(PUBLICATION BAN IN CASE)

The complainant was intoxicated, and eventually passed out or fell asleep in the respondent’s bedroom. She testified that she woke up to find the respondent on top of her with his penis inside her vagina. The respondent denied having sex with the complainant. The respondent was convicted of sexual assault. The Court of Appeal allowed the respondent’s appeal, set aside the conviction, and ordered a new trial.

Argued Date

2023-05-18

Keywords

Criminal law - Trial - Criminal law — Trial — Judgments — Sexual assault — Whether the Court of Appeal erred in concluding that the trial judge relied on speculative reasoning in accepting the complainant’s evidence — Whether there was no merit to the respondent’s alternate argument regarding alleged misapprehensions of evidence, and the appropriate remedy was to restore the conviction.

Notes

(British Columbia) (Criminal) (By Leave) (Publication ban in case)

Disclaimers

This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

(PUBLICATION BAN IN CASE)

An accused was charged with several offences. Before the jury selection process began, a ban on publication was imposed on all pre-trial applications in the proceedings pursuant to s. 648(1) of the Criminal Code. A consortium of major media outlets applied to have the ban clarified and declared applicable only after the jury is empaneled. The motion judge dismissed the application.

Argued Date

2023-05-17

Keywords

Criminal law - Publication bans - Criminal law — Publication bans — Whether a publication ban pursuant to s. 648 of the Criminal Code applies to proceedings before a jury is empaneled?

Notes

(British Columbia) (Criminal) (By Leave)

Disclaimers

This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

(CERTAIN INFORMATION NOT AVAILABLE TO THE PUBLIC)

The respondent Frédérick Silva was charged with four counts of murder and one count of attempted murder based on incidents that occurred on February 21, 2017, and December 20, 2018. On November 22, 2019, the prosecution laid five charges by direct indictment. On August 2 and October 15, 2021, respectively, the Superior Court dismissed Mr. Silva’s motion for a stay of proceedings and Garofoli motion. It also made orders under s. 648(1) of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 (Cr. C.), prohibiting publication, broadcasting and transmission in relation to the two judgments. Further to those judgments, and by consent of the parties, Mr. Silva was tried by a judge alone, without a jury, on four of the five counts. On November 16, 2021, he formally recognized that the prosecution had discharged its burden on each essential element of the four offences through a nolo contendere proceeding. On January 27, 2022, Mr. Silva was convicted on the four counts. The parties agreed that the last count, which was for second degree murder, would be separated from the indictment and that Mr. Silva would have a trial by judge and jury on that count in May 2022. Before the trial began, La Presse brought a motion to lift the orders prohibiting publication, broadcasting and transmission in relation to the two judgments. On March 11, 2022, the Superior Court dismissed the motion. On May 6, 2022, Mr. Silva filed a nolo contendere proceeding on the last count, leading to the cancellation of the jury trial.

Argued Date

2023-05-16

Keywords

Criminal law - Publication bans - Criminal law ? Publication ban ? Orders prohibiting publication, broadcasting and transmission in relation to judgments on voir dire ? Whether s. 648 of Criminal Code applies prior to jury selection ? Whether Superior Court erred in applying Dagenais/Mentuck test ? Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 648.

Notes

(Quebec) (Criminal) (By Leave)

Disclaimers

This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The appellant, George Zacharias, was convicted under s. 5(2) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, S.C. 1996, c. 19, for possession of 101.5 pounds of cannabis for the purpose of trafficking. The main issue at trial was whether Cst. MacPhail, who conducted a traffic stop of Mr. Zacharias’ truck, had reasonable suspicion to enter into an investigative detention and deploy a sniffer dog. The trial judge found that the initial investigative detention and the sniffer dog search were unlawful and breached the ss. 8 and 9 Charter rights of Mr. Zacharias to be free from unreasonable search and arbitrary detention. Applying the test in R. v. Grant, 2009 SCC 32, the trial judge then found that the first two factors did not strongly favour exclusion of the evidence and that the third one favoured inclusion. The evidence was therefore admitted.

A majority of the Court of Appeal dismissed Mr. Zacharias’ appeal, declining to consider his arguments regarding the additional breaches that were neither included in his Charter notice nor argued at trial, as it would have been unfair for an appellate court to make findings of fact of new breach arguments. Further, the majority concluded that while the trial judge did not expressly include the s. 9 Charter breach in her consideration of the second stage of the Grant analysis, her failure to do so did not affect the result. In dissent, Khullar J.A. would have allowed Mr. Zacharias’ appeal, excluded the drug evidence and other evidence seized, set aside the conviction and entered an acquittal. In her view, while there was no reviewable error at the first and third stage of the Grant test, the second Grant factor strongly favoured exclusion of the evidence. The trial judge only considered the exterior search of the vehicle by the sniffer dog, but there were several more Charter breaches. Balancing the three factors together, Khullar J.A. found that admitting the evidence would undermine the reputation of the criminal justice system in the eyes of a reasonable person informed of all the relevant circumstances.

Argued Date

2023-05-15

Keywords

Constitutional law - Canadian charter (Criminal), Arbitrary detention (s. 9), Search and seizure (s. 8), Enforcement (s. 24) - Constitutional Law — Charter of Rights — Arbitrary detention — Search and seizure — Enforcement — Exclusion of evidence — Whether the trial judge properly considered all the relevant Charter-infringing state conduct.

Notes

(Alberta) (Criminal) (As of Right)

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This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The respondent, the Association des cadres de la Société des casinos du Québec (Association), was formed in 1997 under the Professional Syndicates Act, CQLR, c. S-40. Seventy percent of the operations supervisors assigned to the gaming tables at Casino de Montréal are members of the Association. The supervisors are the fifth level of management and are front-line managers at the appellant employer, Société des casinos du Québec inc. (Société). The Société is a subsidiary of the Société des loteries du Québec responsible for four casinos, including Casino de Montréal. Given that each casino’s operations are divided into three areas — gaming tables, slot machines and poker rooms — the Association’s members make up a majority of the supervisors in all three areas combined. Since its creation, the Association’s goal has been to secure recognition from the employer so that it can represent the supervisors and negotiate their conditions of employment. In November 2009, the Association filed a petition for certification with the Commission des relations du travail (which in 2016 became the Administrative Labour Tribunal (ALT)) under ss. 25 et seq. of the Labour Code, CQLR, c. C-27. The filing of that petition allegedly arose out of numerous failed attempts by the parties to negotiate changes to a memorandum of understanding entered into in 2001. In the petition, the Association also asked that the exclusion of managers from the definition of “employee” in s. 1(l)(1) of the Labour Code be declared constitutionally inoperable against the Association and its members on the ground that the provision infringed the freedom of association guaranteed in s. 2(d) of the Canadian Charter and s. 3 of the Charter of human rights and freedoms, CQLR, c. C-12 (Quebec Charter). The ALT declared that s. 1(l)(1) infringed the freedom of association guaranteed by the two charters to the persons covered by the Association’s petition for certification and that the section was of no force or effect in the context of the petition.

The Superior Court allowed the application for judicial review filed by the Société, and the Court of Appeal allowed the Association’s appeal.

Argued Date

2023-04-20

Keywords

Canadian charter (Non-criminal) - Freedom of association, Labour relations, Certification - Charters of Rights - Freedom of association - Labour relations - Certification - Association of managers - Casino - Definition of employee in Labour Code of province of Quebec - Whether s. 1(l)(1) of Labour Code infringes s. 2(d) of Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and s. 3 of Charter of human rights and freedoms, CQLR, c. C-12 (Quebec Charter) - If so, whether infringement constitutes reasonable limit prescribed by law that can be demonstrably justified in free and democratic society within meaning of s. 1 of Canadian Charter and s. 9.1 of Quebec Charter - Whether reviewing court must defer to administrative tribunal’s findings of mixed fact and law where constitutional validity of statute is challenged - Labour Code, CQLR, c. C-27, s. 1(l)(1) - Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, ss. 1, 2(d) - Charter of human rights and freedoms, CQLR, c. C-12, ss. 3, 9.1.

Notes

(Quebec) (Civil) (By Leave)

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This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

(PUBLICATION BAN IN CASE)

The respondent pleaded guilty to a charge of sexual interference committed against a minor under the age of 16 between August 1, 2013 and July 19, 2015. During that period, he and the complainant had full sexual intercourse four times. He also pleaded guilty to a charge of child luring arising from interaction with the complainant on social media between February 25 and September 13, 2015. The trial judge sentenced the respondent to imprisonment for 10 months on the count of sexual interference and for 5 months concurrent on the count of child luring. She also found that the mandatory minimum sentence of one year of imprisonment provided for in s. 172.1(2)(a) Cr. C. for the offence of child luring was disproportionate in view of the circumstances in which it had been committed in this case and the respondent’s own circumstances, and that it was therefore contrary to s. 12 of the Charter. As a result, she declared it to be of no force or effect with respect to the respondent. The majority of the Quebec Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal from the sentence of imprisonment for child luring and from the declaration that the minimum sentence was of no force or effect. Levesque J.A., dissenting, would have allowed the appeal, increased the sentence for child luring from 5 to 12 months and set aside the declaration that the minimum sentence was of no force or effect.

Argued Date

2023-02-15

Keywords

Canadian charter (Criminal) - Criminal law, Sentencing - Charter of Rights — Criminal law — Sentencing — Mandatory minimum sentence — Whether majority of Court of Appeal erred in law in downplaying gravity of offence of child luring based on considerations not relevant for sentencing purposes — Whether majority erred in law in finding that once underlying offence (in this case sexual interference) has been committed, subsequent interaction is less serious, even though it has same objective — Whether s. 172.1(2)(a) Cr. C. is contrary to s. 12 of Charter — If so, whether it is appropriate and reasonable limit prescribed by law that can be demonstrably justified in free and democratic society in accordance with s. 1 of Charter — Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 172.1(2)(a).

Notes

(Quebec) (Criminal) (By Leave) (Publication ban in case)

Disclaimers

This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

On December 24, 2015, the appellant was charged with crimes relating to the shooting of two individuals. The appellant’s jury trial for second degree murder, attempted murder and assorted firearm charges was scheduled to commence on November 5, 2018. However, it was adjourned to October 28, 2019. The appellant applied for a stay of proceedings for violation of his right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter. The trial judge dismissed his application holding that, although the net delay exceeded the ceiling of 30 months under Jordan, it was justified because this was a transitional case where the transitional exceptional circumstance applied. The appellant was acquitted of second degree murder and convicted of manslaughter in connection with the victim who died. He was acquitted of attempted murder but convicted of discharging a firearm with intent to wound in connection with the second victim and of possession of a restricted firearm without a license. The appellant appealed the convictions and alleged that the trial judge erred in dismissing the s. 11(b) application and in his instructions to the jury on how they should approach the evidence in this case. The majority of the Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal. It found that the delay was justified by the transitional exceptional circumstance and that the trial judge’s assessment of the entire delay under the Morin framework was required as part of the transitional exceptional circumstance analysis. Further, the majority concluded that the impugned passages of the jury charge did not reveal error. Nordheimer J.A., dissenting, would have allowed the appeal, set aside the convictions, and ordered a stay of proceedings. He found that the trial judge erred on his reliance of the transitional exceptional circumstance to excuse the delay and that the Crown had ample time to adapt to the Jordan framework. Moreover, he found that there was a serious error in the trial judge’s instructions to the jury.

Argued Date

2023-04-17

Keywords

Canadian charter (Criminal) - Criminal law, Right to be tried within a reasonable time (s. 11(b)), Charge to jury - Charter of Rights — Criminal law — Trial delay — Right to be tried within a reasonable time — Transitional exceptional circumstance — Charge to jury — Whether the trial judge erred by concluding that the transitional exceptional circumstance justified the presumptively unreasonable delay in the appellant’s trial — Whether the trial judge misdirected the jury with respect to the presumption of innocence and burden of proof — Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s. 11(b).

Notes

(Ontario) (Criminal) (As of Right)

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This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The Government of Alberta sought the Court of Appeal of Alberta’s opinion on the constitutionality of the Impact Assessment Act, S.C. 2019, c. 28, s. 1 (“IAA”) (found in Part 1 of Bill C 69, entitled An Act to enact the Impact Assessment Act and the Canadian Energy Regulator Act, to amend the Navigation Protection Act and to make consequential amendments to other Acts, S.C. 2019, c. 28) and one of its associated regulations, the Physical Activities Regulations, SOR/2019 285 (“Regulations”). The questions posed via Order in Council 160/2019 were as follows:

1. Is Part 1 of An Act to enact the Impact Assessment Act and the Canadian Energy Regulator Act, to amend the Navigation Protection Act and to make consequential amendments to other Acts, S.C. 2019, c. 28, unconstitutional in whole or in part, as being beyond the legislative authority of the Parliament of Canada under the Constitution of Canada?

2. Is the Physical Activities Regulations, SOR/2019 285, unconstitutional in whole or in part by virtue of purporting to apply to certain activities listed in Schedule 2 thereof that relate to matters entirely within the legislative authority of the Provinces under the Constitution of Canada?

The majority of the Court of Appeal of Alberta was of the opinion that the IAA is ultra vires Parliament, and that the IAA and Regulations are unconstitutional. Greckol J.A., dissenting, was of the opinion that the IAA and Regulations are a valid exercise of Parliament’s authority to legislate on the matter of the environment.

Argued Date

2023-03-22

Keywords

Constitutional law - Division of powers, Environmental law - Constitutional law — Division of powers — Environment — Whether Part 1 of An Act to enact the Impact Assessment Act and the Canadian Energy Regulator Act, to amend the Navigation Protection Act and to make consequential amendments to other Acts, S.C. 2019, c. 28 (“IAA”), is intra vires the legislative authority of the Parliament of Canada under the Constitution Act, 1867 — Whether the Physical Activities Regulations, SOR/2019 285 (“Regulations”), are intra vires the legislative authority of the Parliament of Canada under the Constitution Act, 1867 — Whether the Court of Appeal of Alberta erred in its characterization of the pith and substance of the IAA and Regulations — Whether the Court of Appeal of Alberta erred in its classification of the IAA and Regulations — Whether the Court of Appeal of Alberta erred in its application of the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity to disapply the IAA and Regulations.

Notes

(Alberta) (Civil) (As of Right)

Disclaimers

This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The Government of Alberta sought the Court of Appeal of Alberta’s opinion on the constitutionality of the Impact Assessment Act, S.C. 2019, c. 28, s. 1 (“IAA”) (found in Part 1 of Bill C 69, entitled An Act to enact the Impact Assessment Act and the Canadian Energy Regulator Act, to amend the Navigation Protection Act and to make consequential amendments to other Acts, S.C. 2019, c. 28) and one of its associated regulations, the Physical Activities Regulations, SOR/2019 285 (“Regulations”). The questions posed via Order in Council 160/2019 were as follows:

1. Is Part 1 of An Act to enact the Impact Assessment Act and the Canadian Energy Regulator Act, to amend the Navigation Protection Act and to make consequential amendments to other Acts, S.C. 2019, c. 28, unconstitutional in whole or in part, as being beyond the legislative authority of the Parliament of Canada under the Constitution of Canada?

2. Is the Physical Activities Regulations, SOR/2019 285, unconstitutional in whole or in part by virtue of purporting to apply to certain activities listed in Schedule 2 thereof that relate to matters entirely within the legislative authority of the Provinces under the Constitution of Canada?

The majority of the Court of Appeal of Alberta was of the opinion that the IAA is ultra vires Parliament, and that the IAA and Regulations are unconstitutional. Greckol J.A., dissenting, was of the opinion that the IAA and Regulations are a valid exercise of Parliament’s authority to legislate on the matter of the environment.

Argued Date

2023-03-21

Keywords

Constitutional law - Division of powers, Environmental law - Constitutional law — Division of powers — Environment — Whether Part 1 of An Act to enact the Impact Assessment Act and the Canadian Energy Regulator Act, to amend the Navigation Protection Act and to make consequential amendments to other Acts, S.C. 2019, c. 28 (“IAA”), is intra vires the legislative authority of the Parliament of Canada under the Constitution Act, 1867 — Whether the Physical Activities Regulations, SOR/2019 285 (“Regulations”), are intra vires the legislative authority of the Parliament of Canada under the Constitution Act, 1867 — Whether the Court of Appeal of Alberta erred in its characterization of the pith and substance of the IAA and Regulations — Whether the Court of Appeal of Alberta erred in its classification of the IAA and Regulations — Whether the Court of Appeal of Alberta erred in its application of the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity to disapply the IAA and Regulations.

Notes

(Alberta) (Civil) (As of Right)

Disclaimers

This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

(PUBLICATION BAN)

The respondent was convicted of sexual assault and sexual interference, two offences perpetrated on the complainant when she was between six and eight years old. The convictions were based on the complainant’s unsworn, videotaped police statement, which the trial judge admitted into evidence by application of the principled exception to the hearsay rule, based on the requirements of necessity and threshold reliability. A majority of the Court of Appeal allowed the respondent’s appeal, set aside the conviction and entered an acquittal, concluding that the trial judge erred in law by admitting the out-of-court statement into evidence. MacPherson J.A., dissenting, would have dismissed the appeal from conviction.

Argued Date

2023-01-10

Keywords

Criminal law - Evidence, Admissibility, Hearsay - Criminal law – Evidence – Admissibility – Hearsay – Videotaped out-of-court statement given by complainant – Whether the majority of the Court of Appeal erred in law in finding that the trial judge erred in admitting the complainant’s out-of-court statement by (i) finding that the statement met the requirements of threshold reliability; and (ii) finding that the complainant had no motive to fabricate the allegations.

Notes

(Ontario) (Criminal) (As of Right) (Publication ban in case)

Disclaimers

This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).