Fernandez v. United States

Justia · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Nov 12, 2025.

Petitioner: Joe Fernandez.
Respondent: United States of America.

Advocates:

• Benjamin Gruenstein (for the Petitioner)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Joe Fernandez participated as a backup shooter in a 2000 murder-for-hire scheme in the Bronx. On February 22, 2000, Patrick Darge hired him to help kill Arturo Cuellar and Idelfonso Vivero Flores, two Mexican drug cartel members who had come to New York City to collect approximately $6.5 million owed by drug trafficker Jeffrey Minaya for 274 kilograms of cocaine. When Darge's gun jammed after shooting Cuellar in the head, Fernandez fired fourteen shots in the apartment building lobby, nine hitting the victims. He received $40,000 for his participation. After eleven years on the run, Fernandez surrendered to police in October 2011.

Unlike his co-defendants who pleaded guilty and cooperated with the government, Fernandez proceeded to trial in 2013. The government's key witness was Patrick Darge, who admitted during cross-examination to lying to authorities in previous cases. Despite this admission, the jury convicted Fernandez of participating in a murder-for-hire conspiracy resulting in two deaths and aiding and abetting the use of a firearm to commit murder during a crime of violence. In October 2014, he received a mandatory life sentence, while his cooperating co-defendants received significantly lighter sentences: Darge (30 years), Reyes (25 years), Minaya (15 years), and Rivera (2 years).

The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York originally sentenced Fernandez, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed his conviction on direct appeal in 2016. In 2021, the district court vacated one of his convictions but left the mandatory life sentence intact. When Fernandez filed a compassionate release motion citing his possible innocence and sentencing disparity, the district court granted it in 2022, but the Second Circuit reversed this decision.

Question

Can a federal prisoner use the compassionate release law to get their sentence reduced based on claims that they might be innocent or that their sentence is unfair, even though these same claims would normally have to be raised through habeas corpus?

Rutherford v. United States

Justia · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Nov 12, 2025.

Petitioner: Daniel Rutherford.
Respondent: United States of America.

Advocates:

• David C. Frederick (for the Petitioner in No. 24-820)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

In 2003, twenty-two-year-old Daniel Rutherford committed two armed robberies at a Pennsylvania chiropractic office within a five-day period. During the first robbery, he brandished a gun at the chiropractor and stole $390 and a watch. Four days later, he returned to the same office with an accomplice, again pulled a gun, and stole $900 in cash and jewelry.

A jury convicted Rutherford of one count of conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery, two counts of Hobbs Act robbery, and two counts of using a firearm during a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). The district court sentenced Rutherford to 125 months for the robbery-related charges plus mandatory consecutive sentences of 7 years for the first § 924(c) offense and 25 years for the second, totaling nearly 42.5 years in prison. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed his conviction in 2007, and he did not appeal his sentence. In 2021, Rutherford filed a motion for compassionate release, arguing that changes in federal sentencing law would result in a significantly shorter sentence if he were sentenced today. The district court denied his motion in 2023, and the Third Circuit affirmed the lower court’s denial.

Question

May a district court, when evaluating a motion for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), consider as an “extraordinary and compelling reason” the fact that a defendant is serving a sentence substantially longer than what would be imposed today due to the First Step Act’s prospective changes to mandatory minimum penalties, particularly where the disparity amounts to decades of additional imprisonment?

The GEO Group, Inc. v. Menocal

Justia · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Nov 10, 2025.

Petitioner: The GEO Group, Inc.
Respondent: Alejandro Menocal.

Advocates:

• Dominic E. Draye (for the Petitioner)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Alejandro Menocal and other immigration detainees brought a class action lawsuit against The GEO Group, Inc. (GEO), a private company that operates the Aurora Immigration Processing Center (AIPC) in Colorado under contract with U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). GEO maintained a mandatory Sanitation Policy requiring all detainees to clean common areas including walls, floors, bathrooms, and recreation yards. Detainees who refused these cleaning assignments faced escalating disciplinary actions, beginning with suspension of television and phone privileges and potentially resulting in solitary confinement for up to seventy-two hours. Menocal, detained from June to September 2014, witnessed fellow detainees placed in isolation for refusing to clean, and multiple detainees testified to being threatened with or actually placed in solitary confinement for noncompliance. Additionally, AIPC operated a Voluntary Work Program where detainees could work up to eight hours daily in various jobs such as food preparation, barbering, and laundry services for compensation of $1.00 per day.

Menocal filed suit in October 2014, alleging forced labor under the Trafficking Victims Protection Act for the mandatory cleaning program and unjust enrichment under Colorado common law for the $1.00 daily wage in the Voluntary Work Program. The U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado certified two classes in 2017, which the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed in 2018. Following discovery, GEO moved for summary judgment claiming derivative sovereign immunity under Yearsley v. W.A. Ross Construction Co. The district court denied GEO's motion in October 2022, finding that ICE neither directed nor required GEO to compel detainee labor or limit compensation to $1.00 per day. GEO appealed this denial to the Tenth Circuit, which dismissed for lack of appellate jurisdiction.

Question

Is an order denying a government contractor’s claim of derivative sovereign immunity immediately appealable under the collateral-order doctrine?

Landor v. Louisiana Department of Corrections

Justia · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Nov 10, 2025.

Petitioner: Damon Landor.
Respondent: Louisiana Department of Corrections and Public Safety.

Advocates:

• Zachary D. Tripp (for the Petitioner)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Damon Landor, a devout Rastafarian, vowed as part of his faith never to cut his hair—a religious commitment known as the Nazarite Vow. Incarcerated in 2020, Landor was first held at the St. Tammany Parish Detention Center and later at LaSalle Correctional Center, both of which allowed him to maintain his hairstyle in accordance with his religious beliefs. After approximately five months and with three weeks left in his sentence, Landor was transferred to Raymond Laborde Correctional Center. Upon arrival, Landor proactively explained his religious practices and presented documentation of previous accommodations, including a copy of a federal court decision supporting similar claims. An intake guard disregarded his documentation, summoned the warden, and upon Landor’s inability to produce immediate additional proof of his beliefs, guards forcibly handcuffed Landor and shaved his head.

Following his release, Landor sued the Louisiana Department of Corrections and Public Safety, its Secretary James LeBlanc, the correctional center, and Warden Marcus Myers, asserting claims under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of his federal constitutional rights, as well as state law claims.

The U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana dismissed Landor’s individual-capacity RLUIPA claims for money damages, holding such relief unavailable under controlling Fifth Circuit precedent. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed, relying on its prior decision in Sossamon v. Lone Star State of Texas, and rejecting Landor’s arguments that subsequent Supreme Court authority or other legal developments altered that result.

Question

May an individual sue a government official in his individual capacity for damages for violations of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA)?

Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump

Justia · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Nov 5, 2025.

Petitioner: Learning Resources, Inc., et al.
Respondent: Donald J. Trump, President of the United States, et al.

Advocates:

• D. John Sauer (for the federal parties)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Learning Resources, Inc. and hand2mind, Inc. are family-owned businesses that design and distribute educational products for children. Although their product development and some assembly occur domestically, most of their manufacturing is outsourced to international partners, including China. Beginning in early 2025, a series of executive orders from President Donald J. Trump, invoking the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (“IEEPA”), imposed unprecedented tariffs on imports, including goods from China. These included a 20% “trafficking” tariff and additional “reciprocal” tariffs that pushed rates on Chinese goods to over 145%. Petitioners’ imports were directly affected, and complying with the new tariffs would increase their import-related costs from $2.3 million in 2024 to over $100 million in 2025, putting their businesses at existential risk.

The petitioners filed suit on April 22, 2025, in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, challenging the legality of the IEEPA tariffs. The district court granted a preliminary injunction on May 29, 2025, holding that IEEPA does not authorize the president to impose tariffs and finding that the tariffs posed an existential threat to the petitioners. However, that ruling was stayed just days later, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit docketed the case. Meanwhile, the U.S. Court of International Trade ruled similarly in related cases but its decision was also stayed by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.

Question

Does the International Emergency Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (“IEEPA”), authorize the president to impose tariffs?

Coney Island Auto Parts Unlimited, Inc. v. Burton

Justia · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Nov 4, 2025.

Petitioner: Coney Island Auto Parts Unlimited, Inc.
Respondent: Jeanne Ann Burton.

Advocates:

• Daniel Ginzburg (for the Petitioner)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

In November 2014, Vista-Pro Automotive, LLC, a Nashville-based auto-parts corporation, entered bankruptcy proceedings in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Tennessee. In 2015, Vista-Pro—later represented by its Chapter 7 trustee—filed an adversary proceeding against Coney Island Auto Parts Unlimited, Inc., a New York corporation, to recover about $50,000 in unpaid invoices. Vista-Pro mailed the summons and complaint to Coney Island’s Brooklyn address addressed only to the corporate entity, not to any officer, agent, or individual as required for proper service under the rules governing service on corporations. Coney Island did not respond to the complaint, leading the bankruptcy court in May 2015 to enter a default judgment against it.

Following reconversion of the case to a Chapter 7 proceeding, the trustee repeatedly attempted to collect the judgment. Coney Island received notice of the judgment at least as early as April 2016 when its CEO was sent a demand letter. Years later, after the trustee sought to enforce the judgment by freezing Coney Island’s bank assets in New York, Coney Island sought to vacate the default judgment, arguing that it was void due to improper service and lack of personal jurisdiction.

The bankruptcy court and later the district court denied Coney Island’s motion to vacate the judgment as untimely. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that under its precedents interpreting Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(c)(1), motions to vacate void judgments must be filed within a reasonable time.

Question

Does Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(c)(1) impose any time limit to set aside a void default judgment for lack of personal jurisdiction?

Hain Celestial Group, Inc. v. Palmquist

Justia · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Nov 4, 2025.

Petitioner: The Hain Celestial Group, Inc., et al.
Respondent: Sarah Palmquist, Individually and as Next Friend of E.P., a Minor.

Advocates:

• Sarah E. Harrington (for the Petitioners)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Grant and Sarah Palmquist’s son Ethan developed normally until about 30 months of age, when he experienced sudden and severe developmental regression, including cognitive, behavioral, and physical impairments. He was later diagnosed with a range of conditions—some physical, like seizures and hypotonia, and others mental, like autism and neurocognitive disorders. Tests also revealed high levels of toxic heavy metals in Ethan’s system, which some physicians attributed to heavy-metal poisoning. The Palmquists linked his symptoms to his nearly exclusive consumption of Earth’s Best Organic baby food—manufactured by Hain Celestial Group, Inc. and sold by Whole Foods Market, Inc.—from infancy through toddlerhood. In 2021, a U.S. House Oversight Committee report revealed that Hain’s baby foods contained high levels of arsenic, lead, cadmium, and mercury and that Hain had not tested final products for such contaminants until 2019.

In 2021, the Palmquists sued Hain and Whole Foods in Texas state court, raising various state-law claims. Hain removed the case to federal court, alleging that Whole Foods had been improperly joined to defeat diversity jurisdiction. The district court agreed, dismissed Whole Foods, and denied the Palmquists’ motion to remand. It later granted judgment as a matter of law for Hain during trial. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that the Palmquists had adequately stated claims against Whole Foods, defeating diversity jurisdiction. It vacated the judgment and remanded the case with instructions to return it to state court.

Question

Must a federal court’s final judgment be set aside if the case did not have complete diversity when it was removed from state court, and can a plaintiff block diversity jurisdiction by updating the complaint after removal to include a valid claim against a nondiverse defendant?

Rico v. United States

Justia · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Nov 3, 2025.

Petitioner: Isabel Rico.
Respondent: United States of America.

Advocates:

• Adam G. Unikowsky (for the Petitioner)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

In May 2018, Isabel Rico absconded from supervised release after serving only five months of her 42-month term. Rico had originally been convicted in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California and was serving supervised release as part of her sentence. She remained a fugitive until January 2023, when authorities located her. In February 2023, the probation office filed violations based on her absconding and other conduct during her supervised release term.

The district court revoked Rico’s supervised release and sentenced her to 16 months in prison followed by a new two-year term of supervised release. Rico appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, arguing that the district court lacked authority to revoke her supervised release because her original 42-month term would have expired during the time she was a fugitive, but the Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court’s decision.

Question

Does the fugitive-tolling doctrine apply in the context of supervised release?

Hencely v. Fluor Corporation

Justia · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Nov 3, 2025.

Petitioner: Winston Tyler Hencely.
Respondent: Fluor Corporation.

Advocates:

• Frank H. Chang (for the Petitioner)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

In 2016, U.S. Army Specialist Winston Tyler Hencely was stationed at Bagram Airfield in Afghanistan as part of Operation Freedom’s Sentinel. Fluor Corporation held a Department of Defense contract to provide base life support services at Bagram, including vehicle maintenance and hazardous materials management. Under the military’s “Afghan First” counterinsurgency program, which aimed to develop the Afghan economy by employing local nationals, Fluor’s subcontractor hired Ahmad Nayeb, an Afghan national. The Army sponsored Nayeb’s employment despite knowing he was a former Taliban member, viewing his hiring as a reintegration effort. Nayeb worked the night shift at the hazardous materials section of the non-tactical vehicle yard with limited supervision.

During his employment, Nayeb likely smuggled explosives onto the base and constructed an explosive vest while working alone, using base tools including a multimeter he had checked out despite not needing it for his assigned duties. On the morning of November 12, 2016, at the end of his shift, Nayeb was supposed to board a bus to be escorted off base. Instead, he lied about needing to attend a hazardous materials class and walked undetected for 53 minutes to an area near the starting line of a Veterans Day 5K race. When Hencely and others confronted him, Nayeb detonated his vest, killing himself and five others while severely wounding seventeen more, including Hencely. The Taliban claimed credit for the attack.

Hencely sued Fluor in the U.S. District Court for the District of South Carolina, alleging negligent supervision, entrustment, and retention under South Carolina law, as well as breach of the government contract. The district court granted judgment to Fluor on all claims, holding that federal law preempted the state tort claims and that Hencely was not a third-party beneficiary entitled to enforce the government contract. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed.

Question

Does Boyle v. United Technologies Corporation, which immunized government contractors from liability under certain circumstances, extend to preempt state tort claims against a government contractor for conduct that breached its contract and violated military orders?

Louisiana v. Callais (Reargument)

Justia · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Oct 15, 2025.

Appellant: Louisiana.
Appellee: Phillip Callais, et al.

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

This case involves a challenge to Louisiana’s congressional redistricting map, specifically focusing on District 6, alleging that the map is an impermissible racial gerrymander. The map was created in response to a previous lawsuit, Robinson v. Ardoin, where plaintiffs argued that the prior map violated Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act by diluting minority votes. To address these issues, the Louisiana Legislature adopted a new map (Senate Bill 8) that included a second majority-Black district. However, the plaintiffs in this case claimed that this new map violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by prioritizing race in its creation. A three-judge panel concluded that District 6 of the new map did indeed violate the Equal Protection Clause, leading the court to issue an injunction against using this map in future elections.

Question

Does Louisiana’s creation of a second majority-Black congressional district constitute unconstitutional racial gerrymandering, even when drawn in response to a federal court finding that the state’s prior single majority-Black district likely violated Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act?