In capital cases, one arguing for conviction can change and argue for acquittal, but not the reverse - if it's before the time of handing down the verdict. But how does this presentation line up with other comparable sources? It seems that judges cannot reverse a decision to acquit. Also, judging a case in day and at night - where monetary cases are begun in the day time. How far is that taken? What can be done at night? Plus, parallels between the assessment of possible tzara'at and court cases. Including the rule against blind judges. So how could there be a blind judge?

Returning to distinctions between monetary cases being tried and capital cases being tried -- what is the procedure for handling new evidence? The mishnah here is contradicted by a mishnah in Bekhorot -- where, here, in Sanhedrin, the case is retried, fundamentally, while in the other mishnah, the judge is responsible for the error. Why so? Also, reversing capital cases -- in the event of conviction, but not acquittal (that judgement stands). With exploration of various potential reversals, using various verses to illustrate the viability or impossibility of following through on a reversed decision to convict. Plus, the Sadducees and when the need to overturn a case was obvious even to to this sect.

Chapter 4! Beginning with a cluster of mishnayot -- comparing monetary cases with capital cases. For example - the number of judges, opening arguments, the extent to which are witnesses grilled, the majority for "conviction," the handling of new witnesses, evidence and reversals, and more. Also, delving into the need for investigation and interrogation of witnesses, which leads into the treatment of justice in biblical verses, including several interpretation of "tzedek, tzedek tirdof." Plus, the examples of boats that need to pass each other, or camels -- and the nature of compromise.

A new mishnah! With the dispute over when and how a verdict in the property court can be overturned, with new evidence -- or testimony. Also, forming a court for the sake of establishing the litigation - shouldn't it be done where the litigants are? Don't the costs of travel mitigate against the value of traveling to the specific court? Some flexibility is necessary. Plus, the parties sometimes need to bring their litigation to certain courts - depending on the circumstances and the dispute.

When one who borrowed money admitted that he did so - in less formal circumstances than a court, for example, where the claim is that he has set the money aside because he owes it to so-and-so -- that isn't a legal admission. The Gemara provides a general principle when such an admission would count. Also, we follow Rabbi Yehoshua ben Karcha or an admission with regard to land, but not for movable property. [Who's Who? Rabbi Yehoshua ben Karcha] His opinion is also applied for first-born animals which have been blemished and therefore incur a monetary loss. And signs of physical maturity. That is, testimony from 2 witnesses can be combined. But what is the question here, and how was it implemented?

A new mishnah! How the courtroom works - welcoming the witnesses with some scare tactics to make sure that they testify honestly. Note that witnesses are supposed to be designated as such. The judges weigh in, and the proceeding details exactly what needs to happen to rule innocent or guilty -- though each judge is anonymous with regard to the public of the case itself. Plus, the role of an "instigator" -- one who brings another party to do wrong. In the case of an instigator, the court doesn't need to seek out his innocence (as compared to other cases), as derived from the snake in the Garden of Eden. Also, in the event that a debtor admits to his debt before witnesses - that plus a formal act of acquisition means they can write an accord of his debt and that's so much stronger than testimony. And before 3 witnesses - the question is whether they become a court, with or without the formal act of acquisition and whether they can write that account.

Relationship and relationship charts are the essence of most of this daf. What relationships disqualify relatives from testifying against or about a relative? Note that these are all men - as witnesses, though some of the relationships include in-law status via women. And note that these are not the same relationships as the prohibited marriage/yevamot relationships. Also, a "lid on a barrel" - the mechutanim (fathers of bride and groom) can testify against each other. But can a man testify against or about his betrothed? Is that too close of a relationship? But he wouldn't be in deep mourning for her if she died (nor she for him).

A machloket between Abaye and Rava with regard to conspiring witnesses -- whether such a witness is disqualified from that moment onward, or also retroactively for any previous testimony. Note also that this is one of the rare (6) cases where the Halakhah follows Abaye instead of Rava. Also, the disqualifications based on close family relationships. Plus, another version of the list -- Rabbi Akiva's simpler list, which is not used as such. Plus, love and hate may disqualify, just on the strength of those emotions, it would seem. Until the Gemara posits that the Jewish people would not stoop to that kind of bias.

More on the disqualified: First, people who use sabbatical produce as merchandise, during a year where the intercalation is done outside of the land of Israel, which itself is unusual. Kohanim were spotted working the land and produce in various ways - and the Gemara attempts to give them excuses that don't involve violating the shemitah rules. But all that produce could be converted to terumah. Does that mean that kohanim are willing to mess with the laws of the sabbatical produce? Plus, a tussle between Rabbi Yochanan and Resh Lakish... again. Also, the Gemara on a "cluster of wicked people" -- as represented by Shevnah, who was a leader in the court of King Hezekiah, and how God does not heed them over the righteous people. Plus, archaeology that may indeed support some of Shevnah's purported activities.

More on the disqualifying practices - in this case, lending with interest and flying pigeons. With discussion as to whether both borrower and lender are suspect, and whether one can ever be fully rehabilitated. And with discussion as to whether the pigeons are a matter of gambling or theft.