Louisiana v. Callais (Reargument)

Justia · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Oct 15, 2025.

Appellant: Louisiana.
Appellee: Phillip Callais, et al.

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

This case involves a challenge to Louisiana’s congressional redistricting map, specifically focusing on District 6, alleging that the map is an impermissible racial gerrymander. The map was created in response to a previous lawsuit, Robinson v. Ardoin, where plaintiffs argued that the prior map violated Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act by diluting minority votes. To address these issues, the Louisiana Legislature adopted a new map (Senate Bill 8) that included a second majority-Black district. However, the plaintiffs in this case claimed that this new map violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by prioritizing race in its creation. A three-judge panel concluded that District 6 of the new map did indeed violate the Equal Protection Clause, leading the court to issue an injunction against using this map in future elections.

Question

Does Louisiana’s creation of a second majority-Black congressional district constitute unconstitutional racial gerrymandering, even when drawn in response to a federal court finding that the state’s prior single majority-Black district likely violated Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act?

Case v. Montana

Justia · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Oct 15, 2025.

Petitioner: William Trevor Case.
Respondent: State of Montana.

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

In September 2021, Trevor Case’s ex-girlfriend J.H. called police to report that Case had threatened suicide during their phone conversation. J.H. believed Case was intoxicated due to his erratic behavior, and she became alarmed when he mentioned getting “a note or something like that” before committing suicide. During the call, J.H. heard clicking sounds resembling a cocking pistol, prompting her to tell Case she would call police. Case responded by threatening to harm any officers who came to his home. The call ended when J.H. heard a “pop” that she believed was a gunshot, followed by dead air, though the line remained connected. Unable to get Case to respond, J.H. contacted police and drove to his residence.

Law enforcement officers arrived at Case’s home and attempted to make contact by knocking on doors and calling through an open window, but received no response. Through the windows, officers observed empty beer cans, an empty handgun holster, and a notepad they believed contained a suicide note. The officers knew of Case’s history of alcohol abuse, mental health issues, and previous suicide threats, including an incident where he brought a weapon to the school where he taught. After approximately forty minutes on scene, officers made the decision to enter the home without a warrant to conduct a welfare check. They entered with weapons drawn due to J.H.’s report of Case's threats against officers. While clearing the home, Sergeant Pasha encountered Case in an upstairs bedroom closet. When Case suddenly opened the closet curtain, Pasha observed what he believed was a dark object at Case’s waist and shot him in the abdomen. A handgun was subsequently found in a laundry hamper next to where Case fell.

Case was charged with Assault on a Peace Officer and filed pretrial motions to suppress evidence obtained from the warrantless entry. The district court denied the motion to suppress. Following a jury trial in December 2022, Case was convicted of the felony charge. Case appealed to the Montana Supreme Court, which affirmed.

Question

May law enforcement enter a home without a search warrant based on less than probable cause that an emergency is occurring?

Bowe v. United States

Justia · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Oct 14, 2025.

Petitioner: Michael Bowe.
Respondent: United States of America.

Advocates:

• Andrew L. Adler (for the Petitioner)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

In 2008, Michael Bowe was charged with conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery, attempted Hobbs Act robbery, and using a firearm during a crime of violence. He pleaded guilty in 2009 and received a 288-month sentence, which included a mandatory consecutive 120-month term for the firearm conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). Starting in 2016, Bowe made multiple attempts to challenge his § 924(c) conviction through a series of motions and applications, arguing that changes in Supreme Court precedent (particularly Johnson v. United States and United States v. Davis) meant that his underlying crimes no longer qualified as “crimes of violence” that could support the firearm conviction.

The district court initially denied Bowe’s first § 2255 motion in 2016, finding that attempted Hobbs Act robbery still qualified as a crime of violence. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit then denied several subsequent applications from Bowe to file additional challenges, ultimately concluding in that it lacked jurisdiction to consider his latest application because he was attempting to raise the same claim he had already presented in previous applications.

Question

1. Does a rule requiring dismissal of repeat claims in state prisoner habeas petitions also apply to repeat claims in federal prisoner motions to vacate their sentences?

2. Does the Court have jurisdiction to review lower court decisions allowing or denying federal prisoners permission to file repeat challenges to their sentences?

Ellingburg v. United States

Justia · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Oct 14, 2025.

Petitioner: Holsey Ellingburg, Jr.
Respondent: United States of America.

Advocates:

• Amy M. Saharia (for the Petitioner)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

In December 1995, Holsey Ellingburg, Jr. robbed a bank and was indicted in April 1996. He was convicted in August 1996 and sentenced to prison, along with an order to pay over $7,500 in restitution under the Victim and Witness Protection Act (VWPA). Following his release from prison in June 2022, having paid only about one-quarter of the original restitution amount, Mr. Ellingburg filed a motion arguing that enforcement of his restitution order was unlawful. He claimed that the applicable 20-year payment period under the VWPA had expired and that applying a longer restitution term and mandatory interest provision under the later-enacted Mandatory Victim Restitution Act (MVRA) violated the Ex Post Facto Clause.

The district court rejected Mr. Ellingburg’s arguments and upheld the restitution order. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision.

Question

Is criminal restitution under the Mandatory Victim Restitution Act (MVRA) penal for purposes of the Ex Post Facto Clause?

Bost v. Illinois State Board of Elections

Justia · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Oct 8, 2025.

Petitioner: Michael J. Bost.
Respondent: Illinois State Board of Elections.

Advocates:

• Paul D. Clement (for the Petitioners)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Michael Bost, a multi-term U.S. Representative from Illinois’s 12th District, along with Laura Pollastrini and Susan Sweeney, political activists who served as presidential electors in 2020, challenged Illinois’s mail-in ballot receipt procedure. Under Illinois law, election officials can receive and count mail-in ballots for up to fourteen days after Election Day if the ballots are postmarked or certified by Election Day. Plaintiffs argued this procedure violates federal election statutes by impermissibly extending Election Day beyond the federally mandated date. They claimed the counting of these “untimely” ballots dilutes their votes and forces them to expend additional campaign resources to monitor ballot counting for two weeks after Election Day.

Plaintiffs filed suit in May 2022 against the Illinois State Board of Elections and its Executive Director. The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois dismissed the case, finding that Plaintiffs lacked Article III standing. The court also rejected their claims on the merits. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal on jurisdictional grounds.

Question

Do federal candidates have Article III standing to challenge state laws that allow mail-in ballots to be received and counted for two weeks after Election Day based on claims that such laws dilute their votes and force them to incur additional campaign expenses for extended ballot monitoring?

United States Postal Service v. Konan

Justia · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Oct 8, 2025.

Petitioner: United States Postal Service.
Respondent: Lebene Konan.

Advocates:

• Frederick Liu (for the Petitioners)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Lebene Konan, a Black property owner, leased two rental residences in Euless, Texas, and retrieved business and tenant mail from a central mailbox daily. In May 2020, United States Postal Service (USPS) employee Jason Rojas changed the lock on the mailbox at one of Konan's properties without her approval, halted mail delivery, and demanded ownership verification. Even after USPS’s Inspector General confirmed Konan’s ownership, Rojas and another USPS employee, Raymond Drake, allegedly continued marking mail addressed to Konan and her tenants as undeliverable. Konan claims this refusal of service extended to her second property and was racially motivated, causing loss of rental income and disruption of essential communications.

Konan sued USPS, Rojas, Drake, and the United States, raising claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) and alleging violations of the equal protection guarantees of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1985. The district court dismissed her FTCA claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the postal-matter exception, and her equal protection claims for failure to state a claim. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the equal protection claims but reversed on the FTCA claim, holding that sovereign immunity did not bar claims based on intentional acts of mail non-delivery.

Question

Does a claim that Postal Service employees intentionally refused to deliver mail to a designated address arise out of “the loss” or “miscarriage” of postal matter under the Federal Tort Claims Act’s postal-matter exception?

Chiles v. Salazar

Justia · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Oct 7, 2025.

Petitioner: Kaley Chiles.
Respondent: Patty Salazar.

Advocates:

• James A. Campbell (for the Petitioner)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Kaley Chiles is a licensed professional counselor practicing in Colorado Springs. She holds a master's degree in clinical mental health and provides talk therapy, specializing in clients dealing with addiction, trauma, sexuality, gender dysphoria, and other mental health concerns. Chiles identifies as a Christian and serves clients who often seek religiously informed care that aligns with traditional biblical understandings of sexuality and gender. Prior to the enactment of a 2019 Colorado law banning conversion therapy for minors, Chiles counseled clients, including minors, in accordance with their self-identified goals, which sometimes included diminishing same-sex attractions or aligning gender identity with biological sex. Since the law’s passage, Chiles has refrained from engaging in discussions with minors that she believes could be interpreted as conversion therapy and alleges that this has hampered her ability to provide full counseling services in line with her and her clients’ religious convictions.

In September 2022, Chiles brought a pre-enforcement lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Colorado officials responsible for enforcing the statute. She alleged that the ban on conversion therapy for minors violates her rights under the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment. Seeking a preliminary injunction, she asked the district court to block enforcement of the law against her. The court denied the motion but found she had standing to proceed. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed in full, holding that Colorado’s law regulates professional conduct that incidentally involves speech and survived rational basis review.

Question

Does a Colorado law banning “conversion therapy”—i.e., attempts to “convert” someone’s sexual orientation or gender identity—violate the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment?

Barrett v. United States

Justia · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Oct 7, 2025.

Petitioner: Dwayne Barrett.
Respondent: United States of America.

Advocates:

• Matthew B. Larsen (for the Petitioner)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Between August 2011 and January 2012, Dwayne Barrett and several co-conspirators carried out a string of armed robberies in New York, often using guns, knives, and threats of violence. On December 12, 2011, Barrett and two associates followed a minivan carrying the proceeds from a sale of untaxed cigarettes. While Barrett waited in the car, his accomplices held two men at gunpoint and stole the vehicle, which also contained $10,000 and a third victim, Gamar Dafalla. As he tried to discard some of the money during the getaway, Dafalla was fatally shot by one of the robbers. Later that day, Barrett took part in another robbery, threatening a victim’s life. He also helped dispose of the murder weapon and clean their vehicle with latex gloves and cleaning fluid to eliminate evidence.

Barrett was indicted on multiple counts, including conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery, two substantive counts of Hobbs Act robbery (one involving Dafalla’s murder), and separate firearms offenses, including a murder charge under 18 U.S.C. § 924(j). He was convicted in 2014 and originally sentenced to 90 years in prison. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit vacated one firearms conviction under the Supreme Court’s then-new decision in United States v. Davis. Barrett was resentenced to 50 years in 2021. After further appellate proceedings, the Second Circuit affirmed most of his convictions and sentence but vacated and remanded for resentencing in light of the Supreme Court’s 2023 decision in Lora v. United States, which held that § 924(j) does not require consecutive sentencing under § 924(c).

Question

Does the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment permit two sentences for an act that violates 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) and (j)?

Berk v. Choy

Justia · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Oct 6, 2025.

Petitioner: Harold R. Berk.
Respondent: Wilson C. Choy.

Advocates:

• Andrew T. Tutt (for the Petitioner)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Harold R. Berk injured his ankle and allegedly received negligent medical care from three healthcare providers: Dr. Wilson C. Choy, Beebe Medical Center, Inc., and Encompass Health Rehabilitation Hospital of Middletown, LLC. Believing he suffered harm due to their malpractice, Berk filed a lawsuit against them under Delaware law. Like many states, Delaware requires plaintiffs in medical negligence cases to submit an affidavit of merit (AOM)—a statement from a qualified expert certifying that the lawsuit has a reasonable basis—either with the complaint or within a short time after filing.

Berk failed to submit an AOM with his complaint and did not request an extension before the deadline passed. Because the Delaware statute treats the AOM requirement as mandatory, the district court dismissed his case. Berk appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, which affirmed the dismissal, concluding that the Delaware AOM statute is substantive and therefore must be enforced by a federal court sitting in diversity.

Question

Must a Delaware law providing that a complaint must be dismissed unless it is accompanied by an expert affidavit be enforced by a federal court sitting in diversity?

Villarreal v. Texas

Justia · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Oct 6, 2025.

Petitioner: David Asa Villarreal.
Respondent: State of Texas.

Advocates:

• Stuart Banner (for the Petitioner)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

David Asa Villarreal was charged with murder in Bexar County, Texas. During his trial, Villarreal took the stand in his own defense shortly before a planned midday recess. Because Villarreal was still in the middle of his direct examination when the court adjourned for an overnight recess, the trial judge instructed his attorneys not to confer with him regarding his ongoing testimony but permitted them to discuss other trial-related matters. Villarreal’s lead counsel objected to this limitation under the Sixth Amendment but otherwise indicated understanding of the court's directive. The next day, Villarreal resumed his testimony, and no further objections about the limitation were raised. Villarreal was ultimately convicted and sentenced to sixty years in prison.

Following his conviction, Villarreal appealed, arguing that the trial court’s restriction violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. A divided appeals court affirmed his conviction, and Villarreal petitioned for discretionary review, and the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas held that the trial judge’s limited no-conferral order did not violate Villarreal’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel.

Question

Does a trial court violate a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel by preventing the defendant and his lawyer from discussing the defendant’s testimony during an overnight break in the trial?