California v. Texas

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Nov 10, 2020.
Decided on Jun 17, 2021.

Petitioner: The State of California, et al..
Respondent: The State of Texas, et al..

Advocates:

• Michael J. Mongan (for California, et al.)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

In 2012, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the individual mandate of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) against a constitutional challenge by characterizing the penalty for not buying health insurance as a tax, which Congress has the power to impose. In 2017, the Republican-controlled Congress enacted an amendment to the ACA that set the penalty for not buying health insurance to zero, but it left the rest of the ACA in place. Texas and several other states and individuals filed a lawsuit in federal court challenging the individual mandate again, arguing that because the penalty was zero, it can no longer be characterized as a tax and is therefore unconstitutional. California and several other states joined the lawsuit to defend the individual mandate.

The federal district court held that the individual mandate is now unconstitutional and that as a result, the entire ACA is invalidated because the individual mandate cannot be “severed” from the rest of the Act. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit upheld the district court’s conclusion but remanded the case for reconsideration of whether any part of the ACA survives in the absence of the individual mandate. The Supreme Court granted California’s petition for review, as well as Texas’s cross-petition for review.

Question

Do the plaintiffs in this case have standing to challenge the individual mandate of the Affordable Care Act (ACA), which now has a penalty of zero for not buying health insurance?

If the plaintiffs have standing, is the individual mandate unconstitutional?

If the individual mandate is unconstitutional, is it severable from the remainder of the ACA?

Conclusion

The plaintiffs lack standing to challenge the Affordable Care Act’s minimum essential coverage provision. Justice Stephen Breyer authored the 7-2 majority opinion of the Court.

To have standing to bring a claim in federal court, a plaintiff must “allege personal injury fairly traceable to the defendant’s allegedly unlawful conduct and likely to be redressed by the requested relief.” No plaintiff in this case has shown such an injury.

With respect to the individual plaintiffs, the Court found the injuries they alleged—past and future payments necessary to carry the minimum essential coverage that §5000A(a) requires—not “fairly traceable” to the allegedly unlawful conduct. There is no penalty for noncompliance, only the statute’s unenforceable language, which alone is insufficient to establish standing.

With respect to the state plaintiffs, the Court found the injuries they alleged not traceable to the government’s allegedly unlawful conduct. The state plaintiffs alleged direct and indirect injuries. The states alleged indirect injuries in the form of increased costs to run state-operated medical insurance programs, but they failed to show how an unenforceable mandate would cause state residents to enroll in valuable benefits programs that they would otherwise forgo. The states alleged direct injuries in the form of increased administrative and related expenses, but those expenses are the result of other provisions of the Act, not §5000A(a) and are thus not fairly traceable to the conduct alleged.

Justice Clarence Thomas authored a concurring opinion, praising Justice Samuel Alito’s dissent in this case (describing the “epic Affordable Care Act trilogy”) but stopping short of agreeing with his opinion in its entirety because Justice Thomas agreed with the majority that the plaintiffs lack standing in this case.

Justice Samuel Alito authored a dissenting opinion, which Justice Neil Gorsuch joined, arguing that Texas and the other state plaintiffs have standing and that because the “tax” imposed by the individual mandate is now $0, the mandate cannot be sustained under the taxing power.

Brownback v. King

Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Nov 9, 2020.
Decided on Feb 25, 2021.

Petitioner: Douglas Brownback, et al..
Respondent: James King.

Advocates:

• Michael R. Huston (for the petitioners)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Two undercover FBI agents mistakenly identified petitioner James King as a criminal suspect and approached him. The parties differed in their account of the facts as to whether the agents identified themselves as police officers, but King apparently perceived he was being mugged and resisted their attempts to restrain him. A violent fight ensued, in which the officers severely beat King until onlookers called 911 and local police arrived on the scene. The local police officers ordered bystanders to delete video footage of the altercation because the videos could reveal the identities of undercover FBI officers. King was taken to the hospital, where he received medical treatment and was discharged. On his discharge, police arrested him and took him to Kent County Jail, where he spent the weekend in jail before posting bail and visiting another hospital for further examination. Prosecutors pursued charges, but a jury acquitted King of all charges.

King then filed a lawsuit against the United States and both FBI agents, alleging that the agents violated his clearly established Fourth Amendment rights by conducting an unreasonable seizure and by using excessive force. In general, the United States and its agents are immune from liability under the principle of sovereign immunity. The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) waives sovereign immunity in specific situations, and the plaintiff bringing an FTCA claim bears the burden of showing his claim falls within such situations. The FTCA also contains a “judgment bar” provision that precludes a plaintiff from bringing additional claims concerning the “same subject matter” as an FTCA claim after a judgment is entered on the FTCA claim.

The district court found that King failed to prove one of the six requirements for FTCA to apply, and therefore that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to hear King’s claim against the United States. The court further held that the defendant agents were entitled to qualified immunity and granted summary judgment in their favor. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed, finding the FTCA judgment bar does not preclude King’s remaining claims because the court did not reach the merits of the FTCA claims and that the defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity.

Question

Does the judgment bar provision of the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) prevent a plaintiff whose FTCA claim against the government failed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction from filing another action, against the same defendants and arising from the same set of facts and injuries, under Bivens?

Conclusion

The district court’s order dismissing King’s FTCA claims was a judgment on the merits and thus triggered the Act’s judgment bar to block his Bivens claims. Justice Clarence Thomas authored the unanimous opinion of the Court.

The FTCA’s judgment bar was drafted “against the backdrop doctrine of res judicata,” or claim preclusion, and so a judgment on the merits will trigger that bar. A dismissal under Federal Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim is a “quintessential” merits decision because it signifies that the undisputed facts fail to establish all the elements of the FTCA claims. Although the question is “complicated” by the jurisdictional effect of a failure to state a claim, the Court noted that when the pleading of a claim and the pleading of jurisdiction coincide, as in this case, “a ruling that the court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction may simultaneously be a judgment on the merits.”

Justice Sonia Sotomayor wrote a concurring opinion to note that the Court “does not today decide whether an order resolving the merits of an FTCA claim precludes other claims arising out of the same subject matter in the same suit.

Niz-Chavez v. Garland

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Nov 9, 2020.
Decided on Apr 29, 2021.

Petitioner: Augusto Niz-Chavez.
Respondent: Merrick B. Garland, Attorney General.

Advocates:

• David J. Zimmer (for the petitioner)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Agusto Niz-Chavez, a Guatemalan native and citizen, came to the United States without inspection in 2005. On March 26, 2013, he was served with a notice to appear before an immigration judge at a date and time to be determined later, and approximately two months later, on May 29, 2013, he received a notice of hearing in removal proceedings. Niz-Chavez made an appearance at the hearing on June 25, 2013, where he conceded removability and stated his intent to seek withholding of removal under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) and relief under the Convention Against Torture.

After a hearing on the merits, the immigration judge denied both applications, and Niz-Chaves appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals. In addition to challenging the immigration judge’s conclusions, Niz-Chavez asked the Board to remand the case in light of the Supreme Court’s intervening decision in Pereira v. Sessions, in which the Court held that a notice to appear that does not include the specific time and place of the noncitizen's removal proceedings does not trigger the stop-time rule under §1229(a) of the INA. Niz-Chavez argued that under Pereira, he was now eligible for cancellation because of the deficiency of the notice to appear he received. The Board affirmed the immigration judge’s decision and denied the motion to remand, finding that Niz-Chavez was not eligible for cancellation under Pereira. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit denied Niz-Chavez’s petition for review of each of the challenged decisions by the Board.

Question

Under Section 1229(a), must the government serve a specific document that includes all required information, or may the government serve that information over the course of multiple documents?

Conclusion

The government must serve a single document that includes all the required information for the notice to appear to trigger the IIRIRA’s stop-time rule. Justice Neil Gorsuch authored the 6-3 majority opinion.

Section 1229b(d)(1) states that the stop-time rule is triggered “when the alien is served a notice to appear under section 1229(a),” and Section 1229(a) states that “written notice...shall be given...to the alien...specifying” the time and place of his hearing, among other listed items. The singular article “a” (as in “a notice”) means, to an ordinary reader, a single document containing the required information, not a series of such document with the information spread across them.

The IIRIRA’s statutory structure confirms this interpretation. For example, it refers to “the Notice” and “the time of the notice” in other nearby provisions (emphasis added). Its history, too, supports this reading. In passing the IIRIRA, the Congress intentionally changed the law from authorizing the government “to specify the time and place for an alien’s hearing ‘in the order to show cause or otherwise’” to requiring that the “time and place information...be included in a notice to appear, not ‘or otherwise.’”

Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored a dissenting opinion, joined by Chief Justice John Roberts and Justice Samuel Alito, arguing that the government’s provision of notice in two documents, as was the case here, should be sufficient to trigger the stop-time rule.

Fulton v. City of Philadelphia

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Nov 4, 2020.
Decided on Jun 17, 2021.

Petitioner: Sharonell Fulton, et al..
Respondent: City of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, et al..

Advocates:

• Lori H. Windham (for the petitioners)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

In March 2018, the City of Philadelphia barred Catholic Social Services (CSS) from placing children in foster homes because of its policy of not licensing same-sex couples to be foster parents. CSS sued the City of Philadelphia, asking the court to order the city to renew their contract. CSS argued that its right to free exercise of religion and free speech entitled it to reject qualified same-sex couples because they were same-sex couples, rather than for any reason related to their qualifications to care for children.

The district court denied CSS’s motion for a preliminary injunction, and the Third Circuit affirmed, finding that the City’s non-discrimination policy was a neutral, generally applicable law and that CSS had not demonstrated that the City targeted CSS for its religious beliefs or was motivated by ill will against its religion.

Question

1. To succeed on their free exercise claim, must plaintiffs prove that the government would allow the same conduct by someone who held different religious views, or only provide sufficient evidence that a law is not neutral and generally applicable?

2. Should the Court revisit its decision in Employment Division v. Smith?

3. Does the government violate the First Amendment by conditioning a religious agency’s ability to participate in the foster care system on taking actions and making statements that directly contradict the agency’s religious beliefs?

Conclusion

The refusal of Philadelphia to contract with CSS for the provision of foster care services unless CSS agrees to certify same-sex couples as foster parents violates the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. Chief Justice John Roberts authored the majority opinion of the Court.

Philadelphia’s actions burdened CSS’s religious exercise by forcing it either to curtail its mission or to certify same-sex couples as foster parents, in violation of its stated religious beliefs. Although the Court held in Employment Division v. Smith that neutral, generally applicable laws may incidentally burden religion, the Philadelphia law was not neutral and generally applicable because it allowed for exceptions to the anti-discrimination requirement at the sole discretion of the Commissioner. Additionally, CSS’s actions do not fall within public accommodations laws because certification as a foster parent is not “made available to the public” in the usual sense of the phrase. Thus, the non-discrimination requirement is subject to strict scrutiny, which requires that the government show the law is necessary to achieve a compelling government interest.

The Court pointed out that the question is not whether the City has a compelling interest in enforcing its non-discrimination policies generally, but whether it has such an interest in denying an exception to CSS. The Court concluded that it did not.

Justice Amy Coney Barrett wrote a separate concurring opinion in which Justice Brett Kavanaugh joined and in which Justice Stephen Breyer joined as to all but the first paragraph. Justice Barrett acknowledged strong arguments for overruling Smith but agreed with the majority that the facts of the case did not trigger Smith.

Justice Samuel Alito authored an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justices Clarence Thomas and Neil Gorsuch joined. Justice Alito would overrule Smith, replacing it with a rule that any law that burdens religious exercise must be subject to strict scrutiny.

Justice Gorsuch authored an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justices Thomas and Alito joined, criticizing the majority’s circumvention of Smith.

Borden v. United States

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Nov 3, 2020.
Decided on Jun 10, 2021.

Petitioner: Charles Borden, Jr..
Respondent: United States of America.

Advocates:

• Kannon K. Shanmugam (for the petitioner)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Police caught Charles Borden, Jr., with a pistol during a traffic stop in April 2017, and he subsequently pleaded guilty possessing that firearm as a felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). At sentencing, the government recommended sentencing Borden as an armed career criminal, under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), based on three prior Tennessee aggravated assault convictions. Borden objected, arguing that one of his prior convictions—reckless aggravated assault—did not qualify as a “violent felony” under the “use of force” clause of the ACCA. Borden argued that reckless aggravated assault requires only a mental state of recklessness, and reckless use of force does not amount to a crime of violence under the ACCA. Retroactively applying Sixth Circuit precedent holding that reckless aggravated assault does constitute a violent felony under the “use of force” clause of the ACCA, the district court held that all three of Borden’s aggravated assault victims constituted “crime[s] of violence” under the ACCA and designated him as an armed career criminal. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed.

Question

Does the “use of force” clause in the Armed Career Criminal Act encompass crimes with an intent requirement of mere recklessness?

Conclusion

The “use of force” clause in the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) does not encompass reckless aggravated assault. Justice Elena Kagan authored the four-justice plurality opinion. Justice Clarence Thomas concurred in the judgment to reverse and remand the case.

The elements clause of the ACCA defines “violent felony” as an offense requiring the “use of physical force against the person of another.” According to the plurality, the phrase “against another” requires conduct directed at another individual. Recklessness, which is the disregard of a substantial and unjustifiable risk, cannot be directed at another individual and so cannot meet the definition of a violent felony.

Justice Thomas authored an opinion concurring in the judgment, reasoning that reckless aggravated assault is not a violent felony under the ACCA because the “use of physical force...has a well-understood meaning applying only to intentional acts designed to cause harm.” Justice Thomas argued that the reckless conduct at issue in this case falls within the ACCA’s residual clause, which the Court (erroneously, in his view) struck down.

Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored a dissenting opinion, joined by Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices Samuel Alito and Amy Coney Barrett. Justice Kavanaugh argued that the plurality “disregards bedrock principles and longstanding terminology of criminal law, misconstrues ACCA’s text,” and “overrides Congress’s judgment about the danger posed by recidivist violent felons.”

Jones v. Mississippi

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Nov 3, 2020.
Decided on Apr 22, 2021.

Petitioner: Brett Jones.
Respondent: Mississippi.

Advocates:

• David M. Shapiro (for the petitioner)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

When Brett Jones was fifteen years old, he stabbed his grandfather to death. He was convicted of murder, and the Circuit Court of Lee County, Mississippi, imposed a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment, and Mississippi law made him ineligible for parole. The appellate court affirmed his conviction and sentence. In a post-conviction relief proceeding, the Supreme Court of Mississippi ordered that Jones be resentenced after a hearing to determine whether he was entitled to parole eligibility. Subsequently, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), and Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. __ (2016). In Miller, the Court held that mandatory life in prison without the possibility of parole sentences for juveniles violated the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments. And in Montgomery, it clarified that Miller barred life without the possibility of parole “for all but the rarest of juvenile offenders, those whose crimes reflect permanent incorrigibility.” The circuit court held the hearing weighing the factors laid out in Miller and determined Jones was not entitled to parole eligibility.

Question

Does the Eighth Amendment require a sentencing authority to find that a juvenile is permanently incorrigible before it may impose a sentence of life without the possibility of parole?

Conclusion

A sentencing authority need not find a juvenile is permanently incorrigible before imposing a sentence of life without the possibility of parole; a discretionary sentencing system is both constitutionally necessary and constitutionally sufficient to impose a sentence of life without parole on a defendant who committed a homicide when they were under 18. Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored the 6-3 majority opinion.

In Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), the Court held that “a sentencer [must] follow a certain process—considering an offender’s youth and attendant characteristics—before imposing” a life-without-parole sentence.” And in Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190 (2016), the Court stated that “a finding of fact regarding a child’s incorrigibility . . . is not required.” Taken together, these two cases refute Jones’s argument that a finding of permanent incorrigibility is constitutionally necessary to impose a sentence of life without parole. The Court noted that it expresses neither agreement nor disagreement with Jones’s sentence, and its decision does not preclude states from imposing additional sentencing limits in cases involving juvenile commission of homicide.

Justice Clarence Thomas authored an opinion concurring in the judgment, arguing that the Court should have reached the same outcome by declaring that Montgomery was incorrectly decided.

Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Stephen Breyer and Elena Kagan joined. Justice Sotomayor argued that the majority effectively circumvents stare decisis by reading Miller to require only “a discretionary sentencing procedure where youth is considered.” Under Montgomery, sentencing discretion is necessary, but under Miller, it is not sufficient. Rather, a sentencer must actually make the judgment that the juvenile is one of those rare children for whom life without parole is a constitutionally permissible sentence.

Salinas v. United States Railroad Retirement Board

Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Nov 2, 2020.
Decided on Feb 3, 2021.

Petitioner: Manfredo Salinas.
Respondent: United States Railroad Retirement Board.

Advocates:

• Sarah M. Harris (for the petitioner)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

In 2006, Petitioner Manfredo M. Salinas applied for a disability annuity under the Railroad Retirement Act, but the U.S. Railroad Retirement Board (“the Board”) denied his application. After the filing period had expired, Salinas sought reconsideration, which the Board also denied, based on its conclusion that Salinas had not shown good cause for missing the deadline. Salinas did not pursue any further action on his application, so the Board’s denial became a final decision on February 9, 2007.

Nearly seven years later, in 2013, Salinas filed a new application for a disability annuity. The Board granted him an annuity, but Salinas appealed the annuity's beginning date and amount. During that appeal, Salinas asked the Board to reopen all its decisions on his prior applications, including the decision denying his 2006 application. After a hearing, a Board hearing officer concluded that Salinas's 2006 application was beyond the four-year timeframe for reopening based on new and material evidence or administrative error under the Board's regulations. Salinas then asked the U.S. Court of Appeals to review the Board's decision not to reopen his 2006 application. Following its own binding precedent holding that it lacked jurisdiction to review a Board decision declining to reopen a prior benefits claim, the Fifth Circuit dismissed Salinas’s petition.

Question

Does a decision by the Railroad Retirement Board denying a request to reopen a prior benefits claim constitute a “final decision” subject to judicial review?

Conclusion

A decision by the Railroad Retirement Board denying a request to reopen a prior benefits claim is subject to judicial review. Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored the 5-4 majority opinion.

The Railroad Retirement Act of 1974 (RRA) “makes judicial review under the RRA available to the same extent that review is available” under the Railroad Unemployment Insurance Act (RUIA). The RUIA allows any person “aggrieved by a final decision under subsection (c) of this section” to “obtain a review of any final decision of the Board.” Because Salinas’s 2006 application was the “terminal event” in the Board’s administrative review process and substantively affected Salinas’s benefits and the Board’s obligations under RRA, the denial was a “final decision of the Board” under RUIA and thus subject to judicial review. This conclusion is bolstered by the plain text of § 335(f), which authorizes judicial review of “any” final decision, and even if the text were ambiguous, there is a “strong presumption favoring judicial review of administrative action.”

Justice Clarence Thomas filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Samuel Alito, Neil Gorsuch, and Amy Coney Barrett joined. Justice Thomas argued that while the majority may correctly interpret RUIA, the RRA’s provision is critically different. RUIA explains how to obtain judicial review, but RRA separately defines what may be reviewed. The dissent argued that the statutory language of RRA limits judicial review to Board decisions determining rights or liabilities, so its denial of Salinas’s claim was outside the scope of review.

U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service v. Sierra Club

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Nov 2, 2020.
Decided on Mar 4, 2021.

Petitioner: United States Fish and Wildlife Service, et al..
Respondent: Sierra Club, Inc..

Advocates:

• Matthew Guarnieri (for the petitioners)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Industrial facilities, power plants, and other manufacturing complexes use water from lakes, rivers, estuaries, and oceans to cool their facilities through cooling water intake structures. Because these structures potentially cause significant harm to aquatic life, Section 316(b) of the Clean Water Act directs the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to regulate their design and operation. In April 2011, the EPA proposed new regulations for cooling water intake structures. As part of the rule-making process and required by Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act, in 2012, the EPA consulted with the Fish and Wildlife Service and the National Marine Fisheries Service about the potential impacts of the regulations and produced a written biological opinion on the impacts of the proposed agency action.

The Sierra Club made a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request for records generated during the EPA’s rule-making process, including the documents generated as part of the consultation with the Services. The Services withheld some of the requested records, citing Exemption 5 of FOIA, which shields from disclosure documents subject to the “deliberative process privilege.” The district court determined that 12 of the 16 requested records were not protected to the privilege and ordered disclosure. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court’s order to disclose some of the records but reversed as to two of the records.

Question

Does Exemption 5 of the Freedom of Information Act, by incorporating the deliberative process privilege, protect against compelled disclosure of a federal agency’s draft documents that were prepared as part of a formal interagency consultation process under Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act of 1973 and that concerned a proposed agency action that was later modified in the consultation process?

Conclusion

The deliberative process privilege protects from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) an agency’s in-house draft biological opinions that are both predecisional and deliberative, even if the drafts reflect the agencies’ last views about a proposal. Justice Amy Coney Barrett authored the 7-2 majority opinion.

The deliberative process privilege of Exemption 5 of FOIA protects from disclosure “documents reflecting advisory opinions, recommendations and deliberations comprising part of a process by which governmental decisions and policies are formulated.” The rationale behind the exemption is to encourage officials to communicate candidly with each other during the deliberative process. However, it does not apply to documents reflecting the final agency decision. Documents are “predecisional” if they were generated before the agency’s final decision on the matter and “deliberative” if prepared to help the agency formulate its position.

The documents at issue in this case were drafts of biological opinions because “more work needed to be done.” As such, they could not have been generated before the agency’s final decision had been made. That the recommendations ultimately proved to be the last word does not affect their status as “predecisional.”

Justice Stephen Breyer authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Sonia Sotomayor joined. Justice Breyer argued that in the specific context of the rulemaking processes of the Fish and Wildlife Service and the National Marine Fisheries Service, so-called Draft Biological Opinions reflect “final” decisions regarding the “jeopardy” the EPA’s then-proposed actions would have caused, and as such, would normally fall outside, not within, Exemption 5.

Pereida v. Wilkinson

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Oct 14, 2020.
Decided on Mar 4, 2021.

Petitioner: Clemente Avelino Pereida.
Respondent: Robert M. Wilkinson, Acting Attorney General.

Advocates:

• Brian P. Goldman (for the Petitioner)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

Clemente Avelino Pereida, a native and citizen of Mexico, pleaded no contest to a criminal charge in Nebraska, arising from his attempt to use a fraudulent social security card to obtain employment. The Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings against Pereida, and Pereida sought cancellation of the removal application. At issue is whether Pereida's criminal attempt conviction qualifies as a crime involving moral turpitude; if so, under the Immigration and Nationality Act, Pereida would be ineligible for cancellation of removal.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that it was Pereida’s burden to establish his eligibility for cancellation of removal. However, the court determined that it was not possible to ascertain which statutory subsection formed the basis for Pereida's conviction, so Pereida failed to meet his burden. Because Pereida did not establish that he was eligible for cancellation of removal, the court upheld the Board of Immigration Appeals’ determination that he did not show such eligibility and denied Pereida’s petition for review.

Question

Does a criminal conviction bar a noncitizen from applying for relief from removal when the record of conviction is ambiguous as to whether it corresponds to an offense listed in the Immigration and Nationality Act?

Conclusion

A nonpermanent resident seeking to cancel a lawful removal order must show that he has not been convicted of a disqualifying offense when the statutory conviction on his record is ambiguous regarding whether a disqualifying offense formed the basis of his conviction. Justice Neil Gorsuch authored the 5-3 majority opinion.

The Court first looked to the text of the relevant provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(4)(A), which states that “an alien applying for relief or protection from removal has the burden of proof to establish” that he “satisfies the applicable eligibility requirements” and thus deserves a favorable exercise of discretion to cancel the removal order. One of these requirements is that they have not been convicted of a disqualifying criminal offense, such as crimes involving “moral turpitude.” Failure to show even one of these requirements is a failure to meet one’s burden, so Pereida’s failure to prove that the basis of his conviction was not a crime involving moral turpitude meant he failed to meet his burden. This interpretation is supported as well by the context of the INA and a similar requirement of noncitizens who seek admission.

Justice Stephen Breyer authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan joined. Justice Breyer argued that the Court should apply the so-called “categorical approach” to determine the nature of a crime that a noncitizen was convicted of committing—an approach the Court has “clearly and repeatedly” embraced in the INA context. That approach would require a judge to look only at certain specified documents, and unless those documents show the crime of conviction is a crime involving moral turpitude, the judge must find the conviction was not such a crime. Following that approach in this case would result in a finding that Pereida was not convicted for a disqualifying crime.

Justice Amy Coney Barrett took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.

Torres v. Madrid

Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org

Argued on Oct 14, 2020.
Decided on Mar 25, 2021.

Petitioner: Roxanne Torres.
Respondent: Janice Madrid, et al..

Advocates:

• Kelsi B. Corkran (for the Petitioner)

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)

In 2014, Roxanne Torres was involved in an incident with police officers in which she was operating a vehicle under the influence of methamphetamine and in the process of trying to get away, endangered the two officers pursuing her. In the process, one of the officers shot and injured her. Torres pleaded no contest to three crimes: (1) aggravated fleeing from a law enforcement officer, (2) assault on a police officer, and (3) unlawfully taking a motor vehicle.

In October 2016, she filed a civil-rights complaint in federal court against the two officers, alleging claims including excessive force and conspiracy to engage in excessive force. Construing Torres’s complaint as asserting the excessive-force claims under the Fourth Amendment, the court concluded that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity. In the court’s view, the officers had not seized Torres at the time of the shooting, and without a seizure, there could be no Fourth Amendment violation. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed.

Question

Must physical force used to detain a suspect be successful to constitute a “seizure” under the Fourth Amendment?

Conclusion

The application of physical force to the body of a person with intent to restrain is a seizure, even if the force does not succeed in subduing the person. Chief Justice John Roberts authored the majority opinion.

Under the Court’s precedents, common law arrests are considered seizures under the Fourth Amendment, and the application of force to the body of a person with intent to restrain constitutes an arrest even if the arrestee escapes. The use of a device, here, a gun, to effect the arrest, makes no difference in the outcome; it is still a seizure. There is no reason to draw an “artificial line” between grasping an arrestee with a hand and using some other means of applying physical force to effect an arrest. The key consideration is whether the conduct objectively manifests the intent to restrain; subjective perceptions are irrelevant. Additionally, the requirement of intent to restrain lasts only as long as the application of force. In this case, the officers’ conduct clearly manifested intent to restrain Torres and was thus a seizure under the Fourth Amendment.

Justice Amy Coney Barrett took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.

Justice Neil Gorsuch authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Clarence Thomas and Samuel Alito joined, arguing that “neither the Constitution nor common sense” support the majority’s definition of a seizure.