Now that we have a result, David and Helen reflect on what the next four years might hold. What issues could define a Biden presidency? Has this election indicated a possible realignment of American politics? And is it enough to restore faith in democratic politics? If Trump is not how democracy ends, where does the real danger lie?

Talking Points:

Biden faces three big issues: China, climate, and COVID.

• It’s probably not possible to go back to US-China relations pre-Trump. However, China does perceive this election as significant.
• Making climate a priority has implications for the China relationship.

This was too close to be a realignment election. Both parties turned out their vote because they had oppositional energy.

• But there are shifts within. Florida went red, but people voted to increase the minimum wage. California went blue, but people voted to resist the unionization of essentially Lyft and Uber workers.
• Trump has opened up the possibility for a more cross-racial, working class Republican Party. These shifts are still small, but it will be hard for them to go back to being a party of tax cuts for the rich, deregulation, and cultural conservatism.
• It’s more complicated for the Democrats. There has been a shift to the left, but there are also deep divisions in the party.

A lot of the ‘Trump is how democracy ends story’ didn’t add up. How can American democracy have been so vulnerable, and yet so easily restored?   

• The threats to democracy: COVID, climate, and China, don’t fit electoral cycles.
• American democracy faces huge medium to long term challenges; too much energy has gone into short term risks.
• Trump has allowed people to close their eyes to deeper structural problems.

Trump’s presidency did have serious geopolitical implications.

• He changed American policy on China; most of the political class now regards China as a serious strategic rival.
• He changed relations with Iran, and, in doing so, relations with Europe.
• He pulled the US out of the Paris Climate Accord.

Mentioned in this Episode:

• China, climate, COVID: the new energy map
• David’s book, How Democracy Ends
• David on TP: How Democracy Ends
• Joe Biden’s victory speech

Further Learning:

• Biden’s endorsement interview with the NYTimes (on big tech and other things)
• Talking Politics American Histories: Monopoly and Muckraking
• Stacey Abrams’ fight for a fair vote, from The New Yorker

And as ever, recommended reading curated by our friends at the LRB can be found here: lrb.co.uk/talking

David, Helen and Gary convene on very little sleep to try to make sense of another extraordinary election. Though we still don't know who won, we do know that some things are going to get even harder for American democracy. What's the nightmare scenario: the loser refusing to lose, or the winner being unable to govern? Why did the pollsters get it wrong again? And what's likely to happen when the contest reaches the courts? Plus we ask if the American Constitution can cope with close elections any more.

Relevant Episodes:

From our Mini-Series:

• History of Ideas on Tocqueville and American democracy
• American Histories: The 15th and the 19th 
• American Histories: Deporting Mexicans 
• American Histories: The Great Abortion Switcheroo 

Old Episodes on Trump:

• What Trump Means to Us
• One-term presidents 
• Can America Cope
• American Fascism: Then and Now 
• America First? 
• Michael Lewis on Donald Trump (And Michael Lewis Updated)
• Trump and History 

A Broader Perspective on US Politics:

• The Talking Politics Guide to … the US Constitution 
• Police State USA
• Adam Tooze on US vs. China 
• Judith Butler: Then and Now 
• Where Power Stops
• The Talking Politics Guide to… the Gilded Age
• Inaugurals 

From the LRB

David talks to Roberto Foa about his recent report into young people's attitude to democracy around the world. Why are millennials so much less satisfied with democratic politics than older generations? Can populist politics do anything to alter that? And what does the generation divide tell us about changing attitudes to Trump? Plus we discuss the generational politics of climate change, education and wealth inequality. 

The report in full: https://www.cam.ac.uk/system/files/youth_and_satisfaction_with_democracy.pdf

A conversation with Pulitzer Prize-winning author Daniel Yergin about the new energy map of the world. What impact has the shale revolution had on global politics? Is China winning or losing the energy wars? And will the energy transition happen fast enough for climate change?

Daniel's book: www.waterstones.com/book/the-new-map/daniel-yergin/9780241472347

Helen on oil: play.acast.com/s/talkingpolitics/oil-

Helen and David talk about what four years of Trump - and of talking (and talking) about Trump - have meant for their thinking about America and about democratic politics. Is it possible to give a balanced picture of Trump's presidency? Have the last four years followed a pattern or has it just been chaos? What is the likely legacy of Trump's extraordinary level of global fame? Plus we discuss whether 2020 marks the beginning of the 'short' twenty-first century and what that means for Trump's place in it.

Talking Points:

Will historians see 2020 as the start of the ‘short’ 21st century?

• If so, Trump belongs to the interregnum. He’s not a dramatic break. 
• Certainly there are continuities, for example, in the Middle East. But there are also discontinuities with China and Iran.
• Is the pandemic a fundamental watershed?  

Is American power in decline? 

• In some ways, the US is more powerful this decade than it was the decade before.
• The US has a strong domestic energy supply again.
• The Fed is still an international lender of last resort.
• One of the consequences of the pandemic was that in March the Fed effectively extended an indirect dollar credit line in principle to China. 
• The story about rising Chinese power is not straightforwardly at American expense. 
• The domestic political turmoil in the US is going to be consequential to the American-Chinese strategic competition.

The Republican party got what they wanted out of a Trump presidency, the courts.

• In that sense, 2020 could be another watershed year: pre-Barrett and post-Barrett.
• Although history of the court suggests that partisan affiliations don’t always predict outcomes.
• Since the late 1960s/early 1970s, American politics has become judicialized. 
• The crucial point is the intense politicization of these decisions.

Trump invokes huge depths of revulsion in many Americans. Trying to stand back and look at his presidency historically can seem like moral indifference.

• The narrative about Trump as a singular evil is the lens through which many people have lived their lives in the past four years.
• This narrative takes a pretty distorted view of the American past as well as the state of the republic before Trump.
• Trump seems incapable of understanding the distinction between the president as head of state and the president as head of government.
• Geopolitically, the Trump presidency has made a difference, especially in relation to China.

Mentioned in this Episode:

• Our post-election episode from 2016
• Our last episode with Gary Gerstle
• Our last episode with Sarah Churchwell
• Our most recent crossover with 538
• David’s review of David Cameron’s memoirs

Further Learning:

• Hobsbawm’s Age of Extremes: The Short 20th Century

We talk to Peter Geoghegan of openDemocracy and Jennifer Cobbe of the Trust and Technology Initiative about Cambridge Analytica, money, power and what is and isn't corrupting our democracy. How easy is it to buy influence in British politics? Did Cambridge Analytica break the rules or show just how little difference the rules make anyway? Who has the power to take on Facebook? Plus we discuss why the British government's failure to handle the pandemic tells us a lot about the corrosive effects of cronyism.  https://www.petergeoghegan.com/books/

Talking Points:

The ICO report on Cambridge Analytica largely concluded that their tactics were not unusual.

• Of course, we can take issue with the fact these practices are so widespread. 
• One of the reasons Cambridge Analytica was such a scandal was that people didn’t realise they could be targeted in this way.
• Cambridge Analytica and organizations like it can do is seed misinformation into a wider ecosystem. They take advantage of the lack of regulation.
• Sowing misinformation doesn’t require sophisticated skills; it’s easy.

The conversation about micro-targeting often centers on Cambridge Analytica, but we need to look at the structures that make these practices so easy and so potent.

• Facebook makes all of this really easy to do. Why were we so complacent? 
• When we think about the influence of money in politics, it’s easy to imagine nefarious people throwing around big sums, but at least in the UK a small amount can go a long way when people have the right connections. This is cronyism.

The pandemic has made the tech giants unthinkably wealthy.

• At the same time, they’ve changed the way that money affects politics.
• Could Trump have won without Facebook and Twitter?
• The tech companies do not need to lobby politicians in the traditional sense because they are simply that powerful.

Governments are dependent on these technologies, as we all are.

• Can we think about the tech companies as the technical infrastructure of society?
• Right now, these companies have a huge amount of discretion. 

Cronyism has been a prominent feature of the UK Government’s COVID response.

• There is a strain in a certain school of political thought that the state isn’t good for much. When politicians who believe that are in charge, it can be self-fulfilling.
• A hollowed out state creates space for more cronyism.
• The civil service has become a punching bag. This could have a long tail. 

Does the system that needs reform have the capacity to generate the necessary reforms?

• When it comes to tech, the biggest problem is ideological.
• It’s hard to get politicians to agree that changing micro-targeting is necessary because they all use it.
• Politicians do not want to change a system that has benefitted them even if they can recognize its flaws. 
• Can you build a coalition that would force them to do so? 

Mentioned in this Episode:

• The UK Information Commissioner's Office report on Cambridge Analytica
• Peter’s book, Democracy for Sale
• Jennifer’s recent piece in the Guardian

David talks to the historian Sarah Churchwell about how well America's political institutions have withstood the stress of the last four years. Have we seen the limits of presidential power or have we discovered how easy it is to trash those limits? Are constitutional checks and balances still intact? Is it really Mitch McConnell who is putting American democracy under stress? Plus we talk about what will be needed to restore the social contract and the perils of political humility.

Talking Points:

Many of the founding institutions in political life have been put under stress during the Trump administration. 

• Trump has said a lot, but he hasn’t done much. We’ll have a better sense of the extent of the damage after the election.
• Trump’s behaviour often gets more outlandish as the constraints on his power become more visible.

The power of the U.S. executive has been growing, certainly since 9/11.

• Both Bush and Obama strengthened the executive presidency. 
• Some have argued that Trump’s incompetence precludes authoritarianism. Strong men have to be strong.
• But from an institutional standpoint, the Trump presidency has revealed that the American system is vulnerable to strongmen leaders.

Because congressional Republicans have sanctioned his behaviour, Trump has not been as constrained as he might have been.

• The other institutional check that often flies under the radar is states rights.
• The electoral system is bound up in local state power. Every state has a series of strong, legally required actions that go into certifying vote counts.
• So far, states rights has been the most effective check on Trump’s power.

We focus on Trump, but the lasting legacy of the Trump presidency may be elsewhere.

• If the lasting legacy of Trump is in the judiciary branch, it won’t be because he created a Trumpian judiciary. 
• In this sense, Trump is the enabler of Mitch McConnell rather than the other way around.
• McConnell’s agenda is about obstructing the Democrats and consolidating Republican power. 

Trump has not been able to totalize authoritarian control. 

• Certain aspects of liberalism have gotten stronger during the Trump administration.
• There can be an authoritarian regime without an authoritarian state.

Mentioned in this Episode:

• Sarah on impeachment for Talking Politics American Histories
• Sarah on TP on American fascism
• Kimberly Jones, ‘How Can We Win’ 
• Ross Douthat, ‘There Will Be No Trump Coup’ 

Further Learning:

• The 538 U.S. presidential election forecast 
• Sarah on American Fascism for NYBooks
• What is originalism?
• The precedent, and perils of court packing in the...

This week we come back to Brexit and ask whether Boris Johnson has a good way out of the current negotiations with the EU over a trade deal. First we talk with Kenneth Armstrong, Professor of European Law, about the thinking and the reality behind the government's Internal Market Bill. Then David, Helen and Chris Brooke explore the politics of success and failure in the negotiations. Can the Union survive? Does the government have a coherent strategy? And how much trouble is Johnson really in?

Talking Points:

Is the Internal Market Bill just a negotiating tactic, or is it a genuine safeguard for a future world in which there is no trade deal? 

• The government is worried that the wording of the Northern Ireland Protocol risks the possibility of the EU overreaching in its interpretation in ways that would make it more difficult for the UK to pursue its own state aid policy, for example.
• The government is now saying that it would only invoke these provisions if the EU acts in ‘bad faith.’
• The problem with that argument is that the agreements already have their own safeguard mechanisms. Why do you need a domestic legal mechanism?
• The substance of the Internal Market Bill is also getting serious pushback from the devolved authorities.

The EU has launched infringement proceedings against the UK. 

• It’s a structured process with different phases. 
• The imperative is to try to seek a resolution without needing to take the action before the Court of Justice.
• The Commission’s argument is that the UK is acting on bad faith. 
• In the transition period, the UK is effectively treated as a member state. What happens when the UK is fully outside of the transition period? 
• For now at least, all this political theatre isn’t immediately derailing the process of getting an agreement on a future relationship.

The ultimate obstacles to a deal are existential: the UK wants to guarantee respect for its autonomy, so does the EU.

• The EU’s great fear is that the model of a social market economy that it has been building among its member states would be threatened if the UK could engage in regulatory competition or distorted subsidies with the EU.
• That’s why the level playing field rules and state aid are so important for the EU. 
• There’s also the geopolitical question: the consequences for both sides of not reaching a deal would be significant.

Johnson gave his conference speech and he barely mentioned Brexit.

• The stakes of the ongoing negotiations are as high as they were a year ago, but the political heat—at least for now—has gone out of it.
• Johnson hopes that if you can get through the next few years and stabilize the Union from the present threats then it will be possible to put the Union on more solid constitutional groundings.
• This is a politics of crisis. There’s not a clear strategic vision.

The pandemic has made the politics of devolution even more complicated because it’s created a de facto English government, which is the UK parliament.

• The more the Scottish government, the Northern Irish government and the Welsh government disagree about what the rules should be, the more the fact that there is an English government comes to the surface.
• This becomes an electoral issue too.

Is Johnson on his way out?

• His track record may be a liability where the Union is concerned. There may be better people to lead the Conservative party on the Scottish question.
• Making a deal with the EU could hurt him with the Spartans of the European Research Group.
• Johnson’s health could also be an issue; that’s why he’s determined to show that he doesn’t have long-COVID.

Mentioned in this Episode:

David talks to Helen Thompson and Gary Gerstle about the historical precedents for US presidents losing office after a singleterm. It doesn't happen very often, but it could be about to happen again! Can Trump use the powers of incumbency to prevent it? Can Biden use Trump's growing chaos to seal his fate? Plus we talk about the fall-out from the first presidential debate and we ask how the politics of the Supreme Court might intersect with a contested election result.

Talking Points:

One-term presidents are rare in American history.

• Herbert Hoover, Jimmy Carter, and George H. W. Bush are the only presidents in the last 100 years who have lost reelection bids.
• When you take out third party challengers, you’re left with Hoover and Carter, two presidents who both failed to handle a significant national disaster.

The Hoover and Carter cases came at turning points in presidential cycles.

• 1932 and 1980 signify profound shifts in political order: from Republican to Democrat, and then from Democrat to Republican. 
• There is not a clear dominant party right now. 
• You would expect a one-term presidency to be more likely when there isn’t a dominant party.  

In the Carter case, incumbency was perhaps a disadvantage. 

• He faced a difficult economic situation as well as the Iranian hostage crisis. 
• Both Carter and Hoover got hit by an economic crisis for which the country was not prepared, for which there were no ideal or quick solutions.  

There’s never been a Supreme Court justice appointed and confirmed so quickly or so close to an election.

• The Republican party thinks their future lies with controlling the courts.
• McConnell’s strategy might actually harm Trump in the elections; they are determined to do this even, potentially, at the cost of the presidency.
• If Barrett said she would recuse herself from ruling on the election, McConnell wouldn’t care, but Trump would. 

The debate may have been unedifying, but it clarified what was at stake.

• Biden did not make a positive case for himself; his pitch was that he is not Trump.
• The overriding impression of the debate was chaos.
• Trump’s attempt to frame Biden as a creature of the left fell short. 
• Trump made the presidency look cheap. The aversion factor matters: which of the candidates do most people find unacceptable? 
• But Trump also dragged Biden into the chaos.
• What would happen if a Conservative court legitimated a Biden victory? 

Mentioned in this Episode: 

• The US Presidential Debate

Further Learning:

• ‘Hating on Herbert Hoover,’ from The New Yorker
• What happened with Merrick Garland? 
• Six takeaways from the presidential debate from The New York Times
• Who won the debate? From 538
• Frederick Wilmot-Smith in the LRB on the US Supreme Court

David and Helen talk to the philosopher Michael Sandel about the damage that the idea of rewarding people on merit has done to education, democracy and public life. Why is it wrong to try to match the best students to the best universities? What is credentialism and how has it warped the way work is rewarded? Whatever happened to the idea of the common good? Plus we discuss America's sense of itself as God's chosen nation in the age of Obama and Trump.

Talking Points:

Places like Stanford and Harvard have more than 40,000 applicants for 2,000 places. Most of these applicants are qualified.

• Michael thinks that universities should admit students based on a lottery.
• The meritocratic way of thinking about success and social recognition has produced and intensified an epidemic of credentialism.  
• Should elite universities function as arbiters of opportunity?
• Even going to university hasn’t delivered what people expected. 
• How do we translate what we can see is socially and morally wrong about our society into a different way of economically living?

For decades, we have been told that the solution to inequality is individual upward mobility through higher education.

• The ‘rhetoric of rising’ has run its course.
• How do we affirm and renew the dignity of work?

What kind of jobs has the shift towards credentialism encouraged?

• There’s a concentration around law and finance, as well as public sector or public administration jobs.
• The financialism of the economy is an important part of this story.
• The divide between winners and losers has deepend.
• It’s not just inequality: the people on top believe that their success is their own doing.
• Michael thinks that the sense of elites looking down on the less credentialed has fueled the anger and resentment that authoritarian populists have exploited.
• Could automation displace credentialism?

The money people make, or the recognition they receive, is not a measure of their contribution to the common good.

• It’s easy to outsource this kind of moral judgment to markets, but Michael thinks that’s a mistake.
• Can we reconfigure the economy to bring about a better alignment between the contributions people make and the rewards and recognition they receive?
• The pandemic has revealed the importance of jobs that are hugely undervalued, particularly forms of human care. 

There has been a structural, material transformation in Western economies since the 1980s that has gone hand and hand with the rise of credentialism and financialisation.

• Industrial manufacturing employment has gone overseas.
• We are nostalgic about an age that no longer exists, including the role of trade unions, which had power in part because they could disrupt the economy through strikes.

What happened to the nation as a source of identity and belonging?

• The United States is a providential nation; the same forces of meritocracy can be at work at the national level.
• Is it possible to challenge the sense of providence in American democracy?

Mentioned in this Episode:

• Michael Sandel, The Tyranny of Merit
• Thomas Wolfe, You Can’t Go Home Again

Further Learning:

• Michael in the Guardian: ‘The populist backlash has been a...