(PUBLICATION BAN IN CASE)

The respondent, T.J.F., was charged with human trafficking and obtaining a financial or material benefit from human trafficking during a period from 2006 through 2011. The trial judge accepted that the respondent had engaged in threats, intimidation and injury towards the complainant; he characterized this as “past discreditable conduct” but not part of the actus reus of the offences alleged. The complainant testimony included evidence of exploitation and attempted exploitation, but the trial judge did not accept the complainant’s evidence due to issues with her credibility. The respondent was acquitted. On appeal by the Crown, a majority of the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal agreed that the trial judge erred in treating the respondent’s violent conduct as “past discreditable conduct,” but it held that the error had no impact on the acquittal because exploitation and attempted exploitation depended upon the complainant’s testimony which the judge did not accept. The appeal was therefore dismissed.

The dissenting judge would have held that the trial judge erred in law by misapprehending critical evidence and also concluded that the Crown would have been able to rely on the evidentiary presumption in s. 279.01(3), which was enacted in 2019. The dissenting judge concluded that there is a reasonable degree of certainty the verdict would not have been the same but for the judge’s error. She would have allowed the appeal, set aside the acquittals and ordered a new trial.

Argued Date

2024-03-27

Keywords

Criminal Law — Offences — Evidence — Trafficking and obtaining financial or material benefit from trafficking — Credibility — Evidentiary presumption — Temporal application — Whether the trial judge’s erroneous characterization of the respondent’s violent conduct as “past discreditable conduct” rather than part of the actus reus raised a reasonable certainty that the verdict would not have been the same but for the error — Whether the evidentiary presumption in section 279.01(3) of the Criminal Code would be triggered in this case — Whether the evidentiary presumption in section 279.01(3) of the Criminal Code would apply retrospectively — Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, ss. 279.01, 279.02, 279.04.

Notes

(Nova Scotia) (Criminal) (As of Right) (Publication ban in case)

Language

English Audio

Disclaimers

This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

After consuming alcohol, Mr. Wolfe drove his vehicle on the wrong side of a divided highway for a considerable distance at night. He caused a head-on collision that seriously injured Mrs. Niazi and killed her husband and daughter. Mr. Wolfe was convicted on two counts of criminally negligent operation of a motor vehicle causing death under s. 220(b) of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, and on one count of criminally negligent operation of a motor vehicle causing bodily harm under s. 221 of the Criminal Code. He was sentenced to three concurrent terms of incarceration with a global term of six years. The sentencing judge additionally ordered a driving prohibition for 10 years for each count of criminal negligence causing death and a driving prohibition for 7 years for the count of criminal negligence causing bodily harm. The Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal from the sentence.

Argued Date

2024-03-26

Keywords

Criminal law — Sentencing — Driving prohibition — Can a driving prohibition be imposed following conviction for criminal negligence causing death through the operation of a conveyance or criminal negligence causing bodily harm through the operation of a conveyance?

Notes

(Saskatchewan) (Criminal) (By Leave)

Language

English Audio

Disclaimers

This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

This case involves a challenge to the validity of regulations adopted by the Agency to compensate air passengers for various delays, losses and inconveniences experienced in the course of international air travel.

Parliament adopted the Transportation Modernization Act, S.C. 2018, c. 10 (“TMA”), which amended the CTA by creating the new s. 86.11. This new provision requires the Agency, after consulting with the Minister of Transport, to make regulations imposing certain obligations on air carriers, notably in relation to flight delays, flight cancellations, denial of boarding, and loss of or damage to baggage.

Pursuant to s. 86.11(2) of the CTA, the Minister issued the Direction Respecting Tarmac Delays of Three Hours or Less, S.O.R./2019-110 (the Direction) requiring the Agency to adopt regulations imposing obligations on air carriers to provide timely information and assistance to passengers in cases of tarmac delays of three hours or less.

Around the same time, the Agency adopted the Regulations, imposing obligations, including liability, on air carriers with respect to tarmac delays, flight cancellations, flight delays, denial of boarding and damage or loss of baggage in the context of domestic and international air travel.

The appellant airlines challenged numerous provisions of the new Regulations on the basis that they exceed the Agency’s authority under the CTA. They claim that the Regulations contravene Canada’s international obligations, in particular the Montreal Convention and many of the Regulations’ provisions are ultra vires because they have impermissible extraterritorial effects, which violate fundamental notions of international law.

These matters went directly to the Federal Court of Appeal. It dismissed the appeal, except with respect to s. 23(2) of the Regulations which it found ultra vires of the CTA (this section deals with liability for temporary loss of baggage).

Argued Date

2024-03-25

Keywords

Transportation law — Air transport — Validity of Air Passenger Protection Regulations, SOR/2019-150 (“Regulations”) adopted by Canadian Transportation Agency (“Agency”) to compensate air passengers for various delays, losses and inconveniences experienced in course of international air travel — Whether liability provisions of Regulations, when applied to international carriage by air, are inconsistent with Canada’s obligations under Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage by Air (“Montreal Convention”), and ultra vires Agency’s regulation-making power under s. 86.11 of Canada Transportation Act, S.C. 1996, c. 10 (“CTA”), and therefore invalid — Whether Federal Court of Appeal erred by deciding that expert evidence on issues of international law is inadmissible as a matter of law, and by striking those parts of appellants’ expert evidence addressing whether “state practice” relied upon by Attorney General of Canada (“AGC”) is “in the application of”, and consistent with Montreal Convention?

Notes

(Federal) (Civil) (By Leave)

Language

English Audio

Disclaimers

This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

Police seized a cellphone during a search incident to the arrest of a known drug dealer. The phone was displaying incoming text messages on its screen. The police believed the messages revealed a transaction for heroin, which would likely be laced with fentanyl, was in progress.

The police impersonated the drug dealer by responding to the text messages, and arranged to have the drugs delivered to the dealer’s residence. Applicant Dwayne Alexander Campbell arrived at the residence and was arrested. Mr. Campbell was charged under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act (CDSA). At trial, Mr. Campbell brought a motion to exclude evidence, claiming that his rights under s. 8 of the Charter had been infringed by the police action in using the dealer’s phone to communicate with him. The trial judge rejected Mr. Campbell’s claim that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the text messages, and concluded that the likelihood that the drugs were laced with fentanyl created exigent circumstances that justified the warrantless use of the drug dealer’s cellphone. Mr. Campbell was convicted and sentenced.

The Court of Appeal held that Mr. Campbell did have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his electronic communications, but that the police action was justified by the exigent circumstances doctrine. Consequently, there was no breach of Mr. Campbell’s s. 8 rights. The Court of Appeal dismissed Mr. Campbell’s appeal.

Argued Date

2024-03-21

Keywords

Charter of Rights — Search and seizure (s. 8) — Enforcement (s. 24) — Exigent circumstances — Police seizing cellphone in search incident to the arrest of a known drug dealer — Incoming text messages from appellant visible on its screen — Police believing messages concerned impending drug deal involving fentanyl — Police impersonating drug dealer, facilitating drug transaction with the appellant via text message — Whether police breached appellant’s s. 8 rights by warrantless use of drug dealer’s cellphone to impersonate drug dealer and engage in electronic conversation with accused — Whether police action justified by exigent circumstances because the police reasonably believed the drug transaction may have involved fentanyl — Whether police breached the appellant’s s. 8 rights by intercepting private communications without authorization — Whether evidence obtained by s. 8 breaches should have been excluded — Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, S.C. 1996, c. 19, s. 11; Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, Part VI

Notes

(Ontario) (Criminal) (By Leave)

Language

English Audio

Disclaimers

This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

Following a trial in the Court of Québec, the appellant, Gabriel Boudreau, was convicted of dangerous driving causing bodily harm as a result of a collision between him and the complainant. On appeal, the appellant argued that the trial judge had erred by finding that he had taken part in a race with another driver, by improperly assessing the complainant’s testimony and by failing to consider some of the evidence. The majority of the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, as it was of the view that the verdict was not unreasonable, illogical or irrational. The trial judge, who had direct evidence on some aspects and circumstantial evidence on others, could convict the appellant of the offence based on that evidence.

The dissenting judge would have allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction and ordered a new trial. In her view, the trial judge had made two errors that undermined the reasonableness of the verdict. She had rejected the testimony on the basis of an illogical inference even though the appellant’s version was consistent with the site of the damage and was confirmed by the complainant’s testimony. In addition, the judge’s finding that the complainant had been driving in the left lane well before the impact was contradicted by the complainant’s testimony.

Argued Date

2024-03-20

Keywords

Criminal law — Appeals — Unreasonable verdict — Evidence — Whether trial judge arrived at unreasonable verdict by drawing illogical inferences and by drawing inferences that were clearly contradicted by evidence.

Notes

(Quebec) (Criminal) (As of Right)

Language

English Audio

Disclaimers

This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The appellant, Trevor Ian James Lindsay, is a constable with the Calgary Police Service. While processing an arrestee, an altercation occurred between the appellant and the arrestee that left the latter with serious injuries. The appellant was charged with aggravated assault under s. 268 of the Criminal Code. At trial, the appellant’s defence included s. 25 of the Criminal Code, which protects peace officers from liability related to their lawful use of force. The trial judge concluded that s. 25 did not protect the appellant from criminal liability for his actions. A majority of the Court of Appeal agreed. However, Wakeling J.A., in dissent, would have held that the trial judge erred in concluding that the prosecution had proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant’s actions constituted an assault, and also that the trial judge erred in concluding that s. 25 did not apply. Wakeling J.A. would have allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial.

Argued Date

2023-12-14

Keywords

Criminal Law — Defences — Use of force by peace officer — Protection of peace officers — Whether the majority of the Court of Appeal of Alberta erred in upholding the trial judge’s decision that s. 25 of the Criminal Code did not protect the appellant from criminal liability — Whether the majority of the Court of the Appeal erred in upholding the trial judge’s decision that the prosecution had proven the elements of aggravated assault beyond a reasonable doubt — Criminal Code, s. 25.

Notes

(Alberta) (Criminal) (As of Right)

Language

English Audio

Disclaimers

This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The appellant engaged in a sexual encounter with two other men in a park. A number of hours later, the body of one of those men was found in the park; he had died due to external neck compression. The appellant had mental health difficulties and had consumed both psychiatric medication and alcohol around the time he was in the park with the victim and the third man. The appellant had made several statements both before and after the victim’s death that he wanted to harm and kill gay men, and that he had at times carried a rope and a knife to do so. In the days following the killing, the appellant searched the internet for news with respect to the discovery of a body in the park.

A jury found the appellant guilty of first-degree murder. A majority of the Court of Appeal dismissed his appeal and held that the trial judge’s instructions to the jury had been appropriate. In dissent, Nordheimer J.A. would have allowed the appeal on two grounds: (1) that the trial judge failed to instruct the jury on the appellant’s mental health as it relates to the intent required for murder and (2) that the trial judge failed to provide a limiting instruction on the use of after-the-fact conduct evidence. Nordheimer J.A. would have ordered a new trial.

Argued Date

2023-12-15

Keywords

Criminal law — Charge to jury — Non-direction amounting to misdirection — Need to review mental health evidence with jury — Need to include limiting instruction for after-the-fact conduct evidence — Whether Court of Appeal erred by holding that trial judge did not err in not relating mental health evidence to intent required for murder — Whether the Court of Appeal erred by holding that the trial judge did not err in not providing a limiting instruction for after-the-fact conduct evidence

Notes

(Ontario) (Criminal) (As of Right)

Language

English Audio

Disclaimers

This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

(PUBLICATION BAN IN CASE)

The appellant, a police officer, was temporarily off work because of medical problems. During a meeting with a physician-arbitrator who was to determine whether his disability was permanent, the appellant misrepresented his work activities with his former spouse’s travel agencies. The physician-arbitrator found that his disability was permanent, and the appellant was therefore entitled to permanent disability benefits from his employer. The employer knew of some of the appellant’s work activities but did not tell the physician-arbitrator about them.

The trial judge found that all the elements of the offence of fraud over $5,000 had been established. The appellant was convicted of one count of fraud. The majority of the Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge’s decision, while the minority would have substituted a verdict of attempted fraud.

Argued Date

2024-01-17

Keywords

Criminal law — Offences — Elements of offence — Fraud — Deprivation — Concurrence between actus reus and mens rea — Proof of causation — Whether Court has jurisdiction to hear appeal as of right under s. 691(1)(a) of Criminal Code — Whether majority of Court of Appeal interpreted essential element of deprivation too broadly — Whether victim’s prior knowledge of scheme prevents deprivation from being shown — Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 380(1).

Notes

(Quebec) (Criminal) (As of Right) (Publication ban in case)

Language

English Audio

Disclaimers

This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

Appellant Daniel Hodgson was charged with second-degree murder following a death at a house party. The victim, a large man, had become aggressive towards the house owner and refused to leave. Mr. Hodgson, who had been sleeping in a nearby bedroom, was asked by a guest to help remove the victim from the house. The victim died after Mr. Hodgson applied a one-arm choke hold on him.

Mr. Hodgson was acquitted at trial. The trial judge had a reasonable doubt as to whether Mr. Hodgson had the requisite intent for murder. On the lesser included offence of manslaughter, the trial judge concluded that the Crown had not proven beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Hodgson did not act in self-defence pursuant to s. 34 of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. The Court of Appeal set aside the acquittal and ordered a new trial.

Argued Date

2024-02-15

Keywords

Criminal Law — Defences — Self-Defence — Appellant charged with second-degree murder following an altercation at party — Trial judge finding no intent to murder, and Crown failing to disprove self-defence on the lesser included offence of manslaughter — Appellant acquitted — Court of Appeal setting aside acquittal and ordering new trial — Whether Court of Appeal exceeded its jurisdiction in concluding that the trial judge’s failure to infer intent for murder was a reviewable legal error — Whether the Court of Appeal erred in concluding that the trial judge was required to infer the intent for murder — Whether the Court of Appeal erred in concluding that the trial judge erroneously approached the issue of the reasonableness of the Appellant’s response from a purely subjective perspective — Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 34.

Notes

(Nunavut) (Criminal) (By Leave)

Language

English Audio

Disclaimers

This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

(Publication ban in case)

In the Court Martial, a military judge acquitted the respondent, Private D.T. Vu, of sexual assault under s. 130 of the National Defence Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. N-5 (“NDA”), that is to say, s. 271 of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. It is alleged that the respondent performed a sex act on the complainant who was incapable of consenting to the act by reason of advanced intoxication. The judge concluded that the Crown did not prove part of the actus reus (being a lack of subjective consent) beyond a reasonable doubt.

The appellant Crown appealed to the Court Martial Appeal Court. It submitted that the military judge erred in finding that the prosecution failed to prove a lack of consent or capacity to consent. Its submission rested on the proposition recognized in R. v. J.M.H., 2011 SCC 45, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 197, that the judge committed a legal error by failing to consider the entirety and cumulative effect of the evidence in reaching his conclusion on the issue. A majority of the appeal court (per Bell C.J. and Trotter J.A.) dismissed the appeal. It held the military judge did not err in law in his analysis leading to the respondent’s acquittal. Any findings the military judge made that the majority took issue with were held to have no bearing on the verdict reached. The majority further held that in the event it was incorrect on this point, it would rely upon s. 241 of the NDA, which states that “[n]otwithstanding anything in this Division, the Court Martial Appeal Court may disallow an appeal if, in the opinion of the Court, to be expressed in writing, there has been no substantial miscarriage of justice”. In dissent, McVeigh J.A. would have allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial. In her view, the military judge erred in law by failing to consider all of the evidence cumulatively, which led him to speculate improperly about alternative theories. These errors might have reasonably had a material bearing on the verdict. Further, the military judge erred by relying on improper inferences which, in effect, amounted to an insistence that the complainant’s intoxication had to be corroborated beyond the available evidence in this case.

Argued Date

2024-01-16

Keywords

Criminal law — Armed forces — Military Offences —Sexual Assault — Evidence — Whether the military judge failed to consider all of the evidence cumulatively — Whether the military judge assessed the evidence based on the wrong legal principles.

Notes

(Federal) (Criminal) (As of Right) (Publication ban in case)

Language

English Audio

Disclaimers

This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).