A dispute between Abaye and Rava, whether a betrothal works if there's no consummation with sexual intercourse. Plus, how is this impacted by an attempt betrothal of two woman who can't be "co-wives" to begin with. Also, explaining the rationale of both Abaye and Rava, including complicated cases of betrothal to support the rational of each.

If you think your positions in your mind without articulating them, then they don't count, even when it's a positive commitment. Also, 4 new mishnayot: betrothal via shaliach with conditions, like the location of betrothal. What if she has "vows," for example, as a lien, etc. She needed to be forthcoming monetarily. She needed to divulge any relevant details... or blemishes might be grounds for divorce (not as blemishes, but as undisclosed information). Plus, betrothal with less than the value of a perutah. Likewise, kiddushin for 2 women who are related in such a way as to prohibit kiddushin, via figs, plus they were shemitah produce.

A conditional kiddushin - where a statement is made as a prerequisite to the betrothal. With implications for lineage status (yuchasin). Plus, a rich man who claims to be poor and vice versa. Also, 10 measures of all kinds of things that were given to the world, where specific countries or entities got 9 of those measures (beautiful Jerusalem, for example). Plus, a mishnah, continuing the discussion of conditional betrothals, where the conditions are not met and the betrothals do not take effect.

A dispute on the question of whether kiddushin works via a loan, on an oral agreement. Plus, transferring the right if collection. Also, betrothal with a document - when does it work, and when not? All via beraitot trying to understand Rav's opinion on betrothal. Also, a new mishnah: a man who betroths a woman with a cup of wine, but it turns out to be honey, or other cases of mistaken identity, as it were - that betrothal does not take effect.

Betrothing with a loan does not work - but why not? What is the rationale for the mechanism not bringing about kiddushin? Perhaps the loan itself is never really considered owned by the borrower who would use it for kiddushin. Plus, how she feels about the sum total of the betrothal and the need to scrounge for it can have impact on whether the kiddushin takes effect. Also, Rav's view on the loan not working for betrothal. Plus, a disagreement over a loan that has not yet been spent. If it hasn't been, the lender can recall the loan. But is that really acceptable?

A new mishnah: a betrothal via a date (the fruit). But is it worth a perutah? Can the value of the individual dates accrue? What if she eats them as he gives them to her? How are we to make sense of this mishnah? Also, a gift to a sister is obviously collateral, a deposit. Why would he say "kiddushin" (in this case)? How did the sanctity of a kohen's food make a difference? What about the challah that is given as flour? How complicated can that flour be whether it's challah or not? Won't it get mixed up? What does the kohen know about whether he can separate the challah from that new dough? Doesn't everyone need to pay attention to these details?

A couple of cases of betrothing a daughter - with a cup of wine, with a package of vegetables in the marketplace. And who's doing the betrothing? The father of the daughter to the father of a son is a complicated question. And the marketplace complicates matters because it (or the vegetables themselves) may be lacking in respect. Plus, when the mother and father of the daughter each want their daughter betrothed to a relative of each respective side. Also, terumah! Namely, how the minor might be allowed to continue eating terumah, or not. Specifically, if a minor accepts kiddushin without her father's knowledge. What are the implications to the betrothal? With a dispute over the meaning of the father's silence (or lack of protest) at the immediate timing.

On the case of a father betrothing his daughter - a series of disputes on how this works. Which leads into a "reality" story account of the yelling in the beit midrash. Also, what about a minor who accepts kiddushin, not her father's doing? Plus, the complicated case of bringing a case before Shmuel and then Rav - when the get is needed, plus mi'un, where the action (or marriage, or betrothal) can be rejected.

More on the topic of sending an agent to do a sin - in this case, specifically, murder. With parallels to King David, in his efforts to hide his affair with Batsheva. Also, can a shaliach (agent) be a witness? Some key disputes flesh out the concerns.

How do we know shelichut (appointing an agent) works, with some pushback as to whether it should work at all. Plus, the idea of benefitting another person, and whether action taken on another's behalf is necessarily shelichut. Also, who is responsible for damages in the process of shelichut - the agent or the one who appoints an agent? Note the important principle that there's no agent for a sin, because the agent himself needs to heed God's instructions over and above those of the person who would appoint the shaliach.