Hamm v. Smith

Justia · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Dec 10, 2025.

Petitioner: John Q. Hamm, Commissioner, Alabama Department of Corrections.
Respondent: Joseph Clifton Smith.

Advocates:

• Robert M. Overing (for the Petitioner)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Joseph Clifton Smith was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death in Alabama. Years later, Smith filed a federal habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, seeking to overturn his death sentence on grounds that he is intellectually disabled and therefore cannot be executed under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The central issue in Smith’s case involved determining whether he met the three-prong test for intellectual disability: significantly subaverage intellectual functioning, significant deficits in adaptive behavior, and manifestation of these qualities before age 18.

Smith's IQ testing revealed multiple scores—72, 74, 75, 74, and 78—that fell within or near the range associated with intellectual disability when accounting for standard error of measurement. His experts testified that four of his five scores were consistent with mild intellectual disability, while the state’s expert, Dr. King, argued that Smith’s multiple scores placed him in the borderline range just above intellectual disability. After extensive evidentiary hearings featuring competing expert testimony about both Smith’s IQ scores and his adaptive functioning deficits, the district court found Smith intellectually disabled.

The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Alabama granted Smith’s habeas petition and vacated his death sentence. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed this decision, but the Supreme Court granted certiorari and remanded the case, asking the Eleventh Circuit to clarify whether its ruling relied solely on the lower end of Smith's IQ score range or on a holistic analysis of all evidence. On remand, the Eleventh Circuit explained that its reasoning was based on a holistic analysis.

Question

When a capital defendant has taken multiple IQ tests with varying results, how should courts evaluate the cumulative effect of those scores to determine whether the defendant has significantly subaverage intellectual functioning under Atkins v. Virginia?

FS Credit Opportunities Corp. v. Saba Capital Master Fund, Ltd.

Justia · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Dec 10, 2025.

Petitioner: FS Credit Opportunities Corp.
Respondent: Saba Capital Master Fund, Ltd.

Advocates:

• Shay Dvoretzky (for the Petitioners and BlackRock Respondents supporting the Petitioners)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Investment funds organized as closed-end mutual funds under Maryland law adopted “control share provisions” that stripped voting rights from shareholders who owned 10% or more of a fund’s shares. These provisions were adopted in response to activist investor Saba Capital, which had been acquiring large positions in underperforming closed-end funds with the goal of unlocking shareholder value through various strategies, including electing new directors and advocating for share buybacks.

Saba Capital sued sixteen closed-end funds in June 2023, seeking rescission of these control share provisions. Saba argued that the provisions violated Section 18(i) of the Investment Company Act (ICA), which requires that “every share of stock shall be a voting stock and have equal voting rights with every other outstanding stock.” Saba brought its lawsuit under Section 47(b) of the ICA, relying on Second Circuit precedent that recognized an implied private right of action for parties seeking to rescind contracts that violate the ICA.

The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York granted summary judgment in favor of Saba against eleven of the funds (five were dismissed due to forum selection clauses requiring suit in Maryland). The district court held that the control share provisions violated the ICA’s equal voting rights mandate and ordered their rescission. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed this decision in a summary order.

Question

Does Section 47(b) of the ICA, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-46 (b), create an implied private right of action?

National Republican Senatorial Committee v. Federal Election Commission

Justia · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Dec 9, 2025.

Petitioner: National Republican Senatorial Committee.
Respondent: Federal Election Commission.

Advocates:

• Noel J. Francisco (for the Petitioners)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

In 2022, two Republican party committees—the National Republican Senatorial Committee and the National Republican Congressional Committee—along with then-Senator J.D. Vance and then-Representative Steve Chabot, sued the Federal Election Commission (FEC). The Republican committees asserted that the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA) unconstitutionally restricts their ability to coordinate campaign advertising with their own candidates. This coordination allows the party and its candidates to unify their political message and spend money more efficiently. For example, in the 2021-2022 election cycle, the senatorial committee spent about $15.5 million and the congressional committee spent about $8.3 million on such coordinated expenditures, which primarily fund political advertising.

The plaintiffs argue that developments since a 2001 Supreme Court decision, FEC v. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee (Colorado II), which upheld these same limits, have rendered that decision obsolete. Specifically, they point to changes in campaign finance law, the rise of “Super PACs,” and shifts in the Supreme Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence as reasons the restrictions no longer pass constitutional muster.

The plaintiffs filed their lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio. As required by FECA for constitutional challenges, the district court certified the legal question to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit sitting en banc. The Sixth Circuit concluded that the FECA’s limits on coordinated campaign expenditures do not violate the First Amendment and denied both the facial and as-applied challenges brought by the plaintiffs.

Question

Do FECA limits on coordinated party expenditures in 52 U.S.C. § 30116 violate the First Amendment, either on their face or as applied to party spending in connection with “party coordinated communications”?

Trump v. Slaughter

Justia · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Dec 8, 2025.

Petitioner: Donald J. Trump, President of the United States, et al.
Respondent: Rebecca Kelly Slaughter, et al.

Advocates:

• D. John Sauer (for the Petitioners)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Rebecca Kelly Slaughter was serving as a Commissioner on the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), an agency led by five commissioners appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate to seven-year terms. The Federal Trade Commission Act limits the President’s ability to remove an FTC Commissioner to “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.” President Donald J. Trump fired Commissioner Slaughter, explaining her continued service was “inconsistent with [the] Administration’s priorities,” which did not meet the statutory standard of “cause.” Slaughter sued President Trump and the three remaining FTC Commissioners, arguing her removal was unlawful because the President failed to offer a statutory cause.

The district court ruled in favor of Commissioner Slaughter, declaring her removal unlawful, ordering her reinstatement, and issuing a permanent injunction against the remaining Commissioners and their subordinates, barring them from interfering with her duties. The government appealed the decision and requested a stay of the district court's order pending the appeal. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit denied the government’s motion for a stay pending appeal and dissolved an administrative stay that had been previously entered. The Supreme Court granted the stay on September 22, 2025, and also granted certiorari.

Question

Do the statutory removal protections for members of the Federal Trade Commission violate the separation of powers?

Olivier v. City of Brandon, Mississippi

Justia · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Dec 3, 2025.

Petitioner: Gabriel Olivier.
Respondent: City of Brandon, Mississippi, et al.

Advocates:

• Allyson N. Ho (for the Petitioner)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Gabriel Olivier was an evangelical Christian who regularly preached in public using signs and loudspeakers to convey religious messages. Between 2018 and 2019, he evangelized several times outside the Brandon Amphitheater, a city-owned venue in Brandon, Mississippi. In 2019, the city enacted an ordinance requiring protestors during live events to remain in a designated protest area, restricting use of loudspeakers and prohibiting non-handheld signs. In May 2021, Olivier returned to the Amphitheater during a concert to preach and was ordered by the police chief to move to the protest area. After briefly complying, Olivier returned to a more populated area, resulting in a citation for violating the ordinance. He pleaded no contest in municipal court, paid a fine, and did not appeal the conviction.

Olivier then filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi, seeking damages and an injunction to prevent future enforcement of the ordinance, arguing it violated his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The district court held that his claims were barred by the doctrine established in Heck v. Humphrey because success on them would necessarily imply the invalidity of his still-standing conviction. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed, modifying the dismissal to be with prejudice only until the conditions set by Heck were met.

Question

Does Heck v. Humphrey bar Section 1983 claims for purely prospective relief when the plaintiff has already been punished under the challenged law, and does that bar apply even if the plaintiff lacked access to federal habeas relief?

First Choice Women's Resource Centers, Inc. v. Platkin

Justia · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Dec 2, 2025.

Petitioner: First Choice Women's Resource Centers, Inc.
Respondent: Matthew J. Platkin, Attorney General of New Jersey.

Advocates:

• Erin M. Hawley (for the Petitioner)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

First Choice Women’s Resource Centers, Inc. is a nonprofit organization in New Jersey that operates a network of centers offering pregnancy-related services. In 2023, the New Jersey Division of Consumer Affairs began investigating First Choice over concerns that its client-facing websites downplayed its pro-life mission and may have misled donors and clients about its services, staff qualifications, and medical practices. State investigators identified possible discrepancies between what First Choice told donors—emphasizing a pro-life mission—and what was publicly communicated to potential clients on other websites. The investigation also scrutinized potentially misleading medical statements and questioned whether unlicensed staff were performing services that require medical credentials.

As part of its investigation, the State issued a non-self-executing subpoena to First Choice seeking internal documents, advertising material, substantiation for medical claims, and information on donors and licensed personnel. First Choice objected to the subpoena—particularly the requests for donor identities—arguing that complying would violate its constitutional rights, including freedom of association and donor privacy. While First Choice continued to raise these objections, the state filed a motion in New Jersey Superior Court to compel enforcement. The state court denied First Choice’s motion to quash the subpoena in full but did not order immediate production of documents. Instead, it instructed the parties to negotiate the subpoena’s scope, specifically reserved constitutional arguments for future resolution, and clarified that donor identities would be sought only for those who contributed through two specific websites. As a result, First Choice remained under no court order to turn over the disputed materials while negotiations continued.

While contesting the subpoena in state court, First Choice filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey, seeking federal relief to block enforcement on constitutional grounds. The district court twice dismissed the federal suit as unripe, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed, holding that the ongoing state court proceedings and the lack of any order compelling compliance rendered First Choice’s claims not ready for federal adjudication.

Question

When the recipient of a state investigatory subpoena demonstrates an objectively reasonable chill of its First Amendment rights, does a federal court lack jurisdiction to hear the case because those constitutional claims must first be resolved in state court?

Cox Communications, Inc. v. Sony Music Entertainment

Justia · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Dec 1, 2025.

Petitioner: Cox Communications, Inc.
Respondent: Sony Music Entertainment.

Advocates:

• E. Joshua Rosenkranz (for the Petitioners)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Cox Communications, Inc. is a major internet service provider selling internet, telephone, and cable television to millions across the United States. Between 2013 and 2014, some of Cox’s internet subscribers used peer-to-peer file-sharing networks, such as BitTorrent, to download and distribute copyrighted songs owned by numerous record companies and music publishers, including Sony Music Entertainment (the “Plaintiffs”). These record companies, through the Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA), hired a company called MarkMonitor to monitor illegal file sharing and notify internet service providers when infringement was detected. MarkMonitor sent Cox over 163,000 notices of infringement during the relevant period. In response, Cox operated a “thirteen-strike” policy, under which it warned or temporarily suspended subscribers after repeated notices, but in practice it rarely terminated service for copyright infringement, while regularly terminating service for nonpayment.

Plaintiffs became frustrated with Cox’s limited enforcement against repeat infringers and sued Cox instead of its subscribers, alleging that Cox was secondarily liable for copyright infringement occurring on its network. Specifically, plaintiffs contended Cox either intentionally contributed to or benefited from its subscribers’ infringements by failing to take adequate steps to stop it, thereby inducing or materially contributing to the unlawful acts.

The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia denied Cox statutory safe harbor under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) and allowed the case to proceed to trial on theories of vicarious and contributory copyright infringement. The jury found Cox liable on both counts and awarded $1 billion in statutory damages. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the jury’s finding of willful contributory infringement, reversed the vicarious liability verdict, and vacated the damages award, remanding the case for a new trial on damages.

Question

Can an internet service provider be held liable, and found to have acted willfully, for copyright infringement just because it knew users were infringing and did not terminate their access?

Urias-Orellana v. Bondi

Justia · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Dec 1, 2025.

Petitioner: Douglas Humberto Urias-Orellana.
Respondent: Pamela Bondi, Attorney General.

Advocates:

• Nicholas Rosellini (for the Petitioners)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Douglas Humberto Urias-Orellana, a Salvadoran citizen, fled to the United States with his wife and minor child after facing threats from Wilfredo, a local hitman. The violence began in 2016 when Wilfredo shot and seriously injured Urias-Orellana’s two half-brothers in separate incidents. Wilfredo then vowed to kill their entire family. Over the next several years, Urias-Orellana was repeatedly threatened at gunpoint by masked men demanding money and warning they would harm him like his brothers. In December 2020, he was physically assaulted in his hometown, with the attackers striking him three times in the chest.

To escape these threats, Urias-Orellana and his family relocated multiple times within El Salvador. They lived peacefully in some locations for extended periods but encountered problems when returning to areas near his hometown. After noticing his attackers searching for him in early 2021, the family entered the United States without authorization in June 2021.

The Department of Homeland Security charged Petitioners with removability for illegal entry. They applied for asylum based on persecution of their family group, with Urias-Orellana also seeking protection under the Convention Against Torture. The Immigration Judge denied their applications, finding the harm did not constitute persecution and that they could safely relocate within El Salvador. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed, leading to this petition for review before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. The First Circuit denied the petition for review, upholding the Board of Immigration Appeals’ decision on all claims.

Question

Must a federal court of appeals defer to the BIA’s judgment that a given set of undisputed facts does not demonstrate mistreatment severe enough to constitute “persecution” under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)?

Fernandez v. United States

Justia · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Nov 12, 2025.

Petitioner: Joe Fernandez.
Respondent: United States of America.

Advocates:

• Benjamin Gruenstein (for the Petitioner)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Joe Fernandez participated as a backup shooter in a 2000 murder-for-hire scheme in the Bronx. On February 22, 2000, Patrick Darge hired him to help kill Arturo Cuellar and Idelfonso Vivero Flores, two Mexican drug cartel members who had come to New York City to collect approximately $6.5 million owed by drug trafficker Jeffrey Minaya for 274 kilograms of cocaine. When Darge's gun jammed after shooting Cuellar in the head, Fernandez fired fourteen shots in the apartment building lobby, nine hitting the victims. He received $40,000 for his participation. After eleven years on the run, Fernandez surrendered to police in October 2011.

Unlike his co-defendants who pleaded guilty and cooperated with the government, Fernandez proceeded to trial in 2013. The government's key witness was Patrick Darge, who admitted during cross-examination to lying to authorities in previous cases. Despite this admission, the jury convicted Fernandez of participating in a murder-for-hire conspiracy resulting in two deaths and aiding and abetting the use of a firearm to commit murder during a crime of violence. In October 2014, he received a mandatory life sentence, while his cooperating co-defendants received significantly lighter sentences: Darge (30 years), Reyes (25 years), Minaya (15 years), and Rivera (2 years).

The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York originally sentenced Fernandez, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed his conviction on direct appeal in 2016. In 2021, the district court vacated one of his convictions but left the mandatory life sentence intact. When Fernandez filed a compassionate release motion citing his possible innocence and sentencing disparity, the district court granted it in 2022, but the Second Circuit reversed this decision.

Question

Can a federal prisoner use the compassionate release law to get their sentence reduced based on claims that they might be innocent or that their sentence is unfair, even though these same claims would normally have to be raised through habeas corpus?

Rutherford v. United States

Justia · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Nov 12, 2025.

Petitioner: Daniel Rutherford.
Respondent: United States of America.

Advocates:

• David C. Frederick (for the Petitioner in No. 24-820)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

In 2003, twenty-two-year-old Daniel Rutherford committed two armed robberies at a Pennsylvania chiropractic office within a five-day period. During the first robbery, he brandished a gun at the chiropractor and stole $390 and a watch. Four days later, he returned to the same office with an accomplice, again pulled a gun, and stole $900 in cash and jewelry.

A jury convicted Rutherford of one count of conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery, two counts of Hobbs Act robbery, and two counts of using a firearm during a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). The district court sentenced Rutherford to 125 months for the robbery-related charges plus mandatory consecutive sentences of 7 years for the first § 924(c) offense and 25 years for the second, totaling nearly 42.5 years in prison. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed his conviction in 2007, and he did not appeal his sentence. In 2021, Rutherford filed a motion for compassionate release, arguing that changes in federal sentencing law would result in a significantly shorter sentence if he were sentenced today. The district court denied his motion in 2023, and the Third Circuit affirmed the lower court’s denial.

Question

May a district court, when evaluating a motion for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), consider as an “extraordinary and compelling reason” the fact that a defendant is serving a sentence substantially longer than what would be imposed today due to the First Step Act’s prospective changes to mandatory minimum penalties, particularly where the disparity amounts to decades of additional imprisonment?