Olivier v. City of Brandon, Mississippi

Justia · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Dec 3, 2025.

Petitioner: Gabriel Olivier.
Respondent: City of Brandon, Mississippi, et al.

Advocates:

• Allyson N. Ho (for the Petitioner)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Gabriel Olivier was an evangelical Christian who regularly preached in public using signs and loudspeakers to convey religious messages. Between 2018 and 2019, he evangelized several times outside the Brandon Amphitheater, a city-owned venue in Brandon, Mississippi. In 2019, the city enacted an ordinance requiring protestors during live events to remain in a designated protest area, restricting use of loudspeakers and prohibiting non-handheld signs. In May 2021, Olivier returned to the Amphitheater during a concert to preach and was ordered by the police chief to move to the protest area. After briefly complying, Olivier returned to a more populated area, resulting in a citation for violating the ordinance. He pleaded no contest in municipal court, paid a fine, and did not appeal the conviction.

Olivier then filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi, seeking damages and an injunction to prevent future enforcement of the ordinance, arguing it violated his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The district court held that his claims were barred by the doctrine established in Heck v. Humphrey because success on them would necessarily imply the invalidity of his still-standing conviction. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed, modifying the dismissal to be with prejudice only until the conditions set by Heck were met.

Question

Does Heck v. Humphrey bar Section 1983 claims for purely prospective relief when the plaintiff has already been punished under the challenged law, and does that bar apply even if the plaintiff lacked access to federal habeas relief?

First Choice Women's Resource Centers, Inc. v. Platkin

Justia · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Dec 2, 2025.

Petitioner: First Choice Women's Resource Centers, Inc.
Respondent: Matthew J. Platkin, Attorney General of New Jersey.

Advocates:

• Erin M. Hawley (for the Petitioner)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

First Choice Women’s Resource Centers, Inc. is a nonprofit organization in New Jersey that operates a network of centers offering pregnancy-related services. In 2023, the New Jersey Division of Consumer Affairs began investigating First Choice over concerns that its client-facing websites downplayed its pro-life mission and may have misled donors and clients about its services, staff qualifications, and medical practices. State investigators identified possible discrepancies between what First Choice told donors—emphasizing a pro-life mission—and what was publicly communicated to potential clients on other websites. The investigation also scrutinized potentially misleading medical statements and questioned whether unlicensed staff were performing services that require medical credentials.

As part of its investigation, the State issued a non-self-executing subpoena to First Choice seeking internal documents, advertising material, substantiation for medical claims, and information on donors and licensed personnel. First Choice objected to the subpoena—particularly the requests for donor identities—arguing that complying would violate its constitutional rights, including freedom of association and donor privacy. While First Choice continued to raise these objections, the state filed a motion in New Jersey Superior Court to compel enforcement. The state court denied First Choice’s motion to quash the subpoena in full but did not order immediate production of documents. Instead, it instructed the parties to negotiate the subpoena’s scope, specifically reserved constitutional arguments for future resolution, and clarified that donor identities would be sought only for those who contributed through two specific websites. As a result, First Choice remained under no court order to turn over the disputed materials while negotiations continued.

While contesting the subpoena in state court, First Choice filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey, seeking federal relief to block enforcement on constitutional grounds. The district court twice dismissed the federal suit as unripe, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed, holding that the ongoing state court proceedings and the lack of any order compelling compliance rendered First Choice’s claims not ready for federal adjudication.

Question

When the recipient of a state investigatory subpoena demonstrates an objectively reasonable chill of its First Amendment rights, does a federal court lack jurisdiction to hear the case because those constitutional claims must first be resolved in state court?

Cox Communications, Inc. v. Sony Music Entertainment

Justia · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Dec 1, 2025.

Petitioner: Cox Communications, Inc.
Respondent: Sony Music Entertainment.

Advocates:

• E. Joshua Rosenkranz (for the Petitioners)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Cox Communications, Inc. is a major internet service provider selling internet, telephone, and cable television to millions across the United States. Between 2013 and 2014, some of Cox’s internet subscribers used peer-to-peer file-sharing networks, such as BitTorrent, to download and distribute copyrighted songs owned by numerous record companies and music publishers, including Sony Music Entertainment (the “Plaintiffs”). These record companies, through the Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA), hired a company called MarkMonitor to monitor illegal file sharing and notify internet service providers when infringement was detected. MarkMonitor sent Cox over 163,000 notices of infringement during the relevant period. In response, Cox operated a “thirteen-strike” policy, under which it warned or temporarily suspended subscribers after repeated notices, but in practice it rarely terminated service for copyright infringement, while regularly terminating service for nonpayment.

Plaintiffs became frustrated with Cox’s limited enforcement against repeat infringers and sued Cox instead of its subscribers, alleging that Cox was secondarily liable for copyright infringement occurring on its network. Specifically, plaintiffs contended Cox either intentionally contributed to or benefited from its subscribers’ infringements by failing to take adequate steps to stop it, thereby inducing or materially contributing to the unlawful acts.

The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia denied Cox statutory safe harbor under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) and allowed the case to proceed to trial on theories of vicarious and contributory copyright infringement. The jury found Cox liable on both counts and awarded $1 billion in statutory damages. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the jury’s finding of willful contributory infringement, reversed the vicarious liability verdict, and vacated the damages award, remanding the case for a new trial on damages.

Question

Can an internet service provider be held liable, and found to have acted willfully, for copyright infringement just because it knew users were infringing and did not terminate their access?

Urias-Orellana v. Bondi

Justia · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Dec 1, 2025.

Petitioner: Douglas Humberto Urias-Orellana.
Respondent: Pamela Bondi, Attorney General.

Advocates:

• Nicholas Rosellini (for the Petitioners)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Douglas Humberto Urias-Orellana, a Salvadoran citizen, fled to the United States with his wife and minor child after facing threats from Wilfredo, a local hitman. The violence began in 2016 when Wilfredo shot and seriously injured Urias-Orellana’s two half-brothers in separate incidents. Wilfredo then vowed to kill their entire family. Over the next several years, Urias-Orellana was repeatedly threatened at gunpoint by masked men demanding money and warning they would harm him like his brothers. In December 2020, he was physically assaulted in his hometown, with the attackers striking him three times in the chest.

To escape these threats, Urias-Orellana and his family relocated multiple times within El Salvador. They lived peacefully in some locations for extended periods but encountered problems when returning to areas near his hometown. After noticing his attackers searching for him in early 2021, the family entered the United States without authorization in June 2021.

The Department of Homeland Security charged Petitioners with removability for illegal entry. They applied for asylum based on persecution of their family group, with Urias-Orellana also seeking protection under the Convention Against Torture. The Immigration Judge denied their applications, finding the harm did not constitute persecution and that they could safely relocate within El Salvador. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed, leading to this petition for review before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. The First Circuit denied the petition for review, upholding the Board of Immigration Appeals’ decision on all claims.

Question

Must a federal court of appeals defer to the BIA’s judgment that a given set of undisputed facts does not demonstrate mistreatment severe enough to constitute “persecution” under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)?

Fernandez v. United States

Justia · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Nov 12, 2025.

Petitioner: Joe Fernandez.
Respondent: United States of America.

Advocates:

• Benjamin Gruenstein (for the Petitioner)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Joe Fernandez participated as a backup shooter in a 2000 murder-for-hire scheme in the Bronx. On February 22, 2000, Patrick Darge hired him to help kill Arturo Cuellar and Idelfonso Vivero Flores, two Mexican drug cartel members who had come to New York City to collect approximately $6.5 million owed by drug trafficker Jeffrey Minaya for 274 kilograms of cocaine. When Darge's gun jammed after shooting Cuellar in the head, Fernandez fired fourteen shots in the apartment building lobby, nine hitting the victims. He received $40,000 for his participation. After eleven years on the run, Fernandez surrendered to police in October 2011.

Unlike his co-defendants who pleaded guilty and cooperated with the government, Fernandez proceeded to trial in 2013. The government's key witness was Patrick Darge, who admitted during cross-examination to lying to authorities in previous cases. Despite this admission, the jury convicted Fernandez of participating in a murder-for-hire conspiracy resulting in two deaths and aiding and abetting the use of a firearm to commit murder during a crime of violence. In October 2014, he received a mandatory life sentence, while his cooperating co-defendants received significantly lighter sentences: Darge (30 years), Reyes (25 years), Minaya (15 years), and Rivera (2 years).

The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York originally sentenced Fernandez, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed his conviction on direct appeal in 2016. In 2021, the district court vacated one of his convictions but left the mandatory life sentence intact. When Fernandez filed a compassionate release motion citing his possible innocence and sentencing disparity, the district court granted it in 2022, but the Second Circuit reversed this decision.

Question

Can a federal prisoner use the compassionate release law to get their sentence reduced based on claims that they might be innocent or that their sentence is unfair, even though these same claims would normally have to be raised through habeas corpus?

Rutherford v. United States

Justia · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Nov 12, 2025.

Petitioner: Daniel Rutherford.
Respondent: United States of America.

Advocates:

• David C. Frederick (for the Petitioner in No. 24-820)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

In 2003, twenty-two-year-old Daniel Rutherford committed two armed robberies at a Pennsylvania chiropractic office within a five-day period. During the first robbery, he brandished a gun at the chiropractor and stole $390 and a watch. Four days later, he returned to the same office with an accomplice, again pulled a gun, and stole $900 in cash and jewelry.

A jury convicted Rutherford of one count of conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery, two counts of Hobbs Act robbery, and two counts of using a firearm during a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). The district court sentenced Rutherford to 125 months for the robbery-related charges plus mandatory consecutive sentences of 7 years for the first § 924(c) offense and 25 years for the second, totaling nearly 42.5 years in prison. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed his conviction in 2007, and he did not appeal his sentence. In 2021, Rutherford filed a motion for compassionate release, arguing that changes in federal sentencing law would result in a significantly shorter sentence if he were sentenced today. The district court denied his motion in 2023, and the Third Circuit affirmed the lower court’s denial.

Question

May a district court, when evaluating a motion for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), consider as an “extraordinary and compelling reason” the fact that a defendant is serving a sentence substantially longer than what would be imposed today due to the First Step Act’s prospective changes to mandatory minimum penalties, particularly where the disparity amounts to decades of additional imprisonment?

Landor v. Louisiana Department of Corrections

Justia · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Nov 10, 2025.

Petitioner: Damon Landor.
Respondent: Louisiana Department of Corrections and Public Safety.

Advocates:

• Zachary D. Tripp (for the Petitioner)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Damon Landor, a devout Rastafarian, vowed as part of his faith never to cut his hair—a religious commitment known as the Nazarite Vow. Incarcerated in 2020, Landor was first held at the St. Tammany Parish Detention Center and later at LaSalle Correctional Center, both of which allowed him to maintain his hairstyle in accordance with his religious beliefs. After approximately five months and with three weeks left in his sentence, Landor was transferred to Raymond Laborde Correctional Center. Upon arrival, Landor proactively explained his religious practices and presented documentation of previous accommodations, including a copy of a federal court decision supporting similar claims. An intake guard disregarded his documentation, summoned the warden, and upon Landor’s inability to produce immediate additional proof of his beliefs, guards forcibly handcuffed Landor and shaved his head.

Following his release, Landor sued the Louisiana Department of Corrections and Public Safety, its Secretary James LeBlanc, the correctional center, and Warden Marcus Myers, asserting claims under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of his federal constitutional rights, as well as state law claims.

The U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana dismissed Landor’s individual-capacity RLUIPA claims for money damages, holding such relief unavailable under controlling Fifth Circuit precedent. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed, relying on its prior decision in Sossamon v. Lone Star State of Texas, and rejecting Landor’s arguments that subsequent Supreme Court authority or other legal developments altered that result.

Question

May an individual sue a government official in his individual capacity for damages for violations of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA)?

The GEO Group, Inc. v. Menocal

Justia · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Nov 10, 2025.

Petitioner: The GEO Group, Inc.
Respondent: Alejandro Menocal.

Advocates:

• Dominic E. Draye (for the Petitioner)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Alejandro Menocal and other immigration detainees brought a class action lawsuit against The GEO Group, Inc. (GEO), a private company that operates the Aurora Immigration Processing Center (AIPC) in Colorado under contract with U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). GEO maintained a mandatory Sanitation Policy requiring all detainees to clean common areas including walls, floors, bathrooms, and recreation yards. Detainees who refused these cleaning assignments faced escalating disciplinary actions, beginning with suspension of television and phone privileges and potentially resulting in solitary confinement for up to seventy-two hours. Menocal, detained from June to September 2014, witnessed fellow detainees placed in isolation for refusing to clean, and multiple detainees testified to being threatened with or actually placed in solitary confinement for noncompliance. Additionally, AIPC operated a Voluntary Work Program where detainees could work up to eight hours daily in various jobs such as food preparation, barbering, and laundry services for compensation of $1.00 per day.

Menocal filed suit in October 2014, alleging forced labor under the Trafficking Victims Protection Act for the mandatory cleaning program and unjust enrichment under Colorado common law for the $1.00 daily wage in the Voluntary Work Program. The U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado certified two classes in 2017, which the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed in 2018. Following discovery, GEO moved for summary judgment claiming derivative sovereign immunity under Yearsley v. W.A. Ross Construction Co. The district court denied GEO's motion in October 2022, finding that ICE neither directed nor required GEO to compel detainee labor or limit compensation to $1.00 per day. GEO appealed this denial to the Tenth Circuit, which dismissed for lack of appellate jurisdiction.

Question

Is an order denying a government contractor’s claim of derivative sovereign immunity immediately appealable under the collateral-order doctrine?

Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump

Justia · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Nov 5, 2025.

Petitioner: Learning Resources, Inc., et al.
Respondent: Donald J. Trump, President of the United States, et al.

Advocates:

• D. John Sauer (for the federal parties)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Learning Resources, Inc. and hand2mind, Inc. are family-owned businesses that design and distribute educational products for children. Although their product development and some assembly occur domestically, most of their manufacturing is outsourced to international partners, including China. Beginning in early 2025, a series of executive orders from President Donald J. Trump, invoking the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (“IEEPA”), imposed unprecedented tariffs on imports, including goods from China. These included a 20% “trafficking” tariff and additional “reciprocal” tariffs that pushed rates on Chinese goods to over 145%. Petitioners’ imports were directly affected, and complying with the new tariffs would increase their import-related costs from $2.3 million in 2024 to over $100 million in 2025, putting their businesses at existential risk.

The petitioners filed suit on April 22, 2025, in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, challenging the legality of the IEEPA tariffs. The district court granted a preliminary injunction on May 29, 2025, holding that IEEPA does not authorize the president to impose tariffs and finding that the tariffs posed an existential threat to the petitioners. However, that ruling was stayed just days later, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit docketed the case. Meanwhile, the U.S. Court of International Trade ruled similarly in related cases but its decision was also stayed by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.

Question

Does the International Emergency Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (“IEEPA”), authorize the president to impose tariffs?

Coney Island Auto Parts Unlimited, Inc. v. Burton

Justia · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Nov 4, 2025.

Petitioner: Coney Island Auto Parts Unlimited, Inc.
Respondent: Jeanne Ann Burton.

Advocates:

• Daniel Ginzburg (for the Petitioner)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

In November 2014, Vista-Pro Automotive, LLC, a Nashville-based auto-parts corporation, entered bankruptcy proceedings in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Tennessee. In 2015, Vista-Pro—later represented by its Chapter 7 trustee—filed an adversary proceeding against Coney Island Auto Parts Unlimited, Inc., a New York corporation, to recover about $50,000 in unpaid invoices. Vista-Pro mailed the summons and complaint to Coney Island’s Brooklyn address addressed only to the corporate entity, not to any officer, agent, or individual as required for proper service under the rules governing service on corporations. Coney Island did not respond to the complaint, leading the bankruptcy court in May 2015 to enter a default judgment against it.

Following reconversion of the case to a Chapter 7 proceeding, the trustee repeatedly attempted to collect the judgment. Coney Island received notice of the judgment at least as early as April 2016 when its CEO was sent a demand letter. Years later, after the trustee sought to enforce the judgment by freezing Coney Island’s bank assets in New York, Coney Island sought to vacate the default judgment, arguing that it was void due to improper service and lack of personal jurisdiction.

The bankruptcy court and later the district court denied Coney Island’s motion to vacate the judgment as untimely. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that under its precedents interpreting Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(c)(1), motions to vacate void judgments must be filed within a reasonable time.

Question

Does Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(c)(1) impose any time limit to set aside a void default judgment for lack of personal jurisdiction?