A long discussion on the dispute between Rabbi Meir and the rabbis in mishnah -- beginning with a case of a husband who accuses his wife of not being a virgin at marriage (tantamount, in this context to an accusation of adultery), and the dispute is over the question of whether the case requires 3 or 23 judges (is it a capital case or a monetary one)? (8 explanations addressing the interpretations of 3 vs. 23). Also, what if that same case were subject to conspiring witnesses... which means they were seeking the woman's death for her adultery. And what if there were conspiring witnesses about the witnesses that testified to the first set of witnesses? (Such that the testimony has to be thrown out)

Parsing a verse from the Torah, the Gemara explores the ethics of judges, and how they must judge "small and great" alike -- understood to be monetary sums at stake. The Gemara recognizes that people will try to cheat the court. Plus, a comment from Moshe (Moses) that is interpreted as a strike against him and, conversely, in his favor. Also, a twist on "zimmun," the 3 who eat and bless afterwards together - but that's not what this is.

A sidebar to the discussion of judges, wherein a passerby utters pithy statements which a couple of sages then ground in biblical verses. Also, errors in judgement: what happens when the judge selected was a poor choice, or if the judgement is wrong? The care in judgement is essential.

How many judges do you need for meditation? For compromise? Is it akin to "judgement" or not? Plus, the need for a formal act of acquisition (or lack thereof) for a compromise to go into effect. Also, on the topic of arbitration, or compromise - where some maintain it is not the job of a judge, and some say it is. Plus, the relationship between peace and judgement -- which comes to compromise. Plus, the biblical figures associated with the respective traits, as needed in the judicial system.

For a judge to not undertake financial responsibility for an error in judgement, he needs permission to judge from the exilarch. Plus, complications between the authority granted by the exilarch in Babylonia and that granted by the nasi in the land of Israel. Plus, the origins of the terms of rabbinic ordination of different levels, even (mostly) to this very day. Also, a focus on the authority of establishing (and permitting) the status of the first-born animals. Plus, some dramatic errors and what happened afterwards, for example, in the liquids that would purify or render impure (or do nothing). Also, the greatness of Rabbi Yehudah HaNasi in recognizing the significance of making halakhic decisions.

Cases of whether one should focus on the pronunciation of a word as compared to its written version, for any number of cases where both are presented, when they are not the same. The dispute upholds both, truth be told. One example: How many walls are required for a kosher sukkah - based on the written/read word in the Torah. Also, which wins? It seems that pronunciation always does, so the Gemara explores if that is accurate.

On why the mishnah needs to include damages and half-damages in its list (about how many judges for this kind of case). Also, a dispute about whether the number of judges really needs to be odd. Also, Rabbi Yehudah HaNasi's position that 5 judges are needed, not 3! Perhaps 3 judges on the side of the verdict? Which means 5 to make the majority... (except that is rejected too, because how can it possibly always mean that X number of judges agree to the final verdict?). Plus, more on the word for God in His attribute of justice and that for judges (Elokim/elohim). But why do the sages disagree with Rabbi Yehudah HaNasi's 5? The difference between how the Torah is written and how it is read, for select terms.

Beginning Sanhedrin! With an introduction to the court system, as initially instituted, in some measure, in the Torah. And the first mishnah -- this time, all of the mishnah of the chapter, printed together at its beginning. First and foremost, determining the number of judges needed for each case of damages, in "monetary law" (dini mamanot) - 3, and then for capital cases (dini nefashot) - 23. Plus, how do we know the number of judges for the courts? That is, which verses from the Torah?). Also, the Gemara opens with an evaluation as to why the mishnah specifies certain of the basic monetary issues, and not include them in a more general umbrella presentation of monetary issues.

In the case of one who wrote an IOU document in his own handwriting, without witnesses, then the collection can only take place from unencumbered property -- even if that same IOU was later ratified in court. A bill of divorce is brought in the attempt to argue that such a document should function as a complete IOU and be able to collect from property that has a lien on it. Though the Gemara highlights the differences in the cases instead of accepting the argument. Also, in the case of needing the collect (and pay back) the guarantor... to avoid being strangled. With praise going to one sage, even though the halakhic decision is not according to him -- because the process of halakhic thinking is part of what is needed.

Returning to the person on his deathbed -- what about liability incurred by a person in these circumstances? What are the implications of his status for how the funds/property can be collected? Note that the witness factor is significantly diminished because of that deathbed status. Also, a new mishnah! (the last mishnah of the tractate) One who lends via a document can collect from "encumbered property" - that which has a lien on it. And again, what is the role of the guarantor? Plus, the value of studying these laws of property, in accord with Torah requirements. Also, the Gemara's analysis of when the loan can be paid back from encumbered property and when not -- it's a machloket! Between Ullah and Rabbah with regard to which approach is the Torah law. Plus, the exceptions made are done so out of concern for, on the one hand, the customers, and on the other, the borrowers.