense and it was a very effective offense. He wiped out the adversary's tanks. So that's the other half of it is when you are living in somebody else's strategy, they also have control of how that strategy falls out.00:06:04 SANDOR FABIANAbsolutely.00:06:05 JACK GAINESNow, your observation is never present your adversary with a type of war that they are organized, trained, and equipped for, which we've already started discussing. And thinking of that and also the introduction about how people ignore or are blind to different aspects of a conflict, one thing that reminds me of is right now in Ukraine, there was a supply gap between what the U .S. and the EU were providing in weapons and material to Ukraine. But Ukraine didn't collapse, and it's because of something that no one's talking about, and that is that Estonia and the Czech Republic were finding weapons and material and delivering them. They were also going into the black markets in the underground to find other people willing to donate and give weapons and material. But then they also started fundraising public money in order to buy 155 rounds or other munitions to help the Ukrainians continue the fight. while the traditional Western systems were dry. And it's just not talked about. But it really comes down to that notion that Ukraine is not just at war with Russia. It's Ukraine and their network at war with Russia and their network. And that network is critical on who is going to win, who is going to succeed at different phases. So that just really struck me to your first point.00:07:22 SANDOR FABIANYes, Ukraine in this case didn't collapse, thankfully, but they also didn't win. They are presenting the same type of war and we kind of enabling them because we are providing the tanks, we are providing the armored personnel carriers, we're providing artillery and so on. So we are incentivizing and pushing them into the corner of fighting along the terms of Russia. As long as that's happening, we are creating a situation when the two networks that you described is fighting pretty much a material war against each other. So the outcome is going to be determined who can sustain longer on both sides.00:07:56 JACK GAINESRight. And actually, the Czech Republic were also fundraising for combat drones. So they're trying to see through and around this quagmire that you're talking about.00:08:05 SANDOR FABIANWell, another thing I don't talk about in the paper that has been fascinating me for many years, we on the West are fascinated with fighting the war. But we don't determine what winning means and what's happening afterwards. So everybody celebrated that now the U .S. is providing all this aid again to Ukraine to win. But what win really means in this war?00:08:27 JACK GAINESThat actually feeds to your fourth observation. Friends are important in war, but they can be detrimental as well. especially for your defense efforts, which is what you're bringing up now. And that is if your vision of success, of strategic success as a Ukrainian is to take back all territory and have Russia in a position where they can no longer fight, then that's success. But if your Western allies, if their vision of success is that you have sustained yourself and that... Russia can no longer go further. Their support is only going to go so far because once you have hit their success lines, that's when what they're providing you starts to dry up.00:09:04 SANDOR FABIANYeah, and the Ukrainian president has made it clear several times that the official goal is getting everything back. And that's obviously the communicated Ukrainian goal, understandably, because they are a sovereign, independent country who lost quite a bit of territory to an aggressor. I'm not necessarily seeing the same very clear message from all the Western allies. However, obviously, you can make the argument there is no counter communication made. So the public and everybody else can assume that on the West, we think along the same way. However, again, if you are a very cold headed, completely objective analyst, then the evidence on the ground points to a different direction.00:09:48 JACK GAINESThat's what I'm seeing. It's almost that Madeleine Albright, Saddam Hussein moment where Saddam asked, do you have an issue if we invade Kuwait? She said, the U .S. doesn't have a position. And he thought, oh, that means that they are okay with me invading Kuwait. But it wasn't. It just caused a misunderstanding that ended up with an invasion that started this whole mess in Iraq. So I get what you're saying. And the signals are never clear between nations on intent. And so you're right. You have to look at the behavior on supply and on policy and what they're giving away to help you in order to succeed. And I think it's going to be limited. So I would imagine Ukraine in itself is going to have to have a plan B in case the U .S. says, you know what, you've gotten 80 % back. I think that's fine. We're going to end our support there. Or the EU says the same thing and they're kind of stuck.00:10:42 SANDOR FABIANIt is a very unique case. So when other European countries are looking at the Ukrainian case, I think they should be very careful because Ukraine could actually marshal a global network behind her struggle against Russia. And the same kind of support, the same kind of geopolitical situation, what we are sitting right now might not be recreatable in the future for some other countries.00:11:06 JACK GAINESLike Myanmar, the national unity government. just doesn't have the global network of support that Ukraine has. And it's a very different scenario, but it's also an excellent example of what it's like to not have that kind of support. Now, one thing that you were bringing up is that we shouldn't pay too much attention to Ukraine, as an example, because it's all in the field, it's all in trenches, it's very traditional. And one of your arguments, one that you have in this paper as well as in other papers, is that we need to start thinking about urban warfare, The fighting is going to hit the streets more often than not.00:11:42 SANDOR FABIANYes, absolutely. Many analysts and previous studies are pointing to the war is actually back in the trenches, far away from urban areas and far away from the civilian population. It's not true. Right now, the current situation is more out of urban areas, but still the majority of the fronts includes small villages, small towns, and larger built -up areas. The Russians are attacking those urban centers because those have operational and strategic importance. If you look back at the early months of the invasion, almost all the targets that the Russians were going after were urban areas. If you kind of step back and look at the conflicts of the last 20 years, 30 years, urban areas are the future. We are in a very unique opportunity here that we can actually build our future battlefields. We are building the buildings. We are looking at road networks. We are wiring the CCTV networks, the communication networks in the cities. So why we are not thinking about this in how we are going to utilize our buildings, our underground structures, our communication for military or defensive purposes. And if you look at it, it's nothing new because the Finns are very good at this. During the Cold War, they had an amazing network43 min - 177: Patrick Passewitz on the Sicilian Model
Today, we welcome Patrick Passewitz, who authored the Monograph "The Sicilian Connection: A Story of Allied Military Governance in 1943" while attending the Army's School of Advanced Military Studies. We brought him over today to discuss his findings and how they apply to current events. We will share the article link when it is published.
One CA is a product of the civil affairs association
and brings in people who are current or former military, diplomats, development officers, and field agents to discuss their experiences on the ground with a partner nation's people and leadership.
We aim to inspire anyone interested in working in the "last three feet" of U.S. foreign relations.
To contact the show, email us at CApodcasting@gmail dot com
or look us up on the Civil Affairs Association website at www civilaffairsassoc.org
Special thanks for SensualMusic4You producing "Hip Hop Jazz & Hip Hop Jazz Instrumental: 10 Hours of Hip Hop Jazz." Sample found at https://youtu.be/XEa0Xn9XAzk?si=eeWyVqE3c1uL6d2Q
dependent. How can the military, diplomacy, and development workers manage the process to ensure a successful transition to becoming an independent partner in the international community?
Special thanks to DrSaxLove for the song "Happy Hour." Retrieved from: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=c8YIlU_30Kk
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Credits
Sponsor: Civil Affairs Association
Host: Jack Gaines
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00:00:04 Introduction
Welcome to the 1CA podcast. This is your host, Jack Gaines. 1CA is a product of the Civil Affairs Association and brings in people who are current or former military, diplomats, development officers, and field agents to discuss their experiences on ground with the partner nation's people and leadership. Our goal is to inspire anyone interested in working the last three feet of foreign relations. To contact the show, email us at capodcasting at gmail .com or look us up on the Civil Affairs Association website at www .civilaffairsassos .org. I'll have those in the show notes. Today we welcome Patrick Passewitz, who authored the monograph, The Sicilian Connection, A Story of Allied Military Governance in 1943, while attending the Army's School of Advanced Military Studies.00:00:52 PATRICK PASSEWITZWe brought him over today to discuss his findings and how they apply to current events. So let's jump right in. I did read your thesis. It was solid. And the thing that struck me, and maybe it's because of my time in Iraq, Afghanistan, and some of our other cooperative, not fully overturned the government initiatives, basically, was the lack of control of the markets and the lack of control of corruption and crime in those regions. For example, when I was in Iraq, we basically allowed the Iraqis that we emplaced, and we quickly emplaced a government. And anyone who wanted to give them a bribe was open to their market. And the Chinese flooded Iraq with all kinds of manufactured goods to where it wiped out everything from their shoe industry to their leather making to their textiles. And it really wiped out their economy. It made everyone unemployed. What I saw in your survey of Sicily with Operation Husky, they controlled the markets, they controlled the value of currency. And by doing that, they controlled the level of black market. And have you seen a similar comparison when you were writing that piece?00:02:07 JACK GAINESSo the biggest thing to go all the way back, comparing a little bit of Husky to Iraq and Afghanistan, not that it's pure apples and oranges, but with Husky, it was very much in... the beginning parts of the process of the planning. Because we understood, hey, this is going to be the first time we as the Allies are going to interact with basically an enemy population. We did some limited governance in North Africa, but it very much went back to indigenous control after that. But this is the first time we're going to interact with an enemy population. We need to get it right from all aspects to include. governance, because if we fail to, we're still going to have to commit a lot of military resources to Sicily, because it was vital, particularly for the British, to control from Gibraltar all the way to Suez to keep reinforcing the Burma theater. So they had to get it absolutely right, so they brought in military governance very early on in the planning process. The second thing, once they did that, they broke it down into a systems approach. We understand that security, economics, and good governance are going to be late. And if you break down how they interacted with all of those, they made them mutually reinforcing, which I think was really brilliant and smart. And they balanced that system's approach with very immediate impacts, as well as the long -term strategy of stability that eventually happened about six months after the Allies landed on Iraq and Afghanistan. We were pushing the bull just a year at a time. I know there were some very smart guys in the State Department, and I was actually just reviewing David Kilcullen's book when he was in Iraq. They had the long -term stuff, but I don't think it was truly married or we married it late in the campaign compared to Sicily that was very early on. One of the brilliance, I thought, was they got the legal piece down. With the economic piece, if we see black markets, You're going to go to jail. We're also going to provide wage stimulation. We're going to give jobs. We're going to ration food, as rough as that is. And then if you're corrupt within any of these realms, whether it be the legal realm, the working realm, or the political realm, you're gone. The system was too important to fail. And help mutually reinforced it. And I go back to it. If you want your systems, forces, and functions to work, you got to change how it's structured. And I think we came in an altered structure to equal form and function.00:04:51 PATRICK PASSEWITZRight. And one thing it helped do is weed out insurrections, criminal groups, black markets. And that was one thing that really struck me because one of the biggest problems with most of our foreign policy outreach to partner nations in development or in conflict stabilization. And post -conflict stabilization is the corruption and the insurgency. So it seems like they had a mind for it in the planning process.00:05:17 JACK GAINESAbsolutely. And I lean on our doctrine a little bit, and that's why I not took a critical shot at doctrine, but highlighted where we could probably get better. If you look at how old 27 -5, the FM for military governance, you need to collect printing presses, wireless. You need to control that. atmosphere in that environment to be able to control the population and then enforce not necessarily your will but your economic reforms your legal reforms i think they'll be extremely difficult in today's age with how information flows that's why i think it's a little bit of apples and oranges but i think we can also wrap our heads around it and get smarter at it if we bring in the planning by all means i think or even a division can turn off some internet or restrict that so that we can enable some good governance and some stability mechanisms.00:06:12 PATRICK PASSEWITZWas it helpful that Sicily is a smaller nation than some of the ones we've tried to tackle recently? I think that was very much a good starting block. Kind of a really awesome to test. Yeah. Yeah, absolutely.00:06:26 JACK GAINESBecause if you look at it, right after Sicily, they went into Naples. which was roughly about the same size population -wise as Boston. And I think the Allies learned a little bit six weeks prior from when they finished Husky and moved into Naples that, hey, this is what's going to work. This is what didn't work. And ultimately, it definitely paved dividends when we finished up Italy and moved into Germany.00:06:51 PATRICK PASSEWITZWell, one of the things I noticed in the paper was that each commander that managed different districts had a different attitude about the population and the controls. And same today, right? Anyone new that comes in, the last guy was an idiot. I'm a genius. We're going to do it my way now. Go do an assessment. And we got complaints about that. And so it seemed like they were also trying to address that issue by trying to homogenize some of the policies and practices so that whether you had a new commander, old commander, they were conservative, they were liberal, that they had guardrails. You've got to control the economic situation. You've got to keep people employed. You've got to allow local laws and governances to emerge and take over the population's practices and beliefs. But you've got to remove the poisonous actions of that fascist regime as well. It seemed like a balancing act.00:07:46 JACK GAINESTwo things, Jack. First, spot on. I think the first part is going back to the planning. As soon as the Allies liberated a town... They'd find the public building and lay down their 10 proclamations of, hey, this is what allied military governance means. These are the new laws that you're going to follow. This is what occupation means. And this is what disillusionment of the fascist regime means. And now we're also going to put that onus on the division commander because you are now the military governor. And if you want your... Rear area secured because we're pushing forward through the island. To keep this offensive going, you need to secure your rear area, which means you need to accept military governance and really put some thought into it because it's going to sustain your offensive. The second thing I think we also did very well is you have a two -star division commander trying to keep the fight going. We also have the military governor starting to land and starting to work that consolidation area. He's also a two -star. So we have... a better cooperative through the ranks of, hey, I understand you need XYZ in your front area, but for that to happen, we need to work this with the military governor. And the ultimate end state of controlling Sicily to allow commerce to transit the Mediterranean was ultimately the goal. I think everybody understood that. And it goes back to, hey, if we bring civil affairs and governance and some of these enablers in early, it's a better product in the end. Right.00:09:16 PATRICK PASSEWITZNow, another I saw happening was every time we've gone into a town or into a capital, we've allowed free press to go watch right off the bat. Did they do the same thing in Sicily or did they have more of a control or a censorship of public communication?00:09:33 JACK GAINESIt's almost unthinkable now, but yes, there were no correspondents. We temporarily shut down the Italian press. We opened up our own newspaper and we controlled the narrative very much. And I don't want that to sound misleading. That was also our key way of informing the population of, hey, this is what governance now means. These are the new work programs that were starting to work. So it was more of a necessity than a censorship. But we also discounted the narrative from the opposing side to ensure that our actions were getting out to the population and then ultimately that it is going to work.00:10:12 PATRICK PASSEWITZAnd I see the benefits of both, honestly. Because like Libya, in the middle of the revolution back in 2012, I saw a lot of radical radio and online social media popping up as we're supporting the fight. And I remember our PSYOP and IO folks had to send them a message saying, hey, the people that are helping you with Gaddafi, we're going to cut you off. And it squelched it. squelched it immediately. They knew that this was not acceptable. But in an environment where you have to control all aspects in order to get the rules and norms of the population to behave a certain way, to cooperate, to participate in governance, to participate in the economics, kind of have to control that narrative. And I know censorship is a bad word these days, but it might be something that we have to look at. A hundred percent. And to put it into context,00:11:12 JACK GAINESThe Allies landed in July. The battle was only really 38 days long. By then, the first two weeks were starting to inch in the stability force. By the end of the 38 days, the military governor really takes control of the island because the Nazis flee back over to the Straits of Messina. And by 1944, so we're really talking about six months, we're giving everything back to the Sicilians, mostly with training wheels, and sometimes the training wheels came off depending on which... sector of the public sphere we're looking at. The economic piece was probably the longest standing one because we were controlling, as you mentioned, imports, exports. We were definitely working on exchange rates of what the lira was to British pounds. So that was probably the longest piece. But harvesting the daily public utilities, they went very quickly back over to the Sicilian population. Because they knew the systems. Yeah.00:12:09 PATRICK PASSEWITZthey knew the systems.00:12:12 JACK GAINESYeah. And the courts were probably the longest as well. As we mentioned, hey, we wanted to have good governance. We built up the local system very quickly. By the time it got to the national and that, about six months, we handed it back over and we built in mechanisms because we understood, hey, we're at the due governance at first, not purge, but evaluate the former fascist judges.00:12:37 JACK GAINESformer fascist00:12:40 JACK GAINESRight. When we found the ones that were on the level and not part of the party, but had to say they were part of the party, but were competent, we installed them fairly quickly. They were allowed to review sentences, grant parole, clemency, or reinforce everything. So it was pretty fluid in how they were able to balance the first two weeks. We were just doing human problems to make sure that the Army can roll forward after those two weeks when the stability guys got there. we're going to work on rebuilding this population and actually make it favorable to Allied efforts.00:13:16 PATRICK PASSEWITZRight. Well, one thing I thought was interesting is that, yes, they reinstated judges, but they also had the Army legal system oversee the judgments. So it was as if they were auditing to make sure that they're following their own rules and laws, as well as international rule of law, effectively before they would back off and let them do their job. But they continued to monitor in case someone sta21 min - 176: Part II, interview with J. David Thompson
Brian Hancock hosts Major J. David Thompson, a Civil Affairs planner out of U.S. Africa Command, to discuss military campaigning, just war with post-modern conflict and avoiding civilian harm in conflict.
One CA is a product of the civil affairs association
and brings in people who are current or former military, diplomats, development officers, and field agents to discuss their experiences on the ground with a partner nation's people and leadership.
We aim to inspire anyone interested in working in the "last three feet" of U.S. foreign relations.
To contact the show, email us at CApodcasting@gmail dot com
or look us up on the Civil Affairs Association website at www civilaffairsassoc.org
Special thanks to Relax Music for sampling "Trio Riberto's song "Yellow Summer." Retrieved from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=stpq54O2qO0
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Credits
Sponsor: Civil Affairs Association
Host: Brian Hancock
Showrunner / editor: Jack Gaines
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00:00:03 Introduction
Welcome to the 1CA Podcast. This is your host, Jack Gaines. 1CA is a product of the Civil Affairs Association and brings in people who are current or former military, diplomats, development officers, and field agents to discuss their experiences on ground with the partner nation's people and leadership. Our goal is to inspire anyone interested in working the last three feet of foreign relations. To contact the show, email us at capodcasting at gmail .com. or look us up on the Civil Affairs Association website at www .civilaffairsassos .org. I'll have those in the show notes.00:00:38 BRIAN HANCOCKWelcome. I'm Lieutenant Colonel Brian Hancock, and I will be your host for this session. Today, we're going to explore the concepts of military campaigning, civil harm mitigation, and how to align just war with postmodern conflict. To get after this, I have with me Major J. David Thompson. He's a civil affairs major assigned to the U .S. Africa Command. He holds a Juris Doctorate from Washington and Lee University School of Law. He is a Ph .D. candidate at King's College London, where he is researching the ethics of proxy warfare. Major Thompson, welcome to the show.00:01:15 J. DAVID THOMPSON.Glad to be here, sir.00:01:16 BRIAN HANCOCKAll right, before we begin, Dave, our quick disclaimer, a reminder to our audience that all remarks made are those of the presenters solely. All right, let's begin. Dave, can you tell me a little bit about your current positions and duties of what you're doing there at U .S. AFRICOM?00:01:35 J. DAVID THOMPSON.Thank you. So I am a same military operations planner at U .S. AFRICOM. That's within the JFOLA. With same forward division, we have also the humanitarian assistance portfolio, largely, I think, the ODACA programs. We have a number of interagency representatives from the Health and Stabilization Office of the Department of State, foreign policy advisor from State Department, a public health advisor from DHEP. We also have a liaison from Pacific Disaster Center of PBC Global, and the PBC Global liaison works with California. That's a lot. Yes, that is a lot, but luckily we have really good leadership and good control. Arrow Division.00:02:22 BRIAN HANCOCKFantastic. I was worried you were never going to get to sleep with all those duties on your plate. All right, let's jump into our first varsity -level question. You recently wrote an award -winning civil affairs issue paper. Let me read the exact title. Campaigning the Campaign Plan, Focusing on the Fundamentals at the Combatant Command by Assessing Civil Affairs Operations, Activities, and Investments. The famous OANI is there. Now, it feels to me that the Army's come full circle. When I started my career 18 years ago, military campaigns were a thing. They were discussed. And then suddenly the term fell out of vogue. I never understood quite why. But now it's back. So campaigns are back on the menu, huh?00:03:16 J. DAVID THOMPSON.Afghanistan, partly with global war on terror. I had the opportunity to meet Joel Stane. He was talking to me and he was doing this battlefield circulation, was the commander, and I was telling him all the things we were doing about the Afghan security forces. And he said, what would you do if you hadn't stayed here until the war? And can you think that, well, I would... Probably spend a little bit more of a tele -focus on doing a partner for us so that way I could hand this off to somebody because I was doing it. And ideally, it needs to be somebody else for us to win. So that started me thinking of how my rotation fit into Baylor's attention. So then we changed our approach. And during that time, I made it a little, to use a sports analogy, the ball was on the 20 -yard line and I was going to try to get it to the 30 -yard line. And that will mean our soldiers doing more and us doing less. That's being within that advice in a such role.00:04:21 BRIAN HANCOCKThat makes sense to me. And I love your analogy on incremental movements, right? When we're talking about all these very complicated systems and politics and economics where strategic objectives tend to lie, these are not things that are solved quickly, especially in areas where you've got deep sectarian violence and hatred. And, you know, at the end of the day, I think not only as civil affairs officer, but as military officers in general, you know, we need to keep moving that needle to the right. Love that anecdote that you mentioned with General McChrystal to one of the generals in, you know, the famous book, The Four Star. Very interesting individual. For the audience, I think that their experience with the word campaign is in a political sense rather than in a military sense. For clarification, how does the Department of Defense define that term? And if you don't mind, can you just explain how it's different from an operation, an engagement, or a theater plan, which are other terms we hear bantered about a bunch?00:05:25 J. DAVID THOMPSON.So there is Champagne, as in Philippe, which is in J .F. Station, Rio. And I'm going to read a bit of the definition here.00:05:45 J. DAVID THOMPSON.Now that differs from campaign plan and campaign, which comes from the joint publication final. So campaign is a series of laden operations with a given time and space, and a campaign plan is a joint operation plan. through a series of related major operations within its habit space. So ideally, you have the campaign plan, which lists LFP -CAN -8 objectives, the intermediate military objectives, and then the effects, subordinate to those IMOs or intermediate military objectives. Then you have the campaign formula, which provides TANAS to components. These TANAS generate operations, activities, and investments, or OAIs. So components can then have OAIs linked to tasks in the combatant command. It can have tasks linked to effects linked to IMOs linked to championing objectives. So if you think about it linearly, you should be able to draw a line between an operational activity or investment in OAI directly to the champion.00:06:50 BRIAN HANCOCKI know NATO talks a little bit about in -states as opposed to objectives, just a different way of looking at it. or desired conditions as you're moving towards things in a plan. It seems that based upon how DoD looks at a campaign, it's kind of on that cusp between operations and strategy with an ability to be broken down to tactical tasks and activities that support it. Let's go deeper into strategy and operations. In the paper that you published, you mentioned that the connection between strategy and operations is inherent. I know you've read Sean McFake's work. You're pretty well read. In that, he and other military scholars argue that America has actually lost every war since World War II, as measured by a failure to complete the strategic objectives of those conflicts. Now, given the potential connection between strategy and operations, what do you think went wrong? As a force, did we just suck at operations, and that in turn causes our strategy to fail in many of these wars? What do you think?00:07:57 J. DAVID THOMPSON.So first, one of the unique things about that paper was, it didn't call for any new .lltf piece, which just uses current dapering as what we have available. So anybody can go through and use it. Now the paper is published with the Silhouette Association as publicly available. Another kind of spent on looking at this, I talked to the OAIs and the campaign objectives. I forgot to mention maybe the measuring and assessments of those tasks, which are important and maybe lead to your point. You should be able to measure, both quantitatively and qualitatively, measure them with facts and measure the performance, if the OAIs are what people are being tasked to do for helping to reach the campaign objectives. If not, why not? Do there need to be new structures, new processes, more guidance? machine resources in the 40s. She must really do all of assessments comes into play. So he doesn't show McFay. So he wrote a book, The New Rules of War, about the same time that Richard Cox wrote, A World in Disarray. And they both looked at the same question broadly and approached it in two very different ways. And there were solutions to solving that. I think if you read those two books side by side, you can follow all conclusions.00:09:23 BRIAN HANCOCKThanks for that. Obviously, these are hot political issues as well as military issues. To use an egregious example, if we take a look at the war in Iraq, I don't know if you read Mark Perry's book, The Pentagon Wars, but he makes a pretty cogent case that the Iraq War actually reduced security abroad, caused some chaos, empowered Iran. Russia and ISIS damaged relationships between the civil and the military, nearly bankrupt the nation, and of course got many, many Americans as well as Iraqis killed. And relative to the strategic objectives, it doesn't look like that is a victory. So going back to what you said about assessments, did we just... pick the wrong things to do, and then therefore the rosy assessments, which I saw were just measuring the wrong things. Yeah.00:11:54 BRIAN HANCOCKThat's great. I think we could probably have an entire podcast on just talking about the different definitions of victory and competition. I think those are hot terms.00:12:23 BRIAN HANCOCKfrom maybe a political lens or a socioeconomic lens, perhaps not. So I think that's one of the challenges, and you talk about it in some of your other papers, with the graying of modern warfare, our definitions just kind of haven't kept pace. Let's move on to the next question. You spent some time addressing assessments in your publication and referred to it earlier. Now, these are critical, and particularly as we move up echelon, they often direct... Now, in my experience, assessing non -lethal effects are challenging. Many of the things we're trying to affect are complex adaptive human systems, which have a relation to operations, activities, and investment. Now, to use an example of a difficult non -lethal assessment, one of the taskings we often get at U .S. Army, Europe, and Africa is for a civil affairs action team or a four -man cat team. to assess a tactical ODACA project. You talked about ODACA there earlier in your office. And typically that team has not been part of that project before and may not have contacts or baselines. And it is asked to assess how that typically tactical level project has advanced U .S. and NATO strategic objectives. And unfortunately, the team is usually only given a few days to accomplish this. Now, given math and science required to conduct a statistically valid assessment, how do you think we can do this better? Can we do this better?00:14:16 J. DAVID THOMPSON.Perhaps I can put our CPM manager in touch and they can share some best practices. But I think one of the other things about this is looking when civil affairs forces are getting these very complicated tasks to do. I think that's one of the great things about being a civil affairs officer or soldier. We get tasks to do a hard thing. We don't solve easy problems. So we recruit and train. smart people when we put them through teams with other talented, smart people. And then we give them complex, challenging problems to solve. So, it's fascinating. And generally, they come out successful. Like, I would be hard -pressed to think of a time when I've seen a team take on a challenging problem and not come away with some ideas that were very creative and help solve it. They're really about success. So that's one of the great things about being a Civil Affairs soldier.00:15:15 J. DAVID THOMPSON.one of the great things about being a Civil Affairs soldier. If that appeals to anybody who's listening, who's not a Civil Affairs soldier, definitely get in contact with Colonel Hancock, myself, anybody in the Civil Affairs Association, I'm sure it's willing to help you. To the first part of the question about the assessment speech, right? So at the Geographic Combat and Command level, I think about assessments maybe a little bit different than like a tactical U .S. assessment. We want to know for assessments, are the things we're doing helping us reach our campaign objectives? So, great, let's keep doing. If not, again, what do we need? Do we need a new structure, process, guidance, resources? What is it that we need to do to help them achieve these campaign objectives? As far as the individual assessments of an evocative project, those are great, but at the command and command level, what I'm more interested in are all those assessments helping somebody else make a decision. I'm not so concerned about that decision, just that we have forces available working towards doing that and that they're informing people who are making decisions. The process of what we call civil knowledge integration.00:16:25 BRIAN HANCOCKI actually like your characterization of that, right? All models are wrong, but if it's useful, then it's worth investing in. in relation of a project to strategic impact is hard to measure. But if it moves the ball forward, if it teaches us something we didn't know, if it builds a valuable relationship we didn't have, then that is still useful in and of itself. All we're required to do as a government is conduct legal acceptance, which is more of an MLP, right? Let's say the project was to build a fuel pumping station, just making this up. Does it pump fuel? Does it hold fuel? Is it safe? Okay, yeah. And is the27 min - 175: Part I interview with J. David Thompson
Brian Hancock hosts Major J. David Thompson, a Civil Affairs planner out of U.S. Africa Command, to discuss military campaigning, just war with post-modern conflict and avoiding civilian harm in conflict.
One CA is a product of the civil affairs association
and brings in people who are current or former military, diplomats, development officers, and field agents to discuss their experiences on the ground with a partner nation's people and leadership.
We aim to inspire anyone interested in working in the "last three feet" of U.S. foreign relations.
To contact the show, email us at CApodcasting@gmail dot com
or look us up on the Civil Affairs Association website at www civilaffairsassoc.org
Special thanks to Relax Music for sampling "Trio Riberto's song "Yellow Summer." Retrieved from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=stpq54O2qO0
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Credits
Sponsor: Civil Affairs Association
Host: Brian Hancock
Showrunner / editor: Jack Gaines
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00:00:03 Introduction
Welcome to the 1CA Podcast. This is your host, Jack Gaines. 1CA is a product of the Civil Affairs Association and brings in people who are current or former military, diplomats, development officers, and field agents to discuss their experiences on ground with the partner nation's people and leadership. Our goal is to inspire anyone interested in working the last three feet of foreign relations. To contact the show, email us at capodcasting at gmail .com. or look us up on the Civil Affairs Association website at www .civilaffairsassos .org. I'll have those in the show notes.00:00:38 BRIAN HANCOCKWelcome. I'm Lieutenant Colonel Brian Hancock, and I will be your host for this session. Today, we're going to explore the concepts of military campaigning, civil harm mitigation, and how to align just war with postmodern conflict. To get after this, I have with me Major J. David Thompson. He's a civil affairs major assigned to the U .S. Africa Command. He holds a Juris Doctorate from Washington and Lee University School of Law. He is a Ph .D. candidate at King's College London, where he is researching the ethics of proxy warfare. Major Thompson, welcome to the show.00:01:15 J. DAVID THOMPSON.Glad to be here, sir.00:01:16 BRIAN HANCOCKAll right, before we begin, Dave, our quick disclaimer, a reminder to our audience that all remarks made are those of the presenters solely. All right, let's begin. Dave, can you tell me a little bit about your current positions and duties of what you're doing there at U .S. AFRICOM?00:01:35 J. DAVID THOMPSON.Thank you. So I am a same military operations planner at U .S. AFRICOM. That's within the JFOLA. With same forward division, we have also the humanitarian assistance portfolio, largely, I think, the ODACA programs. We have a number of interagency representatives from the Health and Stabilization Office of the Department of State, foreign policy advisor from State Department, a public health advisor from DHEP. We also have a liaison from Pacific Disaster Center of PBC Global, and the PBC Global liaison works with California. That's a lot. Yes, that is a lot, but luckily we have really good leadership and good control. Arrow Division.00:02:22 BRIAN HANCOCKFantastic. I was worried you were never going to get to sleep with all those duties on your plate. All right, let's jump into our first varsity -level question. You recently wrote an award -winning civil affairs issue paper. Let me read the exact title. Campaigning the Campaign Plan, Focusing on the Fundamentals at the Combatant Command by Assessing Civil Affairs Operations, Activities, and Investments. The famous OANI is there. Now, it feels to me that the Army's come full circle. When I started my career 18 years ago, military campaigns were a thing. They were discussed. And then suddenly the term fell out of vogue. I never understood quite why. But now it's back. So campaigns are back on the menu, huh?00:03:16 J. DAVID THOMPSON.Afghanistan, partly with global war on terror. I had the opportunity to meet Joel Stane. He was talking to me and he was doing this battlefield circulation, was the commander, and I was telling him all the things we were doing about the Afghan security forces. And he said, what would you do if you hadn't stayed here until the war? And can you think that, well, I would... Probably spend a little bit more of a tele -focus on doing a partner for us so that way I could hand this off to somebody because I was doing it. And ideally, it needs to be somebody else for us to win. So that started me thinking of how my rotation fit into Baylor's attention. So then we changed our approach. And during that time, I made it a little, to use a sports analogy, the ball was on the 20 -yard line and I was going to try to get it to the 30 -yard line. And that will mean our soldiers doing more and us doing less. That's being within that advice in a such role.00:04:21 BRIAN HANCOCKThat makes sense to me. And I love your analogy on incremental movements, right? When we're talking about all these very complicated systems and politics and economics where strategic objectives tend to lie, these are not things that are solved quickly, especially in areas where you've got deep sectarian violence and hatred. And, you know, at the end of the day, I think not only as civil affairs officer, but as military officers in general, you know, we need to keep moving that needle to the right. Love that anecdote that you mentioned with General McChrystal to one of the generals in, you know, the famous book, The Four Star. Very interesting individual. For the audience, I think that their experience with the word campaign is in a political sense rather than in a military sense. For clarification, how does the Department of Defense define that term? And if you don't mind, can you just explain how it's different from an operation, an engagement, or a theater plan, which are other terms we hear bantered about a bunch?00:05:25 J. DAVID THOMPSON.So there is Champagne, as in Philippe, which is in J .F. Station, Rio. And I'm going to read a bit of the definition here.00:05:45 J. DAVID THOMPSON.Now that differs from campaign plan and campaign, which comes from the joint publication final. So campaign is a series of laden operations with a given time and space, and a campaign plan is a joint operation plan. through a series of related major operations within its habit space. So ideally, you have the campaign plan, which lists LFP -CAN -8 objectives, the intermediate military objectives, and then the effects, subordinate to those IMOs or intermediate military objectives. Then you have the campaign formula, which provides TANAS to components. These TANAS generate operations, activities, and investments, or OAIs. So components can then have OAIs linked to tasks in the combatant command. It can have tasks linked to effects linked to IMOs linked to championing objectives. So if you think about it linearly, you should be able to draw a line between an operational activity or investment in OAI directly to the champion.00:06:50 BRIAN HANCOCKI know NATO talks a little bit about in -states as opposed to objectives, just a different way of looking at it. or desired conditions as you're moving towards things in a plan. It seems that based upon how DoD looks at a campaign, it's kind of on that cusp between operations and strategy with an ability to be broken down to tactical tasks and activities that support it. Let's go deeper into strategy and operations. In the paper that you published, you mentioned that the connection between strategy and operations is inherent. I know you've read Sean McFake's work. You're pretty well read. In that, he and other military scholars argue that America has actually lost every war since World War II, as measured by a failure to complete the strategic objectives of those conflicts. Now, given the potential connection between strategy and operations, what do you think went wrong? As a force, did we just suck at operations, and that in turn causes our strategy to fail in many of these wars? What do you think?00:07:57 J. DAVID THOMPSON.So first, one of the unique things about that paper was, it didn't call for any new .lltf piece, which just uses current dapering as what we have available. So anybody can go through and use it. Now the paper is published with the Silhouette Association as publicly available. Another kind of spent on looking at this, I talked to the OAIs and the campaign objectives. I forgot to mention maybe the measuring and assessments of those tasks, which are important and maybe lead to your point. You should be able to measure, both quantitatively and qualitatively, measure them with facts and measure the performance, if the OAIs are what people are being tasked to do for helping to reach the campaign objectives. If not, why not? Do there need to be new structures, new processes, more guidance? machine resources in the 40s. She must really do all of assessments comes into play. So he doesn't show McFay. So he wrote a book, The New Rules of War, about the same time that Richard Cox wrote, A World in Disarray. And they both looked at the same question broadly and approached it in two very different ways. And there were solutions to solving that. I think if you read those two books side by side, you can follow all conclusions.00:09:23 BRIAN HANCOCKThanks for that. Obviously, these are hot political issues as well as military issues. To use an egregious example, if we take a look at the war in Iraq, I don't know if you read Mark Perry's book, The Pentagon Wars, but he makes a pretty cogent case that the Iraq War actually reduced security abroad, caused some chaos, empowered Iran. Russia and ISIS damaged relationships between the civil and the military, nearly bankrupt the nation, and of course got many, many Americans as well as Iraqis killed. And relative to the strategic objectives, it doesn't look like that is a victory. So going back to what you said about assessments, did we just... pick the wrong things to do, and then therefore the rosy assessments, which I saw were just measuring the wrong things. Yeah.00:11:54 BRIAN HANCOCKThat's great. I think we could probably have an entire podcast on just talking about the different definitions of victory and competition. I think those are hot terms.00:12:23 BRIAN HANCOCKfrom maybe a political lens or a socioeconomic lens, perhaps not. So I think that's one of the challenges, and you talk about it in some of your other papers, with the graying of modern warfare, our definitions just kind of haven't kept pace. Let's move on to the next question. You spent some time addressing assessments in your publication and referred to it earlier. Now, these are critical, and particularly as we move up echelon, they often direct... Now, in my experience, assessing non -lethal effects are challenging. Many of the things we're trying to affect are complex adaptive human systems, which have a relation to operations, activities, and investment. Now, to use an example of a difficult non -lethal assessment, one of the taskings we often get at U .S. Army, Europe, and Africa is for a civil affairs action team or a four -man cat team. to assess a tactical ODACA project. You talked about ODACA there earlier in your office. And typically that team has not been part of that project before and may not have contacts or baselines. And it is asked to assess how that typically tactical level project has advanced U .S. and NATO strategic objectives. And unfortunately, the team is usually only given a few days to accomplish this. Now, given math and science required to conduct a statistically valid assessment, how do you think we can do this better? Can we do this better?00:14:16 J. DAVID THOMPSON.Perhaps I can put our CPM manager in touch and they can share some best practices. But I think one of the other things about this is looking when civil affairs forces are getting these very complicated tasks to do. I think that's one of the great things about being a civil affairs officer or soldier. We get tasks to do a hard thing. We don't solve easy problems. So we recruit and train. smart people when we put them through teams with other talented, smart people. And then we give them complex, challenging problems to solve. So, it's fascinating. And generally, they come out successful. Like, I would be hard -pressed to think of a time when I've seen a team take on a challenging problem and not come away with some ideas that were very creative and help solve it. They're really about success. So that's one of the great things about being a Civil Affairs soldier.00:15:15 J. DAVID THOMPSON.one of the great things about being a Civil Affairs soldier. If that appeals to anybody who's listening, who's not a Civil Affairs soldier, definitely get in contact with Colonel Hancock, myself, anybody in the Civil Affairs Association, I'm sure it's willing to help you. To the first part of the question about the assessment speech, right? So at the Geographic Combat and Command level, I think about assessments maybe a little bit different than like a tactical U .S. assessment. We want to know for assessments, are the things we're doing helping us reach our campaign objectives? So, great, let's keep doing. If not, again, what do we need? Do we need a new structure, process, guidance, resources? What is it that we need to do to help them achieve these campaign objectives? As far as the individual assessments of an evocative project, those are great, but at the command and command level, what I'm more interested in are all those assessments helping somebody else make a decision. I'm not so concerned about that decision, just that we have forces available working towards doing that and that they're informing people who are making decisions. The process of what we call civil knowledge integration.00:16:25 BRIAN HANCOCKI actually like your characterization of that, right? All models are wrong, but if it's useful, then it's worth investing in. in relation of a project to strategic impact is hard to measure. But if it moves the ball forward, if it teaches us something we didn't know, if it builds a valuable relationship we didn't have, then that is still useful in and of itself. All we're required to do as a government is conduct legal acceptance, which is more of an MLP, right? Let's say the project was to build a fuel pumping station, just making this up. Does it pump fuel? Does it hold fuel? Is it safe? Okay, yeah. And is the23 min - 174: Direct Commissions with Heater Cotter
Assad Raza hosts Heather Cotter, who recently gained a direct commission into the Army and Civil Affairs. In this episode, she talks about what it's like to go through the process and her first impressions of the Army.
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Thank you FeedSpot for ranking One CA Podcast as one of their top 10 foreign policy podcasts. Check it out at: https://podcasts.feedspot.com/foreign_policy_podcasts/
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One CA is a product of the civil affairs association
and brings in people who are current or former military, diplomats, development officers, and field agents to discuss their experiences on the ground with a partner nation's people and leadership.
We aim to inspire anyone interested in working in the "last three feet" of U.S. foreign relations.
To contact the show, email us at CApodcasting@gmail dot com
or look us up on the Civil Affairs Association website at www civilaffairsassoc.org
---
Special Thanks to KaraokeMedia
for sharing Manu Chao's "Me Gustas Tu," instrumental version.
Retrieved from: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eZsSs9aIDqM------
Credits
Sponsor: Civil Affairs Association
Host: Assad Raza
Showrunner / editor: Jack Gaines
---
00:00:03 Introduction
Welcome to the 1CA Podcast. This is your host, Jack Gaines. 1CA is a product of the Civil Affairs Association and brings in people who are current or former military, diplomats, development officers, and field agents to discuss their experiences on ground with the partner nation's people and leadership. Our goal is to inspire anyone interested in working the last three feet of foreign relations. To contact the show, email us at capodcasting at gmail .com. or look us up on the Civil Affairs Association website at www .civilaffairsassos .org. I'll have those in the show notes.00:00:42 ASSAD RAZAWelcome to the 1CA Podcast. I'm your host, Asad Raza, and today we have a very special guest with us, Captain Heather Cotter. Heather has a unique and inspiring story about her journey into the civil affairs branch, and she's here to share that with us today. Heather, welcome to the show.00:00:58 HEATHER COTTERThank you, Roz. Great to be here.00:01:01 ASSAD RAZAOh, we're thrilled to have you. Can you start telling us a little bit about yourself?00:01:05 HEATHER COTTERYeah, absolutely. Well, professionally, for the last 20 years, I've been working alongside law enforcement and allied emergency responders like firefighters, emergency management professionals,00:01:19 HEATHER COTTERparamedics, and most of my career, I expect working at nonprofits that support the advancement of this idea of an integrated public safety community. And in 2020, about three months into the COVID -19 pandemic, I received an email about the 38 Gulf direct commission program. And I was immediately intrigued by this opportunity. After a couple conversations with Lieutenant Colonel Koyanda, I decided to prepare a packet for the commissioning board to consider. All my life, I've been behind the scenes supporting first responders, whether it was through research. training, policy development, or other supportive roles, but I've never been on the other side in the field. And I thought this was a great opportunity to grow as well as serve my country.00:02:10 ASSAD RAZAThat sounds great. So welcome to the other side. So moving on to your decision of joining the civil affairs branch, could you explain to us what the 38 Golf does and what attracted you specifically to become a 38 Golf within the Army Reserves?00:02:24 HEATHER COTTERYeah, you bet. So where do you go? They're also known as military government specialists. The expertise that 38 Gulf brings, specifically, there are currently 18 unique still identifiers for 38 Gulf,00:02:39 HEATHER COTTERidentifiers for 38 Gulf, and each 38 Gulf carries at least one of them. Some of them carry multiple. For example, I carry the one still identifier of a six hotel, which happens to be Long Order Enforcement. And there are, like I said, 18 total. A few others include four Delta, which are laws, regulations, and policies. Six Charlie, which is finance, money, and banking. Six Delta, which is education. And six Victor, which is heritage and preservation.00:03:15 ASSAD RAZAMan, so you said there's 18? Yes,00:03:17 HEATHER COTTERthere are 18 of them. And every unit across the United States Army Reserve. and doing their best to fill the billet with a diverse group of agency leaders who carry these different types of expertise.00:03:31 ASSAD RAZAcarry these different types of expertise. Can you kind of explain what the process was like for you from submitting your application to taking your oath to office?00:03:39 HEATHER COTTERIt's a lengthy process, to be honest, on receiving a direct commission. But from my understanding, this isn't unique to civil affairs either. Some of the other branches also have a lengthy direct commission process. But specific to my experience, it was pretty long. It took me about two years from the time I submitted my packet until I took my oath of office. And there was a lot of paperwork in between that time. So essentially, from the time I submitted my packet back in July of 2020 until my board met, there was really little communication about my status as a candidate. I focused my waiting time on learning more about civil affairs, scanning my civil affairs network by reaching out to people like you, learning about our main history, foreign policy, international relations, hard events, and also improving my foreign language proficiency and improving my physical physics. I even applied to graduate school to get a second master's degree in international affairs. So during this time, like I said, a waiting period. But I tried to maximize it. And when I finally did receive the letter that the board obtained my conditioning appointment back in November 2020, my status changed from a 38 -golf candidate to a 38 -golf selectee. So once I became a selectee, and this is what other 38 -golfs will go through, there will be new next steps to take, like criminal background checks, obtaining a clearance, going through medical screening. And more paperwork.00:05:19 ASSAD RAZASo as a 38 golf candidate, as you're waiting to go through the process, you said it took about two years. You got your second master's in international affairs and you're working on foreign language proficiency. Two questions.00:05:32 HEATHER COTTERYeah.00:05:32 ASSAD RAZAWhat foreign language were you trying to improve on? And what was your thought about getting a master's degree in international affairs and how it's associated with your personal development to be a 38 golf?00:05:42 HEATHER COTTERThat's a great question. So when I was lumber, More than 20 years ago. Actually, when I was in grade school, I was in a program with German and French through college. And then when I entered the workforce, I didn't really use those languages, but I still had a lot of knowledge there deep in my brain. So while I was taking my oath of office and from when I got the approval letter, I was improving my perfect easy in both German and French. And I had also reached out to my unit. to ask them what language needs they had. So they were telling me Mandarin would be good to know, Tagalog would be good to know, as well as Korean. So I just started dabbling in those, but I never got too far. I don't know about you, Roz, but the way I suffer to learn is classroom study, if that makes sense.00:06:37 ASSAD RAZAYeah, absolutely. Having that foundational within the classroom, and I think using the apps later on as a way to maintain the languages. having that foundational within the classroom, especially PACOM -aligned languages, which are a little bit more difficult compared to European languages.00:06:53 HEATHER COTTERYeah, you're absolutely right about that. And then to use second question about the degree in international affairs. So interestingly, before I even learned about the 38 Golf Direct Commission program, I was exploring opportunities before this pandemic hit us in March of 2020. So I think it was like January. I think it must have been a New Year's resolution. In 2020, I started exploring opportunities to get involved with humanitarian aid assistance and what that would require of me in order to go on humanitarian aid work. And a common thing that I saw was a degree in international affairs would be super helpful, which makes obvious sense, right? So I started realizing that This was before civil affairs became something on my radar. But I realized that a degree in IA or international affairs is something I wanted to do. And then, of course, when the pandemic hit, life changed for a lot of us. And then I received the email about the 38 golf program. So I started pursuing that. And when I got selected by the board, I knew. even more confidently that a degree in international affairs would be incredibly helpful for me as an incoming civil affairs officer. Because the one thing that I kept sad was there's a lot of downtime between when you start the process of submitting your application to when you get selected and when you take your oath of office. And for me, you know, time is something that shouldn't be wasteful. I'm going to maximize my time. For me, the best way I could do a service to civil affairs class would be to expand my knowledge in international affairs. So I ended up applying to graduate school at Arizona State University. And I started my master's in August of 2022. And I graduated just a few months ago in December 2023.00:09:07 ASSAD RAZACongratulations on that. Seems like everything kind of worked out, everything kind of aligned itself. So once you pleaded all that, transitioned from being a 38 golf candidate to an actual 38 golf, and you took your oath of office, what did you do next?00:09:21 HEATHER COTTERSo once I took my oath of office back in August of 2022, the same month I started graduate school again, because I got my first, this was after 20 years ago, but I... I took my oath of office in August of 2022, and I attended a few battle assemblies, really just to complete and processing with my unit. And then within a few months, I was at the direct commission course at Fort Worth.00:09:50 ASSAD RAZASo when you say battle assemblies, for our listeners that potentially wanting to be 38 golfs and never served in the military, what is that?00:09:58 HEATHER COTTERWell, essentially, it's an active duty training that we do. Typically on a monthly basis, so it's when you get together with your unit, basically you're working on readiness as well as other soldiering skills, whether it's weapons qualification or something else relevant to whatever the unit's working on. But the 351s, specifically, I can't speak to the other units because I'm not in them. But we meet in a hybrid model, typically quarterly in person. And then we'll do our other battle assembly remotely. And typically, there's kinds of online training and requirements that you have to complete on an annual basis, whether it's anti -terrorism training or cyber awareness training or any other readiness requirements is typically what we're executing. As well as if we're trying to get involved in the school, as well as any mission requirements. or meeting whether it's before you go on a mission or mission.00:11:06 ASSAD RAZAInteresting. Just a really quick question. Where is the 351st Civil Affairs Command located? In Mountain View, California. How far is that from where you're located?00:11:15 HEATHER COTTERI'm physically based in the Phoenix metro area in Arizona. So it's about an hour and a half plane ride when I do have to go in person. So I'll be at battle assembly next month. And I'll fly up there to San Jose, which is about a 90 -minute flight. And then I'll return home.00:11:36 ASSAD RAZANice. So you get to fly up to Northern California for the weekend. Sounds like fun.00:11:42 HEATHER COTTERIt's not the worst place to be, that's for sure. It's a great location.00:11:46 ASSAD RAZAAwesome. Okay, so you mentioned the direct commissioning course at Fort Moore. Can you describe that to our listeners?00:11:53 HEATHER COTTERYeah, we've got the direct commission course. developed for officers to receive a direct commission into the Army. So typically this course consists of mostly JAG officers, but you'll also see some civil affairs direct commission. You'll see direct commission into adjacent general, finance, fiber,00:12:21 HEATHER COTTERreally any branch that the Army offers the direct commission to. So soldiers or those officers will attend the vaccination course at Fort Moore. And they offer this course throughout the year, I believe at a quarter of them basis, typically, and it's six weeks in duration. And throughout this course, you're going to learn how to review the uniform, how to do plan that, how to do basic rifle marksmanship. They'll take the ACFT a couple times, which is diagnostic. just to get you familiar with the requirements of physical fitness. And I'd have to say,00:13:00 HEATHER COTTERhave to say, you know, my experience at Fort Moore was overwhelming and positive. The days were long. We had very little downtime. We were in the barracks and in uniforms, whether they were OCPs or APFUs about 98 % of the time. And we had staff duty in the middle of the night, training during the day. We ate a petite fast that we ate as a week, and we're information every three times a day. So it's a little bit like basic training, but it's designed for officers, and it's much shorter in length.00:13:39 ASSAD RAZANice. So you ate a defect three times a day, every day, for six weeks. Yeah. Did you get tired of the food? You know, I stuck with the salad box. Okay. That's great. I wanted to ask you, I know you said there was a lot of different other branches in there, like JAG and AG, Cyber. Were there any other civil affairs officers or 38 Gulfs in your course?00:14:02 HEATHER COTTERYeah, in my cohort, there were a few of them. There was actually another one from my unit, which was fantastic, Capt30 min - 173: Achieving post conflict stabilization with Prof. Beatrice Heuser (Pt.2)
Recently, I partnered with SMA's Mariah Yager to talk with Professor Beatrice Houser about post-conflict stabilization.
“In Kuwait, preparing for the Iraq invasion, I asked the leadership, ‘Could you give us a little more detail about after we get to Baghdad and topple the regime? ' [The answer] was more than inadequate.’” -David Petraeus, speaking at Carnegie.
The U.S. and the West recently suffered monumental failures in planning and implementing post-conflict stabilization, resulting in massive corruption, instability and loss of foreign policy goals.
[Charley Wilson’s War]. “These things happened. They were glorious, and they changed the world... and then we fucked up the endgame.” -Charley Wilson’s end-of-film quote.
In this session, we turn the corner from commiserating on past failures to discussing solutions to planning and implementing the transition from conflict to post-conflict stabilization. To help partner nations regain their stability, security and partnership in the international community.
To help, we have brought in Professor Beatrice Heuser, renowned Chair in International Relations at the University of Glasgow and second to the General Staff Academy of the Bundeswehr, as Head of Strategy.
Dr. Heuser recently published a paper on post-conflict Gaza stabilization and reconstruction and wanted to discuss strategies for building an effective post-conflict strategy and operation.
Jack Gaines, showrunner and host of the One CA Podcast, is joining SMA to co-host the discussion.
In this session, Dr. Heuser, Jack Gaines, Mariah Yager and the audience will try to address three themes:
1. Planning the transition from conflict to post-conflict. How should the military shape the end of an active conflict to help the transition to post-conflict stabilization?2. How to support the post-conflict stabilization. Typically, during stabilization, insurgencies rise, popular movements grow, and extremist groups attempt to usurp the transition for their political ambitions; how does conflict stabilization work with the military to minimize usurping groups while spotting and enabling popular movements?
3. Spotting and supporting the post-conflict transition and transitioning a post-conflict state that depends on aid and support to become independent. How can the military, diplomacy, and development workers manage the process to ensure a successful transition to becoming an independent partner in the international community?
Thank you FeedSpot for ranking One CA Podcast as one of their top 10 foreign policy podcasts. Check it out at: https://podcasts.feedspot.com/foreign_policy_podcasts/
One CA is a product of the civil affairs association
and brings in people who are current or former military, diplomats, development officers, and field agents to discuss their experiences on the ground with a partner nation's people and leadership.
We aim to inspire anyone interested in working in the "last three feet" of U.S. foreign relations.
To contact the show, email us at CApodcasting@gmail dot com
or look us up on the Civil Affairs Association website at www civilaffairsassoc.org
Special thanks for SensualMusic4You producing "Hip Hop Jazz & Hip Hop Jazz Instrumental: 10 Hours of Hip Hop Jazz." Sample found at https://youtu.be/XEa0Xn9XAzk?si=eeWyVqE3c1uL6d2Q
---
00:00:03 Introduction
Welcome to the 1CA Podcast. This is your host, Jack Gaines. 1CA is a product of the Civil Affairs Association and brings in people who are current or former military, diplomats, development officers, and field agents to discuss their experiences on ground with the partner nation's people and leadership. Our goal is to inspire anyone interested in working the last three feet of foreign relations. To contact the show, email us at capodcasting at gmail dot com. Or look us up on the Civil Affairs Association website at www .civilaffairsassos .org. I'll have those in the show notes.00:00:39 MARIAH YAGERHello, everyone. I'm Mariah Yeager, and welcome to today's SMA speaker session entitled Building Solutions to Post -Conflict Stabilization. I'd like to thank Professor Beatrice Huser for taking the time to speak with us today. And I'd also like to welcome back Major Jack Gaines of the 1CA podcast as our guest host.00:00:57 JACK GAINESI partnered with SMA to talk with Professor Beatrice Hauser on post -conflict stabilization. What you will hear on this show is the edited version. If you wish to listen to the full uncut version, I will have a link to it in the show notes. This is part one of two. The second half comes out next week. So enjoy.00:01:17 MARIAH YAGERSo with that, please keep your video and audio off for the duration of the event so we have a nice clear line for our presentation today. All right, let me introduce Professor Beatrice Huser. She holds the Chair in International Relations at the University of Glasgow. She has degrees from the Universities of London and Oxford and a habilitation from the Phillips University of Marburg. She has taught at King's College London and at universities in France and Germany. Previously, she has worked on the international staff at NATO headquarters in Brussels as well. She has numerous publications. from nuclear strategy, history of strategy, insurgencies, and counterinsurgency. But today we're talking about post -conflict stabilization. And with that, I'm going to turn the floor over to Leijer.00:01:59 JACK GAINESThank you, Mariah. And thank you, Professor Huser. Personally, I see a market gap in post -conflict stabilization. And to describe that gap, I forwarded Professor Huser three challenge questions to help her shape her presentation and the discussion. Those questions were, the military drives conflict to an end state. what conditions do we need to achieve to successfully transition a conflict into post -conflict stabilization? Second, during post -conflict conditions, how does the military and lead agencies spot and support legitimate efforts while also spotting and filtering out groups trying to derail recovery for their own benefit or spoilers or those who use instability for personal gain? And third, How do we work to transition a nation from post -conflict dependencies to becoming a self -sufficient member of the international community? These came to me after listening to retired General David Petraeus speak at Carnegie. He talked about when he was a division commander preparing to go into Baghdad and asking leadership about the plan after toppling the regime. The response was, leave that to us, which he states was inadequate. General Petraeus described the market gap. We needed to know the instate to achieve post -conflict conditions and then how to deter instability to support stabilization and transition. So that is the challenge for Professor Huser to answer. But I also wanted to use this talk as a call to action. We should take chalk to the State Department CSO strategy to either update our current plans and operations so they achieve the conditions for post -conflict stabilization and transition or Build operational templates that staff can plug into the back of any strategy or operation so planners can sketch out the steps to drive a conflict into a successful post -conflict environment with stabilization and transition. So with that, Professor Huser, good morning.00:04:00 BEATRICE HEUSERThank you very much indeed. I'm very honored to be with you. If you can stop sharing your screen, I will flash mine up straight away and start. with a disclaimer that I am a very small and modern armchair strategist, and I'm standing on the shoulders of lots and lots of giants, which means that I'm going to introduce you in the first part of this whole talk to the ideas and the thinking of some very interesting and very important people of the past who've had plenty of experience. But at the same time, what is driving my interest is, of course, the present. And you will see all along, I think, like me, how these ideas that were developed by people a long time ago impact on the present. More still, there's a big debate about how much war changes and how much technology impacts war. I think particularly when it comes to insurgencies, peacemaking, counterinsurgency, intervention in foreign wars, there is a particularly strong continuity. even with allowances made for some of the modern technology. All the themes I'm going to be running past you today very quickly, I have got a very important role to play still in the present. So without further ado, let me plunge into the subject and I promise to you that I'll become more modern as at the very end during questions and answers. But I don't think it would make much sense if I simply ran you through. the NATO AGP 3 .28 contribution to stabilisation, let me take you back instead to a lot of ideas that have been around for a long time, some of which have found their way into this new NATO document. So these are the points that I'm going to be addressing. What happens when we're still at war affects everything else, then the difficulties of the transition to peace, post -conflict stabilisation, and how then to wean a polity from this foreign intervention. And then I have a big philosophical question at the end, which you will have to bear with me for, because it is very, very difficult and very morally problematic in every way. And I hope that I will not be misread when coming to this last point. So very briefly, let us look at what happens while we're still at war and how that influences the outcome and the intervention and the outcome of a stabilisation. process afterwards. One of the things that I've discovered trying to look into the subject of how to end wars is that causes of wars and war aims could be the same really, but they're not. Simply because during a war, particularly if it's more than seven days, more things can appear that will change the aims of the war. In theory, the causes of the war are grievance that you want to address. So if you've addressed the grievance, the war's over. But in fact, during the development of the war, things change. Existing causes and war aims can wax and wane in that context. The question is, in trying to make peace, what is at stake? Is it something like secession of a state or a part of a state? Is it to have better rights? Or is it something much bigger? Is it in fact something like... a world order that lurks behind that particular conflict. Is the war about ethnic tensions with interstate, as it was in Bosnia, Herzegovina and Kosovo? Is it about picking out a foreign occupation power, a colonial power, as in Indochina and Algeria on Indonesia? Is it about religion, as it was for the Iranian Revolution Phase II, the Arab Spring Phase II, Afghanistan in its last phase? Is it about kicking out, overthrowing a government that is non -democratic and corrupt and is trying to perpetuate its power as South Vietnam in Iran, the Shah and phase one in Iraq, in Niger? And one of the important things there was a realization by one of my heroes about you, whom you're going to hear more, a Spaniard called the Third Marquis of Santa Cruz de Mascinado, who lived in the early 18th century. and who even then said that a state rarely rises up without the fault of its governors. And a Welshman who was Catholic and therefore escaped Protestant England and Britain in the 18th century, the first cause and object of a revolt is to repel injuries, real or supposed. The second is to provide for future security, which can never be effectually done other than by destroying the sovereign authority. There is no alternative. Freedom or slavery is the result of it. Very interestingly enough, during the first phase of the American War of Independence, but this stark way he put it is very modern. Therefore, the sovereign in conducting such a war should, by a moderate conduct, diminish the idea of danger and leave room to a solid and hearty reconciliation. So reconciliation is already a very important idea to take away from the idea of how to... end the war and stabilize that result of war. The effects of the conduct of war will polarize warring parties even more, particularly if the war is conducted in a way perceived as being exceptionally cruel. Ukrainians cared little about Russians before 2014. By now, it is pretty unlikely that there are a lot of Ukrainians still around who have positive feelings about Russians and the many things we hear about Ukraine, about how they suddenly... ban Russian books from bookshelves and from the school curricula seem to suggest that. Equally, the feelings of people in Gaza, I imagine, are much worse now towards Israel than even when the war started in October last year. Christina Pizal, who is the only woman strategist I've ever come across in the early 15th century, wrote that cruelty increases and multiplies the number of enemies by making many people die. for their children are kin succeed them in hate. That is to say, for one enemy slain, several others spring up. This has got a path to reconciliation when, for every enemy slain, several others spring up. A very brief note about bombing. The idea in the immediate post -World War I period that you could end wars faster by bombing civilian populations. Pressing them to put pressure in turn on their governments to surrender has been proved to be quite unworkable. So in the Second World War, as a number of authors have shown, this was quite counterproductive because it created more solidarity, both in Ukraine and in Gaza. It has not turned the population against its own government. I think in both cases, the bombing from the air has had very adverse effects on the chances of making a good peace. making it soon and then stabilizing the situation. Let me touch briefly on the question of which external actors might be the best to intervene in something that is a civil war of a country, a non -international armed conflict. There are configurations in which somebody very, very external to the conflict might have been a good side to intervene. For example, I used to go around in the 1990s before the Easter agreements and the Good Friday agreements were signed in 1998, saying that in fact it would have been a good idea to bring in German forces because they weren't sympathising with either side and they weren't seen as enemies by either side. In the Yugoslav wars it was clearly an external multinational force that was the best. In African conflicts what seems not to be a good idea is to bring in previous colonial powers. There's a lot of atheistic reaction to say, ah, they're just neo24 min - 172: Achieving post conflict stabilization with Prof. Beatrice Heuser (Pt.1)
Recently, I partnered with SMA's Mariah Yager to talk with Professor Beatrice Houser about post-conflict stabilization.
“In Kuwait, preparing for the Iraq invasion, I asked the leadership, ‘Could you give us a little more detail about after we get to Baghdad and topple the regime? ' [The answer] was more than inadequate.’” -David Petraeus, speaking at Carnegie.
The U.S. and the West recently suffered monumental failures in planning and implementing post-conflict stabilization, resulting in massive corruption, instability and loss of foreign policy goals.
[Charley Wilson’s War]. “These things happened. They were glorious, and they changed the world... and then we fucked up the endgame.” -Charley Wilson’s end-of-film quote.
In this session, we turn the corner from commiserating on past failures to discussing solutions to planning and implementing the transition from conflict to post-conflict stabilization. To help partner nations regain their stability, security and partnership in the international community.
To help, we have brought in Professor Beatrice Heuser, renowned Chair in International Relations at the University of Glasgow and second to the General Staff Academy of the Bundeswehr, as Head of Strategy.
Dr. Heuser recently published a paper on post-conflict Gaza stabilization and reconstruction and wanted to discuss strategies for building an effective post-conflict strategy and operation.
Jack Gaines, showrunner and host of the One CA Podcast, is joining SMA to co-host the discussion.
In this session, Dr. Heuser, Jack Gaines, Mariah Yager and the audience will try to address three themes:
1. Planning the transition from conflict to post-conflict. How should the military shape the end of an active conflict to help the transition to post-conflict stabilization?2. How to support the post-conflict stabilization. Typically, during stabilization, insurgencies rise, popular movements grow, and extremist groups attempt to usurp the transition for their political ambitions; how does conflict stabilization work with the military to minimize usurping groups while spotting and enabling popular movements?
3. Spotting and supporting the post-conflict transition and transitioning a post-conflict state that depends on aid and support to become independent. How can the military, diplomacy, and development workers manage the process to ensure a successful transition to becoming an independent partner in the international community?
Thank you FeedSpot for ranking One CA Podcast as one of their top 10 foreign policy podcasts. Check it out at: https://podcasts.feedspot.com/foreign_policy_podcasts/
One CA is a product of the civil affairs association
and brings in people who are current or former military, diplomats, development officers, and field agents to discuss their experiences on the ground with a partner nation's people and leadership.
We aim to inspire anyone interested in working in the "last three feet" of U.S. foreign relations.
To contact the show, email us at CApodcasting@gmail dot com
or look us up on the Civil Affairs Association website at www civilaffairsassoc.org
Special thanks for SensualMusic4You producing "Hip Hop Jazz & Hip Hop Jazz Instrumental: 10 Hours of Hip Hop Jazz." Sample found at https://youtu.be/XEa0Xn9XAzk?si=eeWyVqE3c1uL6d2Q
---
00:00:03 Introduction
Welcome to the 1CA Podcast. This is your host, Jack Gaines. 1CA is a product of the Civil Affairs Association and brings in people who are current or former military, diplomats, development officers, and field agents to discuss their experiences on ground with the partner nation's people and leadership. Our goal is to inspire anyone interested in working the last three feet of foreign relations. To contact the show, email us at capodcasting at gmail dot com. Or look us up on the Civil Affairs Association website at www .civilaffairsassos .org. I'll have those in the show notes.00:00:39 MARIAH YAGERHello, everyone. I'm Mariah Yeager, and welcome to today's SMA speaker session entitled Building Solutions to Post -Conflict Stabilization. I'd like to thank Professor Beatrice Huser for taking the time to speak with us today. And I'd also like to welcome back Major Jack Gaines of the 1CA podcast as our guest host.00:00:57 JACK GAINESI partnered with SMA to talk with Professor Beatrice Hauser on post -conflict stabilization. What you will hear on this show is the edited version. If you wish to listen to the full uncut version, I will have a link to it in the show notes. This is part one of two. The second half comes out next week. So enjoy.00:01:17 MARIAH YAGERSo with that, please keep your video and audio off for the duration of the event so we have a nice clear line for our presentation today. All right, let me introduce Professor Beatrice Huser. She holds the Chair in International Relations at the University of Glasgow. She has degrees from the Universities of London and Oxford and a habilitation from the Phillips University of Marburg. She has taught at King's College London and at universities in France and Germany. Previously, she has worked on the international staff at NATO headquarters in Brussels as well. She has numerous publications. from nuclear strategy, history of strategy, insurgencies, and counterinsurgency. But today we're talking about post -conflict stabilization. And with that, I'm going to turn the floor over to Leijer.00:01:59 JACK GAINESThank you, Mariah. And thank you, Professor Huser. Personally, I see a market gap in post -conflict stabilization. And to describe that gap, I forwarded Professor Huser three challenge questions to help her shape her presentation and the discussion. Those questions were, the military drives conflict to an end state. what conditions do we need to achieve to successfully transition a conflict into post -conflict stabilization? Second, during post -conflict conditions, how does the military and lead agencies spot and support legitimate efforts while also spotting and filtering out groups trying to derail recovery for their own benefit or spoilers or those who use instability for personal gain? And third, How do we work to transition a nation from post -conflict dependencies to becoming a self -sufficient member of the international community? These came to me after listening to retired General David Petraeus speak at Carnegie. He talked about when he was a division commander preparing to go into Baghdad and asking leadership about the plan after toppling the regime. The response was, leave that to us, which he states was inadequate. General Petraeus described the market gap. We needed to know the instate to achieve post -conflict conditions and then how to deter instability to support stabilization and transition. So that is the challenge for Professor Huser to answer. But I also wanted to use this talk as a call to action. We should take chalk to the State Department CSO strategy to either update our current plans and operations so they achieve the conditions for post -conflict stabilization and transition or Build operational templates that staff can plug into the back of any strategy or operation so planners can sketch out the steps to drive a conflict into a successful post -conflict environment with stabilization and transition. So with that, Professor Huser, good morning.00:04:00 BEATRICE HEUSERThank you very much indeed. I'm very honored to be with you. If you can stop sharing your screen, I will flash mine up straight away and start. with a disclaimer that I am a very small and modern armchair strategist, and I'm standing on the shoulders of lots and lots of giants, which means that I'm going to introduce you in the first part of this whole talk to the ideas and the thinking of some very interesting and very important people of the past who've had plenty of experience. But at the same time, what is driving my interest is, of course, the present. And you will see all along, I think, like me, how these ideas that were developed by people a long time ago impact on the present. More still, there's a big debate about how much war changes and how much technology impacts war. I think particularly when it comes to insurgencies, peacemaking, counterinsurgency, intervention in foreign wars, there is a particularly strong continuity. even with allowances made for some of the modern technology. All the themes I'm going to be running past you today very quickly, I have got a very important role to play still in the present. So without further ado, let me plunge into the subject and I promise to you that I'll become more modern as at the very end during questions and answers. But I don't think it would make much sense if I simply ran you through. the NATO AGP 3 .28 contribution to stabilisation, let me take you back instead to a lot of ideas that have been around for a long time, some of which have found their way into this new NATO document. So these are the points that I'm going to be addressing. What happens when we're still at war affects everything else, then the difficulties of the transition to peace, post -conflict stabilisation, and how then to wean a polity from this foreign intervention. And then I have a big philosophical question at the end, which you will have to bear with me for, because it is very, very difficult and very morally problematic in every way. And I hope that I will not be misread when coming to this last point. So very briefly, let us look at what happens while we're still at war and how that influences the outcome and the intervention and the outcome of a stabilisation. process afterwards. One of the things that I've discovered trying to look into the subject of how to end wars is that causes of wars and war aims could be the same really, but they're not. Simply because during a war, particularly if it's more than seven days, more things can appear that will change the aims of the war. In theory, the causes of the war are grievance that you want to address. So if you've addressed the grievance, the war's over. But in fact, during the development of the war, things change. Existing causes and war aims can wax and wane in that context. The question is, in trying to make peace, what is at stake? Is it something like secession of a state or a part of a state? Is it to have better rights? Or is it something much bigger? Is it in fact something like... a world order that lurks behind that particular conflict. Is the war about ethnic tensions with interstate, as it was in Bosnia, Herzegovina and Kosovo? Is it about picking out a foreign occupation power, a colonial power, as in Indochina and Algeria on Indonesia? Is it about religion, as it was for the Iranian Revolution Phase II, the Arab Spring Phase II, Afghanistan in its last phase? Is it about kicking out, overthrowing a government that is non -democratic and corrupt and is trying to perpetuate its power as South Vietnam in Iran, the Shah and phase one in Iraq, in Niger? And one of the important things there was a realization by one of my heroes about you, whom you're going to hear more, a Spaniard called the Third Marquis of Santa Cruz de Mascinado, who lived in the early 18th century. and who even then said that a state rarely rises up without the fault of its governors. And a Welshman who was Catholic and therefore escaped Protestant England and Britain in the 18th century, the first cause and object of a revolt is to repel injuries, real or supposed. The second is to provide for future security, which can never be effectually done other than by destroying the sovereign authority. There is no alternative. Freedom or slavery is the result of it. Very interestingly enough, during the first phase of the American War of Independence, but this stark way he put it is very modern. Therefore, the sovereign in conducting such a war should, by a moderate conduct, diminish the idea of danger and leave room to a solid and hearty reconciliation. So reconciliation is already a very important idea to take away from the idea of how to... end the war and stabilize that result of war. The effects of the conduct of war will polarize warring parties even more, particularly if the war is conducted in a way perceived as being exceptionally cruel. Ukrainians cared little about Russians before 2014. By now, it is pretty unlikely that there are a lot of Ukrainians still around who have positive feelings about Russians and the many things we hear about Ukraine, about how they suddenly... ban Russian books from bookshelves and from the school curricula seem to suggest that. Equally, the feelings of people in Gaza, I imagine, are much worse now towards Israel than even when the war started in October last year. Christina Pizal, who is the only woman strategist I've ever come across in the early 15th century, wrote that cruelty increases and multiplies the number of enemies by making many people die. for their children are kin succeed them in hate. That is to say, for one enemy slain, several others spring up. This has got a path to reconciliation when, for every enemy slain, several others spring up. A very brief note about bombing. The idea in the immediate post -World War I period that you could end wars faster by bombing civilian populations. Pressing them to put pressure in turn on their governments to surrender has been proved to be quite unworkable. So in the Second World War, as a number of authors have shown, this was quite counterproductive because it created more solidarity, both in Ukraine and in Gaza. It has not turned the population against its own government. I think in both cases, the bombing from the air has had very adverse effects on the chances of making a good peace. making it soon and then stabilizing the situation. Let me touch briefly on the question of which external actors might be the best to intervene in something that is a civil war of a country, a non -international armed conflict. There are configurations in which somebody very, very external to the conflict might have been a good side to intervene. For example, I used to go around in the 1990s before the Easter agreements and the Good Friday agreements were signed in 1998, saying that in fact it would have been a good idea to bring in German forces because they weren't sympathising with either side and they weren't seen as enemies by either side. In the Yugoslav wars it was clearly an external multinational force that was the best. In African conflicts what seems not to be a good idea is to bring in previous colonial powers. There's a lot of atheistic reaction to say, ah, they're just neo25 min
About One CA Podcast
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One CA Podcast is here to inspire anyone interested in traveling to work with a partner nation’s people and leadership to forward U.S. foreign policy.
We bring in current or former military, diplomats, development officers, and field agents to discuss their experiences and give recommendations for working the ”last three feet” of foreign relations.
The show is sponsored by the Civil Affairs Association.
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