Mullin v. Doe

Justia · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Apr 29, 2026.

Petitioner: Markwayne Mullin, Secretary, Department of Homeland Security.
Respondent: Dahlia Doe.

Advocates:

• D. John Sauer (for the Petitioners)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Congress created the Temporary Protected Status (TPS) program to allow foreign nationals from countries experiencing armed conflict, natural disasters, or other extraordinary conditions to live and work legally in the United States on a temporary basis. Federal law requires the Secretary of Homeland Security to periodically review conditions in each designated country and, after consulting with other government agencies, determine whether those conditions still justify protection. Syria has held TPS designation for years, shielding its nationals from deportation to a country ravaged by civil war and humanitarian crisis.

Shortly after taking office in January 2025, President Trump issued Executive Order 14159, directing the Secretary to aggressively limit TPS designations. Secretary Kristi Noem then terminated TPS for Syria on September 19, 2025, with an effective date of November 21, 2025 — giving roughly 6,100 Syrian TPS holders weeks to lose their legal status, work authorization, and protection from deportation. Seven Syrian nationals with family ties in the United States sued, arguing that the termination violated federal immigration law, was arbitrary and capricious, and reflected discriminatory animus rather than a genuine, good-faith review of conditions in Syria.

The district court granted the plaintiffs' motion and postponed the termination effective November 19, 2025; the government appealed and moved to stay that order, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit denied the stay on February 17, 2026, concluding that the government had not demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits or irreparable harm.

Question

Did the Trump administration lawfully end the Temporary Protected Status program for Syrian nationals?

Hikma Pharmaceuticals USA Inc. v. Amarin Pharma, Inc.

Justia · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Apr 29, 2026.

Petitioner: Hikma Pharmaceuticals USA Inc.
Respondent: Amarin Pharma, Inc.

Advocates:

• Charles B. Klein (for the Petitioners)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Amarin Pharma markets icosapent ethyl under the brand name Vascepa. In 2012, the FDA approved Vascepa for treating severe hypertriglyceridemia (the SH indication), which affects patients with blood triglyceride levels of at least 500 mg/dL. In 2019, following additional research and clinical trials, the FDA approved Vascepa for a second use: reducing cardiovascular risk in patients with triglyceride levels of at least 150 mg/dL (the CV indication). Amarin listed two patents covering the CV indication in the FDA’s Orange Book.

In 2016, Hikma Pharmaceuticals submitted an Abbreviated New Drug Application seeking approval for a generic version of icosapent ethyl. When the CV indication was approved in 2019, Hikma filed a “section viii statement” seeking FDA approval only for the SH indication by “carving out” the patented CV indication from its label—creating a “skinny label.” The FDA approved Hikma’s ANDA in May 2020. Throughout 2020, Hikma issued press releases referring to its product as the “generic version” or “generic equivalent” of Vascepa, describing Vascepa as indicated “in part” for the SH indication, and citing Vascepa sales figures (over $1 billion annually) that were attributable primarily to the CV indication. Hikma also marketed its product on its website under the therapeutic category “Hypertriglyceridemia” and as “AB” rated, though with a disclaimer that it was approved for fewer indications than Vascepa.

In November 2020, Amarin sued Hikma for induced infringement of its CV indication patents. The U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware granted Hikma’s motion to dismiss. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed, finding that Amarin’s allegations—based on Hikma’s skinny label combined with its press releases and marketing materials—plausibly stated a claim for induced infringement.

Question

1. When a generic drug manufacturer excludes a patented use from its label, can it still be liable for inducing infringement if it calls its product a “generic version” of the brand-name drug and cites publicly available information about the brand-name drug’s sales?

2. Can a patent infringement complaint survive dismissal if it does not allege that the defendant made any statement specifically instructing or encouraging the patented use?

Cisco Systems, Inc. v. Doe I

Justia · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Apr 28, 2026.

Petitioner: Cisco Systems, Inc.
Respondent: Doe I.

Advocates:

• Kannon K. Shanmugam (for the Petitioners)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Beginning in the 1990s, the Chinese Communist Party initiated a campaign of persecution—referred to as “douzheng”—against practitioners of Falun Gong, a spiritual discipline derived from Buddhism that grew rapidly in popularity across China. In 1999, the Party formally sought to eliminate Falun Gong through detention, forced conversion, and torture, designating it an illegal organization. To support these efforts, the Chinese authorities envisioned a nationwide surveillance system named the “Golden Shield,” designed to monitor online activity, identify practitioners, and facilitate their apprehension. Because China lacked the necessary technological infrastructure, Chinese officials sought help from Western firms. Cisco Systems, Inc., a U.S.-based tech company, allegedly responded with enthusiasm: from its headquarters in San Jose, California, Cisco pursued contracts, developed Golden Shield software and hardware, and provided training and support to Chinese security officers. Plaintiffs alleged that without Cisco’s technology—including advanced databases, real-time monitoring systems, and network optimization tools—Chinese authorities could not have effectively tracked, detained, or tortured Falun Gong adherents.

Plaintiffs in this case include thirteen Chinese nationals and one U.S. citizen, Charles Lee, who claim they were targeted using Cisco’s technology and then detained, tortured, and subjected to psychological and physical abuse. Some plaintiffs reported multiple detentions and long-term surveillance; others described instances of torture facilitated by personalized information drawn from Golden Shield databases. Several allege that the abuses led to the deaths of family members. They contend that the design, development, and optimization of Cisco’s technology—and its tailored marketing to support Falun Gong persecution—enabled widespread human rights abuses undertaken by Chinese state and Party officials.

The plaintiffs filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California in 2011, bringing claims under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) and Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA). The district court dismissed all claims, finding them insufficiently connected to the United States and lacking the necessary legal support for aiding and abetting liability. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed in part, holding that aiding and abetting liability is actionable under both the ATS and the TVPA and that the plaintiffs plausibly alleged Cisco’s knowing participation in a domestic context.

Question

Does either the Alien Tort Statute or the Torture Victim Protection Act allow a judicially-implied private right of action for aiding and abetting?

Chatrie v. United States

Justia · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Apr 27, 2026.

Petitioner: Okello T. Chatrie.
Respondent: United States of America.

Advocates:

• Adam G. Unikowsky (for the Petitioner)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Okello Chatrie was arrested in connection with the armed robbery of a bank in Richmond, Virginia, where an individual entered the Call Federal Credit Union, threatened employees and patrons with a handgun, and escaped with $195,000. The robbery was captured by surveillance footage, which showed the perpetrator appearing to talk on a cellphone. Lacking viable leads, Detective Joshua Hylton applied for a “geofence warrant” in June 2019. This novel form of warrant compelled Google to provide location data for all devices that had been near the robbery site within a one-hour window around the time of the crime. The geofence specified a 150-meter radius centered on the bank, encompassing not only the crime scene but also public streets, private residences, a hotel, a church, and a restaurant.

Google responded with anonymized location data of devices within the geofence during the specified time. The government then requested two additional sets of data from Google: (1) expanded location data from nine of the original nineteen users, covering movements outside the geofence over a longer timeframe, and (2) identifying information for three of those users. One account belonged to Chatrie. Based on this data, law enforcement identified him as the suspect, arrested him, and charged him in federal court.

Chatrie moved to suppress the location data obtained through the geofence warrant, arguing that it violated the Fourth Amendment. The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia held that the warrant likely violated the Fourth Amendment but declined to suppress the evidence under the good-faith exception. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, sitting en banc, affirmed the district court’s denial of the suppression motion. While the panel sharply disagreed both on whether a Fourth Amendment search had occurred and whether the warrant was constitutionally valid, all judges agreed that any defect was ultimately excused under the good-faith exception.

Question

Did the execution of the geofence warrant violate the Fourth Amendment?

Monsanto Company v. Durnell

Justia · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Apr 27, 2026.

Petitioner: Monsanto Company.
Respondent: John L. Durnell.

Advocates:

• Paul D. Clement (for the Petitioner)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

John L. Durnell used Monsanto’s product Roundup, a herbicide containing the active ingredient glyphosate. Durnell subsequently developed non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma, which he alleged was caused by his exposure to Roundup and glyphosate. In January 2019, Durnell sued Monsanto, asserting claims for strict liability defective design, strict liability failure to warn, and negligence. Durnell claimed that Monsanto should have included a cancer warning on Roundup’s label to alert users to the risk of developing non-Hodgkin's lymphoma from glyphosate exposure.

After a jury trial in September 2023 in the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis, the jury found in favor of Durnell on his strict liability failure to warn claim and awarded him $1.25 million in compensatory damages, but ruled for Monsanto on the defective design and negligence claims. Monsanto moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, arguing that federal law—specifically the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA)—both expressly and impliedly preempted Durnell’s failure to warn claim. The trial court denied the motion, and Monsanto appealed to the Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, which affirmed the judgment.

Question

Does the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act preempt a label-based failure-to-warn claim where EPA has not required the warning?

Blanche v. Lau

Justia · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Apr 22, 2026.

Petitioner: Todd Blanche, Acting Attorney General.
Respondent: Muk Choi Lau.

Advocates:

• Sopan Joshi (for the Petitioner)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Muk Choi Lau, a native and citizen of China, was admitted to the United States as a lawful permanent resident on September 7, 2007, after several years of traveling to the country as a nonimmigrant. On May 7, 2012, Lau was charged in New Jersey with third-degree trademark counterfeiting. While awaiting trial, he left the United States for a brief period. Upon returning on June 15, 2012, he presented himself at John F. Kennedy International Airport as a returning lawful permanent resident. However, because of his pending charge, immigration authorities declined to admit him outright and instead paroled him into the country pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A). Over a year later, in June 2013, Lau pleaded guilty to the counterfeiting charge and was sentenced to two years’ probation.

The Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings against Lau in March 2014, charging him with inadmissibility under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) for having been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude (CIMT). Lau argued that he should not have been treated as an arriving alien at the time of reentry and that he was eligible for a discretionary waiver under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h). The immigration judge rejected both claims, and the Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed. Lau petitioned for review, arguing primarily that DHS lacked clear and convincing evidence to treat him as an applicant for admission on reentry merely due to a then-pending charge. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit agreed, holding that DHS erred in treating Lau as inadmissible based solely on unproven allegations at the time of reentry and granted his petition.

The immigration judge ordered removal in 2018, and the Board of Immigration Appeals upheld that decision in 2021. The Second Circuit vacated the removal order in 2025 and remanded the case to terminate proceedings under the inadmissibility ground, reserving the possibility of future removal under a deportability provision.

Question

To remove a lawful permanent resident who committed an offense listed in Section 1182(a)(2) and was subsequently paroled into the United States, must the government prove that it possessed clear and convincing evidence of the offense at the time of the lawful permanent resident’s last reentry into the United States?

Federal Communications Commission v. AT&T, Inc.

Justia · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Apr 21, 2026.

Petitioner: Federal Communications Commission, et al.
Respondent: AT&T, Inc. .

Advocates:

• Jeffrey B. Wall (for AT&T, Inc. and Verizon Communications Inc.)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Between 2014 and 2019, AT&T operated a location-based services program in which it collected and shared its customers’ mobile location data with third-party service providers such as Life Alert and AAA. To provide this data, AT&T contracted with “location aggregators,” who in turn resold the data to service providers. AT&T required those providers to obtain customer consent for each location request and reviewed their procedures, but it did not directly verify customer consent before transferring data. In 2018, news reports began revealing that some service providers misused or failed to adequately protect customers’ location data. In response, AT&T halted access for those providers, and by March 2019, shuttered the entire location-data program.

Prompted by these reports, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) initiated an investigation and in 2020 issued a Notice of Apparent Liability (NAL), proposing a $57 million fine for AT&T’s purported violations of Section 222 of the Communications Act of 1934 and corresponding FCC regulations. AT&T challenged the classification of location data as “customer proprietary network information” (CPNI), asserted it had acted reasonably, and raised constitutional objections. After reviewing AT&T’s written response, the FCC rejected its defenses and issued a forfeiture order. Significantly, the FCC imposed the fine without a hearing or trial; AT&T’s only opportunity to respond occurred through written submissions to the agency.

AT&T paid the fine and petitioned the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit for review. The Fifth Circuit vacated the forfeiture order, holding that the FCC’s in-house enforcement process violated AT&T’s rights under Article III and the Seventh Amendment.

Question

Are provisions of the Communications Act of 1934 that govern the Federal Communications Commission’s assessment and enforcement of monetary forfeitures consistent with the Seventh Amendment and Article III?

Sripetch v. SEC

Justia · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Apr 20, 2026.

Petitioner: Ongkaruck Sripetch.
Respondent: Securities and Exchange Commission.

Advocates:

• Daniel L. Geyser (for the Petitioner)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

From at least 2013 to 2019, Ongkaruck Sripetch participated in a series of fraudulent securities schemes involving at least 20 microcap, or “penny,” stock companies. Working alongside various associates and through multiple entities, Sripetch acquired discounted shares of small-cap companies and then secretly funded promotional campaigns to inflate their stock prices before selling his own holdings into the artificially heightened market—a practice known as stock scalping. He also engaged in unregistered sales of securities, most notably through control of a company called Abby Inc., and manipulated trading in another company, VMS Rehab Systems, through matched trades and wash trades designed to create the illusion of market activity. Later, he organized pump-and-dump schemes for Argus Worldwide stock, using matched trading to build trading volume before dumping shares after promotions without disclosing his intent to sell.

In 2020, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) filed a civil enforcement action against Sripetch and others. In 2023, Sripetch consented to a bifurcated judgment, agreeing to the SEC’s allegations for the purposes of remedies. The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California found him liable for $2.25 million in disgorgement and over $1 million in interest. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed that the SEC may obtain disgorgement under 15 U.S.C. §§ 78u(d)(5) and (d)(7) without showing that investors suffered pecuniary harm, joining a circuit split on this question.

Question

May the SEC seek equitable disgorgement under 15 U.S.C. §§ 78u(d)(5) and (d)(7) without showing investors suffered pecuniary harm?

T. M. v. University of Maryland Medical System Corporation

Justia · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Apr 20, 2026.

Petitioner: T. M.
Respondent: University of Maryland Medical System Corporation.

Advocates:

• Elizabeth B. Prelogar (for the Petitioner)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

In March 2023, T.M., a woman with a rare medical condition that triggers psychosis upon consuming gluten, was involuntarily committed to Baltimore Washington Medical Center after an episode. Her treating psychiatrist sought and received state approval to forcibly administer antipsychotic medication; T.M. contested this but was unsuccessful in administrative proceedings. Independent psychiatrists later stated that T.M. no longer required inpatient care. To secure her release, T.M. and the hospital negotiated an oral agreement, which was formalized as a state court consent order. The order allowed her to leave the hospital on the condition that she comply with ongoing psychiatric treatment and medications, switch providers, and drop pending lawsuits. Her parents, J.M. and A.M., were also bound to notify authorities if she failed to comply.

Ten days later, represented by new counsel, T.M. and her parents filed the present federal lawsuit claiming that the consent order was unconstitutional and entered under duress. They challenged the order as violating T.M.’s due process rights and sought declaratory and injunctive relief invalidating its enforcement. They did not request damages or challenge the initial commitment decisions.

The U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland dismissed the lawsuit. It held that T.M.’s claims were barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which prevents parties who lose in state courts from challenging injuries caused by state-court judgments, because they amounted to a request for federal review of a state court judgment. It also dismissed the parents’ claims for failure to state a constitutional violation. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed, concluding that T.M. was a “state-court loser” seeking to undo a state judgment still reviewable in Maryland courts. Nonetheless, it remanded for the district court to modify T.M.’s dismissal to be without prejudice, due to lack of jurisdiction.

Question

Can the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which prevents parties who lose in state courts from challenging injuries caused by state-court judgments, be triggered by a state-court decision that remains subject to further review in state court?

Trump v. Barbara

Justia · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Apr 1, 2026.

Petitioner: Donald J. Trump, President of the United States.
Respondent: Barbara.

Advocates:

• D. John Sauer (for the Petitioners)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

On January 20, 2025, President Donald J. Trump issued Executive Order No. 14,160, titled “Protecting the Meaning and Value of American Citizenship,” which declared that individuals born in the United States are not U.S. citizens at birth if their parents lack sufficient legal status. Specifically, the order directs federal agencies not to recognize citizenship claims for children born after February 20, 2025, if: (1) the mother was unlawfully present in the U.S. and the father was neither a U.S. citizen nor a lawful permanent resident (LPR), or (2) the mother’s presence in the U.S. was lawful but temporary and the father was not a U.S. citizen or LPR. The order was issued on the alleged basis that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Citizenship Clause does not confer birthright citizenship on such children because they are not “subject to the jurisdiction” of the United States in the constitutional sense.

Three families challenged the order on behalf of themselves and similarly situated individuals. One class representative is Barbara, a Honduran asylum applicant whose child is due in October 2025. Another is Susan, a Taiwanese citizen in the country on a student visa whose daughter was born in April 2025; her child’s passport application was in progress at the time of the suit. The third is Mark, a Brazilian applicant for permanent residence whose son was born in March 2025 and initially received a U.S. passport. These families filed suit under pseudonyms, alleging that the Executive Order unlawfully strips their children of citizenship guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment and 8 U.S.C. § 1401(a). They seek to preserve access to citizenship-related benefits including Social Security, SNAP, and Medicaid.

The U.S. District Court for the District of New Hampshire issued a preliminary injunction and provisionally certified a nationwide class of children affected by the order. The court held that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of their constitutional and statutory claims. That decision was appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, and before a ruling from that court, the Supreme Court granted certiorari before judgment.

Question

Is a presidential executive order that denies U.S. birthright citizenship to children born in the United States because their parents are unlawfully present or in the country on temporary visas consistent with the Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and 8 U.S.C. § 1401(a)?