South African Border Wars

By Desmond LathamSociety & Culture Documentary History

South African Border Wars episodes

May 01, 2023 Episode 103 – The First Battle of Tumpo Triangle where 61 Mech faced a fierce FAPLA bombardment
It was D-Day for the next attack across the open ground east of the Tumpo Triangle, just outside Cuito Cuanavale in southern Angola. The town was now regarded as a moral prerequisite rather than strategic necessity, Luanda’s position here was no surrender, while in Pretoria, the political leadership knew that they could not take the town.

This would have prompted an escalation which the National Party could not afford at this moment in their history. The South African economy was weakening, and the public support for this long war in Angola had ebbed significantly.

As you’ve heard, the Cubans and Angolans with the Russian advisors were dug in and ready to the east of Cuito Cuanavale, dozens of tanks, thousands of men, covered by Su-22 and MiG fighter jets and ground support aircraft, M-46 heavy artillery ranged and ready, the terrifying Zu-23 anti-aircraft guns horizontal, ready to pound the Ratels.

Mike Muller’s 61 Mech was going to launch itself into this flatland on 25th February 1988, a direct assault on a heavily fortified position with fewer men. Not what the military handbook says - as we all know. If you do not have the element of surprise, then you need 3 to 1 odds in your favour, however poorly trained you believe the other side may be.

The Angolans by now were not as poorly trained as the SADF liked to think. FAPLA been fighting the South Africans since 1975 and had learned a great deal over the past 13 years.
25 min
April 23, 2023 Episode 102 – 32 Battalion strikes Menongue Airfield and a Mirage is shot down
The South Africans were attacking FAPLA’s 59 Brigade, but had run into an ambush - Cubans operating Soviet tanks had laid up waiting for 4SAI to cut across their hull down positions.

These were the T55s of the 3rd Battalion — the commanders and the gunners were Cuban, while the drivers were Angolan. As the SADF had found out earlier on the 14th February 1988, Cubans were also operating as spotters.

Mike Muller of 61 Mech was now trying to capture a Cuban, but the last he’d seen had been shot down right in front of him, while trying to surrender, by UNITA troops who’s blood was up.

When we left off last, it was afternoon - and the SADF had just won a victory over 59 Brigade and 3rd Battalion - the Angolans and their Cuban allies were in full retreat towards the Tumpo Triangle, that y junction in the road south east of Cuito Cuanavale, and just north of the Tumpo River.

This retreat was a rout in many ways, with FAPLA officers only managing to halt the retreating 59th Brigade 120 kilometers north east of Cuito Cuanavale. 21 and 25 Brigades were also pulling back along with the 3rd tank Battalion.

They left behind 14 destroyed T55s, eight armoured cars, one BM-21 Stalin Organ, one mobile radar guided SAM13 missile system, and seven ZU-23 anti-aircraft guns.

400 FAPLA were dead, hundreds more wounded so far on the battle on Valentines’ Day.
Meanwhile, what was called a sideshow had been underway far to the north west of this battle ground.

To coincide with the big attack by 4SAI and 61 Mech against 59 Brigade on Sunday 14 February 1988, Deon Ferreira wanted 32 Battalion to strike the Menongue Airbase.

This was to hamper the Angolans as they dispatched their attack helicopters and ground support MiGs - and the plans had been under way since the 6th February .

It may have been a sideshow, but it was extremely daring - a one-off event in the entire Border War in terms of its conventional style plan. The idea was to launch from a small stream called the Cuma, which was 20 kilometers south east of Menongue.

One Friday 19th February, four Mirage F1AZs took off from Grootfontein in Northern SWA, their target was a FAPLA convoy expected to pass through Cuartir, 40 kilometers east of Menongue.

The last plane out that day was flown by Major Ed Every, known to all at the base as Never Ready because he often forgot things - like his gloves, maps, or flight documents - but on this day he forgot nothing.
23 min
April 16, 2023 Episode 101 – The Valentines Day assault on 59 Brigade and a Cuban tank ambush
It’s the second week of January 1988 and FAPLAs 21st, 59th and 25th Brigades had taken up the front line in what was to be a three layered defenses ahead of the Tumpo Triangle, where two roads joined just north of the Tumpo River.

That was aeast of Cuito Cuanavale.

Behind these three Brigades, 16th and 66th hunkered down in expectation of an SADF follow up attack which had started ended on the 14th January. The third Angolan line of defence was just west of the Cuito River, manned by the 13th Brigade joined by a Cuban battalion. By now FAPLA was communicating by fixed telephone line, going back to an earlier technology which made it much more difficult for the South Africans to intercept their messages.

From the beginning of January 1988 to the end of March, the SADF was going to make six frontal attacks on these well-entrenched FAPLA positions and now the Generals in Pretoria were almost literally breathing down the necks of the tactical commanders.

61 Mech, 4SAI and UNITA had been repulsed after taking ground, the South African troops disgusted as they watched the land they’d fought to seize being retaken by Angolan units around the Chambinga High Ground.

The haphazard nature of the SADF’s attack - part of Operation Hooper - was caused by the territory and by a confused series of orders. I recently attended talks at Voortrekkehoogte by high ranking generals of this period, they defended their decisions and made some pointed comments about false information, but I’m afraid to say that the facts speak for themselves. Let’s go over a few of these and consider for yourself what was going on in these final days of South Africa’s Border War.

After the attack on 21 Brigade some of the Recce observation teams were moved to positions between the Cuito and Cuanavale Rivers, well behind enemy lines, north of Cuito Cuanavale. From here, the observers could see the airfield and the Cuito Bridge. The main danger for these specialists were the crocodiles, the Cuanavale River teemed with them, but after some scouring of the banks, one team led by Justin Vermaak spotted two Makoros, or canoes made from a hollowed tree trunk, and crossed over after dark.

They were prepping for the next major assault which SADF HQ had indicated was supposed to take place by end January, but ended up starting almost a month after their first assault on 21st Brigade. One of the strategic weaknesses plaguing the SADF now was the slow response and planning, logistics was a big problem here hundreds of kilometers away from their bases at Rundu and Oshikati.

Eventually Vermaak and his OP team found an excellent spot behind some of FAPLAs brigades, and watched 21 Brigade reorganised, digging their trenches in the same area that 4SAI had freed only a few days before.

The Recces were also in a good spot to warn their 20 Brigade HQ back in Rundu when they spotted MiGs, being behind enemy lines. That would buy the South Africans a couple of minutes. They were also being warned 200km further west, teams of Recces under Johnny de Gouveia and Buks van den Burg were watching Menongue airport spotting the MiGs and choppers taking off heading towards Cuito Cuanavale.
Pretoria was dithering. They eventually decided on January 25th that the rearming and new plans were ready and the nest target was not 21 Brigade, it was 59th.
61 Mech lieutenant Clive Holt explained how they all knew that 59 Brigade was the key to the FAPLA defences.
FAPLAs 3 Tank Battalion was waiting in support, so this was not going to be easy. Because 59th Brigade was FAPLAs strongest, the aim was to hit them until they collapsed, then 21 and 25 Brigades would fall back towards the town - hopefully without much fight left.
23 min
April 11, 2023 Episode 100 – FAPLA pushed from their positions along the Chambinga High Ground on Friday 13th
D-Day for the renewed attack on FAPLA’s 21 Brigade was reset from January 5th to January 13th 1988 - a Friday, for those who suffered from triskaidekaphobia - a fear of Friday the 13th, it merely served to increase their worries.

4 SAI was now being led by Commandant Jan Malan who replaced Leon Marais, 61 Mech was under temporary command of Koos Liebenberg who’d relieved Mike Muller who had headed home for a six week break to move his home from Pretoria to Tsumeb.

UNITAs 3rd Regular Battalion was under command of former Portuguese army’s General Demostenes Chilingutila - who was the rebel movements Chief of Staff and had decided to come and get more directly involved.

4 SAI and UNITA were going in from the east of the Cuatir River source, using the Chambinga High Ground while 61 Mech would squeeze through between 21 Brigade and 59 Brigades, then take up position on the heavily forested hillside.

As you’ll hear, this became known as 61 Koppie and is one of those hills that appears to be a merely pimple on the landscape but one that turns into a major strategic position. The Koppie protruted just west of the Chambinga high ground, east of the Cuanavale River.

The koppie was 3 kilometers south of 21 Brigade’s perimeter and north of the Dala River source, it was hemmed on three sides by rivers, and to the East lay the Chambinga thickets on the high ground. There are many small rivers that rise around the high ground east or south of Cuito and the Dala was one of these.

The landscape was going to feature as a kind of 3rd force in the upcoming battles, as had happened previously in the SADFs attempts at dislodging FAPLA from East of the Cuanavale and Chambinga rivers.
4SAI began it approach just after midday on the 13th, after the Mobile Rocket Launchers and G5s had softened up the two outposts - more than 300 rounds were pumped towards these FAPLA troops who numbered around 800. The SA artillery continued with 81mm and 120mm mortars, as the SA Air Force flew in, their incendiary bombs setting fire to the forest around FAPLAs position.
23 min
April 02, 2023 Episode 99 – The SAAF tests a top secret weapon while new recruits come to terms with giant moths and skulking MiGs
We’re approaching the date of Operation Hooper, but first a bit of bad news for the SADF regarding disease. The heavy rains through November and December of 1987 had created a perfect breeding ground for the flies and mosquitoes that carried hepatitis and malaria.

This was impacting the morale let alone the operational capacity of the army. The replacement troopies were on their way by the 19th November but they had to receive additional training on the border before they were let loose on FAPLA.

FAPLA too was rearming itself, and new recruits were also arriving at 21 Brigade and other units stationed around Cuito Cuanavale. There was a real expectation building on both sides that something significant was going to happen over the next few months.

This kind of war couldn’t continue, it had mutated from a low intensity guerrilla war ostensibly fought though Ovamboland to a conventional war fought exclusively in southern Angola.

The troops arriving to replace die the national servicemen had no idea what they were in for. This was an old trick of the SADF, most of these men only realised they were going into Angola once they were inside the country. The law stated that they had to volunteer to fight outside the country, but the SADF top brass had got around this by asking if the men were prepared to volunteer once they had crossed the border.

Had these troops not "volunteered", they would have left their brothers to fight with fewer hands. So it was a contorted and rather malicious psychological trick these blokes played on the minds of these youngsters - most of them 18 or 19 years old.
AS the SADF prepared for Operation Hooper, the SA Air Force was testing a new top secret weapon system on the Buccaneer S Mk 50, known as the H2, built by Kentron, a subsidiary of Armscor.

It was a 460 kilogram pre-fragmented, folding winged glide-bomb, controlled by a TV link between the bomb and the aircraft.

It was a simple form of missile, with a guidance unit in its nose with its own power generator, driven by a small impeller at the back of the bomb. An impeller is something like the rotating component of a centrifugal pump. A comms pod was carried under the opposite wing of the Buccaneer which setup the TV link - and the weapon could controlled after launch by its parent aircraft.
23 min
March 26, 2023 Episode 98 – Hougaard goes marauding and a Russian commander dies as an ammunition bunker explodes
When we left off last episode it was the end of Operation Moduler, and Cuban Leader Fidel Castro had begun to consider a negotiated solution to the Namibian and Angolan war.

There was a side-show planned before the next major op in Angola. The SADF top brass had finally decided to try and cut off the logistics route west of Cuito Cuanavale through to Menongue.

This was also a period in the war where the generals began to get more and more involved in the tactical decisions.

Some of the upcoming battles were going to involve the SADF forces creeping ahead, similar to the fighting in World War One. FAPLA had not folded and run, commanders on the ground said that the enemy had often fought with a degree of determination that drew grudging respect from the South Africans.

It’s time to consider Jan Hougaard’s Marauders and an approach that perhaps in hindsight, was about two months too late but better late than never.

The commandant had been sent back to Rundu in late October to put together a secret mission to head west of Cuito Cuanavale, where the road runs east west but the rivers run north south.

That means there’s quite a few points that are strategic because they’re bridges or drifts, at least five places where a motivated and well structured team of saboteurs or attackers could cause mayhem. Convoys of vehicles were arriving in Cuito virtually daily, some with 300 or more trucks, tankers and support machines, bringing supplies and equipment. Each convoy that made the trip safely from Menongue 200 km to the west was greeted by cheers, and each was a knife in the back of the SADF morale.
He had to begin destabilising FAPLAs routes by early December, so he turned to 120 men from 101 Battalion made up of soldiers from Ovamboland. The mobile rocket Launcher battery was shifted from Hartslief to Hougaard. He scouted around Fort Buffalo, 32 Battalion’s headquarters, and managed to pull together a special support company with 81mm mortars, jeep mounted 106 mm anti-tank guns and Milan anti-tank missiles.
The Angolans had been forced to recruit more troops and rush them south, many had not been trained properly and the calibre of fighting man on FAPLAs side had dropped.

But offsetting this was a far cleverer approach to fighting the South Africans. FAPLA had already shown some steel in previous confrontations, they had deployed their mechanised units in a more mobile fashion, moving them around the battlefield. The Cubans and Russian advisors were more hands on as well.
21 min
March 19, 2023 Episode 97 – Castro starts to talk peace but along the Cuito River all hell rains down
We’re wrapping up Operation Moduler this episode and throwing forward to the next assault on Cuito Cuanavale which was to fixate the South African political leadership at a time when the Cold War was melting away.

This was to have a direct effect on the satellite wars such as those in Angola.

Assessing this stage of the conflict it all appeared to be in South Africa’s favour - on the surface.

Combat Groups Alpha, Bravo and Charlie had fought running battles against FAPLAs 21/25 Brigade, 66 Brigade and 59th Brigade for weeks pushing them back to close to where they’d started the own Operation October. Instead of overcoming UNITA at Mavinga and taking their HQ at Jumba, FAPLA had been defeated.

Between July and 18th November 1987 FAPLA had lost 1 059 dead, more than 2000 wounded, 61 tanks were blown up along with 84 armoured cars and 20 artillery pieces.
Some have suggested that if 4SAI and the tank squadron of 12 Olifants from the start of Moduler, they would have overrun the Angolans with ease. That is I’m afraid, an incorrect assessment for two main reasons.

The first was the SA Air Force did not control the air war. The Angolans did. And anyone who understands modern warfare knows that those who control the air, particularly these days of missiles and drones, controls the battle.

Russia has failed to take complete control of the airspace over Ukraine since their invasion in February 2022 - and has paid the price for that failure. Unlike the UN and American force that overran Iraq in Desert Storm after decimating and completely destroying the Iraqi air Force and bludeoning it’s anti-aircraft system into dust. The war was lost from then on for Saddam Hussein whatever his Revolutionary Guard thought.

Secondly, the SADF was attacking entrenched defensive positions without the advantage of the element of surprise and numerically weaker. Tactical college interns at military school will tell you that’s not a blueprint for success.

Even if 4SAI and the tanks had arrived earlier, they would still have had to face MiGs that were spending more time over the ground forces than the Mirages. Perhaps the SADF would have managed to overcome FAPLAs 21 and 25 Brigade, but then they would face four more Brigades. Two east of Cuito and two others in reserve. And if you check the facts, 59 Brigade fought well and in fact, deflected an Olifant attack on the days before 16th November 1987.
By now Cuba's Fidel Castro had lost over 10 000 and some say closer to 20 000 troops as casualties of this never ending war across the Atlantic from his small island nation.

Initially, he had supported the war, sending his men and women in to fight. It’s not well known, but Cuban women for example made up most of the anti-aircraft battery crews around some of the towns of Angola.

He began to think about negotiating a solution rather than fighting to the death against the SADF, and sent his diplomats to the United Nations along with Angolan MPLA officials to contact the South African mission in New York. Castro was wanting out of Angola.
24 min
March 12, 2023 Episode 96 – The Chambinga Gallop and the end of Operation Moduler
FAPLAs 21 and 25 Brigades were manoeuvring around the western edge of the 1370 meter high Viposto high ground which lay south of the Hube and Chambinga Rivers before dawn on the 16th November 1987- and those rivers flowed in an almost direct east to west direction.

That meant the Angolan Brigades were now squeezed between the high ground and the river, heading towards the Hube’s source. Their plan was to circle around the east side of the source, then head back westerly along the right bank of the river, eventually reaching the strategic Chambinga River bridge - and then escaping back towards Cuito Cuanavale.

At 06h00 the 21 and 25 Brigades were refuelling before the next quick push for the headwaters of the Hube, with the Russian advisors team leader Lieutenant colonel Anatoly Artiomenko standing on the top of his troop carrier.

The SADF’s Alpha, Bravo and Charlie Battle groups were thundering north, trying to cut them off on the east side - the right - of the Viposto high ground. During the night of the 15th, SADF Recces and spotters were on the move ahead of the advancing Battle Groups and despite the Angolans determination to co-ordinate their next moves, the next few hours were going to be grim.

And Battle Group Charlie wasn’t hard to spot - FAPLA recon teams heard them miles away because the commander Leon Marais had decided to breach a large minefield using the Ploffadder explosives - fired from a rocket they landed on the minefield in a long strand, detonating loudly and also detonating mines.

They did not always work and this time, they worked well enough to signal Charlie’s presence to advancing FAPLA Brigades. Because both sides had driven into the same area at night, the South Africans had further compounded their own lack of quick quiet action by firing mortar shell illuminating flares before dawn.

They gave their positions away in both cases long before FAPLA actually spotted their forward Ratels and Buffels. The South Africans were also traveling very slowly as the commanders fretted about the exact location of the minefields, even despite having maps they’d seized in the attacks on the 16 Brigade two weeks earlier.
Lieutenant Koos Breytenbach was the SADF forward artillery observer at strategic Bridge and he became known as the Murderer of the Chambinga after what happened next. He was extremely accurate in his distance measurements and timing, bringing down constant G-5 shells, rockets and 120mm mortars on the Angolans crossing the bridge.

**This episode has been re-edited to include comments from Paul Gladwin who kindly provided a more accurate rendition of a casevac that led to an Honoris Crux for Sergeant Labuschagne.
25 min
March 05, 2023 Episode 95 – 21/25 Brigade makes a dash for the Chambinga Bridge amidst heroics by 32's Van Zyl
We’re into the final phase of Operation Moduler in November 1987, and the SADF was lining up FAPLAs 16 Brigade after giving them a bloody nose on the 9th.

Combat Group Bravo was going to draw FAPLAs attention between the Mianei and Vimpula Rivers, south east of Cuito Cuanavale, but that was a diversion. 59 Brigade was based here, and moving slowly in a northerly direction to support 16 Brigade almost due east of the town.

The are a series of short rivers that rise to the north, east and south of Cuito Cuanavale, most flow west and join the Quito River - and it was along these rivers that most of the next phase of Operation Modular would be fought.

The Recces spotted T54/55 tanks heading towards the source of the Hube River and the South African commander Commandant Deon Ferreira was weighing up neutralising these heavy weapons before continuing with the attack on 16h Brigade.

The South Africans were still not fully aware of what 59 Brigade was doing, although they had a better idea about 16 Brigade.

During the night of the 10th, the SADF pulled of a switcheroo, moving Combat Group Alpha to the south of 16th Brigade, combat Group Charlie was now slightly north.

Early on the morning of the 11th, Combat Group Alpha was in position and began to fire their Ratel 90 guns along with the Ratel 81 mortars towards FAPLA trenches. The G-5s also began to pepper 16 Brigade along with the Multiple Rocket launchers, the Valkiris.

ON the same day, the Angolans were celebrating their independence but as the Russian advisors met with their African colleagues for muted festivities, Mirages flew overhead, and began to bomb the Angolan positions.

“Something quite unimaginable is happening now …” wrote Russian translator Igor Zhdarkin,

“The Angolan troops are almost completely demoralised the brigades are on average at 45 percent strength. For every 10 or 15 shells launched by the enemy the Angolans are able to send only one…”

The SADFs rate of fire was wearing FAPLA down while the Recces and artillery spotters were passing on information constantly and then picked up 59th Brigade’s shifting position.

The Russians reported that the Angolans had spotted what they called “their buffalo” - that was 32 Battalion and the advisors reported that “the Angolans fear the South Africans like fire…”.
As both sides picked up their pieces, an incredible casualty evacuation was about to take place. 32's Piet Van Zyl realised that one of the Battalion’s troops was missing - and was told that the infantryman was last seen lying dead in a FAPLA trench 800m away.
25 min
February 26, 2023 Episode 94 – South African and Russian tanks go toe-to-toe at the Chambinga river in southern Angola
It’s early morning November 9th 1987 and the SADF was advancing towards FAPLAs 16th Brigade based at the source of the Chambinga River. The Angolan brigade had received orders to shift eastwards, and the units were about to move when the SADF launched their attack. The first sign of the impending assault was an artillery bombardment and SAAF bombing raid on the eve of the assault.

Commandant Deon Ferreira was OC of Task Force 10 as it was known although the main battle plans had been drawn up by Roland de Vries, his 2 IC. It was a plan that was based on the principles of fluid operations, with the South African mobility exploited to the full.

De Vries had also decided that one of the main aims was to destabilise the enemies logistics and communications, disrupting their plans and likely counter attack.

Robbie Hartslief’s Combat Group Bravo unleashed on 59th Brigade to the south, creating a diversion. But when his units overran the position, the south African commander was surprised to find the brigade’s positions were empty, it had already withdrawn north towards the 16th Brigade.

The Angolans counter attacked with tanks, and Bravo retreated, Hartslief’s actions had confused the enemy and he didn’t want to continue a needless fight against FAPLA which was using heavy weapons, including the T54 and 55s.

The Soviet advisors thought they had won a victory and began exchanging congratulations. Little did they know that the main SADF assault was going to take place further north close to the source of the Chambinga River. That’s where Commandant Deon MArais led Combat Group Charlie towards 16th Brigade, although the going was slow, hampered by the thick bush around the river.

By 06h57 on the morning of 9th November, Recces posted near the 16th Brigade radio to say that could hear FAPLAs tank engines start up - moments later a G-5 bombardment hit one of FAPLAs ammunition dumps, which exploded.

Marais’ Charlie Group approached in close formation, with 4 SAIs two mechanised infantry companies of Ratel 20s on both sides in the front, and an armoured car squadron of Ratel 90s as well as a platoon of 32 Battalion troops between them. Piet van Zyl’s company of 32 infantrymen were all black, led by four white officers.

“We moved 30 km west from the lagoon, riding on Ratels,” said van Zyl quoted by author Fred Bridgeland.
“We passed the tank squadron and its support Ratels under the command of major Andre Retief of 4SAI, That man really knew how to look after his troops…”

Retief had brought a refrigerated canteen truck all the way from South Africa, and van Zyl organised a raid on the truck when 4SAI was looking the other way - liberating two cases of ice cold beer.

“Man that was nectar from heaven” said van Zyl.

The Angolans still believed that the SADF was attacking 59 Brigade further south, but that all changed just after 7.30 when 16 Brigade comms reports that South African tanks appeared to be about to overrun their positions.
22 min

About South African Border Wars

From the publisher's feed

Much has been written about the South African Border war which is also known as the Namibian War of Independence. While the fighting was ostensibly about Namibia, most of the significant battles were fought inside Namibia’s northern neighbour, Angola.