Supreme Court Oral Arguments

Trump v. United States

Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Apr 25, 2024.

Petitioner: Donald J. Trump.
Respondent: United States of America.

Advocates:

• D. John Sauer (for the Petitioner)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Former President Donald Trump was indicted in August 2023 on four counts arising from Special Counsel Jack Smith’s investigation into the January 6, 2021, attacks on the U.S. Capitol. Trump claimed that he cannot be prosecuted for his official acts as president and that a former president cannot be prosecuted unless he has first been impeached by the House and convicted by the Senate.

U.S. District Judge Tanya Chutkan initially set Trump’s trial for March 4, 2024, but later vacated this date pending resolution of Trump’s immunity claims. Judge Chutkan denied Trump’s motion to dismiss on immunity grounds, and Smith asked the Supreme Court directly to expedite review and bypass a decision by the D.C. Circuit. The Court declined, deferring instead to the D.C. Circuit’s judgment. On February 6, the D.C. Circuit upheld Chutkan’s decision, and Trump requested a stay of the D.C. Circuit’s ruling. Ultimately, the Supreme Court decided to expedite the case.

Question

Does a former president enjoy presidential immunity from criminal prosecution for conduct alleged to involve official acts during his tenure in office, and if so, to what extent?

Moyle v. United States

Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Apr 24, 2024.

Petitioner: Mike Moyle, et al.
Respondent: United States of America.

Advocates:

• Joshua N. Turner (for the Petitioners)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

In August 2022, after the Supreme Court’s decision in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization, which eliminated the constitutional right to an abortion, the Biden administration brought a legal challenge to a restrictive Idaho abortion law. The Biden administration argued that the state law, which criminalizes providing an abortion except in a few narrow circumstances, including to save the life of the mother, is preempted by a federal law, the Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act (EMTALA). EMTALA requires hospitals receiving Medicare funding to offer “necessary stabilizing treatment” to pregnant women in emergencies.

The district court ruled in favor of the Biden administration and barred Idaho from enforcing its law to the extent that it conflicted with EMTALA. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, declined to stay the district court's ruling while the state appealed.

Question

Does the federal Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act preempt an Idaho law that criminalizes most abortions in that state?

Department of State v. Munoz

Justia · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Apr 23, 2024.

Petitioner: Department of State, et al.
Respondent: Sandra Munoz, et al.

Advocates:

• Curtis E. Gannon (for the Petitioners)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Sandra Muñoz, a U.S. citizen, married Luis Asencio-Cordero, an El Salvadoran citizen, in 2010. They have a U.S. citizen child. Asencio-Cordero, who arrived in the U.S. in 2005 and has multiple tattoos, applied for an immigrant visa after Muñoz filed an approved immigrant-relative petition and waiver for his inadmissibility. In 2015, he returned to El Salvador for his visa interview, denying any gang affiliations. However, in December 2015, the U.S. Consulate denied his visa under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(A)(ii), suggesting his potential involvement in unlawful activities. Muñoz sought intervention from Congresswoman Judy Chu, but the State Department upheld the decision. A declaration from a gang expert, Humberto Guizar, stated that Asencio-Cordero’s tattoos were not gang-related. Despite this and further appeals, including to the State Department's Office of Inspector General, the decision remained unchanged, with authorities confirming the inadmissibility and indicating no grounds for appeal.

Following the government’s denial of Asencio-Cordero’s immigrant visa application, the plaintiffs sought judicial review, arguing that the statute was unconstitutionally vague. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants, invoking the doctrine of consular nonreviewability to prevent judicial scrutiny of the visa decision. However, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found that the government failed to provide the constitutionally required notice within a reasonable time after the visa application was denied. As a result, the appellate court determined that the government was not entitled to summary judgment based on the doctrine of consular nonreviewability and vacated the district court's decision.

Question

Does the denial of a visa to the non-citizen spouse of a U.S. citizen infringe on a constitutionally protected interest of the citizen and, if so, did the government properly justify that decision in this case?

Starbucks Corporation v. McKinney

Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Apr 23, 2024.

Petitioner: Starbucks Corporation.
Respondent: M. Kathleen McKinney.

Advocates:

• Lisa S. Blatt (for the Petitioner)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

In early January 2022, Nikki Taylor, a supervisor at a Memphis Starbucks, initiated union-organizing efforts, contacting Buffalo, New York, Starbucks employees and the Union for guidance. Conversations with colleagues about unionizing led to managerial scrutiny and disciplinary actions against Taylor for alleged insubordination and a dress code violation. Despite this, Taylor and coworkers held a meeting with Union representatives and drafted a letter to Starbucks's CEO announcing their intent to unionize.

On January 18, following the public release of the unionization letter, the Memphis store was closed early by management under the pretext of understaffing, coinciding with a media event covering the unionization efforts. Subsequent investigations by Starbucks led to the February 8 firing of seven employees, including key organizing committee members, for policy violations during the media event. These terminations led to a reduced display of union support among the remaining staff and increased anxiety about unionizing in other Starbucks locations. However, the Memphis store voted to join the Union in June.

The Union filed charges against Starbucks for unfair labor practices. Following an investigation, a district court ordered a temporary injunction, demanding the reinstatement of the terminated employees. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding that the NLRB satisfied its burden of showing “‘reasonable cause’ to believe that employers engaged in unfair labor practices and that an injunction protects the Board’s remedial power.”

Question

What test must courts use to evaluate requests for injunctions under Section 10(j) of the National Labor Relations Act?

City of Grants Pass v. Johnson

Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Apr 22, 2024.

Petitioner: City of Grants Pass, Oregon.
Respondent: Gloria Johnson, et al.

Advocates:

• Theane D. Evangelis (for the Petitioner)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

The city of Grants Pass in southern Oregon has a population of approximately 38,000, and of that population, somewhere between 50 and 600 persons are unhoused. Whatever the exact number of unhoused persons, however, it exceeds the number of available shelter beds, requiring that at least some of them sleep on the streets or in parks. However, several provisions of the Grants Pass Municipal Code prohibit them from doing so, including an “anti-sleeping” ordinance, two “anti-camping” ordinances, a “park exclusion” ordinance, and a “park exclusion appeals” ordinance.

In September 2018, a three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit decided Martin v. City of Boise, holding that “the Eighth Amendment prohibits the imposition of criminal penalties for sitting, sleeping, or lying outside on public property for homeless individuals who cannot obtain shelter.” While the Grants Pass Municipal Code provisions impose only civil penalties, they still can mature into criminal penalties.

A district court certified a class of plaintiffs of involuntarily unhoused persons living in Grants Pass and concluded that, based on the unavailability of shelter beds, the City’s enforcement of its anti-camping and anti-sleeping ordinances violated the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause. A panel of the Ninth Circuit affirmed, and the Ninth Circuit denied rehearing en banc.

Question

Does a city’s enforcement of public camping against involuntarily homeless people violate the Eighth Amendment’s protection against cruel and unusual punishment?

Smith v. Spizzirri

Justia · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Apr 22, 2024.

Petitioner: Wendy Smith, et al.
Respondent: Keith Spizzirri, et al.

Advocates:

• Daniel L. Geyser (for the Petitioners)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Plaintiffs Smith and others were current and former delivery drivers for Intelliserve. They sued Intelliserve in Arizona state court alleging that “Intelliserve violated federal and state employment laws by misclassifying them as independent contractors, failing to pay them required minimum and overtime wages, and failing to provide paid sick leave.”

Intelliserve removed the case to federal court, then moved to compel arbitration and to dismiss the case. While both parties agreed that, under the FAA, all claims were subject to mandatory arbitration, they disagreed on how the district court was supposed to handle the lawsuit. Intelliserve argued that Section 3 of the FAA permitted the district court to dismiss the action, while the plaintiffs argued that the FAA required the district court to stay the action pending arbitration. The district court dismissed the action without prejudice, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.

Question

Does Section 3 of the Federal Arbitration Act give district courts discretion to dismiss a lawsuit when all claims are subject to arbitration?

Thornell v. Jones

Justia · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Apr 17, 2024.

Petitioner: Ryan Thornell, Director, Arizona Department of Corrections.
Respondent: Danny Lee Jones.

Advocates:

• Jason D. Lewis (for the Petitioner)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

In Bullhead City, Arizona, on March 26, 1992, Danny Lee Jones and Robert Weaver engaged in a day of drinking and using crystal methamphetamine. A violent altercation ensued, resulting in Jones fatally striking Weaver with a baseball bat. Jones also attacked Weaver’s grandmother, Katherine Gumina, and his seven-year-old daughter, Tisha, the latter of whom he also strangled or suffocated. Jones fled to Las Vegas but was arrested and indicted in Arizona on two counts of first-degree murder and one count of attempted murder. His public defender, inexperienced in capital cases, received limited funding for expert witnesses. Jones was convicted on all counts, and a sentencing hearing was scheduled.

At sentencing, testimony revealed Jones’s troubled childhood, including substance abuse, head injuries, and abuse by his first stepfather. Dr. Jack Potts, a forensic psychiatrist, assessed Jones, citing a history of substance abuse, possible mood disorders, and susceptibility to aggression due to drug use. Potts’s report, submitted late due to delayed receipt of the Presentence Information Report, suggested Jones’s impaired capacity to conform to the law at the time of the offenses. Despite a request for a continuance for further psychological testing, the judge found multiple aggravating factors for the murders and sentenced Jones to death for both murders and an additional twenty-five years for the attempted murder.

The Arizona Supreme Court upheld the conviction and sentence, and Jones filed a federal petition for habeas relief. After protracted litigation and appeals, the district court dismissed Jones’s habeas petition. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, concluding that application of the appropriate standards pursuant to the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA") meant that Jones was denied the effective assistance of counsel at sentencing.

Question

What is the proper methodology for assessing prejudice, for purposes of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim?

Fischer v. United States

Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Apr 16, 2024.

Petitioner: Joseph W. Fischer.
Respondent: United States of America.

Advocates:

• Jeffrey T. Green (for the Petitioner)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

On January 6, 2021, while Congress was convening to certify the results of the 2020 presidential election in favor of Joe Biden, thousands of supporters of the losing candidate, Donald Trump, converged on the United States Capitol to disrupt the proceedings. The Trump supporters swarmed the building, overwhelming law enforcement officers who attempted to stop them. The chaos wrought by the mob forced members of Congress to stop the certification and flee for safety. Congress was not able to resume its work for six hours.

Joseph Fischer, Edward Lang, and Garret Miller were indicted for various offenses related to their involvement in the Capitol riot on January 6. All three were charged with felony offenses of assaulting, resisting, or impeding certain officers, and misdemeanor offenses of disorderly conduct in a Capitol building and in restricted grounds, involving the intent to disrupt congressional sessions and government functions. Additionally, each faced a count of obstruction of an official proceeding. The defendants challenged this obstruction charge, claiming that the statute does not prohibit their alleged conduct on that day. The district court agreed, holding that the statute does not apply to assaultive conduct, committed in furtherance of an attempt to stop Congress from performing a constitutionally required duty. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit reversed, concluding that the natural, broad reading of that provision is that it applies to forms of obstructive conduct, not just those related to investigations and evidence.

Question

Does 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c), which prohibits obstruction of congressional inquiries and investigations, include acts unrelated to investigations and evidence?

Fischer v. United States

Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Apr 16, 2024.

Petitioner: Joseph W. Fischer.
Respondent: United States of America.

Advocates:

• Jeffrey T. Green (for the Petitioner)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

On January 6, 2021, while Congress was convening to certify the results of the 2020 presidential election in favor of Joe Biden, thousands of supporters of the losing candidate, Donald Trump, converged on the United States Capitol to disrupt the proceedings. The Trump supporters swarmed the building, overwhelming law enforcement officers who attempted to stop them. The chaos wrought by the mob forced members of Congress to stop the certification and flee for safety. Congress was not able to resume its work for six hours.

Joseph Fischer, Edward Lang, and Garret Miller were indicted for various offenses related to their involvement in the Capitol riot on January 6. All three were charged with felony offenses of assaulting, resisting, or impeding certain officers, and misdemeanor offenses of disorderly conduct in a Capitol building and in restricted grounds, involving the intent to disrupt congressional sessions and government functions. Additionally, each faced a count of obstruction of an official proceeding. The defendants challenged this obstruction charge, claiming that the statute does not prohibit their alleged conduct on that day. The district court agreed, holding that the statute does not apply to assaultive conduct, committed in furtherance of an attempt to stop Congress from performing a constitutionally required duty. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit reversed, concluding that the natural, broad reading of that provision is that it applies to forms of obstructive conduct, not just those related to investigations and evidence.

Question

Does 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c), which prohibits obstruction of congressional inquiries and investigations, include acts unrelated to investigations and evidence?

Chiaverini v. City of Napoleon, Ohio

Justia · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Apr 15, 2024.

Petitioner: Jascha Chiaverini, et al.
Respondent: City of Napoleon, Ohio, et al.

Advocates:

• Easha Anand (for the Petitioners)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Jascha Chiaverini, manager of the Diamond and Gold Outlet in Napoleon, Ohio, bought a men's ring and diamond earring from Brent Burns for $45. He recorded the transaction, including copying Burns' ID and photographing the items. Subsequently, David and Christina Hill contacted Chiaverini, claiming the jewelry was stolen from them. Chiaverini advised them to report to the police but denied buying their described items. After multiple calls, Chiaverini ended the conversation. Both parties contacted the police. Chiaverini expressed his suspicion about holding stolen property and requested police, not the Hills, to visit. When the police arrived, Chiaverini cooperated, providing information and photographs of the jewelry.

The situation escalated when Chiaverini received a conflicting "hold letter" from the police, instructing him to keep the items as evidence but also to release them to the Hills. Chiaverini refused to release the items, citing legal concerns and advice from his counsel. His confrontation with Police Chief Weitzel revealed Chiaverini's lack of a precious-metal-dealer license, prompting a new investigation angle. Officer Steward updated the police report to include Chiaverini's suspicion about the stolen nature of the items, which Chiaverini disputed. Based on these developments, warrants were issued for Chiaverini's arrest and the search of his store, leading to his temporary detention. Although a court later dismissed the criminal case against Chiaverini, he filed a complaint against the officers and the city, alleging various legal violations. The district court granted summary judgment to the officers, citing probable cause for Chiaverini's arrest and dismissing his claims. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed.

Question

May a Fourth Amendment malicious-prosecution claim proceed as to a baseless criminal charge so long as other charges brought alongside the baseless charge are supported by probable cause?