Supreme Court of Canada Hearings (English Audio)

Appellant Daniel Hodgson was charged with second-degree murder following a death at a house party. The victim, a large man, had become aggressive towards the house owner and refused to leave. Mr. Hodgson, who had been sleeping in a nearby bedroom, was asked by a guest to help remove the victim from the house. The victim died after Mr. Hodgson applied a one-arm choke hold on him.

Mr. Hodgson was acquitted at trial. The trial judge had a reasonable doubt as to whether Mr. Hodgson had the requisite intent for murder. On the lesser included offence of manslaughter, the trial judge concluded that the Crown had not proven beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Hodgson did not act in self-defence pursuant to s. 34 of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. The Court of Appeal set aside the acquittal and ordered a new trial.

Argued Date

2024-02-15

Keywords

Criminal Law — Defences — Self-Defence — Appellant charged with second-degree murder following an altercation at party — Trial judge finding no intent to murder, and Crown failing to disprove self-defence on the lesser included offence of manslaughter — Appellant acquitted — Court of Appeal setting aside acquittal and ordering new trial — Whether Court of Appeal exceeded its jurisdiction in concluding that the trial judge’s failure to infer intent for murder was a reviewable legal error — Whether the Court of Appeal erred in concluding that the trial judge was required to infer the intent for murder — Whether the Court of Appeal erred in concluding that the trial judge erroneously approached the issue of the reasonableness of the Appellant’s response from a purely subjective perspective — Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 34.

Notes

(Nunavut) (Criminal) (By Leave)

Language

English Audio

Disclaimers

This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

(Publication ban in case)

In the Court Martial, a military judge acquitted the respondent, Private D.T. Vu, of sexual assault under s. 130 of the National Defence Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. N-5 (“NDA”), that is to say, s. 271 of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. It is alleged that the respondent performed a sex act on the complainant who was incapable of consenting to the act by reason of advanced intoxication. The judge concluded that the Crown did not prove part of the actus reus (being a lack of subjective consent) beyond a reasonable doubt.

The appellant Crown appealed to the Court Martial Appeal Court. It submitted that the military judge erred in finding that the prosecution failed to prove a lack of consent or capacity to consent. Its submission rested on the proposition recognized in R. v. J.M.H., 2011 SCC 45, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 197, that the judge committed a legal error by failing to consider the entirety and cumulative effect of the evidence in reaching his conclusion on the issue. A majority of the appeal court (per Bell C.J. and Trotter J.A.) dismissed the appeal. It held the military judge did not err in law in his analysis leading to the respondent’s acquittal. Any findings the military judge made that the majority took issue with were held to have no bearing on the verdict reached. The majority further held that in the event it was incorrect on this point, it would rely upon s. 241 of the NDA, which states that “[n]otwithstanding anything in this Division, the Court Martial Appeal Court may disallow an appeal if, in the opinion of the Court, to be expressed in writing, there has been no substantial miscarriage of justice”. In dissent, McVeigh J.A. would have allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial. In her view, the military judge erred in law by failing to consider all of the evidence cumulatively, which led him to speculate improperly about alternative theories. These errors might have reasonably had a material bearing on the verdict. Further, the military judge erred by relying on improper inferences which, in effect, amounted to an insistence that the complainant’s intoxication had to be corroborated beyond the available evidence in this case.

Argued Date

2024-01-16

Keywords

Criminal law — Armed forces — Military Offences —Sexual Assault — Evidence — Whether the military judge failed to consider all of the evidence cumulatively — Whether the military judge assessed the evidence based on the wrong legal principles.

Notes

(Federal) (Criminal) (As of Right) (Publication ban in case)

Language

English Audio

Disclaimers

This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

After a trial in the Court of Québec, the appellant, Yves Caleb Jr. Charles, was convicted of assault with a weapon, using an imitation firearm in the commission of assault, and uttering threats. During the trial, a prosecution witness refused to cooperate, and the trial judge allowed the prosecution to introduce an out of court statement made by the witness into evidence as hearsay. In the judge’s view, the statement had features of substantive reliability in light of the corroborative evidence and the circumstances in which the statement had been made. The Court of Appeal, for the reasons of Doyon and Cournoyer JJ.A., dismissed the accused’s appeal. Bachand J.A., dissenting, would have allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, as he was of the view that the out of court statement in issue did not satisfy the threshold reliability requirement for being admitted into evidence. He found that the corroborative evidence was not relevant in analyzing the threshold reliability of the assertion made by the witness concerning the appellant’s conduct and words, and that the circumstances in which the statement had been made did not provide sufficient guarantees of substantive reliability.

Argued Date

2024-01-18

Keywords

Criminal law — Evidence — Admissibility — Hearsay — Out-of-court statement — Corroborative evidence — Circumstances in which statement made — Whether results of search were considered as corroborative evidence, in accordance with principles enunciated in R. v. Bradshaw, 2017 SCC 35, for purpose of admitting K.A.’s statement into evidence — Whether circumstances of K.A.’s statement provided sufficient guarantees of substantive reliability.

Notes

(Quebec) (Criminal) (As of Right)

Language

English Audio

Disclaimers

This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

(PUBLICATION BAN IN CASE) (SEALING ORDER) (CERTAIN INFORMATION NOT AVAILABLE TO THE PUBLIC)

On March 23, 2022, the Quebec Court of Appeal issued a redacted version of its reasons, which it had originally delivered on February 28, 2022, allowing the respondent Named Person’s conviction appeal and staying the criminal proceedings brought against Named Person, a police informer. The trial judgment under appeal had not been made public, and all the details of the proceedings, which were held in camera, were unknown to the public. The Court of Appeal ordered that the original version of its judgment and all information in its record be sealed.

After the Court of Appeal issued the redacted judgment, the media appellants filed a motion to have the confidentiality orders concerning the appeal record and the trial record lifted in whole or in part. The appellant the Attorney General of Quebec filed a motion to vary the sealing order applicable to the appeal record. The Court of Appeal dismissed the motions.

Argued Date

2023-12-12

Keywords

Criminal law - Canadian charter (Criminal), Procedure - Criminal law — Charter of Rights — Procedure — Informer privilege — Order that proceedings be held in camera and sealing order — Whether trial judge can proceed outside justice system, completely and totally in camera, without putting together record or revealing very existence of court proceedings, contrary to open court principle protected by s. 2(b) of Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms — Whether, even though police informer privilege is absolute, its unrestrained interpretation may displace constitutional principle of open court proceedings, as Court of Appeal suggested — In addition to identity and list of information that would automatically identify informer, for which there is absolute protection, what test and framework should apply to permit adversarial proceeding in order to decide what other information might identify police informer — When determining facts that may be published while still protecting police informer’s identity, whether judge who hears application should order that interested third parties be notified and have opportunity to be heard on these matters — Whether Court of Appeal erred in refusing to partially unseal its record on ground that this exercise seemed unworkable.

Notes

(Quebec) (Criminal) (By Leave) (Publication ban in case) (Sealing order) (Certain information not available to the public)

Language

English Audio

Disclaimers

This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

Respondent Joseph Power was convicted of two criminal offences in the 1990s. He served a term of imprisonment.

In 2010 Mr. Power made inquiries about the process to obtain a pardon, but did not apply for one.

In 2011, Mr. Power’s employer learned of his criminal record. He was suspended from work.

Mr. Power applied for a pardon — now called a record suspension — in 2013 in order to continue working in his chosen field. However, two enactments since 2010 — the Limiting Pardons for Serious Crimes Act and the Safe Streets and Communities Act — had amended the Criminal Records Act. Transitional provisions in both of the amending acts gave them retrospective application to offences that had occurred before their coming into force. The combined effect of these enactments and their transitional provisions was to render Mr. Power permanently ineligible for a record suspension.

Mr. Power lost his job and became ineligible for membership with provincial bodies governing his field of employment.

The transitional provisions of both the Limiting Pardons for Serious Crimes Act and the Safe Streets and Communities Act, which gave them retrospective application to offences committed prior to their enactment, were later declared unconstitutional.

Mr. Power brought an action against the Crown, alleging that the adoption and application of the transitional provisions constituted conduct that was clearly wrong, undertaken in bad faith, and abusive of government power. He sought damages pursuant to s. 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

Prior to trial, the appellant Attorney General of Canada sought a determination of questions of law, concerning whether the Crown could ever be held liable in damages in respect of the enactment of legislation that is later declared unconstitutional.

The Court of Appeal of New Brunswick upheld the application judge’s determination of those questions, and dismissed the Attorney General’s appeal.

Argued Date

2023-12-07

Keywords

Constitutional law - Charter of Rights, Remedy (s. 24), Damages - Constitutional law — Charter of Rights — Remedy (s. 24) — Damages — Respondent convicted of criminal offences prior to certain amendments to regime for obtaining pardons, but transitional provisions applied the amendments retrospectively — Respondent seeking pardon after employer learned of criminal record, but amendments rendered respondent permanently ineligible for a pardon — Respondent losing his employment — Respondent seeking damages after transitional provisions declared unconstitutional — Whether the Crown may be held liable in damages for government officials and Ministers preparing and drafting legislation that is later declared unconstitutional — Whether the Crown may be held liable in damages for Parliament enacting legislation that is later declared unconstitutional — Limiting Pardons for Serious Crimes Act, S.C. 2010, c. 5 — Safe Streets and Communities Act, S.C. 2012, c. 1 — Criminal Records Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-47.

Notes

(New Brunswick) (Civil) (By Leave)

Language

English Audio

Disclaimers

This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The respondent, British Columbia Securities Commission found that the appellants, Thalbinder Singh Poonian and Shailu Poonian, breached the Securities Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 418, by engaging in conduct that resulted in the misleading appearance of trading activity in, or an artificial price for, a corporation’s shares. It then imposed both a disgorgement order and an administrative penalty against the Poonians.

The Commission applied to the BCSC for an order declaring that the amounts owed to it by the Poonians were debts that would not be released by an order of discharge under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act. The BCSC granted the Commission’s application. It concluded that the debts fell within two exemptions to the discharge of debts outlined at s. 178(1) of the BIA: the debts were fines, penalties or restitution orders imposed by a court (s. 178(1)(a)) and they resulted from obtaining property or services by false pretences or fraudulent misrepresentation (s. 178(1)(e)). The Court of Appeal for British Columbia dismissed the appeal. While it disagreed that the sanctions had been imposed by a court, it concluded that the BCSC had not erred in finding that the sanctions in this case fell within the exemption defined in s. 178(1)(e) of the BIA. The fact that the misrepresentation was not made to the creditor, in this case, the Commission, did not preclude the Commission from relying on the exemption.

Argued Date

2023-12-06

Keywords

Bankruptcy and insolvency - Securities - Bankruptcy and Insolvency — Debts not released by discharge — Securities Commission finding appellants breached Securities Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 418, and imposing disgorgement order and administrative penalties — Courts below granting declaration that amounts appellants owe Securities Commission are not to be released by any order or discharge granted under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act — Whether Court of Appeal erred in finding Commission’s administrative monetary penalties and disgorgement orders survived Poonian’s discharge from bankruptcy — If so, whether Court of Appeal erred in finding creditors seeking to avail themselves of s. 178(1)(e) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act did not have to prove they were same party debtor made direct representations to by fraud or fraudulent pretense — Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3, s. 178(1).

Notes

(British Columbia) (Civil) (By Leave)

Language

English Audio

Disclaimers

This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The appellant, John Aquino, was the directing mind of Bondfield Construction Company Limited (“BCCL”) and its affiliate, 1033803 Ontario Inc., commonly known as Forma-Con (“debtor companies”). He and the other appellants carried out a false invoicing scheme over a number of years by which they siphoned off tens of millions of dollars from both debtor companies. The respondents challenged the false invoicing scheme and sought to recover some of the money under s. 96 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act and s. 36.1 of the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36. They asserted that the false invoicing scheme was implemented by means of transfers at undervalue by which Mr. Aquino and the debtor companies intended to defraud, defeat or delay a creditor. The appellants asserted that the principles of the common law doctrine of corporate attribution set out in Canadian Dredge & Dock Co. v. The Queen, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 662, did not permit the imputation of Mr. Aquino’s intention to either debtor company. The application judge imputed the fraudulent intention of Mr. Aquino to the corporate debtors. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appellants’ appeals.

Argued Date

2023-12-05

Keywords

Bankruptcy and insolvency - Bankruptcy and Insolvency — Doctrine of corporate attribution — Interpretation of requirement that debtor have intent to defraud, defeat or delay creditor, set out in provision of Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act that permits courts to declare transfers at undervalue void — Courts below holding intent requirement met by attributing intent of companies’ directing mind to the corporate debtors — Whether the Court of Appeal was entitled to reframe the common law corporate attribution doctrine, as formulated in Canadian Dredge & Dock Co. v. The Queen, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 662, and its progeny, within the bankruptcy context — Whether the Court of Appeal made an extricable error in law when it upheld the applications judge’s ruling to the effect that the true financial condition of the corporate debtors, at the time of the impugned transactions, was not “determinative” of whether its directing mind, as a matter of fact, had the requisite intent to defraud, defeat or delay the third-party creditors — Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3, s. 96.

Notes

(Ontario) (Civil) (By Leave)

Language

English Audio

Disclaimers

This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

(PUBLICATION BAN IN CASE)

Mr. Tayo Tompouba was charged with sexual assault. On his first appearance, he was not advised of his right to apply for a trial in French, despite the court’s obligation to inform him of that right under s. 530(3) of the Criminal Code. He was convicted following a trial in English. The Court of Appeal acknowledged that not advising Mr. Tayo Tompouba of his right was an error, but it applied the curative proviso to dismiss his appeal. It held that the right provided for in s. 530(3) is a procedural right, not a substantive right.

Argued Date

2023-10-11

Keywords

Criminal law - Trial - Criminal law — Trial — Language of accused — French-speaking accused not advised of his right to be tried in official language of his choice — Whether curative proviso in s. 686 of Criminal Code can apply to violation of s. 530(3) of Criminal Code — Whether new trial must be ordered — Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, ss. 530(3), 686(1)(b).

Notes

(British Columbia) (Criminal) (By Leave) (Publication ban in case)

Language

English Audio

Disclaimers

This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

(PUBLICATION BAN IN CASE)

The appellants are members of the Canadian Armed Forces who had various charges laid against them. They each filed a preliminary application in the Court Martial seeking a stay of proceedings because of an alleged infringement of their constitutional right to be tried by an independent and impartial tribunal guaranteed by s. 11(d) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. They argued that their right was infringed by an order by the Chief of Defence Staff dated October 2, 2019 regarding the designation of a commanding officer for purposes of considering disciplinary matters for military judges (“impugned order”). Captain Crépeau, in her application, also asked the tribunal to declare ss. 12, 18 and 60 of the National Defence Act to be of no force or effect, alleging that their combined effect was to allow the Chief of Defence Staff to issue an order, like the impugned order, relating directly to discipline for military judges and thus to permit the military hierarchy to exert pressure on a military judge presiding at a court martial. In a series of decisions, military judges concluded that there was an infringement of the accused’s right guaranteed by s. 11(d) of the Charter. In each of the proceedings, they made a similar declaration to the effect that the impugned order was an infringement of the right set out in s. 11(d) of the Charter. They also stayed the proceedings under s. 24(1) of the Charter. The Court Martial Appeal Court of Canada allowed the Crown’s appeals, ruling that no informed person would conclude that there was an apprehension of bias or that the independence of courts martial was compromised. It dismissed Captain Crépeau’s cross-appeal.

This appeal will be heard jointly with the appeals in files 39822, 40046, 40065 and 40103.

Argued Date

2023-10-16

Keywords

Canadian charter (Criminal) - Constitutional law, Judicial independence, Armed Forces, Military offences - Charter of Rights — Right to be tried by independent and impartial tribunal — Constitutional law — Judicial independence — Courts martial — Armed forces — Military offences — Since R. v. Généreux, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 259, does the military status of military judges still raise a reasonable apprehension of bias? — Since Généreux, has there been significant societal change which dissipates this Court’s concern that the military status of military judges is a matter of practical necessity? — If so, does the military status of military judges, prescribed under the National Defence Act’s legislative scheme, lead an informed person, viewing the matter realistically and practically, to conclude that there is an apprehension of bias contrary to s. 11(d) of the Charter? — If so, is this violation justified under s. 1 of the Charter? — If not, what is the appropriate constitutional remedy under s. 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982? — Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s. 11(d) — National Defence Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. N-5, s. 165.21(1) .

Notes

(Federal) (Criminal) (By Leave)

Disclaimers

This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

In 1991, Newfoundland and Labrador reorganized its northeast Avalon municipalities, expanding St. John’s boundaries and triggering a new planning process for St. John’s. The Lynch property and others were zoned as “watershed” because they fall within the Broad Cove River Watershed, which feeds St. John’s municipal water supply. In 2011, the Lynches asked the City what sort of residential, agricultural, forestry or public utility uses the property could be put to. They were informed verbally that no development would be permitted. They then applied to develop a ten-lot residential subdivision. In a letter dated February 1, 2013, the City Manager rejected their application as being contrary to ss. 104 and 106 of the City of St. John’s Act and the development regulations which established the watershed zoning.

The municipal water supply had been subject to statutory protection through limits on development since before the Crown Grant in 1917. In 1959, the City of St. John’s Act was amended to add the Broad Cove Watershed to the area within St. John’s control, even though it was not within the city itself. As a result, the Lynch property was subject to St. John’s pollution control and its powers of expropriation, and its use and development were restricted. Residential building was not expressly prohibited until 1964, when St. John’s amended the City of St. John’s Act to prohibit the erection of most buildings in the controlled area unless they were associated with existing private family dwellings. In 1978, these restrictions were softened to allow the City Manager to grant permission to build on the land. In 1992, St. John’s boundaries were expanded to include the Lynch property, so St. John’s general land use zoning applied to the property. The watershed zoning came into effect in 1994, and the resulting management plan, which included keeping St. John’s watersheds “as pristine as possible”, was adopted in 1996.

The Newfoundland and Labrador Court of Appeal held that the City Manager’s decision to prevent any development in any manner, set out in the February 1, 2013, letter, constituted constructive expropriation: Lynch v. St. John’s (City), 2016 NLCA 35, at paras. 66-67 (“Expropriation Decision”). The Court of Appeal remitted the issue of compensation to the Board of Commissioners of Public Utilities. In the course of determining compensation, the Board referred the following question to the Supreme Court of Newfoundland and Labrador under the Expropriation Act, R.S.N.L. 1990, c. E-19, s. 26(3), by special case:

Whether the Lynches’ compensation should be assessed based on the uses permitted by the existing zoning, which are agriculture, forestry and public utility uses, or whether the existing zoning should be ignored and the value determined as if residential development were permissible.

The applications judge granted compensation for constructive expropriation of property based on existing watershed zoning. The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, ordering that compensation be determined without reference to watershed zoning.

Argued Date

2023-11-16

Keywords

Expropriation - Expropriation — Constructive expropriation — Compensation — Causation — How compensation for constructive expropriation should be assessed — Proper causation analysis for determining loss to landowner — Pointe Gourde principle — Whether regulations sufficiently linked to expropriation of property to justify application of Pointe Gourde principle.

Notes

(Newfoundland & Labrador) (Civil) (By Leave)

Disclaimers

This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).