Trump v. CASA Inc.

Justia · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on May 15, 2025.

Petitioner: Donald J. Trump, President of the United States, et al.
Respondent: CASA, Inc., et al.

Advocates:

• D. John Sauer (for the Applicants)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Question

Oklahoma Statewide Charter School Board v. Drummond

Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Apr 30, 2025.

Petitioner: Oklahoma Statewide Charter School Board.
Respondent: Gentner Drummond, Attorney General for the State of Oklahoma.

Advocates:

• James A. Campbell (for the Petitioners in No. 24-394)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Gentner Drummond, the Attorney General for the State of Oklahoma, filed an action against the Oklahoma Statewide Virtual Charter School Board and its members seeking to invalidate their contract with St. Isidore of Seville Catholic Virtual School. St. Isidore, supported by the Archdiocese of Oklahoma City and the Diocese of Tulsa, aims to operate as a Catholic virtual charter school. In creating this contract, the Charter School Board recognized religious rights and entitlements for St. Isidore, which deviated from the standard expectation that charter schools remain nonsectarian under Oklahoma law.

On June 5 and October 9, 2023, the Charter School Board approvingly voted for St. Isidore's application and contract, both by a 3-2 margin. The contract omitted standard provisions prohibiting religious affiliation while affirming St. Isidore’s religious mission, which the State contends violates the Oklahoma Constitution, the Oklahoma Charter Schools Act, and the Establishment Clause of the federal Constitution. Consequently, the State requested a writ of mandamus to rescind the contract, arguing that the use of public funds for a sectarian institution contravenes legal and constitutional prohibitions.

The Supreme Court of Oklahoma assumed original jurisdiction and granted belated relief to the State, holding that the contract violated state and federal law, including constitutional provisions prohibiting government establishment of religion.

Question

1. Are a privately owned and operated school’s educational decisions considered state action simply because the school has a contract with the state to provide free education to students? 

2. Does the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause prohibit, or the Establishment Clause require, a state to exclude religious schools from its charter-school program?

Martin v. United States

Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Apr 29, 2025.

Petitioner: Curtrina Martin.
Respondent: United States of America.

Advocates:

• Patrick M. Jaicomo (for the Petitioners)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

In October 2017, six FBI agents, led by Special Agent Lawrence Guerra, mistakenly executed a no-knock search warrant at the home of Curtrina Martin and her family in Atlanta, Georgia. The intended target was a nearby home suspected to contain violent gang member Joseph Riley. Due to similarities between the two properties and issues with navigating to the correct address, the agents entered Martin’s home instead. The SWAT team, in full tactical gear, entered the house, causing fear and distress to its occupants. They later realized the mistake and promptly left the scene, later apologizing and assuring the family that the FBI would handle any damages.

Martin and her family sued the U.S. government and the agents, claiming violations of their Fourth Amendment rights and seeking damages under Georgia state law. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the decision, ruling that the agents were entitled to qualified immunity and that the Federal Tort Claims Act claims were barred by the Supremacy Clause and the discretionary function exception.

Question

1. Does the Supremacy Clause prevent individuals from suing the federal government under the Federal Tort Claims Act when federal employees’ actions, even if negligent or wrongful, are related to carrying out federal policy and can be interpreted as following federal laws?

2. Is the discretionary-function exception, which usually protects the government from being sued for certain decisions made by its employees, always inapplicable when dealing with claims related to law enforcement officers’ actions that fall under the intentional torts category?

Laboratory Corporation of America Holdings v. Davis

Justia · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Apr 29, 2025.

Petitioner: Luke Davis.
Respondent: Laboratory Corporation of America Holdings.

Advocates:

• Noel J. Francisco (for the Petitioner)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Julian Vargas, who is blind, encountered inaccessible check-in kiosks at LabCorp facilities. Vargas attempted to use these kiosks but was unable due to their lack of accessibility for visually impaired individuals. As a result, he had to wait for assistance from a staff member, which delayed his check-in and denied him equal access to services such as maintaining his spot in the queue or updating personal information privately. Vargas claimed that this lack of accessibility infringed on his rights under disability laws, leading to the lawsuit. The district court certified two classes: a California class for Unruh Civil Rights Act claims and a nationwide class for claims under the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, and the Affordable Care Act. LabCorp appealed the class certification, arguing that the plaintiffs lacked standing, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision.

Question

May a federal court certify a class action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) when some members of the proposed class lack any Article III injury?

A.J.T. v. Osseo Area Schools, Independent School District No. 279

Justia · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Apr 28, 2025.

Petitioner: A.J.T.
Respondent: Osseo Area Schools, Independent School District No. 279.

Advocates:

• Roman Martinez (for the Petitioner)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

A.J.T., a student with epilepsy, experiences seizures so severe in the morning that she cannot attend school until noon. Her parents repeatedly requested evening instruction from Osseo Area Schools to give her a school day length more comparable to her peers. Despite the District providing some accommodations, including one-on-one instruction, a slightly extended school day, and summer home instruction sessions, they denied the requests for evening instruction. The District’s Director of Student Services, responsible for Section 504 compliance, was unaware of the parents’ complaints and did not know that District policies allowed at-home schooling as an accommodation. A.J.T., through her parents, sued the District for disability discrimination under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the District, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed.

Question

Do the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 and Rehabilitation Act of 1973 require children with disabilities to satisfy a “bad faith or gross misjudgment” standard when seeking relief for discrimination relating to their education?

Soto v. United States

Justia · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Apr 28, 2025.

Petitioner: Simon A. Soto.
Respondent: United States of America.

Advocates:

• Tacy F. Flint (for the Petitioner)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Simon Soto, a Marine Corps veteran with a combat-related disability, was medically retired in 2006 with less than 20 years of service. Although he became eligible for Combat-Related Special Compensation (CRSC) in 2009 when he received his disability rating, he did not apply until 2016. The Navy used the Barring Act’s six-year limitation period to calculate his retroactive payments, giving him payments dating back only to 2010 instead of to 2008 when Congress had expanded CRSC eligibility to veterans with less than 20 years of service. Soto filed a class action lawsuit on behalf of himself and other similarly situated veterans who received only six years of back payments, arguing that the CRSC statute’s own procedures should apply instead of the Barring Act’s six-year limit.

The district court granted summary judgment to Soto’s class, holding that the CRSC statute was more specific and therefore superseded the Barring Act. The court also applied the pro-veteran canon of statutory interpretation, resolving any doubt in favor of the veterans. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed.

Question

When disabled combat veterans claim past-due compensation, should the military use the CRSC statute's rules to calculate how far back they can be paid, or should it use the Barring Act's six-year limit?

Diamond Alternative Energy LLC v. Environmental Protection Agency

Justia · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Apr 23, 2025.

Petitioner: Diamond Alternative Energy LLC.
Respondent: Environmental Protection Agency.

Advocates:

• Jeffrey B. Wall (for the Petitioners)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

In 2012, California applied for a waiver from the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to implement its Advanced Clean Car Program, which included two key components: a Low Emission Vehicle Program to reduce carbon dioxide emissions by 34% for new cars in Model Years 2017-2025, and a Zero Emission Vehicle Program requiring about 15% of manufacturers’ fleets to be electric cars by 2025. The EPA granted this waiver in 2013, and automobile manufacturers began investing to meet these requirements.

However, in 2019, under a different administration, the EPA withdrew the 2013 waiver, arguing that state greenhouse gas regulations were preempted by federal fuel economy standards, that California’s standards weren’t necessary to meet “compelling and extraordinary conditions,” and that California could not show a direct connection between greenhouse gas emissions and its air pollution problems. After this withdrawal, several automakers like Honda, Ford, and BMW voluntarily agreed to continue meeting California’s standards due to their existing investments and growing consumer demand for electric vehicles. In 2022, under yet another administration, the EPA reversed course again and reinstated the 2013 waiver, prompting challenges from various states and fuel industry groups who argued that California should not receive special treatment and that climate change is not a “compelling and extraordinary condition” justifying state-specific standards. California, environmental organizations, and automobile manufacturers intervened to defend the EPA’s decision.

The D.C. Circuit dismissed most of the claims for lack of standing, finding that challengers had not shown that their injuries were redressable by a favorable decision.

Question

May a party establish the redressability component of Article III standing by pointing to the coercive and predictable effects of regulation on third parties?

Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Zuch

Justia · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Apr 22, 2025.

Petitioner: Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
Respondent: Jennifer Zuch.

Advocates:

• Erica L. Ross (for the Petitioner)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

In 2010 and 2011, while still married, Jennifer Zuch and Patrick Gennardo made two estimated tax payments totaling $50,000 for their 2010 taxes, without specifying how to allocate the payments between them. In September 2012, after filing separate tax returns, Gennardo reported owing $385,393 while Zuch reported an overpayment. The IRS applied the entire $50,000 in estimated payments to Gennardo’s liability. When Zuch later filed an amended return reporting additional income and claiming her share of the $50,000, the IRS assessed the additional tax but did not credit her for any portion of the estimated payments, even after Gennardo filed his own amended return indicating the payments should be allocated to Zuch.

In August 2013, the IRS notified Zuch of its intent to levy her property to collect approximately $36,000 in unpaid 2010 taxes. During the ensuing Collection Due Process hearing, Zuch challenged her underlying tax liability, arguing she was entitled to credit for the estimated payments. Meanwhile, over several years while Zuch was disputing her 2010 liability, the IRS repeatedly took her tax refunds from other years and applied them to what it calculated as her 2010 liability, eventually reducing the balance to zero by April 2019.

The case went through the Tax Court, which initially denied summary judgment and remanded to the IRS Office of Appeals. When the balance was reduced to zero through the IRS’s seizure of Zuch's later tax refunds, the Tax Court dismissed the case as moot. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed, holding that the IRS cannot eliminate Tax Court jurisdiction over a disputed tax liability simply by seizing a taxpayer’s refunds to cover the contested debt.

Question

Does a proceeding under 26 U.S.C. § 6330 for a pre-deprivation determination about a levy proposed by the Internal Revenue Service to collect unpaid taxes become moot when there is no longer a live dispute over the proposed levy that gave rise to the proceeding?

Mahmoud v. Taylor

Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Apr 22, 2025.

Petitioner: Tamer Mahmoud.
Respondent: Thomas W. Taylor.

Advocates:

• Eric S. Baxter (for the Petitioners)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

In October 2022, Montgomery County Public Schools in Maryland approved LGBTQ-inclusive books for its English Language Arts curriculum. These “Storybooks” featured characters and themes related to sexual orientation and gender identity, including books like “Pride Puppy!” for pre-K students and “Born Ready: The True Story of a Boy Named Penelope” for K-5 students. Initially, the school board allowed parents to receive notice and opt their children out of lessons involving these books, in line with the district’s guidelines for religious accommodations. However, in March 2023, the Board abruptly reversed this policy, eliminating all notice and opt-out options without explanation, though they later cited concerns about high student absenteeism, classroom disruption, administrative burden, and potential stigmatization of individuals represented in the books.

Several parents of different religious backgrounds (Muslim, Roman Catholic, and Ukrainian Orthodox) sued the Board, arguing that the denial of notice and opt-out options violated their religious freedom and parental rights. The parents did not seek to ban the books or challenge their adoption into the curriculum; rather, they sought to maintain control over how and when their children would be exposed to content they believed conflicted with their religious duties to train their children according to their faiths on matters of gender, marriage, and sexuality.

The district court denied the parents’ motion for a preliminary injunction, finding the parents failed to demonstrate a cognizable burden to their religious freedom, and the parents filed an interlocutory appeal, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial.

Question

Do public schools burden parents’ religious exercise when they compel elementary school children to participate in instruction on gender and sexuality against their parents’ religious convictions and without notice or opportunity to opt out?

Kennedy v. Braidwood Management, Inc.

Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Apr 21, 2025.

Petitioner: Robert F. Kennedy, Jr., Secretary of Health and Human Services.
Respondent: Braidwood Management, Inc.

Advocates:

• Hashim M. Mooppan (for the Petitioners)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

In 2010, Congress passed the Affordable Care Act (ACA), which requires private insurers to cover certain preventive-care services without cost sharing. Rather than defining these services directly, the ACA empowers three agencies within the Department of Health and Human Services to determine required services: the United States Preventive Services Task Force (Task Force), the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP), and the Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA). The Task Force consists of sixteen volunteer experts serving four-year terms, ACIP has fifteen members selected by the HHS Secretary, and HRSA operates through offices and bureaus reporting to the HHS Secretary.

Over the years, these agencies issued various preventive care recommendations, including ACIP’s 2007 recommendation for HPV vaccines, HRSA’s 2011 guidelines for contraceptive coverage, and the Task Force’s 2019 recommendation for HIV prevention drugs (PrEP). Four individuals and two Christian-based businesses in Texas challenged these requirements, arguing that mandatory coverage of these services violated their religious beliefs by making them “complicit in facilitating homosexual behavior, drug use, and sexual activity outside of marriage between one man and one woman.”

The plaintiffs filed suit in 2020 against the federal government and various department secretaries, primarily arguing that the structure of these agencies violated the Appointments Clause of the Constitution. The district court ruled in their favor regarding the Task Force but rejected their challenges to ACIP and HRSA, and both parties appealed. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the Task Force’s structure violated the Appointments Clause and upheld the injunction against enforcing its recommendations, but reversed the district court’s universal remedies and remanded for further consideration of whether HHS properly ratified ACIP and HRSA’s recommendations.

Question

Does the structure of the U.S. Preventive Services Task Force violate the Constitution’s Appointments Clause, and if so, is the provision that insulates the task force from the Health & Human Services secretary’s supervision severable from the rest of the statute?