By January 1986 internal unrest in South Africa that had started in 1984 was in full swing – with the security forces hard pressed to cope. The SA Police were largely responsible for dealing with the ANC and PAC internally, although the SADF was going to get much more involved later.

The unrest would barely calm down before the SADF was involved in a much bigger war in southern Angola, while special ops were increasing against the ANC MK targets in countries other than Angola during this period.

The South African military establishment had drawn clear lines between what they regarded as terror activities and politically motivated unrest that was violent.

This is an important distinction and had a bearing on how they’d conduct some of their external attacks on ANC cadres. Terror was defined by the SADF as actions conducted by infiltrators who committed political murders, lay mines on roads, and blew up substations and other infrastructure.

Unrest was burning down schools and government buildings, barricading streets, large groups of people on streets who’d attack others, sometimes including the terrifying necklace killing technique which was a car tire filled with fuel thrown around the neck of a victim.

IN Ovamboland, SWAPOs armed wing PLAN stepped up attacks on administrative officials. IN March 1986 South African President PW Botha proposed in parliament that Resolution 435 be implemented by August, but wanted the Cubans to withdraw from Angola first. In fact, the opposite was going on as we know.

Back in Angola, Russian general Konstantin Kurochkin who was a veteran of Moscow’s failed push into Afghanistan had instituted his own set of changes. We heard about some last episode, the improved Russian weapon systems, new aircraft, artillery, anti-aircraft and missile systems.

As these built up, the SADF began to focus its attention on FAPLAs logistics and weak points. One of these was the port of Namibe in southern Angola. It lay almost directly due west of the Mavinga and Cuito Cuanavale towns.

So the Recces were ordered to Namibe and Lobito to try and find out what kind of equipment was being collected, and to report back on any possible targets. After a thorough debriefing, it was decided that an attack on Namibe was feasible. There were vessels in the harbour that could be mined, this would kill two birds with one stone. If the Recces could sink a number of these ships, then the quayside would be virtually unusable. They’d also go after the fuel depot.

Eventually, in May 1986, the SADF gave the warning order for Operation Drosdy planning to go ahead. Pretoria had given up on the latest round of negotiations.

It’s September 1985, and the SA Air Force and ground forces have already shot down two Russian helicopters and an Antonov transport plane. That was an attempt at slowing down an MPLA ground assault using it’s PLAN troops against UNITA at Mavinga. If you remember, this was the Angolans Operation Second Congress.

On the 29th September, 32 Battalion ground team near Cuito Cuanavale radio’d the SA Air Force operations of a helicopter formation that had just taken off, bound for the battle zone around Mavinga.

This was a mixed formation, two Mi-8/17 transport choppers escorted by Mi-25 gunships. The Impalas were scrambled and headed at low altitude to the targets which were picked up along the Lomba River. The Russian helicopters were flying at 3000 feet AGL, and the Mi-8/17 formation was in a trailing echelon about 1000 meters apart. About a kilometer back, the two Mi-25s were flying in support and were also at 3000 feet.

The first pair of Impalas launched their attack, and then the second with devastating consequences for the chopper pilots and crew. All four were shot down. A third pair of Impalas who were monitoring watched as two MiG-23 fighter jets approached at 200 feel AGL, then swept their wings back, accelerated and climbed out of sight. They preferred to avoid dogfighting the South Africans.

ON first December 1985 operational order number 1/12/85 required 32 Battalion to inflict maximum damage on FAPLA personnel and equipment in the 3rd and 6th military regions by sustained bombardment. Easier said than done.

The main targets were Cuito Caunavale and the airstrip at Menongue. There were also specific instructions to target the FAPLA force as soon as it began moving towards Jamba using the all-important Multiple Rocket Launchers or MRLs. 32 was warned not to let these fall into enemy hands.

Colonel Eddie Viljoen commanded this part of the operation targeting Menongue, both the MRL troop along with Charlie Company, while Captain Daan van der Merwe led an MRL troop and Golf Company as they attacked Cuito Cuanavale. Ten years earlier 32 had deployed around Menongue during operation Savannah, now they were going back.

On the 15 December four MRLs were flown to Rundu from Waterkloof Air Force Base and everything was set to roll on Christmas eve.

By mid-1985 air traffic between Lubango on the Atlantic coast and Cuito Cuanavale in southern Angola had grown exponentially. Since the railway line running east had been rendered useless by UNITA, the MPLA was relying heavily on transport planes to get their logistics to the front.

Daily flights of the Soviet Antonovs could be seen carrying troops and material to Menongue in support of the MPLA’s war effort. This turned into a veritable flood of planes by late August when the MPLA launched their offensive against UNITA.

As you heard last episode, the Russians and Cubans had tired of being forced into defensive positions by the South Africans and UNITA and had decided to launch a two pronged as part of Operation Second Congress. The initial thrust began to the east into the Cazombo salient, while a second thrust turned south east.

The SA Air Force was then called in to help ferry UNITA troops as well as their own material in something that the South Africans called Operation Magneto. SA Air Force Mobile Air Operations Teams or MOATs were based at Cago Couthino and Cazombo and they guided the Hercules and Pumas in at night. That was to avoid being shot down by the MiGs which operated only during the day.

It was thought that the final phase of the battle for South Africa had begun, at least that’s how the hawks inside cabinet regarded this part of the Border War.

The Recces moved into Angola in support of UNITA and their mission was to shoot down Antonov and other MPLA transport aircraft using captured Russian SA-9 missile systems.

The Angolans were flying aggressive missions daily, resupplying FAPLA on the ground and conducting casevacs. The Mi-25 gunship helicopters, provided flushing fire, air-to-ground support, firing their 57mm rockets at possible UNITA targets, and sometimes, using their cannons.

Watching these flights were the Recces and members of 32 Battalion seconded to UNITA. The SADF was monitoring the Angolan army radio and picked up that many of the helicopter flights were used to ferry the all-important Soviet and Cuban advisors around the battle zones.

The Angolan push called Second Congress now presented an opportunity for some score settling – Pretoria had always regarded the Soviet presence as a perversion, warning the Russians that playing around in South Africa’s back yard would have consquences.

We’re picking up where we left off in Episode 79 with Captain Wynana Du Toit captured, two Recces dead, and six others hiding in a coastal thicket surrounded by FAPLA intent on capturing or killing them.

Operation Argon in 1985 was one part of a two-punch with the plan to send nine operators were heading to oil storage tanks at Cabinda enclave – they’d been dropped off by a submarine but had ended up at the wrong lay-up position.

Their tracks were spotted, then a South African hat was found on the trail and that was the clincher. In the follow up firefight, du Toit had been captured after Corporal van Breda and Liebenberg had been hit and killed.

Two others, Captain Nel and Corporal Hough were wounded and lying alongside four other operators inside the thicket – it was late afternoon on the 21st May 2985.

Desultory fire was aimed at the thicket, but the six survivors did not shoot back. They were running out of ammunition and were waiting for the final assault on their position.

Later during the hurried extraction the submarine was waiting on the surface, an unusual tactic in this particularly dangerous area. By 0400 on the morning of the 23rd the Barracuda’s rendesvouzed with the sub again, with the sub pointing out to sea. That was just in case of attack.

And they were lucky the Captain had ordered this position because moments later, the Stead saw lights of a ship approaching from the south east. His periscope radar detector indicated a vessel was indeed heading their way. Stead wasn’t sure they’d been spotted, but the detector revealed that this ship was steaming directly towards them.

Last episode we covered one of 32 Battalion’s darkest days, the mauling they received at the hands of SWAPO on 11th February 1985, where Charlie Company walked straight into one of the better prepared SWAPO bases after taking what some say was a short cut.

The death toll on the South African side was heavy, 13 soldiers from 32 Battalion’s Charlie company died either during the firefight or of their wounds later, 15 SWAPO were also killed.

32 survivors described what happened that day as a massacre as Charlie Company stumbled upon 100 SWAPO soldiers in trenches who were armed with 82mm mortars and machine guns and proceeded to mow down the soldiers of probably the best known SADF battalion.

Thus, Operation Forte came to a bitter end, the Battalion had been operating deep inside Angola in support of UNITA but by the end of May 1985, 32 withdrew from Angola.

The Joint Monitoring Commission came to an end at the same time. Normal service resumed as they say.

With the JMC done and dusted, the covert war increased in intensity to a full-scaled mechanized war on both sides. In a few months, FAPLA and the Cubans were to launch an attack on UNITA in the south east of the country.

But first, 4 Recce found itself embroiled in their next Operation. This was an ambitious project and took the special forces way beyond their normal stomping ground. They were heading to Cabinda Province far to the north, the province that produces most of Angola’s oil and gas. It’s an enclave inside the DRC, alongside the Congo River.

Operation Argon in May 1985 would leave two Recces dead, one captured, and the South African government in a diplomatic pickle. Four Recce were once again the go-to organization seeing that they had already been successful in blowing up a pipeline in Cabinda in June 1984.

Captain Wynand du Toit was to be Mission Commander, and Captain Krubert Nel was his 2 IC. I’m going to mention the others involved because this is one of the most viscious face to face fights involving the Recces of the entire war.

Staff Sergeant Amilear Queiroz and Maddies Adam were joined by Corporals Michael Hough, Gert Engelbrecht, Toby Tablai, Rowland Liebenberg and Louis van Breda.

The medical support were going to be very busy indeed -and it was fortunate for those who were going to return injured that two doctors were on board the sub, with Doctor Deon Erasmus and Frans Verster who were both qualified operators as well as surgeons part of this mission

We’re traveling with 32 Battalion’s Echo and Golf companies which had entered Angola and were deployed in pseudo-operations – something called Operation Forte was on the go in 1984.

When we left off, the convoy of vehicles had headed directly north and were heading towards Savate about 50km into Angola.

Colonel Eddie Viljoen led this unusual operation. It was early September 1984 and after crossing the cutline, the convoy stopped north of Katwitwi on the road to Savate.

At first light the following day, Sergeant Nortje climbed aboard a Buffel with 4 soldiers and drove off to a UNITA base 15 kilometers away to pick up a guide. But UNITA gave the sergeant a less than cordial welcome. They were detained as UNITA guards could not believe that they weren’t FAPLA because the South Africans had arrived from the north.

In early November the leader group was summoned to Eddie Viljoen’s tent.

The time had come he said, to be circumcised.

And just to show true leadership, Viljoen said he’d go under the knife first. A special Forces doctor Lieutenant Piet Coetzee was to carry out the surgery – the first on a South African soldier almost 200 kilometers inside enemy territory.

On the 11th February, a platoon from 32’s Charlie Company was involved in a routine patrol near the Bale River when things went very badly wrong. The company had been warned to make a detour around the area where Echo company had been hit by rocket fire, but the platoon leadership decided to take a short cut.

They marched straight into one of the better protected SWAPO bases on the entire cutline. And they were hopelessly outnumbered.

By the second half of 1984 the Joint Monitoring Commission was virtually on its last legs and the SADF Special Forces were involved in a number of missions both by sea and across the cutline.

The first we’re going to hear about was an the audacious plan to blow up Angolan railway rolling stock, including locomotives at the shunting yard at Lobito in Benguela province on the Atlantic Coast north of the Catumbela Estuary.

If you travel there now it’s a beautiful beach, palm trees sway on the breeze, small fishing boats come and go and the sea is a azure turquoise. Forty years ago it was a crucial hub in the MPLAs infrastructure. After 1974 diesel-electric locomotives were used to ferry heavy weapons and material between Lobito and Huambo to the east on the main route towards Zambia and southern Congo. By 1984 this railway line had been out of operation for at least six years because of UNITAs sabotage, but the movement of war material between Lobito and Huambo was important to FAPLA.

Twenty two of the locomotives were GE U20Cs from the United States, and in 1983, another 12 had made there way there from Brazil. Because the South African Railways used the same locomotives, it meant the Recces could practice on the same machines.

Back in South Africa, the ANCs unofficial internal ally the United Democratic Front had been formed, and protests in the country’s black townships had exploded in violence. PW Botha’s government was now convinced that only a military option could save the country from the ANC, and the security forces were expanding their power. They also feared that if Namibia achieved independence, SWAPO would support the ANC from next door. It was at this time that 32 Company received an interesting set of orders.

The JMC initiative I’ve covered was floundering and it was evident that SWAPO was capitalizing on the agreement negotiated by Pretoria and Luanda to infiltrate what was supposed to be a Free Zone in southern Angola – free of armed insurgents.

As there was no obvious way to deal with this openly, Pretoria launched a series of clandestine steps to stop SWAPO from re-establishing themselves in FAPLAs areas.

This meant 32 Battalion would now dress and operate like UNITA, under a new banner called 154 Battalion. Major Jan Hougaard who was 2 IC in 32 was tasked along with Commandant Johan Schutte of Military Intelligence to setup this new initiative.

It’s 1984 and the special forces have been busy as you heard in the last episode. The waterborne operations were on the go, but so too were ops into southern Angola with 32 Battalion changing its colours so to speak. They began to patrol the area dressed in SWAPO uniforms, so much for the SADF’s promise to adhere to the terms of a Joint Monitoring Commission where they’d promised to pull all their forces out of the region.

It became a game of cat and mouse between the SADF and FAPLA about who’d be tripped up in the lying game first. The special Forces were increasing what were known as pseudo operations – which the Selous Scots had used to great effect during the Rhodesian Bush War, or the Zimbabwean War for independence depending on your political position.

A large number of the Scouts had made their way south to join the SADF and were now integrated in different units. By August 1984 SWAPO had declared the far east of Ovamboland as a liberated area, with the cadres roaming around the bush and villages freely, visiting kraals and receiving food and support from the locals.

They also collected intelligence from the villagers, and the SADF’s hearts and minds campaign which elements of 32 had tried so hard to initiate had failed. The Recces had a new role to play here.

The vegetation in this part of the border is extremely dense, with large thickets of acacia thorn trees, and the going was hard. The sand is soft in most places along the rivers, but this also made it far easier to track SWAPO when they crossed the cutline. But what’s good for the goose is good for the gander – SWAPO could also track the special forces.

Further west, the SADF had setup a special forces area in Ondangwa called Fort Rev, where the pseudo-operations concept was being fully exploited. It was a secret base alongside Ondangwa Air Force Base, and was full of ex-SWAPO soldiers.

These men were known as masters of the bush, despite what the SADF soldier thought about them. The Recces had a completely different view of their enemy and were now working with dozens of SWAPO who’d switched sides. These men knew the area intimately and could speak the local dialects. They were smuggled in an out of this secret base for obvious reasons.

By September 1984 and the Soviets had just taken over command in Angola from the Cubans, shocked into action by FAPLAs defeat during Operation Askari.

The Soviets wanted to start a series of large-scaled offensives with all the firepower at their disposal to crush UNITA in the east. The Cubans preferred the Chinese way, the Vietkong way, to adopt a classic counterinsurgency approach. The Russians began to taunt the Cubans for failing to stand up and fight, always darting about, and avoiding full-scale clashes with the South Africans.

Moscow was going to deploy their new air support systems in two phases. Firstly they would support the MPLA more closely, perhaps even using ground support, and second, they would increase air support in Zambia, Zimbabwe and Mocambique.

This is episode 75 and we’re covering events in 1984 where various issues had arisen. The South Africans and the Angolans had been jointly patrolling southern Angola in what was supposed to be the preamble to peace in Namibia.

But the Joint Monitoring process had failed by July 1984 with SWAPO continuing to occupy the southern region of Angola, and the South Africans continuing to supply UNITA.

This JMC process was always doomed some say, but at the start there were signs that FAPLA and the SADF could work together.

Unfortunately for the many hundreds who were still to die, that good faith faded away rapidly and there was no chance of a proper cease fire. While the JMC continued operating in name, on the ground things were going from bad to worse. Eventually the whole exercise would be terminated in mid-1985, but before we get there it’s important to focus on special operations of 1984.

You heard how the SADF special forces, specifically the Recces, had been tasked with disrupting Angolan maritime resources and last episode we covered what happened during Operation Bouganvilia earlier in 1984.

The next op was called Nobilis where seaborne operators were going to try and and blow up the ASO 2 Missile boats the Angolan navy had secured from the Russians.

Earlier in the war, the SA Navy was somewhat scathing of the Angolan capacity, but everything changed when the OSA 2 missile boats arrived in 1982. They added a new and more deadly dimension to Luanda’s capacity. By late 1983 there were six of these vessels deployed to ports like Soyo, Lobito and Mocamedes and Luanda.

Eventually, 4 Recce was given the project to sink three OSA missile boats inside Luanda harbour during the dark moon period at the end of July 1984.

It was important to allow UNITA to claim the attack, so the mines were going to be attached to these ships at only 1 to 1.5 meters below the surface. The South Africans used sophisticated underwater breathing systems allowing them to approach much deeper, so they hoped the shallow attachment of the mines would convince the Russians and the Angolans that it was the rebel movement and not the SA special Forces.

We just finished hearing about Operation Askari, and a quick note. I said that the Eland armoured would no longer be used for cross -border operations after Askari, but that’s incorrect. A listener who was on board an Eland much later in 1987 explained how he was part of an operation called Firewood, where the Eland was used to head across the cutline once more.

Apologies for that, and thanks Ian for the correction.

FAPLA and the SADF were conducting patrols together as part of the Joint Monitoring Commission or JMC setup after the signing of the Lusaka Agreement in February 1984 – a precursor to a full cease fire.

The reality was neither the South Africans nor the Angolans were going to adhere to the agreement terms

Pretoria continued to support UNITA, while FAPLA after an intial period of seemingly trying to impose discipline on SWAPO, gave up and allowed their PLAN fighters to continue infiltrating Ovambao.

SWAPO mortared the JMC joint patrols a number of times and firefights had developed through March so I’m sure some of the Angolan soldiers were feeling just a tad schizophrenic.

Still, the main JMC officials – both the South Africans and the Angolans – gave the impression to each that they were attempting to make this whole cease-fire known as the Lusaka Agreement work.

While the SADF and FAPLA were trying to find themselves, the Recces hadn’t stopped special operations. In early 1984 and despite discussing land-based cease-fires, the SADF continued to focus on seaborne ops. Their specops operators, the Special Forces were instructed to investigate the destruction of the main water plant supplying the Angolan capital Luanda. This facility was on the south bank of the Bengo River at Quifangonda - Operation Bouganvilia was born.